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INTRODUCTION1
BY BARTOSZ MAĆKOWIAK, ECB
FRANCESCO PAOLO MONGELLI, ECB
GILLES NOBLET, ECB
FRANK SMETS, ECB
The European Central Bank was established on 1 June 1998. It began operating 
the single monetary policy the day on which the euro came into existence, 
1 January 1999. The Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference took place in 
November 2008, a few months after the tenth anniversary of the establishment 
of the ECB, and a few weeks before the tenth anniversary of the launch of 
the euro. Not surprisingly, four out of six sessions of the conference focused 
on the challenges of and the lessons from the first decade of EMU. Charles 
Wyplosz (Graduate Institute of International Studies) presented a paper, written 
jointly with Francesco Paolo Mongelli (ECB), assessing the evolution of main 
macroeconomic variables in the first decade of EMU. Philip Lane (Trinity College 
Dublin) and José Luis Peydrό Alcalde (ECB) presented papers evaluating the 
evolution of financial markets in the first decade of EMU. Peydrό’s presentation 
was based on the joint paper with Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan (University of 
Houston), Simone Manganelli (ECB), and Elias Papaioannou (Dartmouth 
College). Two panels focused on the tenth anniversary of the euro. The panel 
chaired by Francesco Giavazzi (Università Bocconi) and comprising Erik 
Berglöf (EBRD), Vítor Gaspar (European Commission), Athanasios Orphanides 
(Central Bank of Cyprus), and András Simor (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) discussed 
enlargement of the euro area, in the past and in the future. The theory of optimal 
currency areas was the topic of the panel chaired by Wolfgang Schill (ECB) and 
comprising Martin Feldstein (Harvard University), Andrew Rose (University of 
California at Berkeley), André Sapir (Université Libre de Bruxelles), and Jaume 
Ventura (CREI).
2008 turned out to be not only the year of the tenth anniversary of the ECB, 
but also the year in which a global financial crisis unfolded. Therefore, the 
other two sessions of the conference focused on the global financial crisis. 
Raghuram Rajan (University of Chicago) presented a paper, written together with 
Anil Kashyap (University of Chicago) and Jeremy Stein (Harvard University), 
in which the authors discuss the roots of the global financial crisis and put forth 
a proposal for regulatory reform meant to prevent a future financial crisis from 
escalating. A stimulating exchange of views led by the paper’s discussants 
followed Rajan’s presentation. At the end of the conference the panel chaired 
by Lucrezia Reichlin (London Business School) and comprising several central 
bankers (Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve; Stanley Fischer, Bank of Israel; 
Su Ning, People’s Bank of China; Guillermo Ortiz, Banco de México; and 
Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB) discussed international interdependency in the 
1  We would like to thank all participants in the 5th ECB Central Banking Conference, and all those 
who helped organise this conference. Furthermore, we wish to thank Werner Breun, Susanne 
Buchinger, Patricia Kearns-Endres and Maria Mileva for their help in editing this volume.7 INTRODUCTION
conduct of monetary policy, especially during the current crisis. The tenth 
anniversary of the euro and the global financial crisis intertwined in the speeches 
delivered at the conference by the ECB Board members: in the opening address 
by Lucas Papademos, in the keynote speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, and in the 
closing address by Jürgen Stark.
This volume contains the papers presented at the Fifth ECB Central Banking 
Conference as well as the discussions and the speeches. As the volume’s editors, 
we believe that the texts published here contain a rich combination of materials. 
The reader will find in this volume a documentation of what has actually 
happened in the first decade of EMU, surveys of EMU related literature, but also 
new empirical studies concerning EMU. Moreover, the volume gives a snapshot 
of what renowned economists and leading central bankers thought in November 
2008 about the global financial crisis, about EMU, and about which ideas appear 
most promising for future research in macroeconomics and financial economics. 
In the rest of this Introduction, we would like to summarise the contributions to 
this volume.
The main message of the paper by Mongelli and Wyplosz is that the essentials of 
a monetary union have gone well in the first decade of the euro, perhaps as well 
as anyone could have hoped ten years ago. Inflation in the euro area has been 
low and stable. Low inflation, low inflation expectations, and, in general, low 
macroeconomic variability have supported trade in goods and services, financial 
integration, risk-sharing, and efficiency. The dispersion of inflation rates across 
the euro area countries is now comparable to the dispersion of inflation rates 
across regions of the United States. The convergence of inflation rates has been 
achieved despite not fully synchronised fiscal policies, not fully integrated labour 
markets, the diversity of initial conditions, and despite the Balassa-Samuelson 
effects due to the catching up of some countries.
Mongelli and Wyplosz discuss three concerns that were popular among sceptics 
prior to the launch of the euro. The threats identified by the sceptics at that time 
have remained unfulfilled. The ECB quickly gained credibility, without having 
to resort to repeated interest rate hikes or intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. Furthermore, national fiscal policies have largely avoided pro-cyclicality, 
which could have exacerbated the differences in economic outcomes among the 
euro area countries. It is difficult to determine to what extent the observed fiscal 
outcomes are due to the existence of the Stability and Growth Pact. Finally, there 
appears to be no evidence of divergent real interest rates among the euro area 
countries, as one could have feared based on the Walters critique.
While the expected risks failed to materialize, unexpected challenges arose in the 
first decade of EMU. One challenge has been the emergence of current account 
imbalances, in both directions, in some member countries of the euro area. 
Financial integration has made it possible to borrow and lend on a large scale 
worldwide. Within the euro area, this process has been accelerated by the absence 
of exchange rate risk. The current account imbalances have been accompanied by 
persistent changes in real exchange rates between member countries of the euro 
area. Another challenge is discussed in the section of the paper reflecting only 8 MAĆKOWIAK, MONGELLI, NOBLET, SMETS
the views of Charles Wyplosz. Wyplosz points to data from the ECB’s survey 
of professional forecasters showing that the proportion of forecasters who expect 
inflation to be between zero and two percent has fallen gradually since 1999. The 
conclusion Wyplosz draws from this development is that there could be a need 
for improvement in the communication strategy of the ECB.
The paper by Lane and the paper by Kalemli-Ozcan, Manganelli, Papaioannou, 
and Peydrό Alcalde survey the evolution of financial markets in the first decade 
of EMU. The two surveys are complementary and, in our judgment, can be a 
starting point for anyone interested in what happened in the financial markets in 
the euro area between 1999 and 2008. The main message of both surveys is that 
a substantial increase in the degree of financial integration between euro area 
countries has been taking place. Within-euro-area cross-border holdings of debt 
and equity have risen remarkably. On the other hand, retail banking and lending to 
non-bank entities remaing largely in the national domain. This asymmetric pace 
of integration suggests a need for removing the remaining barriers to competition 
and to trade in financial services within the European Union. Integrated financial 
markets help insure against country-specific shocks: Countries can then maintain 
a stable path of consumption in the face of idiosyncratic fluctuations in income. 
As a result, the cost of not having country-specific monetary policy decreases and 
the net benefits of the monetary union rise.
Both papers review the empirical research suggesting that at least some of the 
increase in the degree of financial integration within the euro area would not 
have happened without the euro. In particular, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. refer to the 
recent empirical work on banking integration by Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, 
and Peydrό. This analysis suggests that cross-border banking activity between the 
euro area countries increased by about 40 percent compared to a control group 
consisting of otherwise similar countries not in EMU.
Lane reviews the recent empirical literature on the effects of financial integration 
within EMU on macroeconomic volatility. In this literature, the main question 
is whether the increase in the degree of financial integration in the first decade 
of EMU has allowed more sharing of country-specific consumption risks. The 
lessons from this literature are still unclear, Lane concludes. One interpretation is 
that too little time has passed since the launch of the euro for an econometrician 
to be able to detect an increase in the sharing of country-specific consumption 
risks in the euro area. On the other hand, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. present new 
econometric evidence to suggest that greater banking integration has indeed led 
to more sharing of country-specific consumption risks. Using banking integration 
data for twenty developed countries over the past thirty years, Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al. find that a country with larger external assets experiences less consumption 
volatility. The authors quantify the degree of international risk sharing due 
to greater banking integration. They find that 38 percent of country-specific 
consumption risk is diversified away, on average across the twenty developed 
countries in the sample, through cross-border bank activity. Furthermore, 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. find that a country that doubles its external assets, relative 
to population, diversifies away an additional 17 percent of country-specific 
consumption risk. Why do Kalemli-Ozcan et al. find that financial integration 9 INTRODUCTION
allows more sharing of country-specific consumption risks, while other studies – 
including those surveyed by Lane – fail to obtain this finding? A plausible 
explanation has to do with the unique nature of the dataset used by Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. Their dataset is detailed and it covers more countries and more years 
than the datasets of others.
The paper by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein discusses the causes of, and the lessons 
from, the current financial crisis. The authors argue that the roots of the crisis lie 
in the global macroeconomic environment of the last several years. An important 
difference between the most recent period of sustained growth and previous 
such periods is the low level of long-term real interest rates over the last several 
years. After the emerging market crises in the late 1990s and the bursting of 
the information technology bubble in 2001, saving grew to very high levels 
in emerging markets (particularly in Asia) while, at the same time, corporate 
investment and public investment declined in many countries. Excess savings 
were channelled toward residential investment, and this process led to an increase 
in housing prices. Furthermore, demand arose among financial institutions such 
as pension funds and insurance companies for assets that would simultaneously 
appear safe and offer a real return higher than the long-term interest rate. Other 
financial institutions, mainly based in the United States, managed to satisfy this 
demand. They did so by transforming sub-prime mortgages into securities with 
AAA ratings, acceptable to pension funds, insurance companies, and banks 
throughout the world.
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein argue that banks are being hit especially hard by the 
global financial crisis, because the problem of governance and the problem of 
short-term leverage are especially serious in banks. Importantly, the two problems 
interact: Agency problems between outside investors and bank managers are the 
reason why banks rely on short-term debt. Furthermore, the authors argue that 
it is difficult to solve the problem of governance and, therefore, to wean banks 
from leverage. Direct regulatory interventions, such as mandating more capital, 
may simply exacerbate private sector attempts to get around regulation. Direct 
regulatory interventions may also damage financial intermediation, and thereby 
decrease economic growth.
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein advocate a specific reform of bank capital structure, 
capital insurance, meant to prevent a future financial crisis from escalating. In 
a nutshell, capital insurance would work as follows. A bank with $500 billion 
in risk-weighted assets would be given the following choice by regulators: It 
could either accept an upfront capital requirement that is, for example, 2 percent 
higher, meaning that the bank would have to raise $10 billion in new equity. 
Or the bank could acquire an insurance policy that pays off $10 billion in the 
event of a systemic “event”. The insurer, a pension fund or a sovereign wealth 
fund, would at inception put $10 billion in Treasuries into a custodial account. 
If no adverse event occurs over the life of the policy, the $10 billion would be 
returned to the insurer, together with the insurance premium from the bank and 
the interest paid by the Treasuries. If there is an event, the $10 billion would be 
transferred to the balance sheet of the insured bank. Capital insurance is meant 
by the authors as a complement to other possible regulatory reform measures. 10 MAĆKOWIAK, MONGELLI, NOBLET, SMETS
The paper’s discussants, Stephen G. Cecchetti (BIS) and Seppo Honkapohja 
(Bank of Finland), welcome the idea of capital insurance. However, both 
discussants raise questions concerning specific aspects of the proposal.
The contribution by Giavazzi serves as an introduction to the panel on enlargement 
of the euro area. Giavazzi formulates several questions that he believes are 
important in thinking about enlargement: Should the EMU entry criteria be 
modified to include a measure of the health of the banking system? How should 
policy react to large capital inflows? Does enlargement strengthen the case for 
centralized euro area banking supervision? What is the optimal monetary policy 
regime in the transition to EMU, an exchange rate peg or inflation targeting with 
a flexible exchange rate? Berglöf, the first of the four panellists, emphasizes 
that those interested in enlargement can learn a great deal from the current 
crisis. He argues that the euro can be a mechanism to prevent a financial crisis 
from escalating. Furthermore, a commitment to joining the euro area can speed 
up institutional reform.2 The second panellist, Gaspar, describes enlargement – 
not just of the euro area, but of the European Union in general – as a success. 
Enlargement spreads prosperity and democracy across Europe, he argues. Gaspar 
believes that it is a bad idea to speculate about modifying the EMU entry criteria. 
Such speculation can only increase the uncertainty associated with the transition 
to EMU. He offers a number of principles to guide policy-makers during this 
transition. The other two panellists, Orphanides and Simor, both central bank 
governors, describe the recent experiences of Cyprus and Hungary, respectively. 
According to Orphanides, the optimal mix of monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy during the transition to EMU is country-specific. Furthermore, Orphanides 
believes that it is important for prospective EMU entrants to achieve sufficient 
real and nominal convergence with the euro area before joining the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism. Simor’s contribution focuses on the optimal timing to join 
EMU. From the recent turmoil in his country, Simor draws the lesson that a 
country should not try to join the euro area before implementing structural reform 
to scale back the overly generous welfare state.
Introducing the panel on the theory of optimal currency areas, Schill asks the 
panellists to re-evaluate this theory from the viewpoint of 2008, after ten years of 
EMU. The first panellist, Feldstein, describes the euro as a success. He stresses 
that continuous fiscal responsibility of the euro area countries is necessary to 
make the success of EMU permanent. According to Feldstein, some fiscal rule 
of the type embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact is a prerequisite for a 
successful currency union. More generally, what is required is the willingness 
of each member of the currency union to accept, at times, short-term losses in 
exchange for long-term gains.
The second panellist, Rose, reviews the recent literature linking monetary union, 
international trade, and business cycle synchronisation. He surveys this literature 
using the quantitative technique of meta-analysis, which allows him to estimate 
the effects of EMU taking into account the entire extant empirical literature. 
Twenty-six recent studies have investigated the effects of the introduction of 
2  The text of Erik Berglöf ’s panel intervention could not be included in this volume.11 INTRODUCTION
the euro on trade (i.e., using European data only). Taking all these studies into 
account, Rose finds that EMU has raised trade inside the euro area by at least 
eight percent, and perhaps by as much as twenty-three percent. Twenty different 
studies have estimated the effect of trade on the synchronisation of business 
cycles. Aggregating across these studies estimates, Rose finds that an increase of 
bilateral trade between two countries raises the synchronisation of their business 
cycles by an economically and statistically significant effect. He estimates that 
a one percent increase in bilateral trade increases the correlation coefficient of 
de-trended output by 0.02. Rose concludes that EMU has created a virtuous 
circle. By increasing trade and the synchronisation of business cycles, EMU has 
reduced the need for national monetary policies.
In his panel contribution, Sapir observes that the authors of the Maastricht treaty 
chose different criteria for joining EMU than those emphasized by the theory 
of optimum currency areas. Sapir argues that the reasons for this choice were 
threefold. A large fraction of asymmetric shocks prior to monetary integration in 
Europe were considered to be national monetary policy shocks. National monetary 
policy shocks would automatically disappear in a monetary union. Furthermore, 
the launch of the euro was expected to create an optimum currency area 
endogenously, by fostering economic integration. Finally, national fiscal policies 
were seen as potential absorbers of asymmetric shocks. According to Sapir, the 
viewpoint that the criteria emphasized by the theory of optimum currency areas 
are unimportant is being challenged today. In the face of the global financial 
crisis, the “core” countries such as Germany, France, the Benelux, and Austria 
are doing better than the “periphery” countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain. The core countries are precisely those that would have qualified for 
EMU ten years ago based on the criteria emphasized by the theory of optimum 
currency areas; the periphery countries would not have qualified.
Ventura begins his panel contribution with sceptical remarks concerning whether 
the theory of optimum currency areas is of practical relevance in today’s world. 
He goes on to argue that economists need to develop a new theory of why 
international cooperation in monetary policy, a monetary union in particular, can 
be optimal. He observes that, in a set of interdependent economies, lending of last 
resort entails externalities. A monetary union can be modelled as an institution 
that allows internalization of these externalities.
The contributions to the panel of central bankers discuss international 
interdependency in the conduct of monetary policy, especially during the current 
crisis. Chairman Bernanke emphasizes the importance of cooperation among 
central banks. He notes that unprecedented cooperation among central banks 
of sovereign nations took place in the run-up to the establishment of EMU and 
is taking place continuously within EMU. He goes on to argue that the global 
financial crisis has been an occasion for unprecedented policy coordination 
among central banks globally. The same theme returns in President Trichet’s 
panel contribution. Trichet emphasizes that international coordination can help 
strengthen domestic objectives of monetary policy. International cooperation is 
likely to be particularly beneficial at a time of a global financial crisis, such as 
the current one, or at a time when uncertainty prevails in global financial markets, 12 MAĆKOWIAK, MONGELLI, NOBLET, SMETS
such as after 11 September 2001. In the words of Trichet, central banks have 
established “intimate confidence” and they have “built a remarkable common 
ground of shared experience, mutual understanding, and trust (…). The world can 
count on a continuation of this fruitful cooperation among central banks (…).” 
In his panel contribution, Governor Ortiz agrees with Trichet that international 
cooperation in monetary policy, while apparently less important in “normal 
times”, becomes crucial at a time of a global crisis. Ortiz believes that the global 
financial crisis is showing the need for improving institutional arrangements for 
international cooperation in monetary affairs.
Governor Fischer’s panel contribution focuses on the question whether the 
recent increase in global financial integration has moved, or should be moving, 
the desirable monetary policy regime of a small open economy, such as Israel, 
in any particular direction. Fisher’s answer to this question in the case of Israel 
is a qualified yes. He believes that policy-makers in a small open economy face 
the choice between a pegged exchange rate regime, joining a monetary union 
being a special case, and a regime of flexible inflation targeting with a flexible 
exchange rate. If the latter option is chosen, policy-makers must recognize that 
the real exchange rate matters for monetary policy in a small open economy, and 
that having a flexible exchange rate does not necessarily imply that the exchange 
rate is totally free floating.
The panel contribution by Governor Su has two themes. Su describes the 
People’s Bank of China’s view of how the challenges from globalisation affect 
China and China’s monetary policy. Furthermore, he discusses how the People’s 
Bank of China and the government of China have responded to the challenges 
from globalisation, in particular to the challenges associated with the current 
financial crisis.
We would like to conclude the Introduction with a brief summary of the speeches 
delivered at the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference by the ECB policy-
makers. The text of each speech is included in the volume. The opening address 
by Vice-President Papademos has two parts. The first part contains reflections on 
the economic performance of euro area in the first decade of its existence and on 
the policy challenges faced by the ECB in that period. The second part is devoted 
to the lessons for central banks from the global financial crisis. The reader may 
want to pay particular attention to the discussion of benefits and costs of central 
banks “leaning against the wind”.
The keynote speech of the conference, by President Trichet, discusses the sources 
of, and the lessons from, the global financial crisis, both for monetary policy and 
for regulation of financial institutions. In addition, Trichet outlines the policy 
response of the ECB to the crisis, in particular the policy response in cooperation 
with other central banks.
In the closing address of the conference the Executive Board Member Stark 
emphasises that the first decade of EMU has not been calm: The ECB had to 
confront the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the bursting of the dot-com bubble, 
the attack of 11 September 2001, and the recent sharp rise in commodity prices. 13 INTRODUCTION
The ECB has done well in those rough times. However, the magnitude and the 
global nature of the current crisis pose an unprecedented challenge to the ECB 
and to EMU. Stark believes that the ECB and EMU will meet also this challenge, 
and he speaks about the core principles which will help, in his view: the focus 
of the ECB on price stability in the medium-term and ECB’s independence. 
Stark’s speech also addresses enlargement of the euro. EMU membership has 
helped countries protect macroeconomic stability in the face of the global 
financial crisis. Therefore, it is not surprising that many countries would like 
to join the euro area on a fast-track procedure. However, Stark emphasizes that 
“there is no shortcut”. The fast introduction of the euro would not resolve the 
underlying structural problems of the candidate countries and moreover, could 
weaken EMU. Structural adjustments as well as real and nominal convergence 
are necessary before the adoption of the euro.14
Lucas Papademos opening the 5th ECB Central Banking Conference15
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OPENING ADDRESS
BY LUCAS PAPADEMOS, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ECB
1 INTRODUCTION
On behalf of the Executive Board, I would like to welcome you to the Fifth 
ECB Central Banking Conference, taking place in the tenth year of the ECB’s 
establishment. We are delighted that this year’s conference has attracted 
many distinguished participants from academia, central banks, governments, 
international institutions and the financial sector. Your contributions will ensure 
that this conference will provide insightful and thought-provoking analysis and 
generate debate on many policy issues of relevance to central banking.
As we will be celebrating the 10th anniversary of the introduction of the single 
European currency in a few weeks’ time, the theme of this conference is, of 
course, focused on “The Euro at ten: lessons and challenges”. The introduction of 
the euro was a historic milestone in the process of European monetary, economic 
and political integration, with wide-ranging implications for the European and 
global economies. Accordingly, this conference will concentrate on several issues 
of relevance to the performance of the euro area economy and financial system 
and on the challenges for the conduct of monetary policy and the performance of 
other central banking tasks in an increasingly integrated global economy.
2  THE EURO: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES
The first session will examine the macroeconomic performance of Economic 
and Monetary Union, its achievements and challenges, over the past ten years. 
There are several key questions to be addressed. First, has the euro and the single 
monetary policy established a zone of monetary stability as envisaged, with all 
the direct and indirect benefits this entails for the 320 million citizens of the 
euro area? The evidence unambiguously provides a positive answer. The euro 
has been a resounding success: it has established itself as a stable and credible 
currency, which has become the second most important currency in the world 
after the US dollar. A deeper analysis, however, should reveal the contribution of 
monetary policy, and of other factors, to this achievement and the challenges that 
lie ahead and must be effectively addressed in order to ensure the preservation of 
price stability in the years to come. 
A second key question is whether – or to what extent – the euro has contributed 
to boosting the trend growth of the euro area economy by strengthening 
competition, enhancing market efficiency, raising productivity growth and 
increasing labour utilisation. The answer to this question if less straightforward 
and the evidence seems, at first sight, to be rather mixed. On the one hand, 17 OPENING ADDRESS
average annual economic growth in the euro area has remained virtually the same 
(2.18%) over the ten years following the introduction of the euro (1999-2007) 
as in the two preceding decades (2.14% (1990-1999) and 2.27% (1980-1989)). 
On the other hand, employment grew impressively, namely by 18.67 million, or 
1.36% per annum, over the past ten years, compared with 5.99 million, or 0.49% 
per annum, in the previous decade. A deeper analysis could reveal how the euro 
has contributed to strengthening the performance of the real economy, but also 
how other factors constrained and partly offset its positive impact, and it will also 
point to important challenges ahead, parts of which stem from the divergences 
in the performance in terms of growth and competitiveness across the member 
countries in the euro area. We are looking forward to the paper by Wyplosz and 
Mongelli, and to the discussion that will follow, for answers to these and other 
relevant questions.
Another important set of issues, which will be addressed in the second session, 
concerns the role of the euro in fostering the integration of financial markets in 
Europe and in promoting the efficiency and stability of the European financial 
system – and through it – of the broader economy in the euro area. Assessing 
the impact of the euro on the integration, efficiency and stability of the European 
financial system requires careful analysis in order to disentangle its contribution 
from the influence of other factors that have simultaneously affected the 
development and functioning of the financial system.
Indeed, the globalisation of financial markets and institutions, which was 
fostered by financial innovation and technological advances, has played a key 
role in shaping the overall environment and influencing the processes that 
determine financial market efficiency and stability. Moreover, the increasing 
interconnectedness and interdependence of our economies and financial systems 
have important implications both for the conduct of monetary policy and for 
the performance of the central banking task of safeguarding financial stability. 
These implications – and there are many – will be examined and assessed 
in the third session on the basis of the paper by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 
and in the concluding policy panel. And, in between, two other panels will 
address – from both an analytic and a policy point of view – other important 
challenges confronting the euro area, in particular those stemming from its future 
enlargement and its evolution towards an optimal currency area.
3  THE ONGOING FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 
FOR CENTRAL BANKS
Over the past ten years, the ECB has performed its tasks in an often difficult 
economic and financial environment that was adversely affected by sizeable 
and persistent shocks; and it has had to face some extraordinary challenges. 
The first was the unique, historically unprecedented challenge of conducting the 
single monetary policy successfully so as to preserve price stability in a newly 
established monetary union of politically independent, though economically 
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is the one we are still facing today: the preservation of price stability and the 
safeguarding of financial stability in the euro area during the worst financial 
crisis in decades. 
The ongoing financial crisis which is, in many respects, unprecedented 
in intensity, scope and complexity has highlighted the role of the ECB in 
safeguarding financial stability. The events of the past year allow us to draw 
a number of conclusions concerning the responsibilities and actions of central 
banks in general, and of the ECB in particular, in contributing to preserving 
price stability through both crisis management and crisis prevention. And they 
have also shown how the conduct of a monetary policy aimed at the preservation 
of price stability and the performance of tasks aimed at safeguarding financial 
stability require the appropriate use of available policy instruments. Let me 
briefly elaborate on a number of pertinent lessons learnt and on the challenges 
to be faced.
It is by now widely accepted that a main underlying cause of the current global 
financial crisis was the same one that had fuelled similar episodes in earlier 
times: the excessive growth of credit globally over a long period of time and 
the associated high leverage in the financial system and in the non-financial 
sectors of some countries. Central banks, through their monitoring and analysis 
of monetary and credit developments, can provide early warning signals about 
the building-up of financial imbalances that may lead to excesses in the financial 
markets – through various channels involving an under-pricing of risk and an 
increase in market liquidity that can fuel asset price bubbles which will eventually 
be followed by market corrections. And such corrections will be the more severe, 
the higher the degree of leverage and the more prolonged the period of excessive 
credit growth. There is substantial empirical evidence across countries and over 
different periods in support of this proposition. The ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy, which includes a comprehensive analysis of developments in money 
and credit, is well-suited to provide useful information about monetary risks to 
financial stability that can have longer-term implications for price stability and 
output volatility.
A second related policy issue is whether – or to what extent – central banks 
should “lean against the wind” of financial market excesses that can be expected 
to turn into a financial storm and whether they can do this both in a manner that 
is consistent with the preservation of price stability and by effectively using the 
single policy instrument at their disposal, the interest rate. In principle, this can 
be done, and should be done, under certain circumstances. This would require the 
monetary policy stance to be tightened in periods of booming financial markets, 
so as to contain the risk of instability to the price level over a longer-term horizon 
(when the boom could turn into a bust); in other words, in order to buy insurance 
against the risk of a financial crisis in which financial intermediation could grind 
to a halt. Such a policy could also help address the problem of moral hazard that 
may be created by policies that aim only to mitigate the impact of adverse shocks 
to financial stability, and thus treat asset booms and busts asymmetrically. In 
practice, however, a policy of “leaning against the wind” is not always feasible; 
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bubbles in the presence of exuberant expectations and it may not be compatible 
with the maintenance of price stability over the medium term.1
Consequently, the single instrument of monetary policy – the central bank 
interest rate – cannot always be used, cannot be used systematically, to 
simultaneously achieve the price stability objective (over the medium and longer 
term) and effectively safeguard financial stability. Clearly, additional tools must 
be employed to this end. Central banks can further strengthen their analytical 
tools and methodologies that can help identify risks and vulnerabilities in the 
financial system and provide early warning signals of emerging imbalances and 
potential instabilities. And central banks – via their financial stability reviews 
and other means – have done so fairly successfully. But the recent experience 
has also shown that, despite the communication of such early warnings, the 
financial markets did not hear, or did not want to hear them for several reasons, 
including the influence of inappropriate incentive structures at different stages of 
the financial intermediation and securitisation chain. What is, therefore, needed is 
a more effective use of regulatory policy instruments by supervisory authorities 
that can help contain procyclicality in risk assessment and the increase in leverage 
that is characteristic of asset market booms. Pre-provisioning measures during 
the upswing phase of the cycle and more effective and longer-term oriented risk 
management can contribute to this end.
More generally, and this a third important lesson learnt from the ongoing financial 
crisis, the effective safeguarding of financial stability – both in preventing and 
in managing a financial crisis – requires parallel and complementary action by 
central banks and supervisors, and an enhanced cooperation and exchange of 
information between them. It is evident that this can be achieved most effectively 
and efficiently when central banks are responsible for banking supervision, or are 
actively involved in the performance of supervisory tasks – as well as have access 
to pertinent information – in collaboration with a separate supervisory authority. 
However, irrespective of the organisational structure and the institutional 
responsibility, effectively reducing the likelihood of a recurrence of financial 
crises affecting markets and institutions requires the fruitful cooperation of the 
central banks and supervisory functions.
Let me now conclude by briefly pointing to two other important lessons and 
associated challenges that have been highlighted by the ongoing financial crisis: 
the first concerns the role and actions of central banks in mitigating the impact 
of financial turbulence on the financial system and the broader economy; the 
second is related to the need to strengthen the cross-border financial stability 
arrangements globally and in Europe.
1  An overvaluation of asset prices can occur – and has occurred – in an environment of 
relatively stable consumer prices. In such an environment, a significant change in the policy 
interest rate to contain credit growth and asset price dynamics could be inconsistent with 
the preservation of consumer price stability over the medium term. An alternative means of 
containing bank credit expansion by reducing the rate of growth of central bank money – at 
a given policy interest rate – would effectively entail a rise in market interest rates and could 
pose similar problems of potential inconsistency.20 PAPADEMOS
The recent experience has demonstrated the crucial role of central banks in crisis 
management through the provision and management of liquidity in the money 
markets and, in exceptional cases, by providing emergency liquidity assistance 
to individual institutions. Since the eruption of the market turmoil, central banks 
in advanced economies have used various policy instruments to limit its effects. 
The ECB’s operations in the money markets have been based on a fundamental 
principle: the separation of the monetary policy stance from liquidity management. 
The monetary policy stance is defined by the level of the key ECB interest rates 
and is determined with a view to achieving the primary objective of preserving 
price stability over the medium term. Liquidity management aims at ensuring the 
orderly functioning of money markets and at mitigating financial stability risks.
The provision and management of liquidity by central banks has alleviated 
pressures in the money markets and has kept spill-over effects on the credit 
markets and the real economy contained. In particular, the provision of unlimited 
liquidity by the ECB to the euro area banking system against an expanded list of 
eligible collateral since mid-October should effectively eliminate concerns about 
liquidity risk and further reduce pressures in the term money market. Central 
banks, however, cannot address some of the underlying causes of money market 
tensions, such as concerns about counterparty credit risk and the continuing 
uncertainty regarding banks’ other funding sources and capital positions. The 
measures being taken by governments should address these problems over time.
The separation principle that guides the conduct of monetary policy and the 
management of liquidity during a financial market correction implies that the 
policy interest rate is not employed to alleviate stresses in the financial system if 
upside risks to price stability prevail. Only if the preservation of price stability 
is secured over the medium term, and will not be jeopardised by a change in 
the monetary policy stance, can the policy interest rate be employed to mitigate 
the impact of financial market stresses in the economy, including their potential 
effects on medium-term price developments.
Finally, I would like to stress that the financial crisis has underscored the 
importance of international cooperation and concerted action in addressing the 
liquidity needs of cross-border financial institutions and ensuring the efficient 
distribution of liquidity at a global level. In particular, the Federal Reserve, 
the ECB and other major central banks cooperated closely and their concerted 
liquidity provision enhanced the effectiveness of liquidity management globally. 
There is an emerging consensus on the need to strengthen cooperation between 
the supervisory authorities responsible for major cross-border institutions and 
to promote a more convergent and consistent application of regulations. In 
the European Union, the implementation of measures to improve supervisory 
cooperation, and to accelerate the convergence of supervisory rules and practices, 
has gained momentum. And there is a growing understanding of the need 
to strengthen the pan-European character of financial stability arrangements 
for crisis prevention and crisis management. Regardless of the institutional 
framework that may be adopted, what is essential is to ensure the effective 
cooperation and the sharing of relevant information between central banks and 
supervisors in a timely and efficient manner. 21 OPENING ADDRESS
4 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Over the past ten years, the euro has established itself as a stable and credible 
currency and the single European monetary policy has preserved price stability, 
and thus the purchasing power of the euro, in the euro area. In addition, the euro 
has played an important role in insulating euro countries from other adverse 
effects that the financial crisis could have had on their economies, via the foreign 
exchange markets and other channels, if the euro had not existed. And some 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro as their currency have indeed 
experienced such effects. Therefore, the euro and the liquidity management of 
the ECB have also played an important role in safeguarding financial stability in 
the euro area.
With these thoughts on some lessons that could be learnt from our experience 
with the euro, from the ongoing financial crisis and from the contribution of the 
ECB and central banks to the preservation of financial stability, I wish us all a 
fruitful and enriching conference.22
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ABSTRACT
The first ten years of the euro may well have been as good as many had hoped. 
Price stability has been broadly attained and interest rates are very low. These 
achievements are serving the citizens of the euro area well. A remarkable feature 
is that recent inflation dispersion in the euro area is already as low and as 
stable as in the United States. We might, understandably, have expected inflation 
dispersion to have remained higher in the euro area due to differences in 
national fiscal policies and supply shocks, adjustments to equilibrium exchange 
rates and the ongoing catching up of incomes. Three concerns raised prior to the 
launch of the euro have been broadly dispelled: first, the ECB has established its 
own credibility and has anchored inflation expectations; second, national fiscal 
policies are no longer pro-cyclical; and third, there is no evidence of the growing 
divergence predicted by the Walters critique, which states that real interest rates 
could act as asymmetric transmission channels. However, we may be witnessing 
a transmutation of the Walters critique that operates through eventually 
self-equilibrating external current account deficits
1  We are grateful to Vítor Manuel Ribeiro Constâncio and Francesco Caselli for their 
excellent discussion of our paper. We would also like to thank Frank Smets, Chiara Osbat, 
Manfred Kremer, Renate Dreiskena, Aidan Meyler, Luca Benati, Irina Bunda, Malin 
Andersson, Christine Elding, Luca Dedola, Viviene Petit, Javier Perez, Joan Peredes and 
Joachim Schroth for their assistance, suggestions and comments. Irene Mühldorf and Karen 
Forbes-Baeyens provided editorial assistance.25 THE EURO AT TEN – UNFULFILLED THREATS AND UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES
1 INTRODUCTION
More than ten years ago, many economists were sceptical about the wisdom 
of monetary union in Europe. Some even characterised it as a project that was 
doomed to failure and that could actually tear the European Union apart.2 This 
foreboding has not materialised. On the contrary, a whole new generation 
of Europeans is growing up with, at most, a distant memory of Belgian and 
French francs, Deutsche Mark, Italian lire and other predecessor currencies. 
An anniversary is a time to take stock. Accordingly, our aim is to review what 
has been achieved, recall the various threats to monetary union that did not 
materialise during this period, and address a number of unexpected challenges.
Given some of the early concerns, the smooth functioning of the euro area should 
not be taken for granted. In Section 2, we illustrate that in spite of the recent hiccup 
in inflation, price stability has been broadly achieved, with average inflation having 
been close to or slightly above 2% since January 1999. Furthermore, the absence 
of exchange rate risk, low current and expected inflation, low interest rates and low 
macroeconomic variability more generally are supporting other beneficial dynamics 
such as additional trade in goods and services as well as deeper financial integration. 
These achievements are undoubtedly serving the citizens of the euro area well.
Many of the debates in the 1990s foresaw difficulties and threats to the successful 
functioning of EMU. As it turns out, most of them have not materialised, at 
least not to a significant extent (see Section 3). First, there was a fear that a 
new supranational central bank would have to earn its credibility the hard way. 
Would the new ECB feel compelled to be systematically over-restrictive in its 
early years? In fact, various measures indicate that the ECB was literally “born 
credible”. Even though the euro soon depreciated, it became clear that this was 
mainly a dollar event. Second, there was a concern that countries with higher 
inflation rates would also have relatively lower real interest rates, which could 
have a pro-cyclical impact and could foster a cyclical de-coupling from the rest 
of the euro area. In this case, a single monetary policy would have polarising, 
destabilising effects on inflation and growth (this argument is also known as 
the Walters critique). While the pattern of national real interest rates to some 
extent conforms to the Walters critique, there is no evidence of a destabilising 
effect. Third, there was a fear that some national authorities would display a bias 
towards running budget deficits that could threaten price stability. The Stability 
and Growth Pact was designed with that concern in mind. Although fiscal 
discipline remains an elusive objective and the Pact had to be amended once, the 
quality of fiscal policies has generally improved and there is no indication that 
they have been destabilising. Finally, there was also concern that once changes 
in the nominal exchange rate had been ruled out, real exchange rates would not 
be sufficiently flexible, meaning that the euro would thwart necessary changes in 
competitiveness within the euro area. This did not happen either.
2  See, for example, Feldstein (1997), “Instead of increasing intra-European harmony and global 
peace, the shift to EMU and the political integration that would follow it would be more likely 
to lead to increased conflicts within Europe and between Europe and the United States”.26 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
At the same time, a number of difficulties that were not widely expected have 
arisen. This is the topic of Section 4. First, to a surprising extent, the ECB has 
found itself criticised for its lack of transparency. The ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy was designed with a view to establishing credibility. It was inspired 
by the highly successful German model, which combined a prominent role for 
monetary aggregates with great pragmatism in executing policy. But the growing 
popularity of the inflation targeting strategy, which emphasises transparency and 
coherence between medium-term forecasts and policy actions (the ECB’s two-pillar 
approach), has come to be seen by some as too complicated. Second, attention is 
gradually focusing on the tendency for current account imbalances, both positive 
and negative, to become relatively large in some countries. To some extent, this may 
reflect the increased financial integration the single currency has spurred. However, 
current account imbalances may also have grown because persistent inflation 
differentials, albeit smaller than in the past, have accumulated over time and have 
led to a loss of competitiveness. We examine this pattern and its potential causes, 
including the possibility that it is an expected effect of the Walters critique.
2  THE ECB’S ACHIEVEMENTS
In this section, we briefly review some evidence on price stability, growth, 
economic integration and the international role of the euro. We then turn to the 
benefits that the euro is bringing to consumers and the corporate sector.
2.1 PRICE  STABILITY
The first and foremost objective of the ECB, as stated in the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht Treaty), is price stability. Table 1 shows that over the first 
five post-war decades, with a few exceptions, inflation in all euro area countries 
was never as low as it was during the first ten years of the euro. One of these 
exceptions is Ireland, which has gone through a decade of extraordinary growth, 
catching up with and then passing the richer European countries.3 
Table 1 also shows that inflation rates have been quite similar, but not identical, 
across the euro area member countries. Some degree of dispersion is unavoidable 
and possibly even desirable. We will deal with this issue at greater length 
below. At this stage, we only wish to establish a few facts and suggest some 
interpretations. Chart 1 shows a measure of dispersion, the standard deviation 
across euro area member countries. Dispersion has steadily declined since 
1999 and is now of the same order of magnitude as within the United States, a 
monetary union of similar size but with a strong central government.
Chart 1 can be interpreted in two ways, however. One is that inflation rates 
are indeed converging within the euro area. Alternatively, it could merely be a 
3  The catching-up process implies that wages and prices, typically lower in poorer countries, 
rise when evaluated in foreign currencies. This Balassa-Samuelson effect implies higher 
than average inflation. Another exception is Germany during the post-war period, with 
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statistical artefact. Indeed, when inflation rates decline, absolute differences are 
bound to become smaller. A natural way to account for this possibility is to use a 
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Source: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unweighted standard deviation in 
percent. 14 MSA are the main Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the US.
Table 1 Sixty years of inflation: ten-year annual averages
1949-58 1959-68 1969-78 1979-88 1989-98 1999-08
Austria  8.9 3.1 6.0 4.0 2.6 1.9 
Belgium  1.4 2.4 7.1 5.0 2.3 2.0 
Finland  6.1 5.0 9.9 7.4 2.7 1.7 
France  6.2 3.8 8.4 8.1 2.2 1.7
Germany  1.1 2.3 4.7 3.0 2.7 1.6 
Greece  7.7  1.9 10.7 20.0 12.2  3.2
Ireland  4.0 3.3  12.2  10.3 2.6 3.7
Italy  3.1  3.4 11.1 12.0  4.6  2.3
Luxemburg  2.6 2.0 6.3 4.8 2.5 2.4
Netherlands  4.1 3.5 7.4 3.2 2.3 2.2
Portugal  0.8 3.4  15.5  18.7 7.0 2.9
Spain  6.1 6.3  13.0  11.1 4.7 3.2 
Denmark  4.0 5.2 8.7 7.4 2.3 2.1
Sweden  4.4 3.6 8.1 8.0 3.9 1.2
Switzerland  1.1 2.8 4.9 3.3 2.6 0.9
UK  3.8 3.1  11.8 8.0 4.3 2.7
Sources: 1949–2007: International Financial Statistics, IMF; 2008: Economic Outlook, 
OECD. 
Note: West Germany only before 1992.28 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
different measure of dispersion, the coefficient of variation, as in Chart 2. The chart 
shows that inflation rates have converged; in addition, they have also declined. The 
clear break after the adoption of the common currency confirms that, in the euro 
area, dispersion is as low as and even more stable than in the United States.
This is surprising, as a number of factors instead suggest that inflation dispersion 
should be higher in the euro area than in the United States.
One factor is divergent fiscal policies. While theory predicts that in a monetary  a. 
union, divergent fiscal policies are unlikely to lead to sustained differences in 
inflation rates, their short-run effects can be sizeable. In Europe fiscal policy is 
almost exclusively a national prerogative, whereas US states face strict limits 
on their ability to run deficits, as explained in Bayoumi and Masson (1995). 
We discuss this further in Section 3.2.
An additional factor is the incidence of different idiosyncratic cost-push  b. 
shocks, for example due to different wage pressures in decentralised national 
labour markets. Instead, we have seen generally lower wage pressure than in 
the past. The result suggests that wage claims were subdued to the same extent 
throughout the euro area during its first ten years.
Another possible factor is that the conversion rates adopted in 1998 might  c. 
not have been close to their equilibrium exchange rates for all countries.4 One 
would expect that US states have long made any correction, while possible 
4  Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) provide evidence to that effect.
Chart 2   Inflation dispersion: coefficient of variation 
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discrepancies in the euro area would trigger relative price adjustments, hence 
greater inflation variability.
Finally, equilibrium exchange rates can change over time, in particular  d. 
because of income catching up, a phenomenon often referred to as the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. Levels of development are more diverse in the euro area 
than in the United States, and labour mobility is lower as well. Chart 3 takes 
a long-term look at a price indicator based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
values of USD 1 in euro terms.5 The PPP rates of euro area countries show 
that over almost two decades, the levels of purchasing power of countries 
with an initially lower level of GDP per capita have caught up substantially. 
This increase in purchasing power has broadly corresponded to an increase 
in real GDP per capita. Hence, the presumption is that there should be more 
variability in the euro area.
The achievement of low inflation during the first decade of EMU is reassuring, 
but a legitimate question is whether the credit goes entirely to the ECB. Most of 
the first decade of the euro coincided with the “Great Moderation”, a long period 
5  The hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, persistence in inflation differentials for countries 
starting off at rather different price levels can reflect convergence towards a new equilibrium 
characterised by price convergence as differences in living standards are eliminated 
(i.e. those in the countries below the euro area average). PPPs are currency conversion 
rates that convert to a common currency (the US dollar in this case) and that equalise the 
purchasing power of different currencies. In other words, they eliminate the differences in 
price levels between countries by means of conversion.
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of low output volatility in many countries around the world. The achievement 
of low and stable inflation may therefore be due to the absence of large shocks. 
Chart 4 shows that euro area inflation performance is very much in line with 
what was observed elsewhere among developed countries. On the face of it, the 
ECB has performed as well as, but not better than other central banks. That, in 
itself, is a significant achievement, given the challenge of conducting policy for 
a large number of countries that had not been previously accustomed to sharing 
the same currency.
A growing literature has started to explore the reasons for the Great Moderation, 
focusing on output variability. The issue is whether the phenomenon is due to a 
decrease in the size of exogenous shocks or to an enhanced ability to absorb these 
shocks. This ability could well include better monetary policies. The literature is 
surveyed in Giannone et al. (2008), whose own evaluation of the US case supports 
the view that the economy’s response is the main source of the Great Moderation.
To sum up, the evidence on inflation dispersion presented above may be 
reassuring, but it is also puzzling. It could be that these various effects all 
materialised and yet somehow compensated each other. We return to this issue 
later in the paper when we bring together various strands of discussion.
Whether shocks were milder or not over the last decade, there is little doubt that 
this period has now come to an abrupt end. The 2007-08 combination of rising 
commodity prices (that subsequently declined rapidly) and the financial crisis 
amounts to a massive shock and a serious challenge for the ECB (as well as 
other central banks).
Chart 4   Great Moderation: inflation in the United States, the United 
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2.2 GROWTH
Before the launch of the euro, there were widespread fears that the ECB 
would want to establish its reputation as a determined inflation fighter at 
the expense of economic growth and employment. These fears were partly 
based on the Maastricht Treaty, which identifies price stability as the ECB’s 
primary objective and “the economy” as a secondary one “without prejudice 
to the objective of price stability”. The fears were further stoked by the ECB’s 
own vocabulary, which was carefully chosen to emphasise the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s legacy.
It rapidly turned out instead, that the ECB was conducting its policy in a 
pragmatic manner. The first period of the euro’s existence was marked by a 
sizeable depreciation, which could have led a hawkish ECB to drive up interest 
rates. In fact, the euro depreciated less as a result of ECB policy than as a result 
of US dollar appreciation. In addition, inflation was low because all member 
countries had to pass the convergence criteria to be admitted to EMU.
Table 2 shows the growth performance of the euro area and other major 
economies. It varies from country to country, which is an indication that 
monetary policy, in and by itself, has not had any particular effect, as theory 
would predict. Those countries where the outcome was disappointing relative to 
the previous decade – Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and to some extent also 
France – obviously need to carry out structural reforms to revive their supply side 
(see Duval and Elmeskov (2006)).
Table 2 GDP growth rates: ten-year annual averages
 1971-78 1979-88 1989-98 1999-2008
Austria 3.6 2.2 2.6 2.3
Belgium 3.4 2.0 2.1 2.3
Finland 3.0 3.7 1.7 3.4
France 3.5 2.4 2.0 2.1
Germany 2.9 2.0 2.5 1.6
Greece 5.4 0.7 1.9 4.2
Ireland 5.2 2.8 6.6 6.1
Italy 3.4 2.8 1.6 1.4
Luxemburg 2.9 3.8 4.9 5.2
Netherlands 3.3 1.7 3.2 2.3
Portugal 4.7 3.3 3.2 1.7
Spain 4.3 2.2 2.7 3.6
Denmark 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0
Sweden 1.7 2.4 1.5 3.1
Switzerland 0.7 2.1 1.4 1.9
United Kingdom 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.7
United States 3.7 3.0 3.0 2.7
OECD 3.8 3.0 2.7 4.5
Source: OECD.32 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
2.3  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Sharing the euro was expected, ceteris paribus, to stimulate among other things 
intra-euro area trade, financial flows and cross-border portfolio investment 
activity by eliminating exchange rate volatility, thereby removing uncertainty 
about returns and profits due to exchange rate fluctuations. In addition to 
the elimination of exchange rate volatility, the so-called “Rose effect” could 
possibly provide an additional boost to intra-euro area trade.6 It was also 
expected that directly comparable prices would enhance competition both 
for goods and services, including financial services. What can we say ten 
years later?
A. TRADE  EVIDENCE
Since 1998, trade among euro area countries has risen strongly. The most 
comprehensive study to date (Baldwin et al. (2008)) concludes that, so far, the 
euro has probably increased trade by some 5%.7 These results are substantial, 
considering that trade among European countries has risen uninterrupted for 
about five decades. The value of imports and exports of goods within the euro 
area increased from about 26% of GDP in 1998, the year before the euro was 
introduced, to 33% of GDP in 2007. In the same period, intra-euro area services 
trade also went up, rising from 5% to 7% of GDP. Since 1998, the year-on-year 
growth of euro area exports of goods to the three EU15 countries that have not 
adopted the euro has been 3% lower on average than the year-on-year growth of 
exports within the euro area. Extra-euro area trade has grown more than intra-
euro area trade, an indication that the euro has not had a trade-diversion effect, 
as was sometimes feared. Hence, there is no “fortress Europe”.
B.  REAL EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
The financial openness of the euro area has risen by about 60% of euro area GDP 
over the past ten years. Between 2000 and 2005, the euro area countries – either 
as recipients or as sources of investment – accounted for as much as 57% of 
world foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. EMU seems to have been a magnet 
for FDI activities particularly in the manufacturing sector, while an increasing 
share of FDI flows is taking place between euro area countries. A positive trend 
can also be observed when looking at FDI stocks, given that intra-euro area FDI 
stocks as a proportion of total euro area FDI stocks increased from almost 43% 
in 1999 to 45% in 2006. Overall, it seems that the positive average effect of the 
euro on aggregate FDI flows within the euro area is about 15%, while the impact 
of the euro on FDI flows from outside the euro area to the euro area countries is 
about 7% (see Petroulas (2007), Schiavo (2007), Ottaviano et al. (2007) and Flam 
and Nordström (2007)).
6  Rose (2000) initially predicted that trade would nearly triple. Similar results emerged from 
the “border effect” literature (Engel and Rogers, 1996). In the meantime, the most recent 
empirical literature has reassessed these results (see de Grauwe and Mongelli (2005)).
7  These figures must be seen in perspective. Mongelli et al. (2007) show that, over the past 
50 years, trade in goods among the six founding members of the European Union has risen 
in volume by over 1,200%. Hence, any further trade deepening would be remarkable. 33 THE EURO AT TEN – UNFULFILLED THREATS AND UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES
By eliminating exchange rate risk, the euro has also boosted cross-border 
portfolio investment activity between euro area countries. Empirical estimates 
by De Santis and Gerard (2006) suggest that the adoption of the euro played 
a key role in the reallocation of portfolios among euro area members as well 
as countries worldwide. The total impact of the euro on bilateral transactions 
between individual euro area countries has been estimated to amount to 3.5% of 
equity securities and 4.2% of bonds and notes of the respective total international 
holdings (see De Santis and Gerard (2006)). Moreover, non-euro area countries 
have on average increased their relative investment in euro area bonds.
2.4  INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO
When it was launched, the euro was “international” simply because it replaced 11 
existing currencies. It was immediately used to replace the Deutsche Mark, the 
French franc as well as other legacy currencies as a reserve currency (and as an 
anchor for the exchange rate policy of some countries).8 Although the ECB has 
adopted a neutral stance on the international use of the euro (which is determined 
by market forces), the euro’s role has grown beyond this legacy, as documented 
in Chart 5.
A distinctive feature of the international role of the euro is still its regional 
character. Borrowers outside the euro area are increasingly issuing bonds in euro, 
more than half of which are purchased by euro area investors. Countries close 
to the euro area naturally choose the euro as a financing currency. For example, 
8  See various issues of the ECB’s Review of the international role of the euro.
Chart 5 Share of the euro in global foreign exchange reserves
in current exchange rates
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issuers resident in Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom account for a 
significant part of euro-denominated debt issuance by non-residents (Table 3), 
and the City of London, as a major international financial centre, has developed 
its transactions in euro along with those in US dollars. Likewise, all countries 
running a euro-related exchange rate policy are in close geographic proximity 
to the euro area. Finally, the degree of currency substitution is highest in the 
new non-euro area EU Member States, as well as in EU candidate and potential 
candidate countries in south-eastern Europe.
2.5  WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE EURO
All in all, consumers and corporations have benefited from price stability, 
including low interest rates at all maturities, which in turn have lowered the cost 
of servicing high public debts, and they have benefited from trade integration. 
Financial integration has also progressed, although to a limited extent only, 
largely because of many surviving barriers. Crucially, the risk of possible 
speculative attacks on national currencies has been removed. For example, prior 
to the launch of the euro, the impact of movements by the Deutsche Mark against 
the US dollar was often aggravated by similar movements between the currencies 
that have now merged to form the euro. This can no longer happen. 
Obviously, adopting a common currency also entails costs, the key cost being the 
loss of direct control of monetary policy and the exchange rate. The costs depend 
largely on each country’s ability to enhance its adjustment capacities. Countries 
with slow dynamic adjustment mechanisms and responsiveness – in the wake of 
shocks and new developments – are at a competitive disadvantage. At least, this 
enhances the incentives to undertake structural reforms in goods, services and 
labour markets (see European Commission (2006)).
3 UNFULFILLED  THREATS
Prior to the launch of the euro, a number of concerns were voiced. We consider 
three of them: the challenge of establishing the ECB’s credibility (Section 3.1), 
the risk of pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Section 3.2), and the risk of asymmetric 
Table 3   Outstanding volume of international bonds and notes by 
region 





























EUR 44.7 3.1 3.8 23.6 5.5 2.0 10.0 6.3 1.0
USD 23.7 19.0 0.3 2.4 4.9 10.8 6.6 23.1 5.0 4.2
JPY 30.0 12.7 1.2 2.9 18.6 4.9 0.6 21.1 7.6 0.5
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transmission through diverging real interest rates, i.e. the Walters critique 
(Section 3.3). These three threats matter, because the benefits listed above greatly 
depend on maintaining the ECB’s credibility, securing fiscal discipline, and 
addressing over time sustained current account imbalances.
3.1  CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY AT BIRTH
When the ECB’s strategy was designed in 1998, there was concern that the new 
institution would have to earn credibility the hard way and possibly very slowly. 
This would lead to inflation expectations that were higher than actual inflation 
and thus to inefficiently high real interest rates. Efforts were therefore directed 
at “borrowing the Deutsche Bundesbank’s credibility”. The main tool was 
monetary policy strategy, which adopted a two-pillar approach with a prominent 
role assigned to monetary growth. Throughout much of its first decade, the ECB 
also followed the Bundesbank’s model of talking tough and acting pragmatically, 
an issue to which we return in Section 4.1. Here, we merely study the outcome. 
There are various measures of credibility based on expectations. Do people 
expect the ECB to deliver price stability? We look here at two complementary 
approaches.
THE ECB’S SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
Inflation expectations can be observed directly thanks to the quarterly survey 
of professional forecasters (SPF). For each term since the launch of the euro, 
Chart 6 reports the actual inflation rate and the two-year ahead forecast. Several 
observations about inflation expectations may be made:
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First, professional forecasters have systematically underestimated inflation  • 
at the two-year horizon. The same is true for all other horizons surveyed. 
The ECB argues that, because they are affected by shocks, expectations at 
the two-year horizon may be an imperfect measure of credibility. The ECB 
prefers to measure credibility at the five-year horizon.9 On the other hand, a 
two-year horizon corresponds best to commonly accepted estimates of the lag 
of monetary policy effects:
Second, until the third quarter of 2008, inflation had always been expected  • 
to be at or below 2%. This is not exactly the Eurosystem’s definition of price 
stability of “close to, but below, 2%”, but it is close enough;
Third, inflation expectations according to this measure were very low at the  • 
outset and slowly edged upwards; and
Fourth, these measures of credibility might also be affected by the perceived  • 
likelihood of shocks.
These observations suggest that the ECB in fact started with a very high degree of 
credibility. The ECB, it appears, inherited the Deutsche Bundesbank’s credibility 
from the outset. Indeed, until mid-2008, inflation expectations were anchored at 
or below 2%. Quite remarkably, this happened even though inflation has almost 
never fallen below 2% since mid-2000. In addition, the euro initially depreciated 
sharply against the US dollar. Even though this was a dollar issue, many 
commentators saw euro depreciation as proof that “the euro wasn’t working”. 
Throughout this period of euro weakness, as further confirmed by the evolution 
of long-term interest rates, markets nevertheless remained confident that inflation 
would stay low. Credibility exists when people believe less what they see – 
inflation above 2%, an initially weak euro – than what they are promised. This 
suggests that the ECB achieved credibility at birth. Yet the SPF survey indicated 
that forecasters had gradually come to recognise that the ECB was facing a real 
challenge in meeting its own definition of price stability. We pursue this issue 
further in Section 4.1.
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS BASED ON CONSENSUS ECONOMICS
A different perspective is provided by international forecast surveys conducted 
by Consensus Economics.10 Chart 7 compares long (6 to 10 years ahead) 
forecasts for inflation for the euro area, the United Kingdom and the United 
States from 1999 onwards. This comparison is useful, given the fact that the 
period from 1999 to 2007 was dominated by the Great Moderation, as discussed 
above, and that the euro area’s inflation performance is not significantly different 
from that of other countries. The chart fully confirms this impression. From 
early 1999, inflation forecasts have been lower for the euro area than for the 
United Kingdom and the United States , thus supporting the view that the ECB 
9  See the article entitled “The outcome of the ECB’s evaluation of its monetary policy 
strategy” in the June 2003 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.
10  The SPF and Consensus Economics forecasts are generally very consistent with each other. 
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achieved credibility at birth. The observation that forecasts converge over time 
(upward for the euro area and mostly downward for the United Kingdom and the 
United States) further amplifies the previous impression that credibility has been 
gradually eroded in the euro area.
3.2  NATIONAL FISCAL POLICIES
How to deal with fiscal policy has been a controversial issue from the start. 
Having surrendered monetary policy autonomy, euro area member states can rely 
only on fiscal policy for demand management. At the same time, the Maastricht 
Treaty has identified national fiscal policies as a matter of common concern, 
which has led to the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact. Its intention is 
to enforce discipline, which had been lacking in several member countries in the 
previous decades. The precise theoretical reasons for “common concern” have 
long been debated (see e.g. Wyplosz (2006)). Policymakers refer only to the 
history of big inflations, all of which can be linked to fiscal profligacy, as the 
ultimate justification for the Pact, but critics note that the ECB’s independence 
and the EU’s no-bailout clause should also be taken into account.
Another reason for the Pact is that two of the criteria for admission to the 
euro area concern fiscal policy. The Pact can be seen as a way to avoid a 
post-entry relaxation of discipline. Indeed, as Chart 8 illustrates, the run-up 
to EMU coincided with a tight fiscal stance for most countries. Directly after 
the introduction of the euro, fiscal policy was loosened in some countries and, 
on average, in the euro area as a whole. This loosening was not justified by 
prevailing economic conditions. The following downturn brought a general 
worsening of budgetary balances, and during the 2003 to 2005 period, some 
Chart 7   An international comparison of inflation expectations 
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countries even ran excessive deficits. Thus, the post-entry fiscal policy relaxation 
can be seen both as a justification of the Stability and Growth Pact and as an 
indication that its effectiveness has not been established so far.
The Pact faces serious analytical issues. Its aim is to encourage fiscal discipline. Its 
central requirement that deficits not exceed 3% of GDP in normal circumstances 
runs the risk of leading to pro-cyclical policies because the Pact is likely to be 
binding during periods of a slowdown in growth. To deal with this undesirable 
property, emphasis has shifted to the preventive arm – the requirement that 
adjustments be pursued during the upside of the cycle – so that the Pact never 
binds during the downside. A stricter version would want member countries 
to forgo discretionary actions, relying on the automatic stabilisers to deal with 
cyclical fluctuations.
This issue is important because available evidence indicates that, even before 
the adoption of the euro, fiscal policies were often pro-cyclical in Europe. The 
situation has changed somewhat since then. The report European Commission 
(2006) provides evidence that the fiscal stance has been pro-cyclical in good 
times and broadly neutral in bad times. Von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008) argue 
that national fiscal policies have become less pro-cyclical during these ten years 
than they were previously.11 This is broadly confirmed by Chart 9, which displays 
the euro area’s overall budget balance along with the maximum and minimum 
national balances achieved in each year. The chart shows the powerful effect 
of the entry criterion in the run-up to the introduction of the euro. It confirms 
a relapse during the cyclical downturn in 2001-03, but even then there is no 
11  Fatas and Mihov (2008) show instead that pro-cyclicality is found less frequently among 
non-euro area developed countries.
Chart 8   Fiscal stance: euro area changes in cyclically adjusted 
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return to the pre-1995 levels, and the slippage was corrected as soon as cyclical 
conditions had improved.
On the institutional side, the Stability and Growth Pact had a rough ride. When 
by late 2003 the two largest countries, France and Germany, had fallen foul of 
the 3% limit, the excessive deficit procedure was held in abeyance for these 
two countries. This episode confirmed the view that the Pact was too rigid. The 
reform ultimately adopted in 2005 introduced some flexibility. In particular, it 
gave a broader definition of the exceptional circumstances under which the Pact 
would be suspended. The same will happen again in 2009. As a result, in practice, 
the Pact has never been binding. Even so, there has not been a widespread 
lack of discipline. If anything, Charts 8 and 9 suggest that fiscal discipline 
has improved.
3.3  THE WALTERS CRITIQUE
Another early concern centred on real interest rates in EMU. With a unified bond 
market, nominal interest rates are equalised, at least as long as all countries remain 
on the common currency in line with expectations. Mechanically, therefore, real 
interest rates are lower when inflation is higher, and are expected to remain so. 
This observation is encapsulated in the Walters critique that is named after Sir 
Richard Walter, a counsellor to Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. The critique 
holds that the effects of the common monetary policy are more expansionary in 
countries with high inflation rates and more contractionary in countries with low 
ones. As a result, growing disequilibria may occur, with inflation rising where it 
started higher and declining where it started lower.
Chart 9 Budget balances in the euro area (12 countries)
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Euro area experience has clearly borne out several steps of the above reasoning. 
At fixed exchange rates, higher inflation translates into real appreciation, so 
we can use both measures interchangeably. Chart 10 plots the total change in 
the real exchange rate – a measure of the cumulated inflation differential  12 – 
against the average real interest rate in euro area member countries over the 
period 1999-2008. The link is quite close and is as expected. The next step in the 
Walters critique is that lower real interest rates generate faster growth. This too 
is confirmed, as Chart 10 shows.
Yet, overall, the evidence thus far shows that the key implication of the Walters 
critique has not materialised: as noted in Section 2.1, inflation rates have actually 
converged over the past decade. Some countries have long had higher or lower 
inflation rates than the euro area average; however, there is no evidence of 
the growing divergence predicted by the Walters critique. Why is this so? An 
interesting question is what, in the logic of the Walters critique, may be wrong. 
As previously noted by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), the most obvious answer 
is that international competition is overlooked.
With a fixed exchange rate, higher inflation means an appreciating exchange 
rate, which causes competitiveness to deteriorate and reduces demand. Thus 
the expansionary effect of low real interest rates stands to be compensated by 
the contractionary effect of an appreciating real exchange rate. Which effect 
dominates and, therefore, whether the process is inherently unstable, as predicted 
by the Walters critique, is partly an empirical issue. The evidence is that inflation 
12 Since real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs have been used, the 
correspondence is only approximate.
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rates did not diverge – quite the opposite. From a theoretical viewpoint, it also 
seems likely that continuing real appreciation is impossible unless justified by 
higher productivity gains, so that ultimately the process has to be stable. We 
return to this issue in Section 4. 
4 UNEXPECTED  CHALLENGES
In this section, we look at some of the issues that emerged after the adoption 
of the euro but were not prominent in the analysis preceding the start of 
EMU. These new challenges concern the communication strategy of the ECB 
(Section 4.1) – central bank communication has emerged as an important issue 
over the past decade – as well as the emergence of large current account deficits 
in some member countries (Section 4.2).
4.1 COMMUNICATION  13
We argued in Section 3.1 that measures of inflation expectations suggest that the 
ECB was born with inherent credibility. A more detailed analysis can be carried 
out using the same survey but looking at the distribution of forecasts. Geraats 
et al. (2008) argue that the proportion of forecasters who predict inflation at 
the two-year horizon to be below 2% (and still be positive) is a better measure 
of credibility than the average forecast of inflation depicted in Charts 6 and 7. 
Indeed, one can argue that the ECB is credible if it manages to convince 
forecasters that, irrespective of the prevailing inflation rate, it will bring inflation 
back in line with the definition of price stability over the policy horizon, which 
can be approximated by a two-year medium term.
To that effect, we turn to Chart 11, which displays the proportion of forecasters 
included in the SPF that expect HICP inflation to be below 2% – the ECB’s 
definition of price stability. The chart shows that, early on, forecasters were 
highly confident inflation would indeed fall to within the range defined as price 
stability. Over the years, that confidence gradually declined as realised inflation 
systematically exceeded forecasts (Charts 6 and 7).
It is true that, historically, large increases in energy and commodity prices 
starting in early 2006 were bound to have an inflationary impact. However, 
unless forecasters had expected these prices to increase continuously, they 
would have expected the ECB to return inflation to the range desirable within 
five years. It is therefore impossible to avoid concluding that some difficulty 
has arisen.
One reason for this evolution, suggested by Geraats (2009), is that the problem 
lies with the ECB’s communication strategy. The euro was launched at a time 
when the inflation targeting strategy was slowly being adopted by a number of 
developed and emerging economies. As explained before, the ECB chose instead 
to follow the Deutsche Bundesbank’s two-pillar strategy, which has become 
13  This section reflects only the views of Charles Wyplosz.42 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
increasingly controversial. That strategy has been criticised repeatedly from the 
start (see e.g. Begg et al. (1998), Svensson (1999, 2003), Alesina et al. (2001) 
and Gali (2003)).
While it gradually emerged that, like the Bundesbank before it, the ECB was 
actually quite flexible in making policy decisions, the ECB’s communication 
has remained firmly based on the two-pillar strategy. This is most visible in its 
Monthly Bulletin and in the President’s monthly press conferences. The result 
has been the impression of a disconnect between policy decisions and their 
justification. The disconnect has become very visible because many other leading 
central banks have gradually developed a great degree of transparency in the way 
they prepare and explain their decisions. The evolution of the Federal Reserve 
System, for instance, has been quite spectacular.
In 2003 the ECB responded to its critics by conducting an in-house review 
summarised in a report (Issing (2003)). The result of this review was that a change 
in the order of presentation of the two pillars and a clarification of how they combine 
and are used to inform the Governing Council. Thus, the economic analysis now 
aims to flag short-run risks to price stability, whereas monetary analysis permits 
the identification of medium and long-term risks. However, this has not reduced 
the controversy. Continuing criticism of the ECB’s strategy is presented in Gali 
et al. (2004) and Woodford (2007), for example, while a defence of the ECB’s 
strategy is provided by Beck and Wieland (2007) and Sauer (2007).
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Although the debate on the strategy is unlikely to abate any time soon, the 
transparency aspects are of particular interest. One key advantage of the inflation-
targeting strategy is that it lends itself naturally to a communication strategy: 
the inflation forecast is a summary statistic that is transparently comparable 
to the inflation target. While a flexible inflation-targeting strategy still leaves 
much freedom to the central bank, and therefore does not automatically deliver 
full transparency, the two-pillar strategy inevitably injects considerably more 
arbitrariness, which significantly complicates communication. Other leading 
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Japan, have 
not adopted an inflation-targeting strategy, but they have taken important steps 
to enhance transparency. For instance, both promptly release the minutes of their 
decision-making meetings, and the Federal Reserve System now releases many 
details of individual Open Market Committee members’ inflation forecasts.
This may matter for credibility and therefore for policy effectiveness. A growing 
literature has been examining the characteristics and effects of transparency, and 
some international estimates have been produced. Table 4 presents the ECB’s 
ranking in the three most recent studies. Not surprisingly, different methodologies 
lead to different results. The ECB’s performance is good in one case and somewhat 
disappointing in the two other reported cases. Other findings of these studies are 
that the ECB’s transparency has improved over the years, but that is a general 
trend. In some studies, the ECB has slipped a bit in the ranking.14 
An important result of this literature is that, ceteris paribus, inflation and output 
variability are inversely related to central bank transparency. This helps to 
explain why this issue, which is related to the description of the strategy, has 
become important in policy debates. Another reason why this issue matters is 
political. As emphasised by Feldstein (1997), sharing a currency may be a source 
of tension among member countries. It is therefore crucially important that the 
ECB be perceived as a trusted institution by the population at large.
According to Eurobarometer survey results, the percentage of citizens who 
consider the common currency as “advantageous overall” declined from 
59% in September 2002 to 48% in September 2006 (Flash Eurobarometer, 
November 2006). The Eurobarometer of spring 2008 shows instead that, during 
the surveys spanning spring 2006 and spring 2007, between 61% and 63% of 
14  Blinder et al. (2008) provide extensive discussions of the limits of transparency indices.
Table 4 Central bank transparency rankings 




Year 2006 2005 2002
No. of countries 28 100 9
ECB ranking 17 6 4 
Sources: Crowe and Meade (2008), Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and Eijffinger and 
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respondents looked favourably on EMU, up from 59% to 60% in the previous 
three surveys. The share of respondents expressing negative opinions on 
monetary union declined steadily from 35% in the spring of 2003 to 31% in the 
most recent survey.15
Unsurprisingly, in 2008 37% of all respondents in the EU as a whole indicated 
that inflation had become the “most important issue facing the country”.16 The 
detailed country results shown in Table 5 indicate that percentages are high in all 
euro area countries except Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland. 
The unweighted average for the euro area is 39.7%, almost the same as that for 
the non-euro area member countries (40.2%). It is also interesting to note that 
concern for inflation was low in Sweden and the United Kingdom, two countries 
whose central banks are usually considered highly transparent.
Not too much should be made of these public opinion polls, but they do remind 
us of the widespread perception that inflation has increased since the adoption 
of the euro. They also suggest that the general public supports the ECB’s focus 
on maintaining price stability, which should help it in dealing with political 
pressures of the kind that have repeatedly arisen since 1999. The ECB’s formal 
independence is unassailable – it would require a new Treaty to change its 
status – but its room for manoeuvre could be reduced through constraints on the 
exchange rate or by setting up a powerful political body designed to deal with 
the euro area economy.
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES
There is no reason for current accounts to balance at either the euro area level or 
the national level. Yet, Chart 12 documents a striking and unexpected feature of the 
recent experience: some national current account imbalances have become large in 
15 See spring 2008 surveys in: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_
en.htm, and http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf.
16  This share went up by 11% with respect to the autumn 2007 survey. Concerns about 
unemployment, crime and the economic situation stood at 24%, 20% and 20% 
respectively.
Table 5   Percentage of citizens who consider inflation the most 
important issue facing their country 
BelgiumBulgaria Czech 
Rep.
DenmarkGermany Estonia Greece Spain France
48 51 38 18 44 54 33 26 51
Ireland Italy Cyprus Latvia LithuaniaLuxembourgHungary Malta Netherlands
22 44 28 71 63 43 35 40 16
Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden UK
54 33 42 48 71 43 33 9 19 
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both directions, while the euro area current account has remained nearly balanced. 
Does this challenge the “one size fits all” requirement for monetary policy?
Current account deficits may be benign if they correspond to productive 
investments. Alternatively, they may be unsustainable if they reflect excessive 
spending by either the private or the public sector. Market-imposed limits 
on extensive borrowing formerly limited the size and duration of external 
imbalances to the point that this was called the Feldstein-Horioka paradox. 
There is mounting evidence (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Lane and Milesi-
Feretti (2004), Caballero et al. (2008)) that the paradox is vanishing, as financial 
globalization makes it possible to borrow and lend internationally on a large 
scale. Within the euro area, the absence of any currency risk and increased 
financial integration imply that the new phenomenon should be even more 
pronounced than elsewhere. The fact that the euro area’s current account has 
remained approximately balanced indicates that some countries lend to others, 
quite possibly indirectly. The question is why and, importantly, whether this is 
a disequilibrating or re-equilibrating mechanism. The question is reminiscent of 
the Walters critique. We now argue that the current account divergences are in 
fact an unexpected manifestation of that phenomenon.
A.  CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES AND THE WALTERS CRITIQUE
We have noted that, as initially stated, the Walters critique has not been fully 
borne out by the facts. It remains that countries with higher inflation face a 
lower real interest rate, a situation that should ceteris paribus be expansionary. 
Chart 12 readily confirms this. The association between inflation and growth 
Chart 12 Current account balances
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is quite strong, but it says nothing about causality, not even about the cause. It 
may well be that inflation fuelled growth via the real interest rate, but it can also 
be that growth fuelled inflation along the traditional Phillips curve link. Most 
likely, both effects reinforced each other, hence the potential source of growing 
divergences within the euro area.
At the same time, as noted by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), real exchange rate 
appreciation is likely to reduce demand. The strong link between the cumulated 
real exchange change rate change and the cumulated current account deficit-
to-GDP ratio displayed in Chart 13 supports this assumption. Pressure from 
international competition may explain why inflation rates did not diverge.
B.  AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL
It may be that the Walters critique has materialised in the form of current 
account divergences in the euro area and that this is what prevented inflation 
from diverging. While it may be reassuring that inflation did not converge, 
replacing inflation divergence with current account divergence is not particularly 
reassuring. To explore this issue, we look at a small illustrative model.
The Walters critique can be described as follows. Let π be the inflation rate in 
the EMU country of interest and let λ be the log of its real exchange rate, defined 
such that an increase is a real depreciation. EMU membership implies that the 
log of the real exchange rate is equal to p- p*, where p and p* are, respectively, 
the log price levels in the country and in EMU as a whole. It follows that the 
cumulated change in the real exchange rate is:
(1)  λ = π * - π
•
.
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Thus a higher rate of inflation leads to a real appreciation. 
The real interest rate is r =
 i-π, where i is the euro area-wide nominal interest 
rate. Without loss of generality, we assume that the EMU inflation rate is zero, 
i.e. π* = 0. Alternatively, we define π as the inflation differential.
In line with New Keynesian models, the Walters critique assumes that the real 
interest rate affects demand (the IS curve) and that inflation is driven by its past 
value, its expected future value and by demand (the Phillips curve). Setting aside 
the role of expectations that lead to considerations irrelevant to the present case, 
we specify the Phillips curve with only a backward component. Therefore we 
express it as the change in the inflation rate:
  π = ay •
where a is a parameter, y is the deviation of real demand for domestic goods from 
trend GDP and a dot represents the time derivative. The output gap is defined as:
 
y = d + x
where d is the deviation of total domestic demand from trend GDP and x represents 
net exports or the current account. This specification implicitly assumes that, in 
the long run, the current account is balanced, an important assumption.17 Both 
components of demand are specified as:
(2)  d = ˉb(r ˉ r) ‾
(3) 
x = x0t + x1λ
In (2),  r ‾  is the neutral real interest rate. Note that we allow for time t to appear 
in (3), a shorthand for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This implies that the real 
equilibrium exchange rate λ
‾, which corresponds to external equilibrium x =0, 
appreciates continuously:




Bringing together these terms, we have:
(5) 
‾ ‾ π = ˉα(r ˉ r) + β(λ ˉ λ),
  ‾ •
where α =ab and β = ax1.
The Walters critique is a statement about the stability of the system when the 
central bank sets the interest rate at a level optimal for EMU as a whole, ignoring 
country-specific conditions. We capture this situation by assuming that the central 
bank sets the nominal interest rate i at its neutral level. Assuming that the neutral 
real interest rate is the same in the home country and EMU, given that π* = 0, 
17  Removing this assumption is an interesting and challenging issue left for further work.48 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
this means that i = r and the home country real interest rate is r = r . As a result, 
(5) becomes:
(6) 
‾ ‾ π = απ + β(λ ˉ λ). •
Together with (1), which can be rewritten as:
(1’)  λ = ˉ π ,
•
(6) fully describes the economy. The first term in (6) captures the Walters 
critique: the real interest rate in the home country is lower than in EMU, the 
difference being equal to the inflation differential. This term is a clear source of 
instability. The second term seems to be a source of stability, since (1’) indicates 
that a positive inflation differential leads to a real appreciation, which reduces 
demand and inflation.
The question is therefore one of model stability. If the model is unstable, we 
should observe growing divergences in both inflation and the current account. 
In fact, the model made up of (1’) and (6) is always unstable as long as α > 0.18 
Merely recognising that competitiveness works against the Walters critique is not 
enough, in this model, to restore stability. We need to allow for other channels 
that reverse the sign of α =ab. One possibility is to allow for FDI, driven by the 
real interest differential r− r = −π . In that case, (2) is changed to:
(2’)  d = ˉb(r ˉ r) + h(r ˉ r) ,
‾‾
where the second term captures FDI. The system remains described by (1’) and 
(6), with one difference: the crucial term α is now α = a(b − h. If the interest rate 
effect on consumption is dominated by the effect on foreign investment, α < 0 
and the model is stable. If the absolute value of α is small relative to β, the model 
is oscillatory: the home economy, and its current account, will exhibit cycles of 
decreasing amplitude.19
There are many other ways of extending the model that may make it stable. 
The important theoretical point is that the Walters critique is not a fatality. If 
the model is stable, the current account may well diverge for a while but any 
imbalance must eventually be corrected by the evolution of inflation and the real 
exchange rate. In that case the process is self-equilibrating and current account 
divergences are no cause for concern.
C.  OTHER SOURCES OF DIVERGENCE
The model ignores other potential sources of divergence. One prominent case 
is the possibility of persistent and unabated excessive domestic spending. Easy 
18 The eigenvalues of the system’s determinant are  s = (α ± α2 − Δ) / 2 ⎯ √ , with 
Δ = α2 − 4 β. When β is large, the determinant is negative and the solution is oscillatory but 
still unstable. In that case, the current account is alternatively negative and positive, but the 
amplitude grows over time (as exp(αt/2)).
19 If  b = h, α = 0, and the economy keeps oscillating between current surpluses and deficits of 
equal magnitude.
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external financing, allowed by financial integration and the absence of any 
exchange rate risk, could make it possible for a country to sustain large current 
account deficits for a significant amount of time, making the eventual correction 
all the more painful.20 In the absence of a nominal exchange rate adjustment, the 
correction would require a significant fall in demand, which could be imposed 
by serious financial stress.
It may be impossible to disentangle the two alternative interpretations of the current 
account imbalance phenomenon. Both start with excessive demand and work 
through inflation and current account deficits. In the Walters critique, the proximate 
cause of excessive demand is inherited inflation; in the alternative case, excessive 
demand is driven by other factors. But these factors may well be the consequence 
of real interest rates that are too low and that push up asset and housing prices.
The only possibly exogenous factor that is not part of the Walters critique is 
excessive public spending that leads to budget deficits. This is examined in 
Chart 14, which plots the average budget and current account balances of the first 
ten years for each of the 12 original members of the euro area. There is a very low 
positive correlation between the two variables (the correlation coefficient is just 
0.10 and the explained share of the variance is minuscule). Hence, there is at least 
a weak link between excessive spending and current account deficits to budget 
deficits, and with large current account surpluses linked to large budget surpluses.
In fact, even if they move in the same direction as budget imbalances, current 
account imbalances are much larger. This indicates that net private savings should 
20  This is reminiscent of the global imbalances resulting from excessive spending in the United 
States that lie at the root of the financial crisis.
Chart 14   Budget and current account balances in the euro area  
Averages for the period 1999-2008
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be highly and positively correlated with the budget balances, as predicted by the 
Ricardian equivalence. Thus the evidence does not rule out the simultaneous 
presence of current account effects of the Walters critique.
D.  THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT
Taken together, Charts 10 in Section 3.3 establish a clear link between the real 
exchange rate and growth. Note that we measure GDP to calculate relative per 
capita growth vis-à-vis the euro area average. While we have interpreted these 
figures in terms of the Walters critique, an alternative interpretation is possible: 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect predicts that catching-up countries exhibit real 
appreciation.
This could be an alternative interpretation of Charts 10, but not of the growing 
current account divergence. In fact, the Balassa-Samuelson effect rests on the 
combination of real exchange rate appreciation and stable current accounts, not 
on the increasing current account deficits that we observe. This interpretation is 
contradicted by Chart 13. In addition, we note that the appreciating countries did 
most of their catching up prior to the adoption of the euro.
5 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The first ten years of the euro have been far better than many had hoped. The 
success is testimony to the institutional robustness of the ECB, which inherited 
the credibility of the Bundesbank and succeeded in generally displaying an 
adequate mixture of commitment to price stability and recognition that central 
banks are also concerned about general economic conditions and, more recently, 
financial stability.
EMU has also led to significant advances in economic and financial integration, 
which have provided euro area citizens and firms with important welfare and 
efficiency gains. The euro area now provides a more secure and stable economic 
and financial environment to safeguard the gains from trade integration and, 
as recently demonstrated, to prevent periodical financial crisis and disruptions 
from tearing apart member countries. Monetary integration also secures a level 
playing-field and permits cross-border investment, such as more M&As and 
significant cross-border FDI.
Interestingly, a number of initial fears have not materialised, but new issues have 
arisen. Some apparent, albeit modest, erosion of credibility, if confirmed, could 
be related to the difficulty of keeping inflation close to, but below, 2%. Concerns 
about the use of fiscal policies at the national level could also be relevant. 
However, if we look at the first ten years of the euro, we have not seen fiscal 
policies diverging in responses to idiosyncratic shocks, and fiscal policies have 
been broadly neutral. At the same time, it is impossible to determine how much 
of the improvement is to be assigned to the existence of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and how much simply to the growing recognition that fiscal discipline must 
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National inflation rates have converged to a degree similar to that observed in the 
United States. This important result conceals a significant degree of persistence 
in national outcomes and could be linked to the Walters critique, meaning that 
national real interest rates could diverge sizeably and lead to an asymmetric 
transmission channel. Rather, we have not observed permanently increasing 
inflation differentials and have advanced the hypothesis that the Walter 
critique may have instead led to widening current account imbalances – in both 
directions – in several euro area countries, while the euro area has remained 
nearly balanced. Financial globalization has rendered it possible to borrow and 
lend internationally on a large scale: providing evidence of the vanishing of the 
Feldstein-Horioka paradox. Within the euro area, the absence of any currency 
risk and increased financial integration has rendered this new phenomenon more 
pronounced than elsewhere. Hence, we might be witnessing a transmutation of 
the Walters critique. Importantly, this is in part a self-equilibrating mechanism 
since real appreciation reduces demand for domestic goods, which exerts 
downward pressure on domestic inflation. Yet this phenomenon still needs to be 
better understood and would need to be addressed over time. 
REFERENCES
Adjaute, K., and J.P. Danthine. 2003. “European Financial Integration and Equity 
Returns: A Theory Based Assessment”. In The Transformation of the European 
Financial System, ed. V. Gaspar, P. Hartmann and O. Sleijpen , 185-246. 
Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank.
Alesina, A., O. Blanchard, J. Gali, F. Giavazzi, and H. Uhlig. 2001. Monitoring 
the European Central Bank. Vol. 3, Defining a Macroeconomic Framework for 
the Euro Area. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Allsopp, C., and D. Vines. 1998. “The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy after 
EMU.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14(3):1-23.
Angeloni, I., and M. Ehrmann. 2004. “Euro Area Inflation Differentials.” 
European Central Bank Working Paper 388.
Asdrubali, P., B. Sorensen, and O. Yosha. 1996. “Challenge of Interstate Risk 
Sharing: United States 1963-1990.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4): 
1081-1110.
Baele, L., A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl, E. Krylova, and C. Monnet. 2004. “Measuring 
Financial Integration in the Euro Area.” European Central Bank Occasional 
Paper 14.
Baldwin, R, V. Di Nino, L. Fontagné, R.A. De Santis, and D. Taglioni. 2008. 
European Economy: Economic Papers. Vol. 321 “Study on the Impact of the Euro 
on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.” Brussels: European Commission.
Baldwin, R.G. 2006. “The euro’s trade effects.” European Central Bank Working 
Paper 594.52 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
Baldwin, R. 2006. In or Out: Does it Matter? An Evidence-Based Analysis of the 
Euro’s Trade Effects. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Baldwin, R., F. Skudelny, and D. Taglioni. 2005. “Trade Effects of the Euro – 
Evidence from Sectoral Data.” European Central Bank Working Paper 446.
Balvers, R. J., and J. H. Bergstrand. 2002. “Government Expenditure and 
Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates.” Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 21(5): 667-692.
Begg, D., P. De Grauwe, F. Giavazzi, H. Uhlig, and C. Wyplosz. 1998. 
Monitoring the European Central Bank. Vol. 1, The ECB: Safe at Any Speed? 
London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Bergstrand, J.H. 1991. “Structural Determinants of Real Exchange Rates and 
National Price Levels: Some Empirical Evidence.” American Economic Review, 
81(1): 325-334.
Blinder, A. S., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratscher, J. De Haan, and D.J. Jansen. 2008. 
“Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: a Survey of Theory and 
Evidence.” Journal of Economic Literature, 46(4): 910-45.
Bun, M., and F. Klaassen. 2007. “The Euro Effect on Trade is not as 
Large as Commonly Thought.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
69(4): 473-496.
Berg, J., M. Grande, and F.P. Mongelli, ed. 2005. Elements of the euro 
area: integrating financial markets. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd.
Bertola, G. 2000. “Labor Markets in the European Union.” Ifo-Studien, 46(1): 
99-122.
Blanchard, O., and F. Giavazzi. 2003. “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and 
Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118(3): 879-907.
Blanchard, O., and J. Wolfers. 2000. “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in 
the rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence.” The Economic 
Journal, 110(462): C1-C33.
Bayoumi, T., and P.R. Masson. 1995. “Fiscal Flows in the United States and 
Canada: Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe.” European Economic Review, 
39(2): 253-274.
Cappiello, L., P. Hördahl, A. Kadareja, and S. Manganelli. 2006. “The Impact of 
the Euro on Financial Markets.” European Central Bank Working Paper 556.
Cappiello, L., R.F. Engle, and K. Shephard. 2006. “Asymmetric Dynamics in 
the Correlations of Global Equity and Bond Returns.” Journal of Financial 
Econometrics, 4(4): 537-572.53 THE EURO AT TEN – UNFULFILLED THREATS AND UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES
Coeurdacier, N., R. De Santis, and A. Aviat. 2009. “Cross-Border Mergers 
and Acquisitions: Financial and Institutional Forces.” European Central Bank 
Working Paper 1018.
Coeurdacier, N. and P. Martin. 2007. “The Geography of Asset Trade and the 
Euro: Insiders and Outsiders.” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper 6032.
Crowe, C.W., and E.E. Meade. 2008. “Central Bank Independence and 
Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness.” International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper 119.
Danthine, J. P., F. Giavazzi, L. von Thadden, and X. Vives. 1999. Monitoring 
European Integration. Vol. 9, The Future of European Banking. London: Centre 
for Economic Policy Research.
De Grauwe, P. and F.P. Mongelli. 2005. “Endogeneities of Optimum Currency 
Areas: What Brings Countries Sharing a Single Currency Closer Together?” 
European Central Bank Working Paper 468.
De Santis, R.A., and B. Gérard. 2006. “Financial Integration, International 
Portfolio Choice and the European Monetary Union.” European Central Bank 
Working Paper 626.
De Santis, R.A. 2006. “The Geography of International Portfolio Flows, 
International CAPM and the Role of Monetary Policy Frameworks.” European 
Central Bank Working Paper 678.
De Sousa, J., and J. Lochard. 2009. “Does the Single Currency Affect Foreign 
Direct Investment? A Gravity-Like Approach.” University of Paris 1. http://
jdesousa.univ.free.fr/recherche/travaux/deSousa_Lochard_FDI_jan09.pdf
Decressin, J., H. Fauqee and W. Fonteyne, ed. 2007. Integrating Europe’s 
Financial Markets. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Di Mauro, F., and R. Anderton, ed. 2007. The External Dimension of the Euro 
Area: Assessing the Linkages. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dincer, N., and B. Eichengreen. 2007. “Central Bank Transparency: Where, 
Why, and with What Effects?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 13003.
Dornbusch, R. 1980. Open Economy Macroeconomics. New York: Basic Books.
Duval, R., and J. Elmeskov. 2006. “The Efects of EMU on Structural Reforms in 
Labour and Product Markets.” European Central Bank Working Paper 596.
Eijffinger, S.C.W., and P.M. Geraats. 2006. “How Transparent Are Central 
Banks?” European Journal of Political Economy, 22(1): 1-21.
Emerson, M., D. Gros, A. Italianer, J. Pisani-Ferry, and H. Reichenbach. 1992. One 
Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming 
an Economic and Monetary Union. New York: Oxford University Press.54 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
Engel, C., and J.H. Rogers. 1996. “How Wide is the Border?” American 
Economic Review, 86(5): 1112–1125.
Engel, C., and J. Rogers. 2004. “European Product Market Integration After the 
Euro.” Economic Policy, 39(19): 347-384.
European Central Bank. 2005 “Monetary Policy and Inflation Differentials in a 
Heterogeneous Currency Area.” Monthly Bulletin, 7(5): 61-78.
European Central Bank. 2005. Review of the International Role of the Euro.
Vol. 4. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: European Central Bank.
European Central Bank. 2007. “Output Growth Differentials in the Euro Area: 
Sources and Implications.” Monthly Bulletin, 9(4): 73-86.
European Central Bank. 2007. Financial Integration in Europe. Vol. 1. Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany: European Central Bank.
European Central Bank. 2008. “Globalisation, Trade and the Euro Area 
Macroeconomy.” Monthly Bulletin, 10(1): 75-88.
European Central Bank. 2008. “European Central Bank – The First Ten Years.” 
Special Edition of the Monthly Bulletin, 10(5): 1-158.
European Commission. 1990. European Economy. Vol. 44, One market, 
One money. An evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an 
Economic and Monetary Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Commission.
European Commission. 2004. European Economy Special Report. Vol. 1, EMU 
after five years. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Commission.
European Commission. 2006. European Economy. Vol. 6, The EU Economy 2006 
Review: Adjustment Dynamics in the Euro area, Experiences and Challenges. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission.
European Commission. 2008. European Economy. Vol. 2, EMU@10: Successes 
and Challenges after 10 Years of Economic and Monetary Union. Brussels: The 
European Commission.
Fatás, A., and I. Mihov. 2001. “Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Monéda y Credito, 212:167-212.
Feldstein, M. 1997. “The Political Economy of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 11(4): 23-42.
Ferreira, A.L., and M.A. Leon-Ledesma. 2007. “Does the Real Interest Rate 
Parity Hold? Evidence for Developed and Emerging Markets.” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 26(3): 364-382.55 THE EURO AT TEN – UNFULFILLED THREATS AND UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES
Fischer, B., M. Lenza, H. Pill, and L. Reichlin. 2006. “Money and Monetary 
Policy: The ECB Experience 1999-2006.”http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/
conferences/cbc4/ReichlinPillLenzaFisher.pdf.
Flam, H., and H. Nordström. 2007. “The Euro and Single Market Impact on Trade 
and FDI”, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University. 
http://www-2.iies.su.se/~flamh/EuroeffectsontradeandFDI.pdf
Gali, J. 2003. “Monetary Policy in the Early Years of EMU”. In EMU and 
Economic Policy in Europe: Challenges of the Early Years, ed. M. Buti and 
A. Sapir. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gali, J., and R. Perotti. 2003. “Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe.” 
Economic Policy, 18(37): 533-572.
Gali, J., S. Gerlach, J. Rotenberg, H. Uhlog, and M. Wooford. 2004. Monitoring 
the European Central Bank. Vol. 5, The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB 
Reconsidered. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Geraats, P. 2009. “Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency.” University of 
Cambridge. http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/geraats/tptrends.pdf
Geraats, P. M., F. Giavazzi and C. Wyplosz. 2008. Monitoring the European 
Central Bank. Vol. 6, Transparency and Governance. London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research. 
Gérard, M. 2006. “Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in 
Europe, a Tentative Appraisal. ” Centre for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute 
for Economic Research 1795.
Giannone, D., M. Lenza, and L. Reichlin. 2008. “Explaining the Great 
Moderation: It Is Not the Shocks.” European Central Bank Working Paper 865.
Giannone, D., and L. Reichlin. 2006. “Trends and Cycles in the Euro Area: How 
Much Heterogeneity and Should We Worry about It?” European Central Bank 
Working Paper 595.
Ishiyama, I. 1975. “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: A Survey. ” 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 22: 344-383.
Issing, O. 2003. “Overview of the Background Studies for the Reflections on 
the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy.” In Background Studies for the Reflections 
on the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy, 2-31. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: 
European Central Bank.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B. E. Sørensen, and O. Yosha. 2003. “Economic Integration, 
Industrial Specialization, and the Asymmetry of Macroeconomic Fluctuations.” 
Journal of International Economics, 55(1): 107-137.
Maes, I. 2007. Half a Century of European Financial Integration: From the 
Rome Treaties to the 21st Century. Brussels: Mercatorfonds.56 MONGELLI, WYPLOSZ
Manganelli, S., and G. Wolswijk. 2006. “Market Discipline, Financial Integration 
and Fiscal Rules: What Drives Spreads in the Euro Area Government Bond 
Market?” European Central Bank Working Paper 745.
Melitz, J. 2004. “Risk Sharing and EMU.” Journal of Common Market Studies, 
42(4): 815-840.
Micco, A., E. Stein, and G. Ordoñez. 2003. “The Currency Union Effect on 
Trade: Early Evidence from EMU.” Economic Policy, 18(37): 315–356.
Mongelli, F.P. 2005. “What Is European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
Telling us about the Optimum Currency Area Properties?” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 43(3): 607-635.
Mongelli, F.P. 2008. “European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the 
Optimum Currency Area Theory.” DG ECFIN European Economy Economic 
Paper 302.
Mongelli, F.P., E. Dorrucci, and I. Agur. 2007. “What Does European 
Institutional Integration Tell Us about Trade Integration?” Integration and 
Trade, 11(26): 151-200.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2005. Economic 
Policy Reforms. Vol. 1, Going for Growth. Paris: OECD.
Ottaviano, G., D. Taglioni, and F. Di Mauro. 2007. “Deeper, Wider and More 
Competitive? Monetary Integration, Eastern Enlargement and Competitiveness 
in the European Union.” European Central Bank Working Paper 847.
Paredes, J., and J.J. Pérez. 2008. “A Quarterly Fiscal Database for the Euro Area 
(1970-2007), Based on Intra-Annual Fiscal Information.” European Central Bank 
and Bank of Spain. Unpublished.
Pedregal, D.J., and J.J. Pérez. 2008. “Should quarterly government finance 
statistics be used for fiscal surveillance in Europe?” European Central Bank 
Working Paper 937.
Pesaran, M.H., S. Yongcheol, and R.P. Smith. 1999. “Pooled Mean Group 
Estimation of Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels.” Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 94(446): 621-634.
Petroulas, P. 2007. “The Effect of the Euro on Foreign Direct Investment.” 
European Economic Review, 51(6): 1468-1491.
Pisani-Ferry, J., P. Aghion, A. Ahearne, M. Belka, J. von Hagen, L. Heikensten, 
and A. Sapir. 2008. Coming of Age: Report on the euro area. Vol. 4. Brussels: 
Bruegel Blueprint Series.
Rose, A. 2000. “One money, One Market: the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade.” Economic Policy, 15(30): 7-46.57 THE EURO AT TEN – UNFULFILLED THREATS AND UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES
Rose, A. 2004. “A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Common Currencies on 
International Trade.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
10373.
Rose, A., and E. van Wincoop. 2001. “National Money as a Barrier to 
International Trade, The Real Case for Currency Union.” American Economic 
Review, 91(2): 386-390.
Nouriel, R., E. Parisi-Capone, and C. Menegatti. 2007. “Growth Differentials 
in the EMU: Facts and considerations.” http://www.aei-ecsa.de/dokumente/
tagung_eurozone_roubini.pdf
Sachs, J., and X. Sala-i-Martin. 1991. “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency 
Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 3855.
Saint-Paul, G., and S. Bentolila. 2000. “Will EMU Increase Eurosclerosis?” 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 2423.
Sauer, S. 2007. “Discretion Rather than Rules? When is Discretionary Policy-
Making Better than the Timeless Perspective?” European Central Bank Working 
Paper 717.
Schiavo, S. 2007. “Common Currencies and Foreign Direct Investment Flows.” 
Oxford Economic Papers, 59(3): 536-560.
Smets, F. 2008. “Monetary Policy in the Euro area: A Comment on Geraats and 
Neumann.” Unpublished.
Svensson, L.E.O. 1999. “Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 51(1): 79-136.
Svensson, L.E.O. 2003. “How Should the Eurosystem Reform Its Monetary 
Strategy?” Briefing Note. Brussels: European Parliament.
Sørensen, B.E., and O. Yosha. 2000. “Is Risk Sharing in the United States a 
Regional Phenomenon?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic 
Review, 85:33-47.
Van der Cruijsen, C., and M. Demertzis. 2007. “The Impact of Central 
Bank Transparency on Inflation Expectations.” European Journal of Political 
Economy, 23(1): 51-66.
Von Hagen, J., and C. Wyplosz. 2008. “EMU’s Decentralized System of Fiscal 
Policy.” European Commission’s European Economy Economic Paper 306.
Woodford, M. 2007. “Does a ‘Two-Pillar Phillips Curve’ Justify a Two-Pillar 
Monetary Policy Strategy?” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper 6447.
Wyplosz, C. 2006. “European Monetary Union: the Dark Sides of a Major 
Success.” Economic Policy, 46(46): 207-261.58 CASELLI
COMMENT
BY FRANCESCO CASELLI, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This very interesting paper presents a rich, indeed almost encyclopedic, overview 
of the many issues emerging from the first ten years of the adventure called EMU. 
I will not try to offer a blow-by-blow response to all the points made in the paper, 
particularly because I agree with much of what the authors say. Instead, I will 
focus my remarks on two main themes, where my perspective diverges somewhat 
from the one set out by the authors. Before I do that, however, I want to reiterate 
my admiration for the authors for the rich canvas of data and observations they 
have mobilized to give us as complete a picture of the economic evolution of the 
Euro area in the last ten years as I know of.
The two themes I will focus my remarks on are interrelated. The first is the 
question of success. Mongelli and Wyplosz are clear enthusiasts, and the overall 
message of the paper, in tone if not in substance, is that the Euro has been a great 
success. In my comments I will begin by arguing that this assessment is likely 
to depend on how we define success. Furthermore, if one measures success in 
terms of improvement in welfare-relevant measures relative to likely outcomes 
had EMU not happened – which I argue to be the most reasonable definition of 
success – it is very hard to qualify EMU as a success.
The second theme I want to revisit is the theme of surprise. Mongelli and Wyplosz 
stress many aspects of the economic experience with EMU that have been 
surprising. While I agree that some of the specific points they make are valid,
 I also think it is important to recognize that overall things have gone roughly the 
way most economists would have predicted ten years ago. In particular, I believe 
that a “representative economist” would have predicted EMU to be a fairly minor 
economic event, with some small microeconomic benefits roughly balanced out 
by some equally small macroeconomic costs. On average, I think one can argue 
that this is roughly what has happened. On the other hand, I do believe there 
have been very surprising political developments. In particular, the process of 
European political unification has stalled. In my concluding paragraphs I will 
advance the conjecture that EMU may unwittingly have contributed to the 
creation of a political climate inimical to political union.
1  IS EMU A SUCCESS?
It is very easy to argue that EMU (or for that matter any policy) has been a huge 
success. All one has to do is to choose a very undemanding definition of success. 
If all one asks of EMU is not to have been a disaster, then EMU was a rousing 
success: inflation has been stable, interest rates have been low, countries have not 
run wildly pro-cyclical fiscal policies out of fear of running foul of the stability 
and growth path (though that may have something to do with the intrinsic lack 59 COMMENT SESSION 1
of credibility of the pact, which may be an issue for EMU enthusiasts), and more 
generally the macroeconomic environment has been fairly stable. Not even the 
most rabid critic can argue that the EMU has been a disaster.
However, we can’t possibly be content with setting the bar for success so low. 
After all, we would never have embarked upon the EMU adventure had the 
economic case for it been that the outcome was unlikely to be disastrous. Rather, 
a clear case was made that EMU would be welfare improving. What that meant 
was that living standards in the EMU would increase more under EMU over the 
subsequent ten years, than they would without EMU. And indeed that was the 
only basis on which an economic argument for EMU could have been made. By 
the same token, the correct way to think about success is to ask whether we are 
better off than we would have been without EMU.
Unfortunately, confidently assessing success by this more demanding criterion 
is exceedingly difficult – which, incidentally, may explain why so often we give 
into the temptation of using less demanding, but easier to measure, yardsticks. 
Obviously we will never know what would have happened in the EMU area 
had EMU not happened, so we can’t make the comparison that we really want 
to make. The best we can do is to compare the experience of EMU members 
with the experience of non-EMU members, i.e. to use the non-EMU members 
as “stand ins” for EMU members under the alternative scenario in which EMU 
did not happen. Clearly such an exercise is fully convincing only if EMU 
participation is the only systematic source of difference in outcomes between 
EMU and non-EMU countries. Since there is no reason to believe this to be the 
case, and plenty of scope for arguing that the opposite is likely to be true, it is 
fair to say that the extent to which EMU was a success or a failure will always be 
a matter of speculation. 1 With that very important caveat firmly in mind, let me 
indulge in some speculation. 
An important preliminary question is what the outcomes are by which we should 
judge EMU. There is a thriving literature trying to assess the effects of the euro 
on a number of economic outcomes that are thought to be important: bilateral 
trade, capital flows, interest rates, etc. Ultimately, though, we care about these 
things not in their own right, but because we expect them to affect our overall 
level of welfare. EMU should thus be evaluated for its ability to lift welfare-
relevant indicators.
The most obvious choice of welfare-relevant indicator is GDP per capita. An 
economy’s output of good and services per person remains, despite all the 
appropriate caveats, the best available proxy for its capacity to satisfy human 
wants. In Chart 1 I plotted EMU GDP per capita as well as GDP per capita in 
1  Of course a partial solution to the problem discussed above is to try to control for as many 
other determinants of country performance as possible. Indeed, there is a growing literature 
of multi-variable regressions of various outcomes on an EMU dummy and controls. The 
solution is only partial, however, because some of the determinants of differences in 
outcomes may be unmeasurable, and therefore omitted by definition from the list of controls. 
Furthermore, the multivariable-regression approach brings its own problems, particularly if 
some of the control variables are themselves endogenous.60 CASELLI
the rest of the OECD against time. I am choosing the rest of the OECD as my 
control group because it is a natural subset of countries that are “similar” to 
the countries that formed EMU, so I suspect it is the group whose experience 
is most likely to be informative about what would have happened to the Emu 
countries without EMU. By GDP per capita I literally mean the aggregate GDP 
of the EMU (non-EMU) countries divided by their aggregate population (in other 
words I am weighting national GDPs by population). To facilitate comparison, 
I have normalized both GDPs in 1980 to 1 – in other words I am comparing 
growth experiences. The source for the data in this and all subsequent Charts is 
the OECD database.
Chart 1 shows that in the 1980s and 1990s the growth performance of OECD 
countries that would later go on to form EMU was essentially undistinguishable 
from the growth performance of the rest of the OECD. In other words, so-called 
“pre-trends” are similar, and this to some (admittedly very limited) extent is good 
news for the validity of the rest of the OECD as a control group for EMU. After 
EMU, a gap opens up in favor of the Rest of the OECD. As I already emphasized 
before, there are likely other factors driving the relatively poorer performance of 
the EMU area in the EMU era. What is certain is that the prima facie evidence 
is hardly supportive of a beneficial role of EMU in fostering improved living 
standards in the countries that adopted the euro.
When thinking about welfare, economists do not only focus on average levels, 
but also on volatility. In particular, one could argue that policies that lead to more 
stable consumption patterns are welfare improving even if they do not imply a 
higher average consumption level. This is because consumers are deemed to 
prefer a smooth pattern of consumption over a volatile one. Accordingly, in 
Chart 2 I plot a measure of consumption volatility inside and outside EMU. 
Specifically, for each country I first compute a rolling standard deviation of the 
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per-capita consumption growth rate, using quarterly data and a two-year window. 
I then take the period average of the standard deviations across the countries 
inside and outside EMU. 
Chart 2 indicates that both EMU and non-EMU countries have experienced a 
substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility since the 1970s. There is of 
course nothing new in this finding: this is the era of the Great Moderation – 
a topic I return to briefly below. Overall, however, the trend towards lower 
volatility seems somewhat more marked outside than inside EMU. Also after 
EMU (quarter 76) volatility seems to have fallen a bit more outside EMU. The 
Chart makes it even harder than before to hazard any statements on causality, 
particularly because pre-trend seem to differ in this case. But at a minimum it 
does not encourage us to conjecture that EMU reduced macro volatility relative 
to what would have been the case without EMU.
While many economists assume that inflation affects welfare indirectly, some 
economists attach welfare significance to the inflation rate per se. Without taking 
a stand on this issue, in Chart 3 I plot the average inflation rate in my “treatment” 
and “control” group. Clearly by a naïve standard the rest of the OECD did better 
since EMU, as it experienced declining inflation while the EMU area did not, and 
by the end of the sample period the inflation rate was the same inside and out. 
But this would be too unfair to EMU: the pre-trends are very different, and in 
particular by the beginning of EMU monetary policy in the euro area was already 
so good that inflation had nowhere lower to fall. In this respect, EMU represents 
a curious example of wholesale removal of power from a set of institutions (the 
national central banks) that had been doing a remarkably good job – and may 


















well have continued to do so had they been allowed to continue, as the experience 
of the non-EMU countries suggest.
In sum, a very simple comparisons of the experiences of the EMU area and 
the Rest of the OECD is not consistent with the view that EMU has brought its 
citizens higher or more stable living standards than they would have enjoyed 
had EMU not been introduced. If anything, the prima facie evidence points in 
the opposite direction. But perhaps the best way to think about the evidence in 
Charts 1-3 is the following. Given the similarity of performance between EMU 
and the control group under EMU, arguing that the EMU has brought welfare 
gains means arguing that EMU countries would have severely under-performed 
the rest of the OECD had EMU not been introduced. It is very hard for me to 
think of compelling reasons why that would have been true.
2  HOW SURPRISING HAVE THE LAST 10 YEARS BEEN?
Mongelli and Wyplosz focus on a number of economic developments since EMU 
that have been somewhat surprising. Without dissenting from their analysis of 
these issues, I would argue that the overall economic picture has been remarkably 
unsurprising. 
Asked in the late 1990s to list pros and cons of joining EMU I suspect most 
economists would have come up with very similar lists, as well as similar 
assessments of their magnitudes. On the positive side of the list he/she would 
have listed some gains from lower transaction costs on existing trade (small 
positive), some increase in within-EMU trade (small positive), some efficiency 
gain from greater transparence in price differences (very small positive), some 
efficiency gain from greater capital mobility (small positive), some increased 
Chart 3 Average inflation rate
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seigniorage, as acquisition of world reserve status may more than compensate 
for loss of seigniorage at national level (small positive). On the negative side 
there would of course have been the inability of conducting monetary policies 
appropriate to each country’s needs. It is probably fair to say that opinions would 
have differed more substantially among economists about the magnitude of this 
cost, ranging from small to sizable, than about the benefits of the items in the 
“pros” list. But my very rough guess is that on balance most economists would 
have been inclined to think that, by and large, cost and benefits would cancel 
each other out, resulting in either a small net benefit, or a small net cost. 2
For reasons we already discussed, it is very difficult to say whether the various 
specific predictions on costs and benefits were accurate, but I don’t think there is 
anything in the data, or in casual observation, that would lead us to conclude in 
the negative. Furthermore, the coarse exercises I have presented in the previous 
section are clearly in keeping with what I described as the representative ex-ante 
view of the net overall effect: whether positive or negative, it was likely quite 
small, as expected. In sum, in terms of economics, the last 10 years have not been 
surprising at all.
One important qualification to this conclusion is that 10 years may not be long 
enough for the effects of the euro, whether positive or negative, to fully reveal 
themselves. On the positive side, one could potentially argue that some of the 
microeconomic gains come from gradual investments and structural changes that 
take a long time to come to fruition. For example, the point has been made that 
we have not yet seen the full effect of the Euro on trade. While this is possible, 
I suspect that, if there are surprises lurking in the future, they are more likely to 
be on the cost side of the ledger.
The main concern is that the last 10 years have been characterized, as already 
noted, by an unprecedented climate of macroeconomic stability. Thanks to the 
Great Moderation, virtually any monetary arrangement would have worked well 
for EMU countries. In this sense the ECB has been very lucky: it got 10 years 
of very calm waters to learn the ropes. But this also means that EMU is still 
somewhat untested. In particular, we still don’t know how the system will 
cope with big asymmetric shocks, or even from a sequence of large aggregate 
shocks – particularly in the face of mounting political pressures from national 
governments. In this sense, we may end up learning more about the costs and 
benefits of EMU in the next 10 months than we did in the last 10 years.
While, subject to the caveat above, the economic effects of EMU have been 
rather unsurprising, one could potentially argue that the euro has had some 
surprising, and unintended, political consequences. The starting point for this 
argument is to acknowledge that, in fact, the main point of the euro was never 
2  Mongelli and Wyplosz tend to give the impression that the balance of opinion in the 
economic profession was much more negative than this. But my impression is that they are 
over-sampling from the tail of the distribution. It also goes without saying that I am not only 
averaging across economists, but also across countries: any economist worth her salt knows 
that these costs and benefits will vary, sometimes dramatically, depending on a country’s 
circumstances.64 CASELLI
economic. The main reason why we have EMU is that it was a central element 
in the strategy, long pursued by certain European governments largely with the 
cooperation of the European Commission, to bring about political unification 
by stealth. In this strategy, economic unification would create the momentum to 
bring about political unification, and European economic institutions would form 
the blueprint for the future political institutions of the United States of Europe. 
The “unification by stealth” project seemed hard to stop or reverse in the late 
1990s. In my view the big surprise of the last ten years has been that, contrary to 
expectation, the process has stalled. There have undoubtedly been many reasons 
for the unification process to hit the rocks. For example, enlargement diluted 
the political weight of some of the countries at the core of the unification drive 
(while at the same time making these countries less keen on unification). But the 
difficulties encountered by the various treaties and constitutions that European 
leaders have submitted to their citizens’ approval stem, at least in some part, from 
popular disillusion with things European.
As Mongelli and Wyplosz point out, the euro has suffered a substantial decline 
in popularity over its lifetime. As anyone who has regular conversations with 
individuals who are not particularly literate in economics knows, part of this loss in 
popularity comes from the fact that many in the general population suspect the euro 
of being responsible for the fairly lackluster rates of economic growth experienced 
by many EMU countries in the last few years (see Chart 1). This view is, of course, 
probably unfair: as my discussion in the previous section suggests, while we can’t 
credit the euro for lifting living standards (relative to the no-euro alternative), 
we also probably can’t blame it for the slow growth of the last several years. 
Fair or unfair, however, it is out there, and it shapes political orientations. 3
If (some) voters blame the euro for slow growth in their country, it will not 
take them a huge leap to extend their dislike to other European institutions 
and policies. Disappointment with the euro may therefore feed into political 
opposition to further steps towards European integration, including, if not 
primarily, political unification. Since the euro was actually originally introduced 
to facilitate that project, this would be a textbook example of the law of 
unintended consequences.
CONCLUSION
It is nearly impossible to say with any high degree of confidence whether the euro 
has been a success or a failure, when success and failure are sensibly defined. But 
3  Mongelli and Wyplosz suggest a different explanation for the decline in popularity of the 
euro. They hint that it has to do with the ECB’s lack of transparency. There are many 
arguments in favor of greater ECB transparency that one could very plausibly, indeed 
conclusively, make, but this is not one of them. It is very far fetched that the publication 
of ECB minutes would make the Euro popular. As mentioned, it is much more likely that 
consumers are responding to the lack of tangible benefits from Euro adoption (particularly 
in the face of inflated pre-Euro hype) and to national politicians’ encouragement to blame 
the ECB (which would likely become even easier to do with transparency).65 COMMENT SESSION 1
it is possible to make a fairly plausible educated guess that, if it was a success, 
it was a small success, and if it was a failure, the failure was also small. In other 
words, the most plausible thing one can say is that it has had very little impact on 
the welfare of EMU-area citizens. This is exactly as one should have expected. 
There were no compelling reasons ex-ante to expect EMU to have a large net 
impact on living standards, so we should not be surprised that we detect little 
effect ex-post. 
What has been surprising is that political unification in Europe has stalled. 
Even more startling, given that EMU was expected to have exactly the opposite 
effect, is that one can potentially build an argument that EMU has contributed to 
slowing down the unification drive.66 CONSTÂNCIO
COMMENT
BY VÍTOR CONSTÂNCIO, GOVERNOR OF BANCO DE PORTUGAL
The euro area is a milestone in the realm of monetary economics. A decade past, 
it is a pleasure to take an evaluative look back at our experience of sharing a 
single currency. The paper by Mongelli and Wyplosz is a good starting point to 
spark this reflection and discussion.
I would like to start with a note of caution. Any evaluation of the impact of monetary 
unification has to tackle the overriding issue of the absence of a consensual 
counterfactual. The problem here is that the equilibrium outcomes that we observe 
in the data result from the combination of the myriad of shocks, structures and 
policies in the euro area, and only a subset of these are directly or indirectly related 
to the introduction of the euro. The absence of such a counterfactual poses serious 
challenges in any assessment of the role of the euro area in driving the data.
Nonetheless, there are several transmission channels and adjustment mechanisms 
in the context of EMU that can be well identified and that are broadly discussed 
by Mongelli and Wyplosz. The authors are particularly careful in surveying the 
literature and cautious in drawing conclusions, even though some of the instruments 
used seem not robust and are ultimately unconvincing (most prominently the 
bivariate relations presented in Charts 13 and 20). With this in mind, I would 
subscribe to most of them. In particular it seems important to underline three of those 
conclusions. First, a commonly encountered misperception in popular circles states 
that there is a high level of heterogeneity among euro area countries. However, in 
reality, the degree of dispersion of GDP growth, output gaps and inflation among 
euro area countries has been broadly stable in the last decade, and at levels that 
are relatively low by historical standards (see Charts 1, 2 and 3 below and Chart 1 
Chart 1 Weighted standard deviation of year-on-year change in HICP
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in Mongelli and Wyplosz’s paper). Second, the conduct of fiscal policy in a 
monetary union is very important. This can be illustrated by the role played 
by the Stability and Growth Pact (in particular in its recently revised form) in 
setting the right incentives aimed at fiscal sustainability. This medium to long 
run goal is particularly pertinent in the current context of financial crisis. The 
third conclusion of the authors worth highlighting is that adjustment mechanisms 
work in the euro area. This is particularly the case of the equilibrating mechanism 
through external competitiveness (which the authors inaccurately link to Hume’s 
description of the stability of a metallic system through monetary flows) as well 
as the supposedly destabilising effect of real interest rate movements (which the 
authors dub “Walters Critique”).
Chart 2 Weighted standard deviation of year-on-year change in GDP 
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In the remainder of this discussion, I would like to build on the authors’ analysis 
and evaluate the euro area experience through the lens of the Portuguese 
economy. The Portuguese adjustment experience is particularly interesting given 
that many of the incentive structures and adjustment mechanisms underlying the 
functioning of a monetary union can be vividly observed since 1995. In fact, the 
behaviour of the Portuguese economy in the past decade can be described as a 
story of adjustment to the new rules of the game in a monetary union.
To start with, it is useful to distinguish between the transition of the economy to 
the new monetary regime and the subsequent adjustment of the economy within 
the rules and incentives established in the euro area. I will deal with each in turn. 
THE TRANSITION TO THE EURO AREA
The introduction of the euro represented a true regime change in Portugal 
(see Mongelli and Vega (2006) and Fagan and Gaspar (2007)). As in other 
converging countries, the transition to a regime of low and stable inflation and 
interest rates, without exchange rate risk and with easier access to external 
financing by domestic agents, led in equilibrium to a boom in consumption and 
investment (see Charts 4 and 5), a decline in the private sector’s savings rate and 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The indebtedness of the private sector 
also increased significantly, in line with the new regime of permanently lower 
and more stable interest rates. 
In normal circumstances, this boom phase would be followed by a gradual 
deceleration towards the new steady state growth path (arguably slightly higher 
than the one prevailing before the monetary unification), as agents adapted to the 
new solvency conditions resulting from their intertemporal budget constraints. 
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However, in the Portuguese case, the transition to the euro area was followed, 
at the beginning of the 00s, by a sharp adjustment to a protracted period of 
very low growth. It should be noted that given the brevity of the boom, and in 
contrast to other euro area economies, no house price bubble emerged in the 
property market.
This sharp deceleration of the economy was related, as usual, to the interplay 
between the shocks – of differing persistence – hitting the economy, the 
structural characteristics influencing the incentives of the agents and the set 
of policies followed during this period. Four of these elements are worth 
highlighting. First, the early 2000s decade were characterised by a deceleration 
of the Portuguese main trading partners and significant oil price shocks, which 
had a sizeable impact on the Portuguese economy. Second, the prospects of 
monetary unification triggered a rational intertemporal response of bringing 
forward consumption and investment decisions, also magnified by enhanced 
growth expectations; the subsequent sharp revision of these expectations led 
to a related revision of investment decisions (see Christiano et al. (2008) for 
a description of the main mechanisms). Fiscal policy also contributed to a 
reversal of these expectations. Third, the Portuguese economy did not seize 
up fully the global technological improvements observed since the 90s, given 
its relatively low level of human capital. Finally, the intensification of the 
globalization process led to significant changes in the revealed comparative 
advantage of the Portuguese economy, with the increasing participation in world 
trade of countries with relatively similar specialization patterns compared to the 
Portuguese economy but much lower unit labour costs. The transition to these 
new comparative advantages was also hampered by the existence of several 
rigidity factors in the economy. These four factors are good illustrations of the 
difficulty in singling out the role of the introduction of the euro to explain the 

















behaviour of the observed macroeconomic data in any country of the monetary 
union (other structural developments, namely the increased worldwide financial 
integration could also be mentioned in this respect). 
THE ADJUSTMENT IN THE EURO AREA
Despite the identification issues mentioned in the previous section, I will now 
contend that shortly after the introduction of the euro the Portuguese economy 
started an adjustment process, fostered inter alia by the incentives set in place by 
the “rules of the game” in the monetary union and by the structure of the Portuguese 
economy. I will focus on four elements: the role of fiscal policy, the real interest 
rate channel, the competitiveness channel and the role of risk-sharing.
During the run-up to the euro area and until 2005, fiscal policy in Portugal was 
mostly procyclical and characterized by an unsustainable increase in primary 
expenditure (including in the pension system) and by successive revisions in 
budgetary plans and targets (see Charts 6 and 7). This behaviour of the fiscal 
authorities (i) exacerbated growth expectations in the late 90s and contributed to 
the sharp reversion of expectations in the early 00s; (ii) increased the uncertainty 
surrounding the decisions of economic agents – namely given the uncertainty 
concerning the measures that would be implemented to correct the fiscal 
imbalance – and thus failed to deliver a macroeconomic stability framework that 
would enhance intertemporal investment decisions; (iii) delayed the decisions 
towards ensuring a sustainable fiscal framework in the long-run. This Portuguese 
experience underlines the importance of attaining a sustainable fiscal position 
before joining the monetary union and maintaining it afterwards. 
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In 2005, with the budget deficit reaching over 6 per cent of GDP, the newly-elected 
government supported by a single-party majority in the Parliament took measures 
to reverse the situation, in a context of broad public support for budgetary action. 
Furthermore, the revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) offered an agreed 
multilateral framework to support the consolidation effort and to rationalize fiscal 
measures aimed at sustainability. After 2005 fiscal policy accomplished a decline 
of the deficit (adjusted for temporary measures) below the 3 per cent threshold, a 
fall in the cyclically-adjusted primary current expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
the fulfilment (and surpassing) of the targets set in the Stability Programmes and 
the implementation of an important reform of the pension system, which allowed 
Portugal to move from a high to a medium-risk group in terms of ageing related 
expenditures. In the Portuguese case, it is clear that the revised SGP was a crucial 
tool to communicate the rationale of the need for fiscal consolidation and also to 
enforce a higher degree of control of public expenditures. 
In a monetary union, there are mechanisms which endogenously amplify 
or mitigate the propagation of shocks to the economies (see European 
Commission (2008)). The real interest rate channel is typically interpreted as a 
destabilizing factor, given that countries with higher growth and inflation face 
lower real rates which foster higher demand and growth, and subsequent higher 
inflation (this is what Mongelli and Wyplosz call “the Walters critique”). 
A high degree of inflation persistence tends to exacerbate this real interest rate 
channel. In the specific case of the Portuguese economy inflation expectations 
were anchored at levels slightly above the euro area throughout the last decade 
(see Chart 8). Ex-ante and ex-post real interest rates were thus lower in Portugal 
relative to the euro area. However, and in contrast with the “Walters critique” 
the gap vis-à-vis the euro area did not grow throughout this period (actually, 
inflation was below the euro area levels in 2008).
Chart 7 Cyclically adjusted primary current expenditure
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It is also interesting to note that movements in the short term interest rates have a 
stronger real impact in Portugal vis-à-vis the euro area, due to the relatively higher 
indebtedness levels of the private sector and the relatively higher share of loans 
with variable interest rates indexed to money market rates. This implied that the 
low level of nominal and real interest rates throughout the last decade contributed 
to foster growth in Portugal vis-à-vis the euro area. Given that the Portuguese 
economy lagged behind the euro area in terms of growth during the last decade, the 
behaviour of the real interest rate thus acted as a stabilizing channel. 
In contrast with the real interest rate channel, the competitiveness channel 
is typically interpreted as an equilibrating mechanism in a monetary union. 
Countries with higher inflation (usually countries with strong domestic demand) 
become less competitive, which reduces external demand for home produced 
goods and increases import penetration by foreign suppliers, thus reducing the 
initial growth differential. General-equilibrium simulations suggest that the 
competitiveness channel tends to build up slowly but is dominant in the long 
run. In particular, if the responsiveness of inflation to the buoyancy/weakness of 
economic activity and the responsiveness of output to changes in competitiveness 
are weak, the adjustment may be very lengthy. In the case of the Portuguese 
economy, most indicators suggest that during the last decade there was an overall 
loss in competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area, using the typical 
relative real exchange rate indicators based on inflation or unit labour costs.1 
However, a closer look at the data suggests that the dynamics of both inflation 
1  A note of caution is nevertheless required in this context: the interpretation of these 
competitiveness indicators is very challenging, in particular in the context of the 
intensification of the globalization process and given the lack of reliable series for sectoral 
unit labour costs in the Portuguese economy.
Chart 8 Short-term real interest rates
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and unit labour costs broadly converged to the euro area levels already in the 
early 2000s decade (Charts 9 and 10). More recently, the Portuguese inflation 
rate actually declined below the euro area average. 
In the context of a relatively low rate of growth of the economy, the magnitude of 
adjustment of prices and unit labour costs was arguably moderate. This may have 
Chart 9 Unit labor costs – total economy
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been related to the high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity in the context 
of a protracted period of low inflation and low productivity growth, which may 
have limited the responsiveness of wages to the unemployment rate. It may also 
have been due to the increased financial integration of the Portuguese economy, 
which allowed a greater sharing of risk within the euro area and the smoothing of 
temporary and idiosyncratic shocks to the agents’ income and wealth. 
This increased sharing of risk is a general feature across euro area countries 
since the 1990s (see Giannone and Reichlin (2006)). The behaviour of the 
Portuguese economy after 2003 illustrates particularly well this pattern, with 
the maintenance of a downward trend in the private sector’s saving rate and a 
broad stabilization of the investment rate (Chart 11). The ensuing current account 
Chart 11 Borrowing requirements of the private sector
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Chart 12 Trade balance (with and without energy)
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deficit was accommodated by particularly favourable conditions in international 
financial markets until mid-2007. These conditions were reflected in favourable 
financing conditions of the private sector. In fact, over these years, Portuguese 
banks ensured the channelling of funds from international investors to finance 
consumption and investment of the non-financial private sector. This allowed the 
smoothing of expenditures even in the face of the unprecedented oil price shocks 
observed in the 2000s decade (Chart 12). Moreover, relative to the euro area, 
there was a significant smoothing of consumption expenditures by households 
in recent years, in contrast with the behaviour of investment (Chart 13). The 
favourable financing conditions translated into an increase in the indebtedness 
of households and firms (Chart 14). However, interest payments are estimated to 
have been broadly stable as a percentage of GDP. 




















Chart 14 Indebtedness of the non-financial private sector
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The banking sector also adjusted fast to the changing economic environments 
during this period. One example is the increase in the capital adequacy ratio 
since 2000. Another prominent example is that the supply conditions in the 
credit market changed in recent years, mitigating the effect of rising interest 
rates on the debt service and improving the ability of households and firms 
to service debt and sustain the demand for credit. The lengthening of loan 
maturities was among those changes.
Increased risk-sharing tends to prolong the reallocation of resources. On the one 
hand, increased access to financing “buys time” for temporarily insolvent agents 
to improve their intertemporal financial position. On the other hand, it sustains 
the maintenance of significant mismatches between domestic supply and demand 
and delays the decision of insolvent companies to leave the market. Participation 
in a monetary union thus implies that the equilibrium adjustment of an economy 
will be smoothened and more prolonged over time.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The developments in the Portuguese economy during the last decade illustrate 
several of the main features of the incentive structure and the adjustment 
mechanisms working in the euro area. Four main insights from the Portuguese 
experience are worth highlighting. 
First, it is important to learn the rules of the game well in advance. When 
Portugal entered the euro area, the functioning of the new regime was not 
broadly understood. This was clear, for example, in the fact that fiscal authorities 
continued to respond to short-term incentives instead of focusing on long-run 
sustainability or that structural reforms implemented during this period were not 
ambitious enough to significantly facilitate domestic adjustment in the face of 
common or idiosyncratic shocks.2 The long period to learn the rules of the game 
in Portugal may have mitigated the welfare gains associated with the participation 
in the euro area. Second, the real interest rate and the competitiveness channels 
seem to have favoured a gradual adjustment of the economy and have worked in 
a stabilizing way in the Portuguese case. This evaluation is obviously conditional 
on the interplay between the (temporary and structural) shocks hitting the 
economy, the economic structures and the policies in place. 
Third, increased financial integration, in part fostered by the participation in 
the euro area, allowed an increased risk sharing of the economy – enlarging the 
choice-set faced by economic agents – but prolonged the necessary adjustment 
process of the economy to the changing international landscape. Fourth, the 
participation in the euro area accentuated the importance of focusing on the long-
run sustainability of fiscal positions. In particular, the revised SGP represented 
a framework that eventually allowed the right incentives to be delivered to the 
public authorities in Portugal. 
2  For an analysis of the absence of reforms in the euro area, see Leiner-Killinger et 
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To conclude, the Portuguese experience adds to the evidence on the appropriate 
functioning of adjustment mechanisms in the euro area. However, it should be 
clear that these mechanisms can never be expected to be substitutes for reforms 
aimed at facilitating economic adjustment in the face of shocks or ultimately 
increasing productivity in the long run. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Assaf Razin pointed out that one can currently observe current account 
imbalances in many counties outside the euro area, for example in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States. This suggests that the cause of the current 
account imbalances within the euro area may have nothing to do with EMU. 
Philip Lane observed that the euro seems to have had a large impact on small 
countries in EMU and a small impact on large countries in EMU. Furthermore, 
people in small countries, such as Ireland, seem to be happy with the euro. Lucas 
Papademos said that, while the inflation rates have broadly converged within the 
euro area, the ECB will continue to watch any persistent inflation differentials. 
Furthermore, he expressed scepticism concerning the view that the ECB has been 
lucky during the first decade of the EMU, for example, because wage growth 
has been moderate. In fact, monetary policy of the ECB has contributed to the 
wage growth moderation. Lucrezia Reichlin found it important to distinguish 
between the effects of the euro on long-term phenomena, such as the effects on 
trade, and the effects of the euro on short-term phenomena, such as the effects 
on the synchronization of business cycles within the euro area. Reichlin’s 
research shows that there has been no significant change in the business cycle 
synchronization within the euro area since the launch of the euro. In this sense, 
there is no evidence that the abandonment of national monetary policy has been 
harmful. According to Alex Cukierman, the ECB is credible and it has inherited 
credibility from the Bundesbank. As a consequence, after the launch of the euro 
real interest rates fell in the euro area countries other than Germany, uncertainty 
decreased, and economic outcomes improved. Francesco Giavazzi expressed 
surprise at the view that assessing the economic consequences of the euro is 
impossible due to the absence of a counterfactual. In fact, careful identification 
can provide a counterfactual. Furthermore, Giavazzi found the transmutation of 
the Walters critique outlined in the Mongelli-Wyplosz paper to be a red herring. 
According to Giavazzi, an increase in financial integration between the euro area 
countries has naturally allowed greater persistence of current account deficits and 
surpluses. Seppo Honkapohja noted that Finland and Sweden have both done 
well in the last decade, although one country is in EMU and the other country 
is not. It is difficult to see a difference in economic outcomes between Finland 
and Sweden in the last decade. The only difference seems to be that travelling 
to Sweden is a nuisance, because one needs to change money. In comparing 
the experiences of Finland and Sweden, it is important to keep in mind that 
Sweden has followed good economic policies, including good monetary 
policy. Hence, one can say that it is possible for a European country to do well 
without the euro, provided that the country follows good policies. According to 
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, the euro has clearly benefited people in the euro area. 
Kalemli-Ozcan’s research shows that small countries have gained substantially 
from the euro in terms of international risk sharing.80
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ABSTRACT
We assess the impact of the euro on financial integration. We document how the 
single currency has re-shaped financial markets and international investment 
patterns. We address the macroeconomic implications of enhanced financial 
integration, with a particular focus on the shift in net capital flows and the 
extent of international risk sharing. Finally, we outline the challenges posed by 
increased financial integration for the ECB and other European policymakers.
1 INTRODUCTION
The financial system provides the central link between the issuers of currency 
and the real economy. Accordingly, an evaluation of the response of the financial 
system to the introduction of the euro is centrally important in assessing the 
economic impact of monetary union. To this end, this paper seeks to provide 
an overview of the financial impact of the euro, with a particular focus on the 
macroeconomic implications of enhanced financial integration.
To the extent that the euro has contributed to financial integration, this plays a 
dual role in the economics of monetary union. First, the efficiency gains from 
financial development contributes positively to the net welfare gains that accrue 
from the formation of the monetary union. Second, to the extent that financial 
integration improves the macroeconomic coherence of the monetary union, it 
endogenously helps the euro area to fulfill the criteria for an optimal currency 
area. In what follows, we consider both aspects of the inter-relation between 
monetary union and financial integration.
It is important to appreciate that it is not straightforward to establish the impact 
of the euro on financial integration. In particular, the last decade has also been a 
period in which the pace of global financial integration has accelerated, such that 
the impact of the euro cannot be considered in isolation. Moreover, there has been 
considerable progress in promoting financial integration across the European 
Union, not just within the euro area. Finally, within countries, there have been 
policy moves to attack historic barriers to regional financial integration. In each 
of these cases, the introduction of the euro has been a central motivating factor 
in driving reform. However, at the same time, it would be excessive to attribute 
the full impact of these innovations to the euro. For instance, the improvements 
in telecommunications technology have been an important driving force behind 
1  I thank the discussants Marco Pagano and Axel Weber for their comments. I am also 
indebted to Patrick Honohan and Richard Portes for helpful conversations and to ECB and 
BIS staff for help with data. I thank Agustin Benetrix, Barbara Pels and Martin Schmitz for 
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international financial integration, while non-euro member countries (most 
notably, the United Kingdom) have also been key actors in the promotion of a 
single market in financial services across the European Union.
Beyond the direct impact of monetary union on financial systems, it is important 
to assess how financial integration has affected macroeconomic behaviour in 
the euro area. At the aggregate level, enhanced financial development may have 
boosted the level of area-wide potential output, in view of the well-established 
connection between financial development and economic growth. In addition, 
financial development may also contribute to a lower level of macroeconomic 
volatility, through a range of mechanisms. To the extent that the euro has 
fostered enhanced global financial integration, it may also have increased the 
interdependence between the euro area economy and the rest of the world. From 
the perspective of an individual member country, monetary union may have 
altered the economics of net capital flows, the relation between domestic activity 
and domestic asset prices and the scope for international risk sharing.
Finally, the structural economic changes associated with the transformation of 
the financial system has posed challenges for the European Central Bank and 
other European policymakers. In relation to the execution of monetary policy, 
the transmission mechanism has been altered by financial integration. Moreover, 
as has been vividly illustrated by the events of the last year, European and 
global financial integration also poses challenges in terms of the management of 
financial turmoil and the maintenance of financial stability.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out a 
conceptual framework for thinking about the impact of monetary union on 
financial integration. We turn to the empirical evidence on the extent of financial 
integration in Section 3. The macroeconomic impact of financial integration is 
analysed in Section 4, while Section 5 discusses the outstanding policy issues and 
offers some concluding remarks.
2  ONE MONEY, ONE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
As was widely discussed in the ex-ante debate on monetary union, the replacement 
of independent, national currencies by a common, single currency was expected 
to re-shape financial markets, financial institutions and the behaviour of investors 
and asset creators.
Most directly, a single currency should promote deeper and more liquid markets 
for monetary assets. Portes and Rey (1998) emphasise the network characteristic 
of financial markets – a greater take-up of a currency improves liquidity and 
thereby increases the attractiveness of that currency for financial transactions, 
which in turn increases usage of that currency and further propels a virtuous 
circle of greater liquidity and declining transactions costs. Furthermore, the 
creation of deep and liquid markets also makes a monetary union a more 
attractive destination for external investors. In similar fashion, it makes the single 
currency a potentially attractive vehicle currency for international asset trade even 84 LANE
between buyers and sellers that are not resident in the monetary union, permitting 
a further expansion in the size and scope of financial markets (Papaioannou and 
Portes 2008a, 2008b). In turn, the scaling up of financial markets increases the 
payoff to financial innovation and asset creation (Martin and Rey 2001). A wider 
range of financial products can be supported by a larger-scale financial system 
and the incentive to capitalise off-market income streams is enhanced.
Another useful framework is provided by Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) who 
propose that the adoption of a single currency combines aspects of preferential 
and unilateral financial liberalisations. In particular, within the monetary union, 
a single currency reduces transactions costs but also increases the elasticity of 
substitution between assets issued by member countries. Accordingly, the net 
effect is ambiguous: a decline in transaction costs should increase cross-border 
holdings, while the increase in the elasticity of substitution reduces the scope 
for diversification. For non-members, the creation of a monetary union reduces 
the transaction cost of investing in the monetary union, relative to the cost of 
transacting in multiple legacy currencies.
Moreover, by eliminating intra-area exchange rate risk, monetary union may 
also promote integration in equity-type markets and in foreign direct investment. 
Especially for the smaller, peripheral member countries, the interest rate 
environment of a monetary union should be more stable relative to a small, open 
economy that may be vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international capital flows 
and the episodic risk of currency crises. In addition, the currency markets of 
small economies may suffer from illiquidity, resulting in higher average interest 
rates relative to more liquid markets.
For investors, the expanded menu of assets and the impact of a single currency 
on the matrix of returns will plausibly reduce the degree of home bias. At 
one level, the elimination of exchange rate risk and the decline in intra-area 
transaction costs should promote crossborder investment within the monetary 
union. However, there will also be an increased incentive to invest in destinations 
outside the monetary union, in view of the limited scope for diversification 
within a monetary union.
The creation of a monetary union will also alter the organisational structure of 
the financial system. For banks, monetary union increases the range of potential 
counterparties in a unified inter-bank market, while also creating a new regime 
in terms of access to the resources of the monetary authority. While potentially 
raising the level of competition within the monetary union, there is also an 
incentive for entry by externally-resident banks that may have a competitive 
advantage in realising the opportunities provided by a larger market. Financial 
integration should also expand the menu of financial options for nonbanks. At 
least for larger firms, a deeper and more liquid bond market enables these firms 
to reduce reliance on bank finance by having the option to issue corporate bonds. 
For all firms, increased competition in the banking sector should reduce the cost 
of capital and improve the quality of financial services.85 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Monetary union will also affect both sides of the balance sheet of households. 
By reducing home bias, households should be able to hold a more diversified 
portfolio of assets, with a greater proportion taken by cross-border holdings. On 
the liability side, all else equal, we may expect to see an increase in the gross 
indebtedness of households to the extent that the removal of liquidity premia 
in interest rates, more intense competition between banks and greater direct or 
indirect access to cross-border funds relaxes credit constraints. Finally, monetary 
union also affects the financial environment of national governments, since a 
deeper area-wide bond market reduces risk premia and improves opportunities to 
issue debt in home currency.
In the next section, we turn to a quantitative assessment of the degree to which 
EMU indeed delivered on the promise of greater financial integration.
3  THE IMPACT OF EMU ON FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
In this section, we provide an overview of the evidence concerning the impact of 
EMU on the financial integration of the euro area. Since the extent of financial 
integration may be expected to vary across the different sectors of the European 
financial system, we organise the analysis into a sector-by-sector tour of the 
evidence.
3.1 DEBT  MARKETS
Between 1999 and 2007, Chart 1 shows that the unsecured money market 
was highly integrated, with the creation of the euro leading to a near-complete 
convergence in key indicators such as the overnight lending rate. Similarly, the 
rates on longer-maturity inter-bank unsecured lending also rapidly converged 
across the euro area. Differences in national legal systems in the treatment of 
collateral remain a barrier to full integration in the secured money markets but 
Table 1 shows that the share of cross-border counterparties in the secured markets 
has largely converged with the share in the unsecured markets (European Central 
Bank (2008a)). In turn, the integration of swaps and future markets is significantly 
higher than the cash-based markets, reflecting the greater concentration in the 
derivatives markets among larger, more sophisticated institutions. However, the 
short-term securities markets are the least-integrated component of the money 
markets: a basic obstacle to a unified short-term securities market has been the 
diversity in norms and definitions in the design of short-term securities contracts. 2
However, as documented by Cassola et al. (2008), the 2007/2008 turmoil has 
led to increased segmentation in the euro area money market. Asymmetric 
2  To this end, the Short-Term European Paper (STEP) initiative has been launched by the 
Financial Markets Association (ACI) and the European Banking Federation (EBF) and is 
heavily backed by the Eurosystem. The STEP Market Convention grants the STEP label to 
securities that meet its criteria for information disclosure, documentation, settlement and 
statistical information and STEP-labelled securities have gained in popularity over the last 
two years; the outstanding stock of STEP-labelled securities stood at €342 billion by August 
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information problems have been a central feature of the malfunctioning of the 
money markets. This has led to a two-tier market structure, with the larger banks 
possessing the highest credit standing active in the cross-border money markets 
whereas smaller banks are confined to trading with domestic counter-parties. 
The segmentation is reflected in pricing data, with interest rates on cross-border 
inter-bank lending lower than on domestic inter-bank lending. As the money 
markets return to more normal conditions, we may expect the degree of 
segmentation to decline even if it does not fully return to pre-turmoil levels.
As with the money markets, the level of general integration in the longer-term 
debt securities markets has been impressive. For sovereign debt, spreads across 
Table 1   Share of domestic counter-parties in money market business
(percentage of euro money market business done with domestic counterparties)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Unsecured  money  market  28.2 32.9 34.5 31.5 25.3 28.2 
Repo  money  market  42.9 35.8 37.7 36.6 28.1 40.0 
Short-term  securities  32.2 54.9 39.7 46.8 37.9 47.8 
Forward  Rate  Agreements  12.3 18.0 18.0 21.4 24.4 
Foreign  exchange  swaps  19.2 22.9 20.9 19.2 27.1 25.0 
Interest  rate  swaps  26.6 20.2 22.1 20.3 21.3 24.4 
Overnight interest rate swaps  16.9  14.6  21.5  22.7  22.08  24.5 
Cross-currency  swaps  22.9 11.8 24.5 19.7 17.4 13.2 
Source: ECB Money Market Survey (ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).
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member governments are small relative to pre-EMU patterns and can be related 
to differences in liquidity properties and credit risk. Although spreads are 
reasonably low in the government bond market, the efficiency and liquidity of 
that market is constrained by differences in the issuance practices of the member 
countries (Dunne et al. (2006), European Commission (2008)). For corporate 
debt, spreads can be related to sectoral and firm-level characteristics, with no 
important role for country-level factors (Baele et al. (2004)).3 In relation to 
liquidity, Biais et al. (2006) show that the liquidity of euro-denominated bonds 
is superior to Sterling- or dollar-denominated bonds, which can be attributed to 
an open and competitive area-wide market in which a large number of banks 
offer dealership services to a wide array of prospective buyers. Moreover, these 
authors find that bid-ask spreads on euro-denominated corporate bonds increase 
with maturity and default risk and decrease with trade size.
The deeper market has in turn stimulated a remarkable increase in the scale of 
bond issuance by corporations. Chart 2 shows a steep increase in the volume of 
securities issued by non-MFI corporations, with the timing clearly associated with 
the beginning of EMU. As is emphasised by Pagano and von Thadden (2004), 
the growth in the volume of corporate bond issues can be in part attributed to 
the euro, in relation to the contribution of the single currency to the increase in 
competition among underwriters, which led to a substantial reduction in issuance 
costs and improved access for smaller and higher-risk firms. That bonds from 
across the euro area are viewed as increasingly close substitutes is evident from 
the composition of cross-border bond portfolios. Chart 3 shows that the share of 
3  The current financial crisis shows that the bonds issued by banks represent an important 
exception, in view of the role of national governments in resolving solvency and liquidity 
problems in relation to the liabilities of banks.
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bond issues held by investors in other euro areas has grown from 10 percent in 
1997 to nearly 60 percent in 2006.
The development of the bond market has benefited from the growing international 
role of the euro. Many non-resident entities have issued euro-denominated 
securities, adding to the depth and liquidity of the euro market. Table 2 shows 
the share of the euro in the total international debt securities outstanding for a 
selection of major non-EMU economies at the end of 2007 relative to the share 
of the euro's legacy currencies in total debt outstanding at the end of 1997. 
The increase in the share of the euro has been quite striking for most of the 
countries in Table 2. Bobba et al. (2007) confirm this pattern in an econometric 
study of the determinants of currency choice in the denomination of international 
securities and find that the euro gained market share relative to the legacy 
currencies upon the formation of EMU.
At the aggregate level, Lane (2006b) investigates whether the pattern of cross-
border bond investment has been influenced by the introduction of the euro. 
Following the specification developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008a), the 
pattern of bilateral bond positions is modeled as
log(Bij) = αi + αj + βEMUij + σZij + εij
where Bij is the stock of country j's bonds held by country i, (αi, αj) control for 
source and host-country fixed effects and EMUij is a 0-1 dummy that takes the 
value 1 if both i and j are members of the euro area and 0 otherwise. The set 
of control variables Zij include a host of bilateral characteristics such as EU 
membership, bilateral exchange rate volatility, bilateral trade, distance and other 
gravity-type variables that are plausibly correlated with joint EMU membership. 
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Even controlling for these factors, this study finds that common membership of 
the euro area doubles the level of pairwise cross-border bond holdings relative 
to other country pairs in a levels specification for the year 2004 and by (85,125) 
percent in a first-differences specification that examines changes in portfolios 
between 1997 and 2004. In an extension of this approach, Pels (2008) estimates 
repeated cross-sections for each year 2001 through 2006 and finds that the 
estimated β is quite stable across these years, with the interpretation that the 
adjustment of bond portfolios to the creation of the euro was essentially complete 
by 2001.
Cœurdacier and Martin (2007) explore a slightly-altered specification
log(Bij) = αi + β1EMUij + β2EMUj + σ1Zij + σ2Zj + εij
where the host-country fixed effects (the αj vector) are dropped and a host of 
country-j characteristics are included. In particular, these authors include the 0-1 
dummy EMUj which takes the value 1 if the destination country is a member of 
the euro area and 0 otherwise. While the exclusion of host-country fixed effects 
runs the risk of conflating an EMU effect with other general characteristics 
of euro area countries, this alternative specification has the virtue of enabling 
an estimation of the impact of the euro on the bond portfolios of non-member 
countries. Indeed, these authors find that both β1 and β2 are significantly positive: 
while EMU has the greatest positive impact on the level of bond holdings 
between two members of the euro area, it also raises the level of euro area bond 
Table 2 Issuance of euro securities by non-euro countries
1998 2007
United States  9.9  15.9 
United Kingdom  11.1  33.5 
Japan 6.0  15.6 
Switzerland 18.4  50.9 
Denmark 38.3  73.4 
Sweden 25.6  58.9 
Norway 15.7  41.4 
Iceland 30.3  52.0 
Canada 9.3  13.4 
Australia 4.5  26.3 
South Africa  14.9  40.8 
Brazil 9.5  8.8 
Russia 15.3  15.7 
India 3.6 *) 4.7 
China 3.9  7.5 
Korea 5.6  12.9 
Mexico 13.3  16.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bank of International Settlements.Share of 
Euro-denominated securities in total outstanding securities.
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holdings by non-member countries. As postulated by Coeurdacier and Martin, a 
reasonable interpretation is that EMU works as a combination of a preferential 
financial liberalization (being disproportionately beneficial to the members 
of the monetary union) and a unilateral financial liberalization (increasing the 
attractiveness of euro area assets to all investors, regardless of origin).
3.2 PORTFOLIO  EQUITY
To the extent that a single currency reduces transaction costs and ameliorates 
risk, it is also possible that EMU may facilitate the integration of equity markets. 
Regarding risk, it is not so clear that nominal exchange rate uncertainty should 
be a major factor in the determination of optimal equity portfolios, in view of 
the low covariance between exchange rate movements and the excess return 
on home equity versus foreign equity, relative to the variance of excess returns 
(Adler and Dumas (1983), Van Wincoop and Warnock (2007)). However, there 
may be regulatory and institutional factors that increase the importance of the 
currency regime for equity decisions. For instance, many investment funds 
operate under guidelines that limit the extent of foreign-currency risk that may 
be taken on. Moreover, even if the covariance between the exchange rate and 
equity return differentials is low during normal periods, it is plausible that this 
covariance increases during periods of sharp economic dislocation, such that a 
long-term investor that seeks to limit exposure to catastrophic events may have a 
preference for domestic-currency holdings.
At the aggregate level, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) find that common 
membership of the euro area substantially increases the level of pairwise cross-
border portfolio equity holdings by about 67 percent, even controlling for a 
host of other determinants of bilateral investment positions. A similar result 
for equities is also obtained by Coeurdacier and Martin (2007), who also find 
evidence that the level of equity investment by non-members into the euro 
area has also increased. Related evidence is provided by De Santis and Gerard 
(2006) who compute the shift in portfolio weights between 1997 and 2001 and 
find a substantial euro effect, especially for those countries with very limited 
levels of cross-border exposure in the pre-EMU period. Similar to her results 
for bond holdings, Pels (2008) finds that the estimated effect is stable across 
the years  2001 through 2006. Again, the interpretation is that the adjustment of 
equity portfolios to the euro was essentially complete by 2001.
The euro has also altered the dynamic structure of equity returns. Financial 
globalisation has led to an increasing role for a global factor in determining 
national equity returns. Baele and Inghelbrecht (2008) show that the introduction 
of the euro has increased the role of the global factor in determining European 
equity returns - in effect, the single currency has facilitated the globalisation of 
the investor base for European equity returns. Baele and Inghelbrecht (2008) 
also show that the volatility of the country-specific element in equity returns has 
declined. In related fashion, Fratzscher and Stracca (2008) show that the response 
of national equity indices to national shocks (such as electoral surprises or major 
disasters) has declined for members of the euro area. The muted response of 
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source of return volatility – that is, country-specific monetary innovations – 
and the absorptive capacity of an international investor base in coping with 
idiosyncratic shocks. Rather, market sentiment is now largely determined at a 
European level, with a lesser role for national factors. 
3.3  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Direct investment represents a key channel for cross-border financial integration, 
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments. 
Moreover, once a direct investment is established, all subsequent financial 
transactions between parent and affiliate (whether equity or debt) are classified 
as direct investment. In principle, this category also includes cross-border 
investments in residential and commercial property, which anecdotal evidence 
suggests has grown strongly in recent years. Finally, in examining the 
geographical distribution of FDI, it is important to bear in mind the prevalence 
of 'transhipment' FDI flows in which financial centres are intensively used as 
locations for holding companies, corporate headquarters and special purpose 
entities for reasons of organisational and tax efficiency (Taylor (2007)).
Several studies have found a significantly positive euro effect in the determinants 
of the bilateral pattern of FDI. Petroulas (2007) studies FDI flows over 1992- 2001 
in a gravity-type framework and finds that common membership of the euro area 
raises bilateral flows by 16 percent. In addition, FDI from member countries to 
non-members is boosted by 11 percent and from non-members to members by 8 
percent. He finds that the effect is strongest for FDI flows between two members 
of the euro area but there is also evidence of an increase in FDI into the euro area 
from non-members. De Sousa and Lochard (2009) study the impact of EMU on 
the geographical distribution of FDI stocks over 1982-2004 and estimate that the 
euro has increased FDI stocks between member countries by 26 percent.
Aviat et al. (2009) emphasise the contribution of the euro to the expansion in 
M&A activity is confined to the manufacturing sector, while these authors do 
not find a significant euro effect for M&A in the services sector. As argued 
by the authors, this may be related to the greater progress in achieving a single 
market in goods than in services, demonstrating the complementarity between 
trade integration and financial integration. In a model in which first-time cross-
border direct investment involves a sunk cost, Russ (2007) shows theoretically 
and, using bank-level data, empirically that exchange rate volatility deters 
FDI. Baldwin et al. (2008) highlight that the Russ results apply in particular 
to the introduction of the euro: the positive effect of the single currency on 
cross-border M&A is primarily due to novice firms undertaking cross-border 
investment for the first time, rather than an expansion in the scale of investment 
by existing multinational corporations. An expansion along the extensive margin 
of investment parallels the role of the extensive margin in trade dynamics, since 
much of the boost provided by the euro to trade takes the form of new firms 
exporting and an expansion in the range of export destinations.92 LANE
3.4 BANKING
The retail banking market remains quite fragmented, with non-trivial differences 
in lending and deposit rates for households and firms across the euro area. 4 
Chart 4 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation in interest rates to small 
businesses and households over 2002-2007, with the spreads showing relatively 
little convergence. Moreover, ECB data show that the extent of cross-border 
lending to non-bank entities is quite small, constituting only 5 percent of total 
loans to non-banks. While this share has grown from an average of about 3 percent 
in the early years of EMU, the rate of increase is very slow. At one level, this 
fragmentation is not too surprising, in view of the importance of local information 
in assessing small-business and consumer loans and differences in national legal 
systems in the enforcement of repayment and foreclosure procedures. In relation 
to retail payments, ongoing high charges for cross-border payments have limited 
the tangible benefits of a single currency for bank customers. However, the 2008 
launch of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) should help in providing a 
low-cost unified payments system that does not discriminated between intra-
national and cross-national payments within the euro area.
Even if retail banking remains fragmented, the banking sector has been a central 
driver of financial integration, through cross-border inter-bank loans and deposits 
and the areawide market in which banks are major cross-border purchasers of 
securities issued by other banks. The scale of cross-border inter-bank lending 
and borrowing within the euro area far exceeds the levels vis-a-vis nonbanks. 
This has transformed the balance sheets of banks in the euro area. Cross-border 
4  The EU Banking Structures report (European Central Bank, (2008b)) provides comprehensive 
data on the European banking system.
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interbank loans between euro area banks have grown from 15.5 percent of total 
inter-bank loans in 1997 to 23.5 percent in 2008, while the holdings by euro 
area banks of the debt securities issued by banks in other euro area countries 
grew from a 12.1 percent share in 1997 to 31.3 percent in 2008. The expansion 
of cross-border activity has also included other EU countries, with the shares of 
inter-bank loans and debt securities between the euro area and the rest of the EU 
growing from 10.3 percent and 1.4 percent respectively in 1997 to 18.6 percent 
and 11 percent in 2008.
In terms of econometric studies, Blank and Buch (2007) estimate a gravity model 
for cross-border bank assets and liabilities. These authors find a significantly 
positive euro effect on the distribution of bank assets, with a weaker estimate 
obtained for bank liabilities. 5 Spiegel (2008a) shows that the sources of external 
financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted with the advent 
of EMU, with these banks traditionally reliant on dollar debt but now able 
to raise funds from counterparts elsewhere in the euro area. More generally, 
Spiegel (2008b) shows that the relative increase in bilateral bank claims 
involving euro area members can be attributed to three different channels: 
(a) a “borrower” effect, by which EMU membership increases creditworthiness 
such that EMU members increase borrowing from all sources; (b) a “creditor” 
effect that increases the attractiveness of a member country's banks as financial 
intermediaries, with EMU members increasing lending to all destinations; and 
(c) a “pairwise” effect such that joint membership of EMU increases the quality 
of intermediation when both lender and borrower are in the monetary union, such 
that the increase in cross-border bank transactions is focused on pairs of countries 
that are both members of EMU. He finds that the pairwise effect is the dominant 
factor in the data. Moreover, there is some evidence of an interaction effect, by 
which the pairwise effect is strongest for those country pairs that also have high 
levels of bilateral trade, such that the single currency reinforces bilateral links in 
which information flows are high.
Some of the benefits of financial integration may be obtained through foreign 
direct investment in the banking sector, with large banks exploiting scale 
economies by operating in multiple national markets. Goldberg (2007) and 
De Blas and Russ (2008) provide evidence that FDI in the financial sector 
reduces lending rates through an increase in competition and an improvement 
in cost efficiencies. Indeed, the relative importance of large international banks 
has grown in recent years. As reported by the European Commission (2008) and 
the European Central Bank (2007), there are 46 EU banking groups (out of a 
total of 8,000 banks) that hold 68 percent of total EU banking assets. Of these, 
16 major banks hold at least 25 percent of their assets in other EU countries and 
are present in at least 25 percent of other EU countries. These major banks have 
been important drivers of enhanced financial integration at the EU level.
5  Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) also find that a positive euro effect on bilateral bank lending 
among the member countries, in addition to increased lending by banks from outside the 
euro area to entities in the member countries.94 LANE
However, consistent with the evidence provided by Aviat et al. (2009), there 
is no evidence of a euro effect in cross-border merger and acquisitions in the 
banking sector. Rather, cross-border banking consolidation can be explained by 
regional factors and global strategies followed by some of the largest banking 
groups. This also lines up with the data reported by the European Central Bank 
(2008b) which show that cross-border mergers and acquisitions that involve euro 
area banks are evenly split between intra-union and extra-union deals. This study 
also finds that the propensity to engage in cross-border deals is increasing in the 
ownership share of foreign institutional investors, such that there is an interesting 
complementarity between portfolio integration and integration in the banking 
sector. Looking to the future, cross-border consolidation in the European banking 
sector is likely to be a key agent of credit market integration. Accordingly, 
understanding the barriers to such consolidation is a major research priority.
3.5  TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
In an integrated financial system, we may expect an increase in the cross-border 
provision of financial services. Table 5 shows the export and import data for 
financial services in 1998 and 2006. For most countries, Table 5 shows that trade 
in financial services has remained quite stable as a share of GDP, with the major 
exception of the rise of Ireland as an international financial centre. Consistent 
with the evidence for the banking sector, the generally low level of financial trade 
reflects the lack of progress in promoting services trade in Europe.
Table 3 Trade in financial services
1998 2006 
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Austria 0.7  0.8  0.6  0.5 
Belgium 1.1  1.0 
France  0.2 0.2  0.1 0.3 
Germany  0.2 0.2  0.4 0.3 
Italy  0.2 0.3  0.2 0.2 
Luxembourg 84.3  44.3 
Netherlands  0.2 0.3  0.3 0.4 
Finland  0.0 0.1  0.1 0.2 
Greece 0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4 
Ireland 0.3  1.1  8.6  6.2 
Portugal 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3 
Spain 0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5 
Switzerland  3.1 0.2  4.4 0.4 
United Kingdom  1.6  0.3  2.4  0.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Services Trade database. Data are 
expressed as ratios to GDP.95 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
3.6  SUMMARY ON FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
The evidence reviewed in this section shows that EMU has been associated with 
a substantial increase in cross-border financial integration across the euro area, 
with both price-based and volume-based measures pointing in this direction. 
In turn, greater financial integration has stimulated financial development across 
the euro area, through the lowering of transactions costs and the expansion in the 
volumes of financial assets.
That said, it is also clear that the process of financial integration is far from 
complete, with a range of real frictions and institutional factors slowing down 
the rate of progress especially in relation to banking. Moreover, the current 
financial crisis has led to some degree of national segmentation of financial 
systems. In part, the re-emergence of country-specific factors reflects differential 
exposures to country-specific macroeconomic vulnerabilities. However, the 
dominant source of this segmentation surely relates to cross-country differences 
in the design of government intervention in the financial sector in response to 
the international financial crisis, including some asymmetries in the treatment of 
domestic-versus foreign-owned financial institutions. We return to the design of 
the financial stability framework in Section 5. In the next section, we turn to the 
analysis of the macroeconomic impact of financial integration.
4 MACROECONOMIC  IMPACT
In analysing the macroeconomic impact of financial integration, three major 
issues arise. First, we may expect financial integration to contribute to the 
financial development of euro area countries. Second, financial integration has 
the potential to improve cross-border risk sharing. Third, financial integration 
may ease barriers to net capital flows, leading to increased dispersion in current 
account balances and net foreign asset positions. In this section, we investigate 
each of these three predictions.
4.1 FINANCIAL  DEVELOPMENT
An extensive literature has shown that financial development boosts income 
levels (see Levine (2005) for a comprehensive survey of this literature, while 
Guiso et al. (2004), Papaioannou (2007), and Jappelli and Pagano (2008) provide 
European-focused reviews of the links between financial development and 
growth). In particular, the evidence from aggregate and micro-level studies is 
that financial development boosts total factor productivity among the advanced 
economies, while it additionally promotes growth through lowering the cost of 
capital in emerging and developing economies. 6 Accordingly, if cross-border 
financial integration positively contributes to financial development, there is the 
6  There are many mechanisms by which financial development may promote productivity growth 
and there is an extensive literature that investigates each channel. For instance, Hartmann 
et al. (2007) emphasise the role of financial development in facilitating the reallocation of 
capital to faster-growing industries and find evidence in support of that channel.96 LANE
potential for a substantial long-term economic payoff via the benefits conferred 
by greater financial development.
Financial integration may promote financial development through several 
mechanisms. Deeper and more liquid financial markets should lower the cost of 
capital through the improved risk diversification opportunities for investors and a 
decline in transactions costs through greater volumes and greater specialisation in 
the provision of financial services. Moreover, the expansion of financial markets 
improves the financing choices faced by firms, with a greater proportion no 
longer solely reliant on bank-based funding. In addition, the evidence shows that 
greater financial development improves the inter-sectoral allocation of capital, 
with faster-growing sectors receiving more investment funding (Hartmann et al. 
(2007)). The greater scope for risk diversification also facilitates the funding of 
riskier projects which may offer the scope for higher long-term returns, as in the 
analysis of Obstfeld (1994).
The impact of financial integration on the banking sector is critically important. 
Again, the scope for a more diversified loan book should improve the funding 
opportunities of riskier and smaller firms. On the funding side, the potential 
depositor base is expanded, while the development of integrated inter-bank and 
securities markets provides additional channels of funding for banks. Financial 
integration should also increase the level of competition in national banking 
systems. In addition to the positive contribution to contestability provided 
by cross-border lending (both directly for larger firms and indirectly via the 
improved access to funding for smaller banks), the expansion of the most 
efficient banks through cross-border FDI (whether through the formation of new 
entities or via mergers and acquisitions) offers the scope for reduced costs and 
lower lending rates. 
In summary, through the transformation of financial markets and banking systems 
in the direction of greater openness, financial integration should improve the 
allocation of capital, leading to improved productivity and innovation. Moreover, 
as is emphasised by Guiso et al. (2004), the potential benefits should be greatest 
for those member countries that entered monetary union with relatively under-
developed financial systems and those sectors most reliant on external finance. 
However, the member countries with advanced financial systems should also 
benefit by permitting domestic financial firms to succeed in the newly-expanded 
markets created by financial integration.
In terms of evidence, the literature primarily relies on longer-term studies 
of the relation between financial development and economic performance, 
while maintaining the assumption that financial integration promotes financial 
development. As pointed out by Jappelli and Pagano (2008), it is difficult to 
capture the full impact of financial integration and financial development, since 
financial integration may promote financial development by either allowing 
the domestic financial system to expand or by allowing domestic firms and 
households to bypass domestic intermediaries in favour of external partners.97 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
However, there are several studies that have specifically examined the impact of 
the euro on different dimensions of financial integration. Papaioannou and Portes 
(2008b) estimate a difference-in-difference model of the impact of the euro on the 
growth rates of a set of financial development indicators. These authors find that 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and narrow and broad measures of private 
sector credit grew significantly more quickly for member countries relative to 
non-members after the formation of EMU. Moreover, these authors show that the 
medium-term impact has been stronger than the short-term impact, such that the 
major gains in terms of financial development took a few years to materialise. 
In terms of convergence of financial systems across the euro area, Jappelli and 
Pagano (2008) note that bond market capitalisation has converged across the euro 
area but there is less evidence that the euro has contributed to convergence in 
equity market capitalisation or the ratio of private credit to GDP.
Bris et al. (2009) show that EMU has boosted corporate valuations for firms 
in the euro area. In particular, these authors show that Tobin’s Q increased by 
an average of 9 percent over 1998-2004 for firms in the euro area relative to 
other firms. Moreover, the effect was strongest for firms from “weak currency” 
countries (that is, those member countries that devalued during the 1992-1993 
currency crisis), with Tobin’s Q increasing by 15.3 percent for this group. Their 
results also show that the effect was relatively stronger for firms whose stock 
returns were historically negatively correlated with the exchange rate. In terms of 
the underlying components, the increase in Tobin’s Q can be attributed in part to 
a reduction in the risk-free rate (due to a more credible monetary environment), 
a reduction in market risk premia (due to the elimination of bilateral currency 
risk within the euro area and improved risk sharing due to the expansion of 
the investor base) and an increase in expected cash flows (for instance, due to 
expanded trade opportunities).
In turn, there is evidence that firms have responded by increasing the level of 
investment. Using industry-level data, Dvorak (2006) shows that the introduction 
of the euro boosted the level of investment in member countries relative to non-
members over 1998 to 2003. Moreover, in line with a priori expectations, Dvorak 
finds that the effect is strongest for those sectors most dependent on external 
finance and resident in the least financially-developed member countries.
Finally, the literature on financial development in emerging market economies and 
developing countries has emphasised that episodes of major financial liberalisation 
frequently involve a crisis phase in which excess debt levels lead to banking and 
currency crises. The evidence of Ranciere et al. (2008) is that liberalisation still 
raises long-term growth even accounting for such “bumpiness”. In similar fashion, 
the current financial crisis may be in part attributed to the radical shift in the 
financial environment associated with the major increase in financial integration 
over the last decade. Of course, it remains too early to tell whether this crisis will 
overshadow the putative long-term gains from increased financial development 
in Europe. Relative to the country experience in other episodes, a major 
difference is that debt liabilities are predominantly denominated in euro, such that 
the banking crisis is not being accompanied by a currency crisis.98 LANE
4.2  INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING
A key hope is that financial integration improves the extent of cross-border risk 
sharing. In principle, international risk diversification can serve as an alternative 
stabilisation mechanism, since domestic wealth and consumption may be insulated 
from domestic production and asset shocks. Moreover, if consumption dynamics 
are similar across the euro area, the coherence of a single monetary policy is 
improved. Increased risk sharing may also improve the long-run growth rate of the 
economy, since expanded hedging opportunities should encourage entrepreneurs 
to pursue riskier projects that may offer higher payoffs (Obstfeld 1994).
Holding other factors constant, the increase in cross-border investment positions 
should have increased risk sharing within the euro area. At the microeconomic 
level, it is surely the case that the personal financial portfolios and pension fund 
assets of households are more internationally diversified than in the pre-EMU 
era. 7 For the corporate sector, the increase in foreign direct investment means that 
earnings are more geographically diversified. For banks, cross-border assets now 
consitute a greater fraction of total assets. Moreover, the increase in financial 
development also increases the scope for risk sharing. A greater share of wealth 
is now tradable, due to the capitalisation of income streams that is facilitated by 
financial development. Accordingly, the capacity of individuals to share risks 
within borders and across borders is positively related to the extent of financial 
development.
7  See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2008) for an analysis of the impact of the euro on the portfolios 
of Italian households.
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It is difficult to empirically measure the macroeconomic extent of risk sharing, 
especially in the context of less than ten years of data for the euro area. Under 
certain conditions, the correlation in consumption growth rates provides an 
indicator of international risk sharing.   Chart 5 plots the cross-country standard 
deviation of consumption growth across the Euro 12 group of countries. While 
the dispersion in consumption growth rates is certainly lower in the post-1999 
period relative to the 1970s, it is difficult to discern any clear shift in the pattern 
relative to the 1980s and 1990s, despite the massive increase in cross-border 
financial integration over the last decade.
Of course, there is a limit to what can be learned from simple unconditional 
correlations. A popular approach has been to investigate the conditional 
dependence of domestic consumption on domestic output fluctuations. In an 
endowment economy under financial autarky, consumption is perfectly correlated 
with domestic output. International risk sharing provides one mechanism that can 
break the link between domestic consumption and domestic output and an active 
line of research measures the covariance between domestic consumption and 
domestic output as a rough proxy of the extent of international risk sharing. More 
precisely, this approach typically runs a regression of the form
Δ log cit – Δ log ct = α + βt (Δ log GDPit – Δ log GDPt) + εit
where cit is country i’s level of consumption in year t and c_t is the aggregate 
level of consumption for the group of countries in the sample and βt measures 
the average comovement of the idiosyncratic component of consumption 
with the idiosyncratic component of GDP growth. Accordingly, the degree of 
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consumption insurance is measured by (1−βt)
^
. Demyanyk et al. (2008) provide 
an extensive review of this literature and test whether EMU has altered the β 
coefficient for members of the euro area. Their results indicate no improvement 
in consumption risk sharing among the EMU member countries during the 
post-1999 period. However, these authors do find that "income risk sharing" has 
improved among this group after 1999: the pass-through from gross domestic 
product shocks to gross national income has declined. This is consistent with 
increasing financial integration since gross investment income flows are 
increasing in the scale of cross-border investment positions and are a component 
of gross national income but not of gross domestic product (Chart 6 shows the 
rapid increase in gross investment income flows for the Euro 12 group in recent 
years). However, their analysis finds little direct support for a role for measures 
of financial integration in explaining the patterns of consumption or income risk 
sharing during this period.
Gerlach and Hoffmann (2008) pursue an alternative empirical strategy by 
examining bilateral comovements in consumption among pairs of advanced 
economies. Their empirical specification is
Δ log cit – Δ log cjt = Øij + δt + β (Δ logGDPit – Δ logGDPjt) + εijt
with
β = β0 + β1EXTRAij + β2INTRAij
where EXTRAij is 0-1 dummy which scores 1 if only one country is a member of 
the euro area, INTRAij is a 0-1 dummy which scores 1 if countries i and j are both 
members of the euro area. A decrease in β is consistent with an improvement 
in bilateral risk sharing, with a decrease in β1 suggesting improved risk sharing 
between EMU members and outside countries and a decline in β2 showing the 
extent of improved risk sharing among pairs of EMU member countries. Using 
consumption and GDP data from the Penn World Tables over 1990 to 2004, these 
Table 4 Bilateral consumption co-movements
PWT Hybrid UN
1990-98   1999-04 1999-06 1990-98 1999-06 
β 0  0.83 0.95 0.96 0.72 0.77 
[0.02]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.02]*** [0.04]*** 
β 1 -0.16 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 0.04 
[0.03]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.03]***  [0.04] 
β 2  -0.24 -0.28 -0.23 -0.16 0.02 
[0.03]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.03]*** [0.05] 
Observations 2277 1518 2024 2277 2024 
Notes: See equation (4) in the text. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
PWT: Penn World Tables.101 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
authors find that β1 and β2 declined during 1999-2004 relative to 1990-1998. We 
confirm their finding at a qualitative level in column (1) of Table 6, even if the 
changes are not statistically significant. Moreover, this pattern continues to hold 
when we extend the time period to 2006 by extending the Penn World Tables 
data with data from the United Nations in column (2). However, if the United 
Nations data are used for the whole sample in columns (3) and (4), the β1 and β2 
coefficients are not significant for the 1999-2006 period.
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2008) pursue an alternative empirical approach by 
examining consumption smoothing across Italian households. These authors 
investigate whether the capacity to smooth consumption in the face of income 
shocks has improved after the introduction of the euro but reject that the euro has 
decreased the sensitivity of consumption to income shocks. 
The mixed nature of the results from these studies serves to highlight that 
establishing the impact of EMU on risk sharing faces several complications. 
First, even aside from the data quality issues in measuring consumption, it is 
difficult to properly derive a measure of international financial integration that 
is relevant for tests of risk sharing. For instance, gross levels of foreign assets 
and liabilities (and/or gross flows of investment income credits and debits) face 
the linkage problem that many types of international financial positions generate 
an intimate connection between returns on foreign assets and returns on foreign 
liabilities. For instance, a bank in country i may have an affiliate in country j and 
obtain FDI earnings in line with the profits of the affiliate. However, in turn, the 
shares of the bank in country i may be predominantly owned by foreign portfolio 
investors, such that an increase in FDI earnings is offset by some combination 
of an increase in portfolio equity investment income debits (if the bank raises its 
dividend to shareholders) or an increase in foreign liabilities (if the increase in 
profits is embedded in the market value of the bank). Even more mechanically, 
a significant proportion of cross-border investment positions represent trades 
by financial intermediaries. For instance, foreign investors may own shares in a 
mutual fund that is resident in country j, where the mutual fund exclusively holds 
foreign portfolio assets. In this case, an increase in the value of the mutual fund 
represents a symmetric increase in foreign assets (the foreign assets held by the 
mutual fund) and foreign liabilities (the ownership shares in the mutual fund that 
are held by foreign investors).
Second, as was argued above, the introduction of the euro was an important 
stimulus to financial liberalisation in several member countries, with a sharp 
reduction in real interest rates and a relaxation of credit constraints. In these 
countries, it was rational for the level of consumption to increase in response to 
the change in the credit environment. In some cases, the scale of the adjustment in 
consumption was amplified by a local asset price boom, especially in residential 
and commercial property sectors. Since these assets were predominantly owned 
by domestic residents, these national asset price booms primarily raised domestic 
wealth and, together with the relaxation in borrowing constraints, have been a 
factor contributing to a divergence in wealth and consumption dynamics across 
the euro area.102 LANE
Chart 7 shows the dispersion in house price dynamics across the euro area over 
1997-2007. Peripheral member countries such as Ireland, Spain and Greece 
experienced cumulative house price increases of 342 percent, 289 percent and 
241 percent respectively. In contrast, housing price growth in Germany and 
Austria was much more modest at 95 percent and 105 percent respectively. In 
view of such dispersion in housing wealth growth during this period, it is hardly 
surprising that national consumption growth rates have not converged.
More generally, the relaxation of credit constraints means greater scope for 
the delinking of consumption and income through international borrowing and 
lending. This mechanism does not constitute risk sharing but just involves the 
intertemporal redistribution of consumption. While it can improve welfare 
by promoting consumption smoothing, the capacity to borrow and lend 
internationally can also lead to over-borrowing scenarios if other frictions 
mean that consumption decisions are distorted. Moreover, even if international 
risk sharing is promoted by geographical diversification, an increased capacity 
to engage in cross-border borrowing may increase sectoral risk to the extent 
that domestic firms in given sectors increase leverage to expand overseas and 
domestic property investors build on domestic capital gains to acquire debt-
financed international property portfolios. 8
8  A good example is provided by the Irish situation. Many domestic households used a 
combination of equity release from the large capital gains earned on owner-occupied housing 
to buy overseas holiday homes and buy-to-let properties across Europe, the United States 
and further afield. In similar fashion, commercial property developers leveraged domestic 
profits to aggressively invest in commercial property, especially in the United Kingdom.
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Furthermore, the largest increase in cross-border investment positions within 
the euro area has been in debt assets that are very close substitutes for domestic 
debt assets. Accordingly, the extent of diversification provided by these 
investments is quite limited. Indeed, the elimination of nominal assets that 
provide payoffs in national currencies may actually have reduced the scope of 
diversification, to the extent that historical payoffs on domestically-denominated 
debt instruments systematically co-moved with domestic macroeconomic 
conditions (Neumeyer (1998)).
Member countries have also increased the scale of international investments in 
nonmember countries. While this in itself may contribute to global risk sharing, 
heterogeneity across the member countries in the geographical and sectoral 
patterns of international investment means that these external investments 
may reduce the similarity of wealth dynamics within the euro area. Indeed, 
this mechanism has been emphasised an important factor in the decision of the 
United Kingdom not to join EMU (HM Treasury (2003)). Examples include the 
importance of Central and Eastern Europe as a direct investment destination 
for Austrian banks and Latin America for Spanish and Portuguese firms, while 
the scale of Ireland's direct investment liabilities vis-a-vis the United States is 
especially striking.
Table 3 shows that the growth in international investment positions has been 
quite heterogeneous across the euro area, even ignoring the outsized statistics for 
the major financial-processing centres of Ireland and Luxembourg. Moreover, 
Table  4 also shows that the relative importance of the euro area as a destination 
for portfolio investment shows considerable variation across the member 
countries. Accordingly, member countries are asymmetrically exposed to 
Table 5 International financial integration
(foreign assets and foreign liabilities as ratios to GDP)
1997 2001 2006
FA FL FA FL FA FL
Austria 78.5 95.2 137.0 163.0 258.4 283.7
Belgium 241.6 211.6 331.8 281.6 488.2 453.6
Finland 56.7 97.0 128.2 209.1 213.3 226.5
France 117.3 108.1 180.1 167.4 287.0 281.5
Germany 81.2 77.5 140.6 133.6 197.8 175.0
Greece 36.8 51.3 39.3 79.6 62.0 139.8
Ireland 313.8 299.7 724.0 734.3 1,187.7 1,194.4
Italy 67.4 73.8 94.5 101.4 128.8 145.2
Luxembourg 5,118.4 5,013.4 7,705.9 7,636.1 11,984.5 11,840.0
Netherlands 162.8 186.3 307.0 322.2 443.8 445.0
Portugal 84.4 100.8 133.4 184.7 179.6 266.3
Spain 55.4 71.6 99.8 127.1 140.7 200.8
Source: Updated version of External Wealth of Nations database reported by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007).104 LANE
international financial shocks, such that the variation in international financial 
integration can act as a source of disharmony under some scenarios.
Fourth, a host of real frictions limit the true scope for international risk 
sharing. At a general level, the literature on limited enforceability and contract 
incompleteness provides strong theoretical reasons as to why production risk 
cannot be completely diversified. Moreover, financial transaction costs are 
non-trivial. For instance, in relation to the issuance of securities, scale factors 
are important, such that smaller firms are not proportionately represented on 
public markets. For private financing, informational asymmetries and contract 
enforcement issues mean that local financiers have a comparative advantage 
over external investors. More generally, the non-tradability of claims on labour 
income limits the extent of domestic and international risk sharing, such that 
even perfectly-diversified financial portfolios would not necessarily hedge 
macroeconomic risks. Finally, as is emphasised by a growing literature, the 
importance of non-tradables and domestically-produced tradable goods in 
consumption means that domestic and foreign households may choose quite 
different portfolios, since consumption risks differ across countries (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2001), Obstfeld (2007), Cœurdacier (2008)).
Finally, it is possible that the risk sharing gains from increased financial 
integration may not show up in data over a relatively short interval such as a 
decade. In particular, the main gain from international risk sharing may be in 
terms of diversification vis-a-vis large-scale rare disasters. 9 To the extent that 
such adverse rare events are country-specific in nature, the increase in cross-
border asset positions provides useful insurance even if it is rarely called upon.
9  The literature on rare disasters and asset pricing is growing rapidly. See Barro (2006) 
amongst others.
Table 6 Share of euro area in cross-border portfolio assets
Debt Equity
1997 2001 2006 1997 2001 2006
Austria 46.7 62.0 65.5 50.2 53.5 55.6
Belgium 59.8 74.9 77.4 84.1 78.9 79.7
Finland 28.7 75.1 74.6 34.9 31.1 38.8
France 45.2 58.9 66.8 39.3 51.1 50.5
Germany 46.9 65.0 66.6 39.2 59.7 69.6
Greece 33.5 30.7 50.1 43.0
Ireland 42.6 43.8 48.4 13.9 18.5 26.8
Italy 19.7 49.5 64.9 55.6 64.3 79.2
Luxembourg 60.4 57.4 37.0 33.6
Netherlands 68.5 66.7 69.3 22.7 26.5 25.6
Portugal 43.2 57.1 60.6 54.0 65.5 67.3
Spain 27.6 67.0 56.8 45.8 54.2 77.0
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey and the Bundesbank.105 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
4.3  NET CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
Along another dimension, financial integration may also alter the dynamics of net 
capital movements. Net flows have the potential to improve welfare through two 
main channels: (a) the allocation of capital to the most productive uses; and (b) 
the smoothing of consumption during the convergence process and in the event of 
temporary macroeconomic shocks. In relation to the capital allocation function, 
monetary union eliminates the national currency risk that historically posed a 
major risk to investment returns, especially in relation to the risk of episodic 
currency crises. At one level, greater efficiency in capital allocation should allow 
countries to converge more rapidly to steady-state output levels. At the cylical 
frequency, as was emphasised by the real business cycle literature, it should also 
increase the responsiveness to productivity shocks, possibly amplifying the local 
business cycle.
One form of consumption smoothing relates to the convergence process, since the 
prospect of higher future incomes stimulates an increase in current consumption. 
In relation to temporary shocks, the welfare cost of cyclical fluctuations 
is ameliorated by the capability to insulate consumption from excessive 
fluctuations. The impact of monetary union on cyclical consumption smoothing 
should be greatest for those countries that historically were characterized by a 
low level of domestic financial development and pro-cyclical access to credit (as 
is the standard pattern for emerging market economies).
In relation to consumption smoothing, the ability to borrow and lend in response 
to shocks has been particularly enhanced by participation in an integrated 
wholesale banking market and the growth in multi-country banks. Banks play 
a critical role since small firms and households primarily raise external finance 
through the banking system. Accordingly, a more developed banking system that 
is populated by diversified banks will be better able to provide stable financing 
in the event of shocks. As is emphasised by Demyanyk et al. (2007, 2008), 
the evidence from the United States is that the deregulation of the US banking 
system in relation to restrictions on cross-state banking activity has substantially 
improved the smoothing of personal incomes, especially for small business 
owners. At the international level, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) highlight 
the role of internal capital markets within global banks in smoothing national 
liquidity shocks. Moreover, such channels contribute to the stabilisation of output 
in addition to the smoothing of income by weakening the impact of the financial 
accelerator mechanism on the production and investment decisions of firms.
However, in the presence of other distortions, a more elastic supply of external 
capital may lead to over-borrowing. In relation to governments, political economy 
factors may generate a temptation to borrow more in order to increase public 
spending or cut taxation; however, the fiscal restraints built into the Maastricht 
Treaty and embodied in the Growth and Stability Pact curb that tendency. For 
banks and near-banks, poorly-designed regulations or inadequate supervision 
may encourage excessive lending on the back of funds raised through the 106 LANE
wholesale market or securitisation. 10 For corporates, if the corporate governance 
environment is inadequate, international leveraging may tempt some executives 
to undertake excessive investment or make ill-advised acquisitions. Under these 
scenarios, capital flows magnify the impact of such distortions and may amplify 
cyclical shocks through a pro-cyclical pattern in capital flows.
Chart 8 shows the cross-sectional dispersion of current account balances for 
the EMU 12 group of countries over 1970 to 2007, while Chart 9 shows the 
dispersion in accumulated net international investment positions. While large 
current account imbalances were run in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these 
proved to be very temporary in nature, with large deficits typically closed 
through a crisis episode. In contrast, the increase in dispersion in current account 
balances over the last decade has been associated with highly-persistent net 
flows for certain countries. Table 7 shows that the persistence of current account 
balances has drifted upwards and that persistence within the euro area since 1999 
is significantly higher than among non-member advanced countries. 11
Moreover, as is shown by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), the link between 
net flows and income levels has strengthened under EMU, with the lower-
income countries typically running large current account deficits. Fagan and 
10 Historically, politically-connected non-banks may have also been tempted to over 
borrow, in the belief that the government would provide a rescue package in the event of 
trouble. However, EU restrictions on state aids sharply limit the scope for the bail out of
non-financial firms.
11  The non-EMU group consist of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
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Gaspar (2007) provide a model of how EMU led to a major increase in the current 
account deficits of those member countries that may have been expected to grow 
relatively quickly for convergence reasons and that historically operated under 
credit constraints. For these countries, the advent of EMU was associated with 
a reduction in real interest rates and a major increase in cross-border borrowing. 
While such factors help to explain the emergence of persistent current account 
deficits, it is also possible that access to external capital contributed to excessive 
expansion in the property sector in some countries and to an unsustainable 
increase in local asset prices.
The emergence of large and persistent current account imbalances within the 
euro area also raises important adjustment issues, especially to the extent that 
deficits have been used to finance consumption or investment in low-productivity 
Table 7 Current account persistence 
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2007 
EMU 
δ 0.59  0.67  0.81 
[7.6]*** [8.5]***  [11.3]*** 
Observations 105  108  108 
Non-EMU 
δ 0.43  0.64  0.59 
[4.7]*** [7.7]*** [8.1]*** 
Observations 108  108  108 
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sectors. While monetary union may insulate a member country from speculative 
attacks on a national currency, the real exchange rate depreciation that is a typical 
part of the adjustment to an increase in net external liabilities cannot be achieved 
through nominal depreciation. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that 
nominal depreciation offers a double benefit for the external balance sheet of a 
debtor economy. In addition to the presumed positive impact on the trade balance 
(albeit with a lag), nominal depreciation that is not fully offset by a differential 
in expected returns also generates a positive valuation effect to the extent that 
foreign assets are disproportionately in foreign currency and foreign liabilities in 
domestic currency. For instance, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) find a substantial 
role for the currency-based valuation channel in the adjustment dynamics of the 
United States (see also Tille (2003) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005)). The 
absence of independent national currencies means that this valuation channel 
does not play a role in the adjustment dynamics of the member countries of the 
euro area, at least in relation to intra-area imbalances.
Moreover, real depreciation vis-a-vis other member countries can only be 
achieved through a negative inflation differential. Accordingly, this requires 
wages to grow more slowly than in other member countries, which is difficult 
to achieve if the institutional environment governing the domestic labour market 
does not facilitate rapid corrections in wage levels. Moreover, a drawn-out period 
of anticipated real depreciation can amplify the negative impact on domestic 
activity, since the ex-ante real interest rate will be higher, depressing domestic 
spending. The slow pace of adjustment in Portugal in correcting its large current 
account deficit and loss of external competitiveness shows the difficulties 
involved in external adjustment under EMU (Blanchard (2007)). Moreover, there 
is evidence that the sensitivity of wages to the level of competitiveness is also 
weak in some other member countries (Honohan and Leddin (2006)).
We also note that the prominence of inter-bank lending as a source of finance for 
current account deficits within the euro area means that a version of the "sudden 
stop" mechanism is a potential risk. If banks in a given deficit country are unable 
to rollover short-term debt, the current account deficit may quickly close in a 
manner that is compounded by a domestic banking crisis. While the generalised 
nature of the 2007-2008 financial turmoil has permitted the European Central 
Bank to provide liquidity support to all banks in the euro area, a similar response 
would not necessarily apply in the context of a country-specific problem. While 
national governments have intervened to provide support to domestic banks 
during the current crisis, it is too early to tell whether this will be sufficient to 
avert a sharp reversal in capital flows to major deficit countries in the euro area.
Accordingly, the external adjustment process for member countries is potentially 
quite challenging. However, it is important to keep in mind the appropriate 
counterfactual. In particular, it is not so obvious that a floating exchange rate 
is automatically helpful in facilitating adjustment. As the current international 
financial crisis reminds us, a deficit country may also be vulnerable to a currency 
attack especially during a period of international turmoil, with currency and 
financial crises feeding on each other. Moreover, the beggar-thy-neighbour 
characteristics of independent monetary responses to crisis situations were an 109 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
important motivation for the formation of EMU, since free trade and cooperation 
on other economic and political issues is difficult to sustain if nominal exchange 
rates are subject to manipulation (Eichengreen (1993)).
5 CONCLUSIONS
The evidence is that the first ten years of EMU has generated a remarkable 
increase in financial integration, even if it the extent of convergence varies 
across different sectors within the overall financial system. However, it is also 
clear that there remain many outstanding barriers to full integration. In relation 
to technical frictions, initiatives such as SEPA, Target-2, the proposed integration 
of securities settlement with the payments system(T2S) and the new version 2 
of the Correspondent Central Banking System(CCBS2) should improve the 
support infrastructure to enable greater progress in achieving deeper and broader 
financial integration. 12
Further financial integration is also dependent on the success of moves to improve 
the European financial stability framework and the system for the supervision 
of large multi-country banks. The tension between the internationalisation 
of banking activity and national responsibility for financial stability was 
evident from the outset of EMU (see, amongst others, Begg et al. (1999) 
and Portes (2001)). Indeed, considerable efforts have been made to promote 
cooperation and coordination between the different national systems in order 
to make this approach operate in an effective manner but the 2007-2008 
international financial crisis has illustrated the limits to voluntary cooperation 
and the potential for "beggar-thy-neighbour" interventions. Accordingly, the 
current crisis clearly signals the imperative of establishing a truly pan-European 
mechanism to cope with stresses in the financial system. However, the viability 
of an area-wide regime faces the limitation that the provision of financial stability 
ultimately requires a fiscal backstop and the political acceptability of pooling 
fiscal resources is open to question. The current crisis has also vividly highlighted 
the global interdependence of financial systems, such that the internationalisation 
of the financial stability function requires improved coordination mechanisms at 
the global level, in addition to making progress in respect of the intra-European 
dimension.
A major focus of this paper has been to analyse the impact of increased financial 
integration on the macroeconomic behaviour of the member countries. There 
is a presumption that financial integration promotes financial development and 
thereby contributes to a higher long-run level of productivity and the initial 
evidence provides encouraging support for this channel. However, a decade of 
data is not long enough to establish conclusive evidence on contribution of the euro 
to financial development, such that this area requires ongoing research attention. 
Moreover, the current crisis is sure to complicate the analysis of the contribution 
12  See European Central Bank (2008) for a comprehensive description of the ESCB's role in 
fostering further financial integration.110 LANE
of expanded capital markets to long-term macroeconomic performance, since the 
full impact cannot be assessed until recovery is fully established.
In relation to international diversification, we have highlighted that there is 
little evidence to support that EMU has generated a substantial increase in the 
cross-border sharing of macroeconomic risks. This should not be interpreted 
as a surprising outcome, in view of the mechanisms that give rise to wealth 
divergence during the transition phase in which peripheral member countries 
have enjoyed a sustained decline in risk premia and large credit booms. However, 
over the longer term, the contribution of increased cross-border investment 
positions to risk sharing may well show up more strongly in the data. The third 
macroeconomic dimension that we covered was to argue that EMU has allowed 
some member countries to run persistent current account deficits. While this 
may well accelerate convergence in income levels, the improved access to 
external credit may also have contributed to over-investment in property and 
unsustainable increases in domestic asset prices in some membership countries. 
Moreover, membership of a monetary union also alters the external adjustment 
process such that the transition from trade deficits to trade surpluses may be more 
prolonged than under a floating exchange rate.
Finally, EMU over the next decade is set to undergo further transformation over 
the next decade, with the entry of increasing numbers of the new EU member 
states. 13 The analysis in this paper suggests that the euro has the greatest financial 
impact on those member countries with initially less-developed financial 
systems. Accordingly, as is projected by Masten et al. (2008), joining the euro 
area should accelerate the financial development of the new member states. 
In addition, conditional on possessing a high degree of macroeconomic and 
fiscal stability upon entry to EMU, the euro area should be a safe haven for the 
new member states relative to the difficulties involved in managing an floating 
exchange rate in a world of high capital mobility. Finally, the enlargement of 
the euro area further reinforces the urgency to improve the European financial 
stability framework, in view of the risks posed by the increased heterogeneity in 
banking systems across the euro area.
13  See Darvas and Szapary (2008) for an analysis of euro adoption strategies by this group of 
countries.111 EMU AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
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ABSTRACT
This paper is composed of two parts. We first review the literature on the effects 
of the euro on financial integration. We discuss the measurement of financial 
integration and describe the main legislative and regulatory harmonization 
policies that the EU member states have implemented in financial markets. 
We then review empirical results showing a positive impact of these policies 
and of the single currency on financial integration. Second, we present new 
empirical evidence of the impact of cross-border financial integration on 
macroeconomic volatility and cross-country risk sharing for 20 industrialized 
countries (including EU-15) over 1978-2007. We find that higher cross-border 
banking integration leads to lower consumption volatility and higher output 
volatility. These results imply that banking integration spurs risk sharing. The 
quantification of the amount of consumption and income smoothing reveals 
an economically significant positive effect of integration on risk sharing. Our 
results, therefore, suggest that the increased financial integration has fostered 
ex-post the optimality of the currency union.
1  Essential parts of this paper were prepared while Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan was visiting the 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial systems play a key role in the functioning of modern economies. 
Capital markets, by efficiently allocating resources across space and time, 
are instrumental in ensuring long-term non-inflationary growth. In addition, 
financial integration may be welfare enhancing by enabling agents to smooth 
consumption and share idiosyncratic risk. From a central banking perspective, 
financial systems represent the primary channel through which monetary policy 
is conducted. A stable, integrated and efficient financial system enhances the 
smooth and effective transmission of monetary policy throughout the economy.
Barriers and obstacles to financial integration prevent the allocation of capital to 
the most valuable projects at the lowest possible cost. European capital markets 
had been shaped by decades of national policies and cultural norms. Although the 
various stages of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project eliminated many 
obstacles and barriers, numerous domestic conventions and practices remained, 
mainly because strong network externalities made it costly for market participants 
to abandon them. Thus, while the introduction of the single currency has spurred 
financial integration across euro area member states, existing barriers implied an 
important loss of efficiency. As a consequence, promoting integration of European 
financial markets has been one of the priorities of European policy makers.
This paper is composed of two parts. First, we review the literature on the impact 
of the single currency on various forms of financial integration. Although the 
introduction of the euro has arguably been the single most important force behind 
the evolution of European financial markets over the past two decades, it has 
been preceded and followed by a series of policy initiatives aimed at creating a 
level playing field across the euro area. Most previous work do not distinguish 
the impact of monetary union from the accompanying policy reforms. We argue 
that, the importance of these reforms in the process of financial integration should 
not be understated: they are continuously shaping the legislative architecture and 
technical infrastructure on which financial markets operate. For these reasons, 
we discuss the main legislative actions taken at the European level, as well 
as the ongoing efforts aimed at integrating the infrastructure of the different 
market segments. Then, we review results from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, 
and Peydró (2008b), who analyze the effect of the euro and the most important 
legislative and harmonization policies in the European financial sector – the 
Financial Sector Action Plan (FSAP) – on banking integration.
Second, we present new empirical evidence regarding the impact of financial 
integration on macroeconomic volatility and risk sharing. Our key innovation 
compared to previous research is distinguishing between external assets and 
cross-border liabilities. Using banking integration data for 20 industrial countries 
over the past 30 years, we find that a higher degree of external asset holdings 
is associated with a lower level of consumption volatility. We also find that a 
higher level of external bank liabilities tends to increase output fluctuations. 
Jointly these results suggest that banking integration may facilitate risk sharing. 
These results are supportive for the models in the spirit of Obstfeld (1994), who 
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results differ from previous empirical studies, which fail to detect a significant 
effect of financial integration on macroeconomic volatility (e.g. Kose et al. 2006). 
We, also, following Demyanyk et al. (2008), quantify the degree of international 
diversification as a result of banking integration by estimating formal risk-
sharing specifications. We find that the average consumption risk sharing among 
the 20 developed countries is 38%. This means that 38% of the country-specific 
risk is diversified away, on average, through cross-border bank investment 
and lending. In addition, we find that a country that doubles the holdings of its 
external assets (relative to population) is able to diversify away an additional 
17%. External bank liabilities seem to have a dis-smoothing effect, but the 
estimated coefficient is not significant. We also estimate income (GNI) risk-
sharing regressions. We estimate that the average income risk sharing over the 
last two decades has increased from zero to 12%. More importantly, a country 
that increases the holdings of external liabilities (relative to population) by 100% 
achieves 18% of additional income smoothing. To our knowledge these results 
are the first to reveal an economically significant positive effect of cross-border 
banking integration on risk sharing. The only other study that we are aware of 
is Demyanyk et al. (2008), who also investigated the effect of bank integration 
on risk sharing for Europe. Demyanyk et al. (2008), however, do not find a 
significant effect of banking integration on consumption risk sharing. Most likely 
this difference is due to our sample, which covers a larger number of countries 
and years.
Our findings have important implications for policy makers in the euro area. 
Asymmetric shocks in a currency union generate output and inflation differentials. 
The impact of such shocks can be considerably reduced if financial markets enable 
cross-country risk sharing. To the extent that risk-sharing allows for the hedging 
of consumption, it represents a key counteracting mechanism against output 
shocks among members of a currency union. This mechanism reduces the need 
for policy intervention in dealing with such asymmetries. Our results, therefore, 
suggest that the increased cross-border banking integration has improved ex-post 
the optimality of the currency union by improving consumption risk sharing.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews the vast and growing literature 
on the effect of the single currency on various forms of financial integration. We 
then describe the main regulatory and legislative policies that the EU member 
states have (are) implemented (implementing). We conclude this review part 
by summarizing the findings from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró 
(2008b), who isolate the effect of monetary union from that of the parallel 
financial sector reforms that took place under the Financial Service Action Plan 
(FSAP) on cross-border financial integration. Section 2 investigates the “real” 
effects of banking integration. We start by examining the impact of cross-border 
banking integration on GDP and consumption volatility. Besides using an 
aggregate index of banking integration that blends foreign assets and liabilities, 
we also distinguish between the two. We then quantify the degree of risk sharing 
that is explained by banking integration. Section 3 concludes.119 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
2  THE IMPACT OF THE SINGLE CURRENCY ON THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE EURO AREA FINANCIAL SYSTEM
There is a vast and growing literature on measuring financial integration 
(e.g. Adam et al. (2002)). The literature tends to measure integration both from 
the “price” side and also from the “quantity” side. Most studies consider the 
financial markets to be integrated if all agents face the same set of rules, are 
treated equally and have equal access to financial products (e.g. Baele et al. 
(2004)). If these conditions are satisfied, any price difference between identical 
assets will be immediately arbitraged away. Given the variety of assets traded, 
the measurement of financial integration with “price-based” indicators is not 
straightforward. Hence the literature also looks at the volume of cross-border 
transactions in the various market segments.
By opening access to foreign markets, financial integration offers agents a wider 
range of financing sources and investment opportunities, and permits the creation 
of deeper and more liquid markets. This allows more information to be pooled 
and processed more effectively, and economies of scale to be exploited. Financial 
integration also increases competition, thereby putting pressure on the cost of 
production for financial services, and increases financial development.
Although increased financial integration and development are usually associated 
with better economic performance, the implications for financial stability are more 
ambiguous. A higher degree of financial integration and development can have a 
positive impact on financial stability, to the extent that both facilitate risk sharing 
among agents. On the other hand, as the recent turmoil clearly demonstrates, 
some new (ill-designed or badly implemented) financial instruments may 
magnify problems arising from asymmetric information, distort incentives and 
offer opportunities for extreme risk taking. As pointed out among others by Rajan 
(2006) and Ferguson et al. (2007), financial integration will improve stability 
most of the times, but may make rare and extreme events more severe.
A key summary statistic to gauge the development of a financial system is the capital 
market size.2 Chart 1 reports the total size of capital markets, which aggregates the 
size of stock, bond and loan markets as a share of GDP. The Chart shows that the 
size of capital markets it has been growing steadily over the past fifteen years for all 
developed economies. Papaioannou and Portes (2009) provide formal econometric 
evidence that the euro has accelerated the growth of financial development among 
euro area member countries. Establishing larger and more liquid capital markets is 
key to financial development, which in turn has a positive effect on investment and 
total-factor-productivity (see Levine (2005) and Papaioannou (2007) for reviews).
2  One important caveat is the following: the data behind the indicators discussed in this survey 
stop in mid 2008. Therefore, they do not cover the very recent developments. Preliminary 
evidence from ECB (2009) shows signs of divergence on price-based indicators (for instance 
in the cross-country dispersion of money market lending rates). From a financial integration 
perspective, it is important to understand how much of this divergence reflects differences 
in credit risk among banks, or alternatively higher market segmentation.120 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
The growing size of the euro area financial system shown in Chart 1, hides uneven 
developments of its individual segments. In the rest of this section we will review 
the literature that examines the impact of the single currency on the most important 
market segments, namely the money, bond, equity and banking market. Following 
the literature on financial integration, we will distinguish between price-based 
measures (based on asset pricing models) and quantity-based measures (based on 
cross-border asset allocations) (Obstfeld and Taylor (2004)).3
MONEY MARKETS
The euro area money market covers interbank short-term lending and borrowing 
and deposit taking.4 The most important segment is the (unsecured and secured 
repo) markets. The unsecured deposit market is where credit institutions 
exchange short-term liquidity without posing collateral as guarantee. In the 
repo market, participants obtain liquidity against collateral, with the agreement 
to reverse the transaction at some pre-specified future date and price. The 
derivatives market includes interest rate futures, options and swaps, and has 
become increasingly important in recent years. The short-term securities market 
consists of commercial paper issued by corporations and certificates of deposit 
issued by banks with less than one year maturity.
3  For early surveys see Adam et al. (2002), Hartmann et al. (2003) and Baele et al. (2004). 
Recently, the European Commission and the ECB have been publishing comprehensive 
reports on financial integration (see EC (2008) and ECB (2008)).
4  See ECB (2008d) for a review of the recent developments in money markets.
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Hartmann et al. (2003), Gaspar et al. (2001) and Perez-Quiros and Mendizabal 
(2006) analyze the evolution and integration of these markets in the early years 
of EMU. Financial integration in money markets is typically measured by the 
dispersion of average daily interest rates prevailing in each euro area country. 
Since transactions in these markets are characterized by similar cash flows and, 
given the very short term maturity contained very little credit risk (until the start 
of the turmoil), the law of one price suggests that in perfectly integrated markets 
any dispersion should converge to zero. The available evidence suggests that 
both the unsecured and secured segments of money markets have reached a high 
degree of integration (see Chart 2). The cross-sectional standard deviation of 
Chart 2   Cross-country standard deviation of unsecured interbank 









































Note: Each indicator is constructed as the unweighted standard deviation of average daily 
interest rates (in basis points) prevailing in each euro area country. The bottom figure reports 
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the overnight lending rates across euro area countries fell sharply to almost zero 
following the introduction of the euro. Spreads between the policy rate and the 
inter-bank rates have been also small and have remained stable until the summer 
of 2007, the start of the financial turmoil. Similar results hold for the 1-month 
and 12-month EURIBOR and EUREPO rates.
Following the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers even very short term 
interbank loans are perceived as risky.5 This in part explains the higher dispersion 
of money market rates observed over the last year, which must not necessarily be 
associated with an increased market segmentation. In the presence of asymmetric 
information – for instance with high uncertainty about the number of risky 
borrowers in the interbank market – the interest rate rises and safer borrowers 
may choose to drop out of the market. As counterparty risks increase even further, 
banks may prefer not to lend to other banks, thus reducing liquidity and increasing 
volatility in the interbank market (Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008)).6
5  For systemic risk in banking see de Bandt, Hartmann, and Peydró (2009), and for interbank 
contagion see Iyer and Peydró (forthcoming).
6  Cassola, Lo Duca and Holthausen (2008) show that cross-border trades declined significantly 
after the start of the turmoil. At the same time the price for cross-border transactions has been 
significantly lower than that for domestic trades. According to the authors, these facts are consistent 
with a two-tier system of the money market: cross-border interbank trades are conducted by 
banks with a relatively high credit standing, while the other banks are mainly trading in domestic 
markets where interest rates are higher because the average credit risk is perceived to be higher.
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The market for short-term securities, on the other hand, has shown little signs 
of integration, mainly because of differences in market practices and standards. 
Since commercial paper contracts vary across countries due to differences in 
legal systems and regulatory requirements, the market for short-term paper in 
Europe has remained largely of domestic nature.7 Since June 2006, the STEP 
initiative (Short-Term European Paper) aims at fostering the integration of this 
market by promoting convergence of market standards.
Chart 3 illustrates the progress achieved so far. In 2007 more than half of the 
outstanding commercial paper in euros had been assigned the STEP label. As 
more issuers use a common STEP label, obstacles to cross-border transactions 
represented by different domestic practices are progressively eliminated. The 
commercial paper market has therefore the potential to become a truly integrated 
euro area market, whose dimension is comparable to that of the US.
BOND MARKETS
With the introduction of the euro and the removal of exchange rate risk, yields 
in the bond market have converged in all euro area member countries, and 
spreads tend to be increasingly driven by common factors. The extant literature 
and available indicators show that the euro had a substantial impact in these 
markets. Unlike for money markets, whose rates are directly comparable, naïve 
comparisons of bond yield differentials may give a misleading indication of the 
state of integration of bond markets. Besides exchange rate risk, bond returns 
differentials reflect differences in perceived credit risk, stemming for example 
from fiscal policies, a history of default, and current account positions. As such, 
bond spreads reflect the proper functioning of market discipline, rather than 
lack of integration. Most price-based measures of integration in bond markets 
are based on the intuition that in integrated markets bond yields should react to 
common, rather than local, factors. We review the evidence for government and 
corporate bond markets separately.
Government Bond Markets Examining the effect of monetary integration on 
government bonds is quite important, as even a small reduction of spreads may 
entail significant savings for the tax payer. A reduction in the cost of borrowing 
may free resources to invest in public works and social welfare programs. 
After the impressive convergence in the run up to EMU spreads have narrowed 
significantly in the initial post-euro period, although differences have not 
disappeared completely. Yet since the start of the financial market turmoil in 
summer 2007, spreads have increased significantly, specifically among countries 
with huge levels of debt, budget and trade deficits.
Although part of the remaining spread reflects cross-country differences in debt 
levels and budget deficits/surpluses, a common finding of the literature that 
clearly points to a higher degree of integration is that following the advent of 
the euro spreads tend to move together (see Pagano and Von Thadden (2004) 
for an early review of the literature). The empirical literature tries to identify 
7  The London based Euro Commercial Paper (ECP) market is the only market where the short 
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which common factors explain spread co-movement. Codogno et al. (2003) 
find that yield differentials between government bonds can be explained by 
variations in international risk factors, such as risk aversion proxied by the 
spread between the U.S. corporate and government bonds. The results are 
obtained with simple regressions, where spreads are regressed against countries’ 
deviation of debt-to-GDP ratios with respect to Germany and their proxy for 
the international risk premium. Using alternative econometric techniques Geyer 
et al. (2004) and Bernoth et al. (2004) reach similar conclusions. Manganelli 
and Wolswijk (2008) show that the spreads of euro area government bonds are 
tightly related to the level of short-term interest rates set by the Eurosystem, 
which in turn may be related to time-varying risk aversion: an increase in interest 
Chart 4   Average monthly spreads of 10 year euro area 
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since the introduction of the euro.125 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
rates is associated to a widening of spreads and conversely lower interest rates 
induce a reduction in spreads. Their finding is also consistent with an emerging 
line of empirical research, showing how tight monetary policy decreases the 
willingness of investors to bear risks.8 Liquidity appears to be an important factor 
(e.g., Gomez-Puig (2006); Jankowitsch et al. (2006); Favero et al. (2007)). The 
general finding of this body of work is that the benchmark property appears 
to command a liquidity premium, although there may be relevant non-linear 
interactions between liquidity and credit risk.
Corporate Bond Market The introduction of the euro has been one of the driving 
forces behind the strong development of the euro area corporate bond market. 
Pagano and von Thadden (2004) provide a broad overview of the major structural 
developments. On the supply side, the introduction of the euro has offered 
companies the opportunity to access a larger pool of investors and diversify their 
liabilities away from traditional loans. Rajan and Zingales (2003), using panel 
data on domestic outstanding corporate debt in several countries till the early 
years of the single currency (2001, 2002), document that EMU had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the amount of net debt issues.
Similarly, the market for corporate euro bond underwriting, after the introduction 
of the euro became a much more contestable business. Santos and Tsatsaronis 
(2003) show that the arrival of the euro had an important negative impact on the 
underwriting fees of international corporate bonds issued in the new currency. 
Biais et al. (2006) document how euro area corporate bonds have narrower 
bid-ask spreads than comparable bonds denominated in other currencies. 
According to the study this spread reduction is largely the outcome of the large 
pool of institutional investors, which was made possible by the integration of 
the European corporate bond market after the introduction of the euro. On the 
demand side, there has been a strong increase in the geographical diversification 
of euro area bond portfolios.
Chart 5 shows that the trend towards internationalization is ongoing. The Chart 
plots cross-border holdings among euro area member states of long-term debt 
securities. Overall, euro area residents have strongly increased their cross-border 
holdings of debt securities since the end of the 1990s, from about 10% to almost 
60%. Given the very low starting point in 1997, this indicator suggests that 
investors have substantially diversified their portfolios across the euro area. 
One obtains similar results by looking at cross-border holdings of financial 
institutions. Cross-border holdings of long-term debt securities have continued 
to increase over the past ten years from about 15% in 1999 to about 40% in 
2007 (see ECB 2008). The visual impression of Chart 5 is conformed by formal 
econometric studies. Lane (2006) and Cœurdacier and Martin (2007) regress 
the amount of cross-border bond holdings on an EMU dummy, controlling for 
several bilateral characteristics, among which EU membership and bilateral 
trade. They find that the introduction of the euro had a substantial impact on the 
amount of cross-border bond investments.
8  See, for instance, Rajan (2006), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Jimenez et al. (2008).126 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
Researchers studying price-based measures also find a significant impact of the 
euro on integration in the corporate bond market. Baele et al. (2004) test whether 
risk-adjusted yields have a systematic country component. In an integrated 
market, the proportion of the total yield spread variance that is explained by 
country effects should be close to zero. The respective indicator shows that the 
euro area corporate bond market is quite integrated. Country effects explain only 
a very small proportion of the cross-sectional variance of corporate bond yield 
spreads (see ECB (2008)).
EQUITY MARKETS
Equity markets in Europe have developed substantially over the past two decades, 
in the midst of a wave of consolidation of stock exchanges. A higher volume of 
transactions lowers intermediation fees and increases market efficiency (see ECB 
(2007a)). Through network externalities and economies of scale the consolidation 
of stock exchanges can further spur integration. Market consolidation occurred 
initially at the national level. Consolidation continued then at the regional level 
(Euronext and OMX), and more recently outside the euro area (with the NYSE-
Euronext and LSE-Borsa Italiana mergers). Schmiedel and Schönenberger (2005) 
report that securities exchanges (including stocks and derivatives) in the 12 euro 
area countries have decreased from 30 in 1999 to 22 in 2005.
It is much harder to assess the degree of integration of equity markets relative 
to money and bond markets, as equity returns are not directly comparable. 
In principle, in a perfectly integrated market only common risk factors are 
priced, while diversifiable country risks command no risk premia. In practice, 
Chart 5   The degree of cross-border holdings of long-term debt 
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it is difficult to disentangle the impact on equity returns of changing economic 
fundamentals from changes in the pricing mechanism (see Adjaouté and Danthine 
(2004) for an in-depth discussion). A simple, direct attempt to quantify the impact 
of integration in equity markets is to look at the dynamics of investors’ portfolios. 
In a truly integrated market, investors should not prefer national over foreign 
equities. Evidence of decreased home bias can therefore be consistent with the 
disappearance of psychological or physical barriers to cross border investments.
The available quantity-based measures indicate a rising degree of integration 
in equity markets. De Santis and Gerard (2006) investigate the determinants of 
international portfolio reallocation for 30 large economies between 1997 and 2001. 
They find an overall decrease in home bias that is more pronounced for euro area 
member states. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Cœurdacier and Martin (2007) 
reach similar results. Chart 6 shows that euro area residents increased their holdings 
of equity issued in another euro area country between 1997 and 2004. Over this 
period, the share of intra-euro area cross-border holdings of equity securities 
doubled to 28%, while the share of euro area equity assets held outside the euro 
area is much lower and increased only slightly.
Another strand of the literature studies integration in equity markets by looking 
at asset returns. A first group of papers uses asset pricing models, while a 
second group looks at changes in comovements at country and sectoral level. 
Hardouvelis et al. (2006) use a conditional asset pricing model where the risk 
premium of the stock market is decomposed into a euro area wide and country 
specific risk factors. The relative importance of these two factors is measured 
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by a time-varying parameter that reflects the (conditional) level of integration 
of each market. The empirical findings show that the degree of integration 
has gradually increased to the point where individual euro area country stock 
markets appear to be fully integrated into the EU market. In a similar fashion, 
Cappiello, Lo Duca and Maddaloni (2008) use an intertemporal CAPM to study 
the dynamics of equity risk premia for the five largest euro area economies. They 
also find that euro area equity markets are well integrated. Fratzscher (2002), 
Baele et al. (2004) and Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) assess to what extent local 
equity returns react to news. The estimates are interpreted as a measure of the 
intensity with which euro area and world factors are transmitted to local equity 
markets. They find that greater economic and financial integration leads to a 
higher degree of co-movement across countries and therefore to an increase in 
sensitivities to euro area factors.
Asset pricing models depend on the particular methodology and empirical 
specification of the risk factors. Furthermore, any test of market integration 
based on an asset pricing model is at the same time a test of the asset pricing 
model itself. To address these limitations, the literature has developed measures 
of integration based on less-restrictive (“model free”) approaches.9 Following 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) a common approach is to analyze the 
relative importance of country and industry factors in driving returns.10 The 
idea of this body of work is that in segmented financial markets the benefits 
of cross-country diversification should be relatively higher than those of
cross-sector diversification. An interesting finding of this line of research is that 
the dominance of country factors has decreased substantially and at certain points 
in time it has been overcome by industry factors in the euro area.
BANKING MARKETS
Banking markets encompass interbank (or wholesale) activities, capital market-
related activities and retail banking activities. Since we have already analyzed 
interbank and capital market related activities, we focus here on the retail 
segment.11 As banking is a multi-product business and banking services are 
quite heterogeneous it is hard to precisely assess the degree of integration. Retail 
customers typically buy packages of financial services that differ from bank 
to bank, let alone from country to country. Furthermore, because of limited 
access to “hard information” (such as publicly accessible account statements or 
an observed repayment track record), banks’ loans to small customers have to 
rely on “soft information”, such as personal interaction with the customer and 
knowledge of the local customs.
9  Ayuso and Blanco (2001) follow the approach proposed by Chen and Knez (1995). Although 
their application is limited to US, German and Spanish stock markets, their results point to 
an already substantial degree of integration during the nineties.
10  See Adjouté and Danthine (2004), Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003), Brooks and Del Negro 
(2004), Cappiello, Lo Duca and Maddaloni (2008), Cappiello, Kadareja and Manganelli 
(2008), Carrieri, Errunza and Sarkissian (2004), Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2008), Eiling, 
Gérard and de Roon (2005).
11  Dermine (2006), Cabral, Dierick and Vesala (2002), and Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and 
Tavakoli (2007) survey recent developments in European banking systems.129 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
A simple way to describe the progress of integration in the banking market is to 
examine whether barriers to entry have been progressively removed. In principle, 
the absence of barriers to entry and the threat of new entries should deter 
incumbents from charging prices in excess of their marginal costs. In practice, 
such an ideal condition is rarely met. Several studies show that even in the U.S. 
the distance between borrower and lender is a highly significant determinant of 
lending conditions (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Degryse and Ongena (2005) 
using a data set containing more than 17,000 firm loans of a large Belgian bank 
find that rates decrease in the distance between the firm and the lender. Similarly, 
loan rates increase in the distance between the firm and competing banks. 
Degryse and Ongena (2004) provide an extensive overview of empirical and 
theoretical literature suggesting that market segmentation may persist in retail 
banking for some time.
Notwithstanding these caveats, quantitative measures of integration in the retail 
bank market can be obtained directly by looking at the dispersion of interest rates 
on loans and deposits from banks to non-financial corporations and households. 
Euro area cross-country dispersion of bank interest rates has remained relatively 
high (at least when compared to the government bond market and interest rates 
on debt securities more generally, see ECB (2008)).12
12  An alternative way to gauge directly the degree of integration in banking market is to 
compare cross-country efficiency of European banks, as suggested for instance by Bos 
and Schmiedel (2007).
Chart 7   MFI holdings of securities issued by MFIs: outstanding 
amounts by residency of the issuer
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Quantity-based indicators of banking integration are based on measures of 
cross-border activities. Chart 7 reports the geographical holdings of securities 
issued by euro area financial institutions and held by other financial institutions 
resident in other euro area countries or in the rest of the European Union. The 
indicator shows substantial progress in the degree of euro area diversification. 
Other indicators, such as loans to other financial and non-financial institutions 
also reveal the existence of an increasing trend of cross-border activity 
(see ECB (2008)). The econometric analysis of Perez, Salas-Fumas and Saurina 
(2005) shows that this integration process has been boosted by the introduction 
of the euro.
The intrinsic nature of the banking system – characterized by strong information 
asymmetries – suggests that bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) may be the 
best strategy to enter another market and provide truly pan-European cross-
border services. Cross-border M&A in banking were low compared to related 
activities in the manufacturing sector. This reflected the existence of barriers, not 
only of geographical but also of regulatory and legal nature (see ECB (2007b), 
Berger (2007), Altunbas and Marqués-Ibáñez (2008)). The introduction of the 
euro has spurred cross-border bank M&A. Chart 8 reports average cross-border 
M&A activities of euro area banks, broken down by the geographical location of 
the deals. We notice that there has been a substantial reduction in the proportion 
of domestic deals which has been substituted by intra-euro area cross-border 
M&A activity. The extent to which banks are owned by foreign institutional 
investors appears to be an important determinant of cross-border M&A activity 
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(ECB (2008e)). If foreign institutional ownership and cross-border M&A help 
to reduce home bias and encourage foreign portfolio investments, they may 
represent important channels to foster financial integration.
2.1  POLICY INITIATIVES COMPLEMENTING MONETARY UNION
The degree of financial integration varies considerably across the various market 
segments. The more uniform the characteristics of the asset the more integrated 
that market. The unsecured money market, where banks lend to each other on 
such a very short term that the credit risk was essentially null (until the start of the 
turmoil), appeared to be the most integrated. Bond markets, where cash flows are 
directly comparable and credit risk can be reasonably estimated, also appear quite 
integrated. Equity and banking markets appear to be the least integrated.
Lack of integration reflects the existence of barriers to cross-border activities. We 





Recent work shows that there are non-negligible psychological and cultural 
barriers to financial integration (see for a review Guiso et al. (2006)). For example 
cultural differences and mistrust explains a significant portion of bilateral 
financial (and trade) flows (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008) and Guiso et al. 
(2008) for evidence). Giannetti and Yafeh (2008) show that cultural similarities 
correlate significantly with rates and the loan structure in the international 
syndicated bank loan market. Besides cultural and psychological reasons, 
information frictions seem to have a significant effect on financial integration. 
Research by Portes and Rey (2005) shows that variables reflecting information 
asymmetries among countries (such as telephone costs, trading time, foreign 
newspaper circulation) correlate significantly with cross-border equity flows. 
Subsequent work on other forms of financial integration reaches similar results 
(e.g. Aviat and Cœurdacier (2006); Papaioannou (2009)). Quite importantly in 
all studies, distance is negatively correlated with financial integration even if one 
accounts for cultural, regulatory, or informational differences. EU integration 
policies mainly focus on removing regulatory-legal barriers and building the 
necessary infrastructure for cheap and fast trading and settlement procedures. 
These measures can also serve to ease the informational frictions. We henceforth 
focus our analysis on these barriers.
REGULATORY/LEGAL OBSTACLES
A precondition for financial integration is the removal of any legislative or 
regulatory differences discriminating agents on the basis of their location. Many 
of the efforts at the European level have been directed at the removal of barriers 
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The legal and regulatory environment of the European banking industry has been 
radically changed over the past three decades (see Dermine (2003, 2006)). The 
transformation started in 1977, with the First Banking Directive establishing the 
principle of home country control: supervision of financial institutions operating 
in two or more member countries was shifted to the home country of the parent 
institution. It was followed in 1988 by the Second Banking Directive, under which 
all credit institutions authorized in a EU country were able to establish branches 
or supply cross-border financial services in other EU countries without further 
authorization (“single banking license”). In parallel with these EU-wide policies 
member states adopted additional policies that aimed at further strengthening the 
banking system (e.g. privatization policies).
After the introduction of the single currency, the European Commission launched 
in 1999 the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The FSAP included a set 
of initiatives aiming at increasing financial integration along three strategic 
objectives (see Hartmann et al. 2003 for details):
A single EU market for wholesale financial services, • 
Open and secure retail markets, • 
State of the art prudential rules and supervision. • 
While the FSAP constituted a major overhaul of the EU legislation for the 
entire financial sector, most of the initiatives related to securities markets. 
Major measures in this respect included, for example, the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), the Transparency Directive, the Market Abuse 
Directive, and the Prospectus Directive. Building on the achievements under 
the FSAP, the Commission adopted in December 2005 a White Paper on EU 
financial services policy for the years 2005-2010. The White Paper aimed at 
ensuring the effective and consistent implementation of the FSAP measures and 
at consolidating and simplifying the existing EU legislation.
Several EU initiatives have recently been adopted in the areas of banking 
regulation and supervision removing existing obstacles to cross-border banking. 
As already discussed in the banking section, cross-border banking groups 
are central for the integration process, as they enhance competition across 
jurisdictions. Against this background, the removal of policy-related obstacles 
to cross-border banking has become a policy priority in recent years. Partly as 
a result of a survey of the European Commission on barriers to cross-border 
banking consolidation, three main obstacles have been identified:
Prudential – Differences in supervisory approval process and prudential rules. • 
Legal – Incompatibilities in national company laws and insufficient legal  • 
harmonization.
Fiscal – Differences in tax treatment of operations related to cross-border  • 
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The European Commission has adopted several directives to address some of 
these issues. For instance, legal obstacles to cross-border M&A operations 
arising from differences in national company laws have been addressed to some 
extent with the Directive on take-over bids, adopted under the FSAP, and with 
the more recent Directive on cross-border mergers. Similarly, a Directive adopted 
in 2007 clarifies the procedural rules and the evaluation criteria for the prudential 
assessment of acquisitions and increases of holdings in the financial sector 
(see ECB (2007b) for details).13 In Section 2 we investigate the effect of these 
policies on cross-border banking integration finding that the implementation of 
these policies did have a positive impact.
TECHNICAL OBSTACLES
Technical market infrastructures are also key for financial integration. 
Impediments to securities trading across national borders inhibit arbitrage forces 
and induce violations of the law of one price. European policy makers and the 
Eurosystem in particular have devoted great efforts to the establishment of a 
common infrastructure.
TARGET and TARGET2 There is unanimous agreement that the high degree 
of integration of the large value payment systems (mostly used for interbank 
payment transactions) has been instrumental to the integration of money markets 
and wholesale banking activities. Before 1999, the system was highly fragmented, 
with only domestic platforms operating in legacy currencies. Payments across 
national borders within the EU were typically made via correspondent banking, 
at higher costs and delays compared to national transactions.
The effective conduct of the single monetary policy required the elimination 
of any difference between intra euro-area and within country payments. With 
the introduction of TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
settlement Express Transfer system) payments between credit institutions within 
the euro-area take place in real-time and at a harmonized transaction fee. At the 
same time the number of payment systems was reduced from seventeen to six 
in 1999.14
TARGET was based on the principle of minimum harmonization, linking the 
national settlement systems of the 15 EU Member States and the ECB payments 
13  Many of these initiatives have been implemented in the context of the so-called “Lamfalussy 
framework”, a legislative architecture introduced by the EU to increase the speed and 
flexibility of the regulatory process. The framework distinguishes four levels in the approach 
to financial legislation. Level 1 concerns the development of basic principles, which are 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. Level 2 involves the implementation 
of the technical details of level 1 directives and regulations, which is delegated to suitable 
committees. At level 3 the committees ensure the homogeneous implementation of 
community legislation at national level. At level 4 the European Commission is in charge 
of strengthening the enforcement of EU law at national level, co-operating with the relevant 
Member States parties. The practical functioning of the Lamfalussy framework – which 
since 2003 has also been implemented in the banking and insurance sectors – has been 
closely monitored and improved over the years.
14  Since the introduction of the euro, two of the remaining six systems were closed down. 
Amongst the remaining four systems, the TARGET system and the private net settlement 
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mechanism into a single platform. In response to the growing demand from 
financial institutions, the Eurosystem launched TARGET2 on 19 November 2007, 
which is no longer based on a decentralized architecture of “system of systems”, 
but on a single shared platform. TARGET2 has replaced the TARGET system 
in full since 19 May 2008.15 TARGET2 is expected to further enhance the 
integration of wholesale payments by providing its participants with:
a single pricing structure for both domestic and cross-border transactions, • 
a harmonized set of cash settlement services in central bank money for  • 
ancillary systems,
a single technical communication interface for multi-country users, to process  • 
the information from branches in  different countries.
The centralization of payment business is expected to allow users to exploit 
benefits from economies of scale and efficiency gains in speed and quality.
TARGET2-Securities The integration of the infrastructure-underlying bond and 
equity markets is much less advanced, partly reflecting the greater complexities 
of these markets. Each country has developed it own system based on different 
practices, as well as different legal, regulatory and fiscal regimes. The resulting 
fragmentation implies higher post-trading costs for EU cross-border securities 
transactions and constitutes a significant barrier to a truly integrated European 
financial market. These problems have been under the radar screen of EU policy 
makers for quite some time, and a number of actions have already been taken, 
such as:
Harmonization of market practices, law, regulation and taxation to remove the  • 
so-called “Giovannini barriers”.16
The development of a “Code of Conduct for clearing and settlement” to  • 
stimulate fair and open competition among all exchanges, central counterparties 
and central securities depositories.
The development of standards for the securities settlement systems aimed  • 
at promoting convergence towards the highest standards of safety and 
efficiency.
To fully exploit the benefit of scale and competition from a truly pan-European 
securities market, the Eurosystem is working at the establishment of TARGET2-
15 We refer to ECB (2008c) for comprehensive information about the main recent 
developments.
16  The Giovannini Group identified a set of barriers to cross-border clearing and settlement, 
stemming from differences in market practices, legal, regulatory and fiscal provisions. 
For details, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_economic_situation/integrating_
markets300_en.htm. See Giovannini (2008) for an extensive overview of clearing and 
settlement systems in Europe.135 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
Securities (T2S), a borderless and neutral platform for securities settlement.17 The 
resulting system endeavors making cross border settlement as cheap and efficient 
as domestic settlement. At the same time, it will allow market participants to pool 
their liquidity and collateral, reducing costs. The use of a common settlement 
platform should increase transparency and facilitate investors’ decision to hold 
securities in the issuing depository, in an investor depository or in a custodian 
bank. Once implemented, investors should be able to choose the provider on 
the basis of costs and services offered, rather than the location of the security. 
This, in turn, will reduce custodian services fees, which currently represent a 
significant fraction of the costs for end-users.
SEPA: Single Euro Payments Area The integration of retail banking markets has 
been hampered by, among other things, the high level of fragmentation of the 
retail payments infrastructure.
Prices for cross-border credit transfers were higher and the execution time 
substantially longer than for domestic transfers. Despite some initiatives by the 
banking industry, progress was slow and the pricing structure remained highly 
heterogeneous. The processing of credit transfers, direct debits and payment 
cards remained fragmented reflecting the underlying payment infrastructures.
European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation in December 2001, 
which enforced an equal pricing of cross-border and national euro payments for 
consumers. This was followed in early 2002 by the launch of the Single Euro 
Payments Area (SEPA) initiative for the banking industry. In SEPA all euro 
payments will be treated as domestic payments and remaining distinctions between 
national and cross-border payments will disappear. By creating a truly integrated 
infrastructure, SEPA should foster the integration and improve the efficiency of 
the euro area retail banking markets (see ECB (2007c) for details).18
STEP: Short-Term European Paper To promote integration in the short-term 
debt securities (i.e. commercial papers and certificates of deposit) the ECB called 
for market participants to improve the functioning of this market. In response, 
the Financial Market Association (ACI) launched the Short-Term European 
Paper (STEP) initiative to foster the integration of the European market segments 
for short-term securities. The STEP initiative aimed at (i) identifying a set of 
common market standards and practices suitable to promote market integration 
and (ii) fostering the voluntary compliance of market participants by granting a 
common label to compliant issuance programmes.
The project has been implemented in two main phases. The first phase – concluded 
in June 2006 with the STEP Market Convention – focused on identifying and 
codifying adequate market standards. The second phase aimed to raise public 
17  The T2S project was official launched by the Governing Council of the ECB on 17 July 2008. 
See http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2s/html/index.en.html for more details.
18  Although the Eurosystem was not the main driver of SEPA, it had a catalyst role in fostering 
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awareness. The campaign contributed to the rapid acceptance and the increasing 
relevance of the STEP market (see Chart 3).19
2.2  THE EFFECTS OF THE EURO AND EU-WIDE POLICIES ON 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
A fast growing body of research analyzes the effect of the euro on various forms 
of financial integration.20 For example Lane (2006), Courdacier and Martin 
(2007), and De Santis and Gerard (2006) use bilateral cross-sectional bond and 
equity holding data (from IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey) in 
advanced economies to examine the effect of the euro on cross-border bond and 
equity holdings. Likewise, Papageorgiou (2005), Petroulas (2007), and Flam and 
Nordstrom (2006) quantify the impact of the single currency on bilateral FDI 
flows. Bobba et al. (2008) document an increased role of the euro in international 
debt issuance, while Spiegel (2009) shows a sizable positive impact of the single 
currency on cross-border banking activities. While estimates differ across studies, 
the overall evidence shows that the euro has spurred financial integration in equity 
and bond markets among member states. For example in the context of banking 
integration Spiegel (2009) finds that cross-border bank lending more than doubled 
after the introduction of the euro in Portugal and Greece.
Yet little attention has been given to isolating the effects of harmonization 
policies from monetary union and other parallel developments. In this section we 
summarize the empirical strategy and results from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou 
and Peydró (2008b), who as far as we are aware, is the only study that disentangles 
the monetary union effect on financial integration from legislative harmonization 
policies in the financial sector.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró (2008b) exploit a confidential data-set 
from the Bank of International Settlements (International Locational Banking 
Statistics Database) which contains information on bilateral bank holdings 
and flows among developed countries. This dataset reports asset and liability 
holdings of banks located in the main industrial countries and some financial 
centers in roughly 150 countries since 1977. The analysis is carried over a group 
of 20 advanced economies over the 1977-2007 period. To assess the effect of 
legislative-regulatory harmonization policies the authors use information from 
the European Commission on the implementation of the 21 Directives of the 
FSAP.21 To measure the impact of the single currency on exchange rate volatility, 
the authors use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification.
19  Like SEPA, STEP is a market led initiative. The ECB played a key catalyst role by 
providing assistance in the formulation and promotion of the project (see ECB 2008b for 
further details).
20  This work follows an earlier literature on the effects of free-trade-agreements and currency 
unions on international trade (e.g. Rose (2000); Micco et al. (2003); Flam and Nordstrom 
(2006); see Baldwin (2006) for a review).
21  The Commission has created league tables to put pressure on the countries to quickly adopt the 
directives. The data is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/index_en.htm. 
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In contrast to previous work that mainly used cross-sectional approaches,22 their 
three dimensional panel structure allows them to control for year fixed effects   
and country-pair fixed-effects. Year fixed-effects account for global trends on 
banking integration. This is important as, for example, cross-border bank flows 
have increased considerably among the past twenty years (e.g. Lane and Milessi-
Feretti (2007)). Country-pair fixed-effects enables them to control for all sources 
of (to a first-approximation) time-invariant bilateral characteristics that affect 
financial integration. Country-pair fixed-effects control for distance, adjacency, 
and other (gravity-like) factors that correlate with banking integration (e.g. Portes 
and Rey (2005); Aviat and Cœurdacier (2006); Papaioannou (2009)). In addition, 
country-pair fixed-effects account for other unobserved or hard-to-account-for 
factors, such as cultural proximity, political ties, legal system similarities, etc. 
that affect financial and international banking in particular linkages (Guiso et al. 
(2009); Giannetti and Yafeh (2008)).
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró (2008b) first estimate difference-
in-difference specification where euro area member countries constitute the 
“treatment” group, while the three EU and the five non-EU countries serve as 
the “control” group. The estimates suggest that cross-border banking activities 
between euro area countries increased by 40% – 45% , compared to the general 
evolution of international financial integration in the control group of countries. 
The difference-in-difference specifications further show that it was the adoption of 
the single currency rather than EU membership that spurred banking integration. 
Second, the authors augment the model with the bilateral measure of the rigidity 
of the exchange rate regime and the index that quantifies the implementation 
of financial sector reforms in the context of the FSAP. The panel estimates 
show that international banking activities is significantly higher among pair of 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime.23 Thus a primary reason behind 
the positive impact of the euro on financial integration was the elimination of 
exchange rate volatility. Legislative harmonization in financial sector tends also 
to have a significant effect on cross-border banking integration. Roughly one 
third of the overall positive impact of the euro in the unconditional estimates is 
explained by these reforms.
Third, the authors also investigate whether the positive effect of the single 
currency on financial integration is driven by a similarly positive impact on 
goods trade. Although trade in goods and assets is positively correlated the 
estimates imply that monetary unification and financial legislation harmonization 
are the key drivers of cross-border banking integration.24
22  This is because previous work mainly relies on IMF’s CPIS data that started becoming 
available at 1997. Since the initial surveys covered a small number of countries and the data 
was questionable, most studies use CPIS data after 2001.
23  This finding is interesting in light of the so-called “fear of floating” literature (e.g. Calvo 
and Reinhart (2003); Klein and Shambaugh (2007)). Yet while this literature focuses on 
developing economies, these results reveal a similar pattern across developed countries.
24  See Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró (2008b) for the robustness of the results 
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3  THE REAL EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the “real effects” of financial 
integration. First, we evaluate the effect of banking integration on macroeconomic 
volatility. Second, we investigate the effect of banking integration on the amount 
of consumption and income risk sharing.
In this section we use data from BIS’s Banking Statistics on cross-border bank 
holdings and flows at the country level over the 1978-2007 period and examine 
the effect of banking integration on output and consumption growth volatility, 
and on consumption and income risk sharing. Our sample includes the initial 
12 euro area member countries, the three non euro area EU15 countries (namely 
the UK, Sweden, and Denmark) and five other industrial countries (the US, 
Japan, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland).
3.1  THE EFFECTS OF BANKING INTEGRATION ON MACROECONOMIC 
VOLATILITY
Standard theory predicts that financial integration should lead to lower 
consumption volatility, as agents will be able to smooth idiosyncratic fluctuations. 
In contrast income volatility may increase as financial integration may magnify 
productivity differences. Yet the empirical literature fails to find such effects in 
the data (see for example Kose et al. 2008)). For example cross-country studies 
find an insignificant effect of international financial integration on output and 
consumption volatility.25
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
We investigate the question of volatility in a panel framework and run the 
following regression:
 
FLUCTi,t  = αt + αi + βFININTi,t-1 + γTRADEi,t-1 +  X'i,t-1δ + εi,t
  Y,C  
 (1)
where dependent variable  FLUCTi,t   Y,C    is a proxy of the fluctuations of output 
(Y) and consumption (C) growth for country i in year t,. We construct the two 
meaures using the analogous study of Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004), who 
quantify the effect of banking integration on GSP fluctuations across US states. 
The index is constructed in two steps. First, we regress real p.c. GDP growth 
25  Besides volatility the literature on the “real” effects of financial integration focuses on the 
correlation between integration and business cycle synchronization (see for example Flood, 
et al. (2008)). The standard international real business cycle model implies that a positive 
productivity shock will yield low cross-country output correlations, as capital will flow to 
the country where the marginal product of labor is high and workers there will substitute 
leisure for labor (e.g. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995), 
Heathcote and Perri (2002)). (Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2008)). 
Yet Kalemli-Ozcan et al reference after Heatcote and Perri reference cross-sectional 
cross-country works find that financial integration makes business cycles more rather 
than less alike (Imbs (2004, 2006); see Rose (2008) for a review). Yet Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Papaioannou, and Peydró (2008a), however, utilize a unique panel dataset of bilateral 
financial flows and show robust evidence that a higher degree of banking integration leads 
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for each country i on country fixed-effects and time fixed-effects. The residuals 
of these models () υі,t
Y  reflect how much GDP growth differs in each country and 
year compared to average growth in this year (across countries) and the average 
growth of this country over the estimation period. The absolute value of these 
residuals reflects GDP fluctuations with respect to the cross-country and the 
















For robustness, we also estimate the model using non-overlapping windows of 
five-year averaged data, where we measure volatility with the standard deviation 
of output and consumption growth over each of the six five-year periods.
Our focus is on the coefficient of country-level financial integration with 
respect to the rest of the world. We use the publicly available version of BIS’s 
Locational Banking Statistics database and we construct for robustness three 
measures of integration: First measure is the growth of total bank external 
assets and liabilities in country i, in year t. Following Morgan et al. (2004) we 
also distinguish between assets and liabilities. This is important as international 
finance theories suggest that they can have different effects on business cycle 
patterns. Hence our second measure is the growth of bank external liabilities in 
country i in year t; and last but not least we use the growth of bank external assets 
in country i in year t, as our third measure.
Given the emphasis of previous work on international trade and production 
similarities as determinants of volatility, we also construct proxy measures 
of trade and specialization patterns. Following Frankel and Rose (1998), we 
measure TRADEi,t with the log of real (deflated with US price deflator) exports 
and imports as a share of GDP. For specialization we follow Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Sorensen, and Yosha (2003) and Imbs (2006), among others, and measure 















n  denote the GDP share of manufacturing industry n in year t in 
country  i (data are retrieved from UNIDO). SPECi,t therefore measures the 
distance between the vector of sector shares in country i, and the vector of 
average sector shares in the other countries, where the total number of countries 
J = 20. Thus, a higher number in SPECi,t indicates that the country has less 
similar production structures to the other 19 countries.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
FLUCT  GDP  600 1.00 1.00 0.00 8.00
FLUCT  Cons  575 1.00 1.00 0.00 7.00
BI Assets  594  13.00 14.00  -29.00  175.00
BI Liabilities  594  13.00 20.00  -32.00  298.00
BI Total  594  12.00 14.00  -27.00  218.00
Notes: FLUCT GDP and FLUCT Cons is the volatility of real p.c GDP growth and 
consumption growth respectively. Volatility is calculated as the absolute residual of 
these respective growth rates after accounting for country fixed-effects and year fixed-
effects. FLUCT measures are reported as percent. BI Assets the growth of external bank 
assets adjusted for valuation effects and exchange rate movements at the country level. 
BI Liabilities is the growth of external bank liabilities is adjusted for same effects at 
the country level. BI Total is the growth of sum of external assets and liabilities, also 
adjusted for the valuation eects. The growth rates are calculated as change in stocks of 
assets from t – 1 to t (or liabilities or total) divided by stocks of assets (or liabilities or 
total) in t – 1. They reported as percent.

























































Year  FE  No  Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Country  FE  No  Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R 2  0.41  0.25  0.43 0.25 0.54 0.32 0.55 0.33 
Observations 574  574  574 574 375 375 375 375 
Countries  20  20  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: t-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coefficients. Fluctuations of GDP 
growth is a volatility measure and calculated as the absolute residual of growth rates after 
accounting for country fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. BI Assets the growth of external 
bank assets adjusted for valuation effects and exchange rate movements at the country level. 
BI Liabilities is the growth of external bank liabilities is adjusted for same effects at the 
country level. BI Total is the growth of sum of external assets and liabilities, also adjusted 
for the valuation effects. The growth rates are calculated as change in stocks of assets from 
t – 1 to t (or liabilities or total) divided by stocks of assets (or liabilities or total) in t – 1. Trade 
is the logarithm of exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Specialization is an index that 
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We now examine the effect of aggregate (country-level) financial (banking 
integration) on business cycle volatility. We first examine the effect of financial 
integration on output fluctuations. Second, we study the effect of integration on 
consumption fluctuations.
OUTPUT FLUCTUATIONS
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates on the effect of financial integration on GDP 
volatility. In Table 2 we employ annual data using as the dependent variable the 
fluctuation index  FLUCT
Y
i,t ()  of Morgan et al. (2004). Table 3 reports otherwise 
identical specifications but now the dependent variable is the standard deviation 
of real GDP p.c. growth over each of the six non-overlapping 5-year periods. For 
comparability with previous work, besides the panel fixed-effect estimates, we 
also report the “between” results. We report unconditional correlation coefficients 
and models that also control for trade and specialization.
The coefficient on the financial (banking) integration measure is positive and 
significant in the cross-sectional models in columns (1) and (5). This shows that 
a higher degree of external assets and liabilities is associated with more volatile 
GDP growth. Yet this correlation could be driven by numerous country-factors. 
Table 3 Fluctuations of GDP growth: 5 year of panel
Btwn Wthn Btwn Wthn Btwn Wthn Btwn Wthn 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
BI  total  0.06 0.00  0.04 0.01 
2.76 0.66  1.47 0.70 
BI assets  0.04  -0.01    0.02  -0.02 
0.03 -1.24    0.77 -1.57 
BI liabilities  0.03  0.02    0.02  0.02 
0.02 2.27    0.68 2.83 
Trade  0.00 -0.05  0.00 -0.08 
0.58 -0.26  0.56 -0.38 
Specialization  0.18 -0.00  0.18 -0.01 
1.29 -0.59  1.23 -0.77 
Year  FE  No Yes  No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
Country  FE  No Yes  No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
R 2  0.30 0.44 0.32 0.46 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.47 
Observations  119 119 119 119 102 102 102 102 
Countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: t-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coefficients. Fluctuations of 
GDP growth is a volatility measure and calculated as the standard deviation over a 
5-year window of growth rates. BI Assets the growth of external bank assets adjusted 
for valuation effects and exchange rate movements at the country level. BI Liabilities is 
the growth of external effects bank liabilities is adjusted for same effects at the country 
level. BI Total is the growth of sum of external assets and liabilities, also adjusted for the 
valuation effects. The growth rates are calculated as change in stocks of assets from t – 1 
to t (or liabilities or total) divided by stocks of assets (or liabilities or total) in t – 1. Trade 
is the logarithm of exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Specialization is an index that 
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In columns (2) and (6) we add a vector of country fixed-effects and period fixed-
effects to account for time-invariant country characteristics and global trends. 
The estimate drops considerably both in the annual and the five-year averaged 
models and is statistically insignificant. This result is in line with previous work 
that using broader measures of financial openness and larger samples also show 
weak correlations between financial integration and macroeconomic volatility.
Theory, however, suggests that external assets and liabilities can have differential 
effects on macroeconomic performance. A high degree of external assets may 
lower volatility through international diversification (e.g. Obstfeld (1994)); 
yet large amounts of external liabilities can magnify fluctuations as foreign 
investors might leave the country in recession times (e.g. Kaminsky, Reinhart 
and Vegh (2004)). In models (3), (4), (7), and (8) we thus split the composite 
measure of financial integration into an assets and liabilities based measure. The 
“within” estimates clearly show that the two types of financial openness have 
opposing effects. The coefficient on external liabilities is positive and significant 
in all model permutations. This suggests that countries that experience a fast 

























































Year  FE  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Country  FE  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R 2  0.15 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.27 
Observations  574 574 574 574 374 374 374 374 
Countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: t-statistics are reported underneath the estimated coefficients. Fluctuations of 
Consumption growth is a volatility measure and calculated as the absolute residual 
of growth rates after accounting for country fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. BI 
Assets the growth of external bank assets adjusted for valuation effects and exchange 
rate movements at the country level. BI Liabilities is the growth of external bank 
liabilities is adjusted for same effects at the country level. BI Total is the growth of 
sum of external assets and liabilities, also adjusted for the valuation effects. The growth 
rates are calculated as change in stocks of assets from t – 1 to t (or liabilities or total) 
divided by stocks of assets (or liabilities or total) in t – 1. Trade is the logarithm of 
exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Specialization is an index that reflects the 
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accumulation of foreign external liabilities tend to have more volatile GDP 
fluctuations.26 In contrast, the estimate on the growth of external foreign assets is 
negative and insignificant at standard confidence levels.
CONSUMPTION FLUCTUATIONS
Theoretical work emphasizes the welfare effects of financial openness. The 
standard argument is that through international diversification, financial integration 
enhances welfare by lowering consumption fluctuations. In Tables 4 and 5 we 
thus report analogous to the GDP fluctuations estimates, quantifying the effect 
of banking integration on consumption volatility. Table 4 reports results in the 
annual dataset using the Morgan et al. (2004) index of consumption fluctuations 
FLUCTi,t () C and Table 5 gives analogous estimates using the standard deviation 
of real consumption growth over 6 non-overlapping five year periods.
26  This result is consistent with Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Volosovcyh (2009), who shows 
a positive effect of foreign ownership on regional level volatility within Europe.

























































Year  FE  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Country  FE  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R 2  0.12 0.47 0.10 0.48 0.13 0.45 0.13 0.48 
Observations  119 119 119 119 102 102 102 102 
Countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Fluctuations of GDP growth is a volatility measure and calculated as the standard 
deviation over a 5-year window of growth rates. BI Assets the growth of external bank 
assets adjusted for valuation effects and exchange rate movements at the country level. 
BI Liabilities is the growth of external bank liabilities adjusted for same effects at the 
country level. BI Total is the growth of sum of external assets and liabilities, also adjusted 
for the valuation effects. The growth rates are calculated as change in stocks of assets 
from t – 1 to t (or liabilities or total) divided by stocks of assets (or liabilities or total) in 
t  –  1. Trade is the logarithm of exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Specialization 
is an index that reflects the dis-similarities in industrial production between the two 
countries. See table 1 for detailed description of variables.144 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
In line with the previous evidence on output volatility there seems to be no effect 
of financial integration on consumption fluctuations, when we use the composite 
measure of banking integration that blends assets and liabilities. When we split 
the results between external asset growth and liability growth, we still do not find 
significant results in the cross-sectional models. However, once we exploit the 
time variation, controlling for country fixed-effects, we find that a higher degree 
of external bank asset growth reduces consumption volatility. This applies both 
when we use the annual fluctuation index (in Table 4) and when we use the 
standard deviation of real consumption growth (in Table 5) in the LHS of the 
specification. This new result offers direct support to theories in international 
finance that international investment enables agents to smooth consumption and 
diversify idiosyncratic country-specific risk. In the next section we quantify the 
effects of banking integration on risk sharing.
3.2  BANKING INTEGRATION AND RISK SHARING
If consumption growth rates in all countries are identical, then there is perfect risk 
sharing. As shown by Arrow and Debreu this is an equilibrium outcome assuming 
consumers have identical CRRA utility functions and access to a complete set of 
Arrow-Debreu securities.27 The empirical implication is that consumption in each 
country is a constant share of aggregate consumption. Starting with Mace (1991) 
the literature generally tests whether or not the growth rates are identical, where 
a rejection implies no perfect risk sharing.28
The literature constructed standard measures of the degree of consumption risk 
sharing among groups of countries as follows. Denote country i’s year t (per 
capita real, government plus private) final consumption, Cit, and denote aggregate 
consumption in year t, Ct. Similarly, denote country i’s year t (real per capita) 
output, GDPit, and aggregate output in year t, GDPt. This measure build on the 
observation that the correlation of country-specific consumption, with country-
specific output shocks is zero under perfect risk sharing. One must consider 
country-specific growth rates, because aggregate shocks cannot be eliminated by 
the sharing of risk, and the aggregate component is, therefore, deducted from the 
individual countries’ growth rates.
  ΔlogCit − ΔlogCt = μi + κ (ΔlogGDPit − ΔlogGDPt) + єit  (2)
In the above panel specification, suggested by Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha 
(1996), 1 – κ is the measure of average amount of risk sharing over the period.29 
κ measures the average co movement of the countries idiosyncratic consumption 
27  See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
28  Mace (1991) uses individual level data and Obstfeld (1994) uses country level data to test 
the same prediction.
29  Note that the above equation is equivalent to using a time fixed effect to remove the 
aggregate shock as shown by Ravallion and Chaudhuri, (1997). So we can also run, 
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growth with their idiosyncratic GDP growth. The inclusion of country fixed 
effects is equivalent to subtracting the country average over the period for each 
variable and running the regression with no constant. Hence, since the country 
averages over time are removed, risk sharing over longer horizons will not be 
captured here. This regression with country fixed effects will only capture risk 
sharing at the business cycle frequency, which is our aim here.
Our purpose is to evaluate how much risk sharing is driven by banking integration. 
Following Melitz and Zumer (1999), Sorensen et al. (2007), and most importantly 
Demyanyk et al. (2008), we modify the basic regression as follows:
  Δ log Cit – Δ log Ct = μi + кit + (Δ logGDPit – Δ logGDPt) + єit    (4)
where




- is the middle year of the sample period, and BANKINTt-1 is the (un-weighted) 
average across countries of BANKINTit-1 at time t – 1. Demeaning the interaction 
terms is equivalent to removing permanent differences between countries 
in banking integration and hence the regressions captures the effect of time 
variation in banking integration on risk sharing. 
The estimated value of 1 – κ0 corresponds to the average amount of consumption 
risk sharing over time and within the group of countries. 1  –  κ0 – κ1. (t – t 
-) – κ2. 
(BANKINTit – 1 – BANKINTt – 1) then measures the amount of risk sharing obtained 
in period t by country i with bank integration level BANKINTit –1. We include 
a time trend in order to guard against the upward trending bank integration 
measures spuriously capturing trend changes in risk sharing that may be caused 
by other developments in international markets. The parameter – κ1 captures the 
average year-by-year increase in risk sharing. Hence here the amount of risk 
sharing is allowed to change over time with the trend and with bank integration. 
The parameter – κ2 measures how much higher than average banking integration 
lowers the co-movement and hence increases the risk sharing.
One can think of other interaction effects. At the same time, the choice of the 
interaction effect should not violate the fact that risk sharing is about buffering 
shocks via large gross holdings of assets within a group of countries such as 
OECD or EU. Hence, primarily, one should account for this direct effect. For 
example, the euro is not suitable to use as an interaction effect, since as we have 
shown in section 2.1, the euro has spurred banking integration in the euro area. 
This implies the effect of the euro on risk sharing works via financial integration. 
In addition, the euro might be capturing issues such as trade increases, decreases 
in transaction costs, all of which may or may not have an indirect effect on risk 
sharing through financial integration. Hence, given the fact that we have a good 
proxy for financial integration itself, there is no reason for us to consider the euro 
as a proxy for integration as done in some previous works. 146 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
Since external assets and liabilities might have asymmetric effects on risk 
sharing, we specify the risk sharing equation as follows:
 
κit = κ0+ κ1.(t−t ) + κ2.(BANKINTit−1     − BANKINTt−1    ) 





Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients. On average consumption risk sharing 
is 38% (=  1  –  0.62) across the 20 countries over 1978-2007. This number is 
similar to what has been found in other studies (see Demyanyk et al. (2008)). The 
effect of banking integration is also economically and statistically significant. 
The interpretation of these coefficients in the interaction term of idiosyncratic 
growth with the banking integration measures (κ2 and κ3 ) are as follows: A 
country that increases the holdings of external assets (relative to population) by 
100% achieves 17% of additional consumption smoothing, i.e. an additional 17% 
of the idiosyncratic shocks to GDP will be smoothed out. The liabilities seem to 
have a dis-smoothing effect but the coefficient is not significant at the standard 
levels.
Column (2) drops Luxembourg. This country is an outlier and, hence, this is 
a necessary robustness test. The average level of risk sharing (κ0 ) and the risk 
sharing through assets (κ2 ) slightly decrease, but the results remain qualitatively 
similar. The dis-smoothing role of liabilities is now significant at 10%. One 
should note that asset and liability banking integration measures are highly 
correlated and, hence, dropping observations will lead to an increase in the signal-
to-noise ratio. Nevertheless, it is important to show the results with and without 
Luxembourg. In both cases we confirm the presence of significant amounts of 
risk sharing on average and through foreign bank assets. Finally, in column (3) 
we look at household consumption. The results are similar. The coefficients are 
slightly lower, possibly due to the smoothing role of governments. Overall our 
Table 6 Risk sharing 
Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Growth of: 
Cons. Cons.   HH Cons. GNI
Sample: All No LUX All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Idiosyncratic GDP Growth 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.88
21.51 21.95 21.30 2.76 
Idiosyncratic GDP Growth* -0.17 -0.13 -0.14 0.08
log (assets/pop) -3.00 -1.93 -2.00 1.10 
Idiosyncratic GDP Growth* 0.08 0.09 0.07 -0.18
log(liab/pop) 1.61 1.82 1.52 -3.52
Idiosyncratic GDP Growth* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Trend -2.74 -2.34 -3.05 -1.91
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All bank integration variables are lagged 1 period. Log (assets/pop) and log 
(liab./pop) are also included but they are not signicant so not reported. All RHS variables 
are demeaned by period by period country means. t-stats are reported in the table.147 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
results indicate much higher levels of risk sharing across our sample in the last 
30 years, compared to what has been found in the literature. The main reason for 
this is likely the fact that we have longer time series, which increase the precision 
of our estimates.
Finally, as shown in the last column, we estimate a similar regression on income 
(instead of consumption) data.30 We find that income risk sharing has increased 
over the years. Specifically, the average income risk sharing over the last two 
decades has increased and must be fluctuated around 12%. More importantly, a 
country that increases the holdings of external liabilities (relative to population) 
by 100% achieves 18% of additional income (GNI) smoothing. If we estimate 
income risk sharing only for the EU sample, we find 15% additional income 
smoothing. These results lead us to conclude that banking integration, facilitated 
both by the harmonization policies and the single currency, has improved ex-post 
the optimality of the currency union by improving risk sharing.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of the euro and the implementation of financial harmonization 
policies have transformed European capital markets. Transaction costs in 
equity and corporate bond markets have fallen considerably, whereas spreads 
in the government bond markets have narrowed and tend to move together. 
While retail banking activities remain fragmented, the interbank markets have 
shown considerable integration. The degree of integration differs across market 
segments, but nevertheless the overall evidence suggests that the euro has 
accelerated financial integration during the 10 years since its introduction. In 
addition the recent episodes of strong financial problems of European countries 
outside the euro area, especially in the smaller countries, suggest that being a 
member of the euro during a crisis may protect against extreme volatility as 
compared to not being a member of the euro area.
This paper comprised two parts. In the first part, we reviewed the vast and 
growing literature on the effects of the European monetary union on money, 
bond and equity markets, and on the banking sector. We then discussed the key 
financial policy initiatives that accompanied and strengthened the monetary 
union. We also reviewed empirical evidence from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou 
and Peydró (2008b) that shows that these policies (in particular, the FSAP) and 
also the single currency increased cross-border banking integration.
In the second part, we presented empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
financial integration on macroeconomic volatility and risk sharing.31 Using 
banking integration data in a sample of 20 industrial countries over the past 
30 years, we find that a higher degree of external asset holdings is associated 
with a lower level of consumption volatility. We also find that a higher level of 
30  We thank our discussant Axel Weber to suggest this exercise.
31  For the results on the other effects of financial integration, see Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, 
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cross-border bank liabilities tends to increase output fluctuations. Jointly these 
results suggest that banking integration may facilitate risk-sharing. We find that 
a country that increases the holdings of external assets (relative to population) 
by 100% achieves 17% of additional consumption smoothing, i.e. an additional 
17% of the idiosyncratic shocks to GDP will be smoothed out. We also estimate 
income (GNI) risk-sharing regressions. A country that increases the holdings of 
external liabilities (relative to population) by 100% achieves 18% of additional 
income smoothing.
Our findings have important policy implications. Asymmetric shocks in a 
currency union generate output and inflation differentials. The impact of such 
shocks is considerably reduced if risk sharing is significant. To the extent that 
risk-sharing allows hedging of consumption, it represents a key counteracting 
mechanism against asymmetric output shocks among members of a currency 
union. This mechanism reduces the need for policy intervention in dealing with 
such asymmetries. Our results, therefore, suggest that the increased cross-border 
banking integration due to the harmonization policies and the single currency has 
improved ex-post the optimality of the currency union by improving consumption 
and income risk sharing. The right criterion for an optimum currency area, then, 
is not the output fluctuations asymmetry but rather consumption fluctuations 
asymmetry given the fact that risk sharing via financial integration will imply a 
reduction in the latter, but not necessarily in the former.
REFERENCES
Adam, K., T. Jappelli, A.M. Menichini, M. Padula and M. Pagano. 2002. “Analyse, 
Compare, and Apply Alternative Indicators and Monitoring Methodologies to 
Measure the Evolution of Capital Market Integration in the European Union.” 
Report to the European Commission.
Adjaouté, K. and J-P. Danthine. 2004. “Equity Returns and Integration: Is Europe 
Changing?” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(4): 555-570.
Altunbas, Y. and D. Marqués-Ibáñez. 2008. “Mergers and Acquisitions and Bank 
Performance in Europe: the Role of Strategic Similarities.” Journal of Business 
and Economics, 60(3): 179-290.
Asdrubali, P., B. E. Sørensen, and O. Yosha. 1996. “Channels of Interstate Risk 
Sharing: United States 1963-90.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 1081-
1110.
Ayuso, J. and R. Blanco. 2001. “Has Financial Market Integration Increased 
during the Nineties?” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money, 11: 265-287.
Aviat, A. and N. Coeurdacier. 2007. “The Geography of Trade in Goods and 
Assets.” Journal of International Economics, 71(1): 22-51.149 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
Backus, D.P. Kehoe, and F. Kydland. 1992. “International Real Business 
Cycles.” Journal of Political Economy, 100: 745-775.
Baele, L. A. Ferrando, P. Hoerdahl, E. Krylova, C. Monnet. 2004. “Measuring 
Financial Integration in the Euro area.” European Central Bank Occasional 
Paper 14.
Baldwin, R.A. 2006. “The Euro’s Trade Effects.” European Central Bank 
Working Paper 594.
Bank of International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department. 2003a. 
“Guide to International Financial Statistic.” Bank of International Settlements 
Paper 14.
Bank of International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department. 2003b. 
“Guide to International Banking Statistics.” Bank of International Settlements 
Paper 16.
Bekaert, G., R.J. Hodrick and X. Zhang. 2008. “International Stock Return 
Co-movements.” European Central Bank Working Paper 931.
Berger, A.N. 2007. “Obstacles to a Global Banking System: ‘Old Europe’ versus 
‘New Europe’.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 1955-1973.
Bernanke S., and K. Kuttner. 2005. “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction 
to Federal Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance, 60(3): 1221-1257.
Bernoth, K., J. von Hagen and L. Schuknecht. 2004. “Sovereign Risk Premia 
in the European Government Bond Market.” European Central Bank Working 
Paper 369.
Bertrand, M.E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should We Trust 
Difference in Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1): 
249-275.
Biais, B., F. Declerck, J. Dow, R. Portes and E.-L. von Thadden. 2006. “European 
Corporate Bond Markets: Transparency, Liquidity, Efficiency.” Centre of 
Economic Policy Research Report.
Bos, J.W.B. and H. Schmiedel. 2007. “Is There a Single Frontier in a Single 
European Banking Market?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 2081-2102.
Brooks, R. and M. Del Negro. 2004. “The Rise in Co-movements across National 
Stock Markets: Market Integration or IT bubble?” Journal of Empirical Finance, 
11: 649-680.
Cabral, I., F. Dierick, and J. Vesala. 2002. “European banking integration.” 
European Central Bank Occasional Paper 6. 
Campbell, J.Y. and A. Deaton. 1989. “Why Is Consumption So Smooth?” 
Review of Economic Studies, 56(3): 357-73.150 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
Cappiello, L., A. Kadareja and S. Manganelli .2008. “The Impact of the Euro on 
Equity Markets.” Forthcoming. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Cappiello, L., M. Lo Duca and A. Maddaloni. 2008. “Equity Risk Premia in 
the Euro Area: an Intertemporal Approach.” European Central Bank Working 
Paper 913.
Carrieri, F., V. Errunza and S. Sarkissian. 2004. “Industry Risk and Market 
Integration.” Management Science, 50: 207-221.
Cassola, N., C. Holthausen and M. Lo Duca. 2008. “The 2007/2008 Turmoil: a 
Challenge for the Integration of the Euro Area Money Market?” http://esst2006.
com/download/vfz/konferenzen/2008_10_17_muenchen/paper_cassola_
holthausen_duca.pdf
Chen, Z. and P.J. Knez. 1995. “Measurement of Market Integration and 
Arbitrage.” Review of Financial Studies, 8(2): 287-325.
Codogno, L., C. Favero and A. Missale. 2003. “Yield Spreads on EMU 
Government Bonds.” Economic Policy, Vol. 18(37): 505-532.
Coeurdacier, N. and P. Martin. 2007. “The Geography of Asset Trade and the 
Euro: Insiders and Outsiders.” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper 6032.
De Bandt, O., P. Hartmann, and J.-L. Peydró. 2009. “Systemic Fisk in Banking: 
An Update.” In the Oxford Handbook of Banking, ed. A. Berger, P. Molyneux 
and J. Wilson. Oxford: The Oxford University Press.
De Santis, R. and B. Gerard. 2006. “Financial Integration, International Portfolio 
Choice and the European Monetary Union.” European Central Bank Working 
Paper 626.
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena. 2004. “The Impact of Technology and Regulation 
on the Geographical Scope of Banking.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
20(4): 571-590.
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena. 2005. “Distance, Lending Relationships, and 
Competition.” Journal of Finance, 60(1): 231-266.
Demyanyk, Y., C. Ostergaard, and B. Sorensen. 2008. “Risk Sharing and Portfolio 
Allocation in EMU.” European Union Commission Working Paper 334.
Dermine, J. 2003. “Banking in Europe: Past, Present and Future.” In The 
Transformation of the European Financial System, ed. Gaspar, Hartmann and 
Sleijpen. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: European Central Bank.
Dermine, J. 2006. “European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart Before 
the Horse.” Journal of Financial Markets. Institutions and Instruments, 15(2): 
57-106.
European Commission. 2008. European Financial Integration Report. Brussels: 
European Commission.151 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
European Central Bank. 2007a. “The Stock Market’s Changing Structure and 
Its Consolidation: Implications for the Efficiency of the Financial System and 
Monetary Policy.” Monthly Bulletin, 9(11): 61-74.
European Central Bank. 2007b. “Strengthening the EU Framework for Cross-
Border Banks.” Special Feature B of the European Central Bank Report on the 
Financial Integration in Europe.
European Central Bank. 2007c. “The SEPA Initiative and Its Implications for 
Financial Integration.” Special Feature C of the European Central Bank Report 
on the Financial Integration in Europe.
European Central Bank. 2008. Financial Integration in Europe. Frankfurt am 
Main, Germany: European Central Bank.
European Central Bank. 2008a. “Financial Development: Concepts and 
Measures.” Special Feature A of the European Central Bank Report on the 
Financial Integration in Europe.
European Central Bank. 2008b. “The Step Initiative.” Special Feature B of the 
European Central Bank Report on the Financial Integration in Europe. 
European Central Bank. 2008c. “Integration of Large-Value Payment and 
Securities Transactions: TARGET2, TARGET2-Securities and CCBM2.” Special 
Feature C of the European Central Bank Report on the Financial Integration in 
Europe. 
European Central Bank. 2008d. “The analysis of the euro money market from a 
monetary policy perspective.” Monthly Bulletin, 10(2): 65-79.
European Central Bank. 2008e. “Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
and Institutional Ownership.” Monthly Bulletin, 10(10): 67-80. 
European Central Bank. 2009. Financial Integration in Europe. Frankfurt am 
Main, Germany: European Central Bank.
Eiling, E., B. Gérard and F. de Roon. 2005. “International Diversification in 
the Euro Zone: Currency, Industry and Country Effects Revisited” Tilburg 
University Centre of Economic Research Discussion Paper 2005-02.
Favero, C., M. Pagano, and E-L von Thadden. 2007. “How Does Liquidity Affect 
Government Bond Yields?” Forthcoming. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis.
Ferguson, R.W., P. Hartmann, F. Panetta and R. Portes. 2007. “International 
Financial Stability.” Geneva Reports on the World Economy. 
Flam, H. and H. Nordström. 2006. “Euro Effects on the Intensive and Extensive 
Margins of Trade.” Institute for International Economic Studies Seminar 
Paper 750. 152 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
Flood, R., A. Matsumoto, and N. Marion. 2008. International Risk Sharing 
During the Globalization Era.” Dartmouth College. https://editorialexpress.com/
cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name= MWM2008&paper_id=199
Fratzscher, M. 2002. “Financial Market Integration In Europe: On The Effects 
Of EMU On Stock Markets.” Journal of International Money and Finance, 
7: 165-193.
Fratzscher, M. and L. Stracca. 2009. “The Political Economy Under Monetary 
Union: Has The Euro Made A Difference?” Economic Policy, 24(4): 307-348.
Galati, G. and K. Tsatsaronis. 2003. “The Impact of the Euro on Europe’s 
Financial Markets.” Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 12(2): 165-
221.
Gaspar, V., G. Perez Quiros and J. Sicilia. 2001. “The ECB Monetary Policy 
Strategy and The Money Market.” International Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 6: 325-342.
Geyer, A., S. Kossmeier, and S. Pichler. 2004. “Measuring Systematic Risk In 
EMU Government Yield Spreads.” Review of Finance, 8: 171-197.
Giannetti, M. and Y. Yafeh. 2008. “Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting 
Parties Matter? Evidence From Syndicated Bank Loans.” European Corporate 
Governance Institute Finance Working Paper 224.
Giovannini, A. 2008. “The Integration Of European Financial Markets: Why Has 
It Not Happened Yet?” Unpublished.
Goddard, J., P. Molyneux, J.O.S. Wilson and M. Tavakoli. 2007. “European 
Banking: An Overview.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 1911-1935.
Gómez-Puig, M. 2006. “Size Matters For Liquidity: Evidence From EMU 
Sovereign Yield Spreads.” Economics Letters, 90: 156-162.
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. 2006. “Does Culture Affect Economic 
Outcomes?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2): 23-48. 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. 2008. “Cultural Biases in Economic 
Exchange?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3): 1095–1131.
Hardouvelis, G.A., D. Malliaropulos, and R. Priestley. 2006. “EMU And 
European Stock Market Integration.” Journal of Business, 79: 365-392.
Hartmann, P., A. Maddaloni, S. Manganelli. 2003. “The Euro-Area Financial 
System: Structure, Integration And Policy Initiatives.” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 19(1): 280-313.
Hartmann, P., F. Heider, E. Papaioannou and M. Lo Duca. 2007. “The Role 
Of Financial Markets And Innovation In Productivity And Growth In Europe.” 
European Central Bank Occasional Paper 72.153 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
Heider, F., M. Hoerova and C. Holthausen. 2008. “Information Asymmetries In 
The Interbank Market: Theory And Policy Responses.” European Central Bank. 
Unpublished.
Heston, S. and K. Rouwenhorst. 1994. “Does Industrial Structure Explain The 
Benefits Of Industrial Diversification?” Journal of Financial Economics, 36(1): 
3-27.
Imbs, J. 2006. “The Real Effects of Financial Integration.” Journal of International 
Economics, 68(2): 296-324.
Iyer, R. and J. L. Peydró. 2006. “Interbank Contagion At Work: Evidence From A 
Natural Experiment.” EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings. http://ssrn.com/abstract=895061
Jankowitsch, R., H. Mösenbacher and S. Pichler. 2006. “Measuring The Liquidity 
Impact On EMU Government Bond Prices.” The European Journal of Finance, 
12(2): 153-169.
Jimenez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.L. and Saurina, J. 2008. “Hazardous Times 
For Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About 
The Effects Of Monetary Policy On Credit Risk-Taking?” Centre for Economic 
Policy Research Discussion Paper 6514.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B.E. Sorensen, and O. Yosha. 2001. “Regional Integration, 
Industrial Specialization and the Asymmetry of Shocks across Regions.” Journal 
of International Economics, 55: 107-137.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B.E. Sorensen, and O. Yosha. 2003. “Risk Sharing and 
Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence,” American 
Economic Review, 93(3): 903-918.
Kalemli-Ozcan, B.E. Sorensen and Volosovcyh. 2009. “Deep Financial Integration 
and Volatility.” Unpublished.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., E. Papaioannou, and J.L. Peydró. 2008a. “Financial Integration 
and Business Cycle Synchronization.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 14887.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., E. Papaioannou, and J.L. Peydró. 2008b. “How Does the 
Euro Affect Financial Integration? The Role of Currency Risk, Regulation, and 
Trade.” Unpublished.
Kose, M.A., E. Prasad, K. Rogoff and S.-J. Wei. 2006. “Financial Globalization: 
A Reappraisal.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 189.
Lane, P.R. 2006. “Global Bond Portfolios And EMU.” International Journal of 
Central Banking, 2: 1-23.
Lane, P.R. and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti. 2007. “The International Equity Holdings 
of Euro Area Investors.” In The Importance of the External Dimension for the 
Euro Area, ed. Robert Anderton and Filippo Di Mauro. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.154 KALEMLI-OZCAN, MANGANELLI, PAPAIOANNOU, PEYDRÓ
Mace, B.J. 1991. “Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 99(5): 928-956.
Manganelli, S. and G. Wolswijk. 2008. “What Drives Spreads in the Euro Area 
Government Bond Market?” European Central Bank Working Paper 745.
Micco, A., Stein, E., Ordonez, O. 2003. “The Currency Union Effect on Trade: 
Early Evidence from EMU.” Economic Policy, 18(37): 315-356.
Morgan, D., B. Rime and P. E. Strahan. 2004. “Bank Integration and State 
Business Cycles.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 1555-1585.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of International Macroeconomics. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Obstfeld, M. and A.M. Taylor. 2004. Global Capital Markets: Integration, 
Crisis, and Growth. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pagano, M. and E.-L. Von Thadden. 2004. “The European Bond Markets under 
EMU.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(4): 531-554.
Papageorgiou, T. 2005. “Estimating the Impact of Common Currencies on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Evidence from the EMU.” Yale University. Unpublished.
Papaioannou, E. 2007. “Finance And Growth: A Macroeconomic Assessment 
Of The Evidence From A European Angle.” In The Handbook of European 
Financial Markets and Institutions, ed. X. Freixas, P. Hartmann, and C. Mayer. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Papaioannou, E. 2009. “What Drives International Bank Flows? Politics, 
Institutions and Other Determinants.” Journal of Development Economics,
88(2): 269-281.
Papaioannou E. and R. Portes. 2009. “Costs and Benefits of Running an 
International Currency.” European Commission Special Report on the European 
Economy.
Perez, D. V. Salas-Fumas and J. Saurina. 2005. “Banking integration in Europe.” 
Bank of Spain Working Paper 519.
Perez Quiros, G. and H.R. Mendizábal. 2006. “The Market for Funds In Europe: 
What Has Changed With The EMU?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
38(1): 91-118.
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan. 2002. “Does Distance Still Matter? The Information 
Revolution And Small Business Lending.” Journal of Finance, 57: 2533-2570.
Petroulas, P. 2007. “The Effect of the Euro on Foreign Direct Investment.” 
European Economic Review, 51 (6): 1468-1491.
Portes, R. and H. Rey. 2005. “The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows.,” 
Journal of International Economics, 65(2): 269-296.155 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND RISK SHARING
Rajan, R. 2006. “Has Financial Development Made The World Riskier?” 
European Financial Management, 12(4): 499-533.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales. 2003. “Banks and Markets. The Changing Character 
of European Finance.” In The Transformation of the European Financial System, 
ed. Gaspar, Hartmann and Sleijpen. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: European 
Central Bank.
Ravallion, M. and S. Chaudhuri. 1997. “Risk and Insurance in Village India: A 
Comment.” Econometrica, 65(1): 171-184.
Rose, A. 2000. “One Market, One Money: Estimating the Effect of Common 
Currencies on Trade.” Economic Policy, 30: 7-45.
Rose, A. 2001. “Currency Unions and Trade: the Effect Is Large.” Economic 
Policy, 33: 449-461.
Rose, A., and M.M. Spiegel. 2004. “A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: 
Trade, Default, and Credit.” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 51(1): 
50-63.
Santos, J. and K. Tsatsaronis .2003. “The Cost of Barriers to Entry: Evidence 
From The Market For Corporate Euro Bond Underwriting.” Bank of International 
Settlements Working Paper 134.
Schmiedel, H. and A. Schönenberger. 2005. “Integration of Securities Market 
Infrastructures In The Euro Area.” European Central Bank Occasional 
Paper 33.
Sørensen, B.E., Y.T. Wu, O. Yosha, and Y. Zhu. 2007. “Home Bias and 
International Risk Sharing: Twin Puzzles Separated at Birth.” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 26(4):587-605.
Spiegel, M. 2008. “Monetary and Financial Integration: Evidence From The 
EMU”. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 23(2): 114-130.
Spiegel, M. 2009. “Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or 
Pull.” Review of International Economics, 17(4): 751-776.
Wooldridge, P.D. 2002. “Uses of the BIS Statistics: An Introduction.” Bank for 
International Settlements Quarterly Review, 39(1): 75-92.156 PAGANO
COMMENT
BY MARCO PAGANO, UNIVERSITÀ DI NAPOLI FEDERICO II
Both of these papers provide a complete and up-to-date assessment of the literature 
on the effects of financial integration, with special reference to the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Each of the two papers is composed of two parts. First, 
it describes the evolution of various markets upon the inception of EMU and 
concomitant reforms (FSAP, TARGET, etc.), drawing extensively on the recent 
body of empirical work that has analyzed them. Second, it produces some novel 
results on the effects of EMU on financial integration, and of both of them on the 
real economy of the euro area. In these comments I will focus on the latter.
The first novel result – in the study by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. – concerns the 
relationship between EMU and the integration of the credit market. Previous 
work has documented that EMU has been associated with greater integration in 
money, bond and stock markets, though to different extents. But we know much 
less about the integration of banks, largely because the inherent heterogeneity of 
bank loans makes it hard to assess international integration of the credit market. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. overcome this problem by measuring integration of banks 
via BIS data on banks’ bilateral cross-border holdings, and exploit the panel 
structure of these data to control for fixed country and country-pair effects. 
Interestingly, they find that this measure of bank integration is positively and 
significantly correlated not only with EMU, but also with the financial reforms 
associated with EMU. To my knowledge, this is the first study that documents a 
distinct effect of these reforms on financial integration, controlling for the effect 
of EMU itself.
The second set of novel results concerns the effect of EMU on risk sharing. Here 
we enter realm of the “real effects” of EMU and financial integration, with the 
latter being treated as an explanatory variable and no longer as the dependent 
variable. Most of the existing studies in this area have focused on “growth 
dividend” of EMU via financial integration and financial development. Much 
less effort has been directed to explore if EMU is also associated improved risk 
sharing, as the theory would predict. But both Lane and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
probe further into the macroeconomic evidence on this score.
They do so by using two variants of the same approach, based on the idea that in 
a financially integrated area the differences in consumption growth among pairs 
of countries should not be related to the respective difference in income growth. 
That is, if one estimates the regression
Δ log cit – Δ log cjt = φ ij + δt + β(Δ log yit – Δ log yjt)
for financially integrated countries, the coefficient β should not be significantly 
different from zero. Previous studies, which are replicated in Lane’s paper, report 
that indeed the estimate of β has decreased over time, and more so for EMU 157 COMMENT SESSION 2
country pairs than for non-EMU ones. However, Lane also documents that this 
result is not stable over time, since it does not hold if the sample is extended to 
2006. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. instead investigate the relationship between β and 
their measure of banking integration, rather than EMU per se, and find that the 
estimate of β has decreased more for country pairs with more cross-border bank 
assets. However, they find the opposite for liabilities (“desmoothing”). 
A possible reading of this evidence is that indeed there is no detectable effect 
of EMU on risk sharing in macroeconomic data, which is consistent with the 
findings obtained by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2008) on microeconomic data for 
Italy. This is not contradicted by Kalemli-Ozcan et al.’s evidence of an effect 
of financial integration on risk sharing in a larger set of 20 countries, because 
this effect is not specifically connected with EMU. The “desmoothing effect” 
of cross-border liabilities may reflect episodes of “binge borrowing” arising 
from financial liberalization (including low interest rates upon entry in EMU: 
Spain, Ireland, etc.). Probably it is too early to expect detectable EMU-induced 
increases in risk sharing: the time series available since the inception of EMU 
are still quite short, and the short-term effects of such a large regime change are 
likely to cloud steady-state regularities.
Moreover, if indeed the greater financial integration induced by EMU truly 
increased international risk-sharing, it is likely to have done so not just among 
Euro-area countries but also between the Euro area as a whole and other 
countries, chiefly the United States. If so, perhaps the current financial crisis can 
be read as an instance of massive risk sharing, with Europe sharing the burden of 
the large negative shock arising in the United States. Of course, this is not a shock 
as normally defined in our models (that is, “news” about productivity or tastes), 
but a shock arising from a massive malfunctioning of markets. This suggests 
that better risk sharing may also mean sharing more in such malfunctioning. 
This point is emphasized by Lane, who points out that by facilitating financial 
integration, EMU may have strengthened “contagion”: perhaps, had they been 
less internationally integrated, European banks would have bought fewer toxic 
asset-backed securities. But quite rightly Lane also highlights that EMU may 
also have had a powerful stabilizing influence once the financial crisis erupted 
and propagated to Europe, insofar as it prevented it from turning into a currency 
crisis as well.
This stabilizing role that EMU has played on the monetary front in the current 
crisis must however not make us oblivious to the fact that the crisis has also 
painfully exposed the unfinished state of the institutions of EU financial markets. 
This has been evident, for instance, in the uncoordinated policy response to bank 
solvency problems. Indeed, the crisis has tarnished two of the main “success 
stories” of European financial integration: a vibrant euro-area corporate bond 
market, and the emergence of a few large pan-European banks. The corporate 
bond market has been dramatically hit in terms of trading volumes, liquidity 
and issuance, while concerns have arisen about the solvency of the large pan-
European banks that have played an important role in integrating euro-area 
financial markets. This suggests that in the current uneasy “middle station” the 158 PAGANO
gains made by Europe on the front of greater financial integration are still at risk. 
In particular, monetary union badly needs to be complemented by coordinated 
supervision and crisis management of large pan-European banks. While this 
raises politically thorny regulatory and fiscal issues, it is a need that can no 
longer be neglected if financial integration is to be put on a firmer footing for 
the future. Hopefully the severity of the current crisis has convinced European 
policy-makers to face up to this challenge as soon as possible.159 COMMENT SESSION 2
COMMENT
BY AXEL A. WEBER, PRESIDENT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
1 INTRODUCTION
The euro at ten can justifiably be called a success story, and increasing 
financial integration in the euro area is a striking example of this. I am 
therefore pleased to comment on the two very interesting and insightful papers 
presented by Philip Lane and by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Simone Manganelli, 
Elias Papaioannou and José Luis Peydró. 
Professor Pagano has already given some helpful and meaningful comments 
on the papers. In my comments, I shall first concentrate on Philip’s reflections 
on EMU and financial integration and add to them some findings for Germany. 
Second, I shall discuss some issues raised by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
in their paper on the role of the monetary union for financial integration and 
risk sharing.
2 PHILIP  LANE
Philip Lane’s paper builds on his extensive research on EMU and financial 
integration, and presents us with a comprehensive and well structured overview 
of recent research and market developments. The paper provides broadly based 
evidence that the first ten years of EMU have seen a remarkable increase in 
financial integration, even if the extent of convergence varies across different 
sectors. Philip notes that there are still many barriers to full integration, but 
that initiatives, such as SEPA, Target 2 and T2S should remove some of these 
obstacles. This is why the Eurosystem is actively supporting these projects. 
Philip then challenges a number of general predictions about the macroeconomic 
impact of financial integration on the financial development of euro-area 
countries, international risk sharing and net capital movements. 
3 HOME  BIAS
To complement Philip’s findings on financial integration in bond and equity 
markets, I would like to focus on one issue of great importance: To what extent 
has investors’ home bias changed over the past decade? Using German data it 
can be shown nicely, first, that home bias has declined and second, that EMU 
plays a prominent role in how the portfolios of German investors are diversified 
internationally.
To start with some theory, Solnik’s (1974) international Capital Asset Pricing 
Model predicts – given there are no transaction costs – that the regional 160 WEBER
diversification of a securities portfolio should be the same in all countries 
worldwide and it should copy the structure of the global portfolio.
In reality, the portfolios in all countries show divergences from this “benchmark 
portfolio” in favour of domestic securities; this “home bias” can be explained 
by transaction costs and imperfect information, in particular, concerning foreign 
securities.
In the euro area, transaction costs should have declined significantly with the 
abolition of exchange rate movements within the European Monetary Union 
and further initiatives for harmonising the financial market institutions by the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). At the same time, information on foreign 
investments can be expected to have improved within EMU. To see whether 
these predictions are true, I shall now investigate the regional structure of the 
German international investment position. German investors’ preference for 
domestic securities is calculated by comparing the share of actual foreign assets 
held by German investors with the percentage of foreign assets in the global 
benchmark portfolio.1
Against this backdrop, home bias on the assets side indicates whether foreign 
securities are less intensively (and domestic securities are more strongly) 
represented in the national portfolio compared with the benchmark. A home 
bias would reach the value 100 if investors were to take exclusively domestic 
securities into their portfolios. If the benchmark portfolio is perfectly copied, the 
home bias would carry the value 0. A negative number of the home bias indicates 
that domestic investors invest more heavily in the securities of a particular country 
or group of countries than is indicated by the global benchmark portfolio.
The calculations yield some interesting results: First, since the start of EMU, the 
home bias of German investors in equities has been tending to decline. While, 
in 1998, German investors invested 76% of their stock in domestic equities, this 
share had diminished to 58% at the end of 2007. By comparison, the percentage 
of German equities in the global benchmark portfolio was 6% in both years. 
In our calculations, this yields a decline in the home bias from 75% to 55% of 
the benchmark.
Second, German investors have developed a strong liking for stocks of EMU 
partner countries – as the corresponding negative home bias demonstrates. In the 
beginning, the German “EMU bias” was only small but it has grown to a notable 
amount during the past decade. At the end of 2007, the share of EMU equity 
securities in German investors’ portfolio was 51% higher than the corresponding 
portion in the global benchmark portfolio.
Third, with regard to extra-EMU investment, German home bias was also 
reduced, albeit slightly.
1  The calculations are similar to those carried out by De Santis, R. A. and Gérard, B. (2006).161 COMMENT SESSION 2
These results are not specific to German portfolios. Investors from other EMU 
countries also display a bias in favour of German bonds. This is reflected in the 
disproportionately large representation of German bonds in the portfolios of the 
other EMU member states. 
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home bias vis-à-vis non-EMU countries
euro area bias
Source: Bundesbank calculations.
Note: Equity portfolios include investment certificates. The number indicates the 
underrepresentation of foreign securities in German portfolios as a percentage of their share 
in the benchmark portfolio. A negative number indicates an overrepresentation.
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overall home bias
home bias vis-à-vis non-EMU countries
euro area bias
Source: Bundesbank calculations.
Note: Bond portfolios include medium to long-term debt securities. The number indicates the 
underrepresentation of foreign securities in German portfolios as a percentage of their share 
in the benchmark portfolio. A negative number indicates an overrepresentation.162 WEBER
To put it in a nutshell, the data on home bias and “EMU bias” with regard to 
German cross-border investment in securities give an idea of how EMU has 
influenced cross-border financial integration. The home bias is also an important 
issue when it comes to investigating international risk sharing. This brings me 
to the paper by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Simone Manganelli, Elias Papaioannou 
and José Luis Peydró. 
4  SEBNEM KALEMLI-OZCAN ET AL.
Part I of their interesting and topical paper gives an overview of financial 
integration in EMU and describes the main legislative and regulatory policies 
that EU member states have implemented in financial markets. Part II provides 
empirical evidence for the impact of the single currency and European 
harmonisation policies on financial integration. Furthermore, it analyses the 
implications for consumption risk sharing in the euro area. The main findings 
are that the single currency and the harmonisation policies of EU have both 
fostered financial integration and that cross-border banking integration increases 
consumption risk sharing.
4.1  EMU AND CROSS-BORDER BANKING INTEGRATION
An important contribution made by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. is that they try to 
disentangle the impact of the single currency and harmonisation policies on 
financial integration. This distinction is of major relevance with respect to the 
further process of integration. 
The authors’ focus on banking integration is appropriate with regard to the 
subsequent analysis of consumption risk sharing, where bank lending is deemed 
to be a prominent transmission channel. However, it should be kept in mind 
that there are more financial market segments of interest and that the euro and 
harmonisation policies might affect them to a different degree. As I have already 
noted, there is strong evidence that monetary union has fostered integration of 
markets for equity and long-term debt securities.
4.2  BANKING INTEGRATION AND RISK SHARING
As for the authors’ concept of consumption risk sharing, let me make two 
remarks. First, consumption smoothing is measured relative to a panel of 
20 European and non-European countries. This reflects the fact that the paper 
concentrates on differences in consumption growth across countries and, 
therefore, analyses international consumption smoothing. Domestic smoothing 
is thereby ignored. Furthermore, the estimates do not make a distinction between 
whether consumption smoothing of EMU countries takes place within the euro 
area or vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is true that, from a welfare point of view, 
a distinction between intra- and extra-euro-area risk sharing does not make sense. 
However, the authors conclude that “the increased cross-banking integration 
due to the euro has improved ex-post the optimality of the currency union by 163 COMMENT SESSION 2
improving risk sharing”. This implies that risk sharing of euro area countries 
takes place mainly among each other.
My second comment concerns the way the authors measure consumption 
smoothing. The paper regresses international differences in consumption growth 
on international differences in GDP growth, multiplied by a term including banking 
integration. A perfect consumption smoothing would imply that asymmetric GDP 
shocks do not transmit into diverging consumption paths at all.
Following Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and the modification of Mélitz 
(2004), it might be helpful not to stop here but to have a further look at the 
individual components of GDP and the respective channels of risk sharing.
Expressed in logarithms and first differences, GDP growth can be decomposed 
into 2
∆ln GDP = ∆ln C     (growth of private consumption)
   +  ∆ln GDP – ∆ln C  (consumption smoothing)
or, in more detail,
∆lnGDP = ∆ln C     (growth of private consumption)
   +  ∆ln GDP – ∆ln GNP  (smoothing by net foreign income)
   +  ∆ln GDP – ∆ln A  (smoothing by external saving)
   +  ∆ln A – ∆ln C   (smoothing by domestic saving)
In this disaggregation, we would expect the term ∆ln GDP – ∆ln A to be the 
main channel through which consumption smoothing by cross-border banking 
integration should work.
In the following table, calculated for Germany, the coefficients βE and βH indicate 
the absorption of additional GDP growth by net foreign income and external 
saving, respectively.3 A positive sign stands for a positive effect on consumption 
smoothing. The coefficients suggest that international consumption risk sharing 
in Germany is primarily achieved by countercyclical net foreign income, whereas 
external saving tends to go along with business cycles. This outcome holds for 
both overall consumption smoothing and consumption smoothing vis-à-vis other 
euro-area countries only.
2 Where  GDP = Gross Domestic Product, GNP = Gross National Product, A = domestic 
absorption, C = private consumption.
3  The estimates result from the regressions
  ∆ln GDP – ∆ln GNP = αE + βE ∆ln GDP + εE
  ∆ln GNP – ∆ln A = αH + βH ∆ln GDP + εH.
  The sum of βE and βH corresponds to 1-κ in the paper of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. However, 
the coefficients are calculated by simple OLS and do not account for endogeneity and 
other factors like – for example – serial correlation. Therefore, significance levels are not 
indicated and the values should be interpreted with caution.164 WEBER
Obviously, your paper goes beyond these simple correlations. It clearly identifies 
the impact of cross border banking integration and uses more sophisticated 
econometric techniques. I highly appreciate your work and consider it a valuable 
contribution to the current debate. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that this 
interesting topic leaves much room for further research.
5 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
To conclude, both papers are very instructive in terms of learning more about 
details of the ongoing process of financial integration in the European Monetary 
Union. They have both shown that cross-border risk-sharing has improved 
during the past decade and that EMU has given a major stimulus to this. Our 
own calculations on the German home bias point in the same direction. These 
approaches, therefore, allow us to conclude that EMU has welfare-enhancing 
effects. 
The Eurosystem will do its best to make them come to the fore with full force in 
the years to come.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Charles Engel expressed the view that both papers in this session focused 
excessively on international risk sharing. He wondered whether there is evidence 
that greater financial market integration has improved capital allocation within 
the euro area. Philip Lane responded that cross-country capital flows have 
increased with the EMU. However, the market for venture capital remains little 
developed in Europe. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan thought that a study with firm-
level data would be required to answer Engel’s question concerning capital 
allocation. Elias Papaioannou added that research based on sector-level data 
shows a positive effect of financial integration on capital allocation.
Mark Spiegel observed that the empirical findings of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
concerning international risk sharing are about cross-country averages. However, 
there seems to be significant heterogeneity across countries which the authors fail 
to explore. Alex Cukierman thought that one way to summarize the papers in 
this session was to observe that small countries have benefited significantly from 
financial market integration in the euro area, while large countries have benefited 
by a lesser extent. This is exactly what trade theory would have predicted.166
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS1
BY JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, PRESIDENT OF THE ECB
1 INTRODUCTION
I am very pleased to welcome you to what we consider to be the ECB’s flagship 
conference and to this dinner in these beautiful surroundings. The focus of this 
conference is on the lessons and challenges facing the euro, as it reaches its tenth 
anniversary. In recent months there has been no shortage of challenges, far from it. 
As for the lessons, I shall come to those towards the end of my address. 
This evening, I would like to share with you some thoughts about the main factors 
bringing about the financial market turmoil that has shaken the global economy 
for more than a year now, and raise some of the possible long-term solutions.
2  THE CALM AND THE STORM
Until early 2007 we were living in a period often described as the “Great 
Moderation”. The world economy was growing vigorously, macroeconomic 
indicators were significantly less volatile and, most importantly, inflation was 
low. Financial markets were performing strongly. Many asset prices were rising, 
while volatilities and risk premia were exceptionally low. Profitability in the 
financial sector was high, and banks seemed liquid and well capitalised. 
However, there were warning signs, even back in 2006, that global markets were 
“priced for perfection” and that even a small change in conditions could severely 
disrupt financial markets.2 Several policy makers had indicated to market 
participants that they needed to prepare for a significant correction. As chairman 
of the Global Economy Meetings of central bank governors, I myself reported 
my colleagues’ sentiments on this matter.3 At the same time, several financial 
stability reports – including from the ECB, the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and other organisations – analysed 
vulnerabilities and warned of emerging weaknesses.4 
1  I would like to thank A. Maddaloni and P. Hartmann for their valuable input. 
2  See, among others, IMF (2006a), IMF (2006b) and Gieve (2006). 
3  Financial Times, “Prepare for asset repricing, warns Trichet”, 29 January 2007. 
4  The ECB noted signs of risks in several subsequent issues of the Financial Stability Review 
(FSR) in 2006 and 2007; see also Trichet (2007). Research by ECB staff also suggested 
increases in systemic risks among large and complex banking groups (LCBGs), particularly in 
the US and less so in Europe; see P. Hartmann, S. Straetmans and C. G. de Vries (2005a,b). 169 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
We knew that a storm was brewing but, admittedly, we did not know exactly 
where. Neither did we know what would trigger it, or when it would come. 
As we all know today, the turmoil erupted in August 2007 when investors 
around the world suddenly faced a dramatic change in liquidity conditions, and it 
became increasingly difficult for banks to refinance themselves in the wholesale 
money market.5 For many months, we have been facing a financial turmoil that 
was triggered by a liquidity shortage, countered by rapid and resolute action 
from central banks. The storm intensified very significantly in mid-September 
2008, when some large failures of financial institutions led to a general loss of 
confidence and to a very severe reaction in financial markets. This transformed 
the turmoil into a crisis, and the liquidity shortage became a massive threat to 
solvency for many financial institutions in a large set of countries. 
How can we conceptualise the sudden emergence of this turn of events in the 
terminology of risk assessment? A useful analogy is to think about the series of 
events during the development of the crisis as so-called “black swan” events. 
As many of you probably know, the analogy draws from the observation that 
for centuries people, including scientist, thought all swans to be white. Nobody 
considered that this assessment could ever change. In the discovery of the 
Australian continent, however, swans with black feathers were found there. 
A single observation invalided a general belief based on centuries of observations. 
Therefore, a “black swan” has been used to characterise an entirely unexpected 
event – an outlier – that has a major impact, and whose occurrence only becomes 
predictable with hindsight. It may reflect some of the limitations of human nature 
that we tend to concentrate on things that we already know and sometimes fail to 
consider the things that we do not know.6
3  UNDERVALUED RISKS, A PRIORI ASSUMPTIONS AND OPACITY
Coming back to the current financial situation, the root cause of the crisis 
was the, overall and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial 
institutions and countries. This derived from two main factors. First, the 
probability of certain events was misjudged. This means that these events were 
considered highly improbable, if not “impossible”. Second, the impact of an 
increase in fundamental uncertainty at the systemic level on the distribution of 
returns across asset classes was largely neglected. Such a fundamental increase 
of uncertainty is what we observed with the massive shock to global confidence 
in mid-September. 
With this in mind, a useful − albeit not the only − way to characterise recent events 
is to employ the concept of non-measurable risk, or “Knightian” uncertainty.7, 8 
5  For a detailed analysis of the sequence of events which led to the financial turmoil 
see N. Cassola, M. Drehmann, P. Hartmann, M. Lo Duca and M. Scheicher (2008) and 
ECB (2008a).
6  See Taleb (2007) and Taylor and Williams (2009).
7  See Knight (1921). 
8  For other characterisations of systemic risk see Bandt and Hartman (2002). 170 TRICHET
The economist Frank Knight originally developed the distinction between risks, 
to which probabilities can be assigned; and uncertainty, for which even these 
probabilities are unknown. In the last two decades this distinction has been used 
again in formalising economic choices under so-called “uncertainty” aversion.9 
Many episodes of financial instability over the last decades were characterised by 
a sharp increase in general “uncertainty”. The reaction of investors is to suddenly 
assign very high probabilities to events they deemed very unlikely before. They 
concentrate on “bad” outcomes and worst-case scenarios and show a strong 
preference for safety and liquidity. This may be an important explanation for the 
very pronounced “flight to quality”, which we often observe during episodes of 
financial turbulences.10 
Both the underpricing of the unit of risk and the underestimation of the quantity 
of risk contributed to the emergence of the crisis. Inadequate assumptions were 
made about the distribution of returns to highly complex, new financial securities. 
This implied that the unit of risk was generally underpriced. Moreover, some 
large financial institutions showed a massive concentration of risk, suggesting 
that risk management systems failed to identify the quantity of risk that financial 
institutions were accumulating. These same systems also failed to assess the 
systemic consequences arising from a global loss of confidence.
UNDERPRICING OF A UNIT OF RISK
The structure of global markets is changing fast, and we need to model future 
default and risk profiles of new products with a short history. Statistical models 
using the recent past to estimate the parameters of the probability distributions 
turned out to be little helpful. Market participants used evaluation models that 
did not account properly for an additional dimension to risk. The distribution 
of returns depends on which “state of nature” prevails, for example if we are in 
normal market times or in crisis times. Very small changes in beliefs can translate 
into large changes in behaviour, which in turns have large effects on markets.11 
One of the most important elements contributing to the underpricing of risk was 
the sheer complexity of structured financial products, which even sophisticated 
investors were not able to assess properly. Hence prices reflected only in part 
fundamentals, while the credibility of the issuer and the “willingness to purchase” 
of the buyer played an equally important role in the pricing of these products. 
The general compression of spreads and risk premia in global financial markets 
also suggests that investors’ preferences were characterised by comparatively 
low levels of risk aversion. This, in turn, further inflated flawed valuations based 
on very favourable expectations of future returns. 
There are two additional elements that played a role in the underpricing of risk: 
first, the large ex ante excess of savings over investment, which was one of the 
9  See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
10  See in particular Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008).
11  See O’Hara (2004).171 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
consequences of the bursting of the internet bubble and of the Asian crisis. The 
phenomenon became even more important due to the oil and commodity price 
shocks, which triggered an additional ex ante excess of forced savings in the 
global economy. A second factor, closely correlated to the innovation in financial 
markets, has been the very powerful process of leveraging that has characterised 
global financial institutions in all different constituencies. This has included 
regulated and listed commercial and investment banks, private equity firms, 
hedge funds and all types of highly leveraged entities.
UNDER APPRECIATION OF THE QUANTITY OF RISK
In addition to the underpricing of the unit of risk, also the sheer quantitative 
accumulation of risk was underestimated, at the level of institutions as well as at 
the level of the system. 
It is still debated to which degree the “Great Moderation” that had started in the 
mid-1980s and was observed until the middle of last year, and that consisted 
of a remarkable reduction of volatilities in the real economy, has influenced 
the overall assessment of the quantity of risk in a large array of asset markets 
during this period. The correlation between the reduction of volatilities and the 
magnitude of risk taking is there, but the direction and even the existence of a 
possible causality, remains an open question.12 
Amongst other factors there was also a considerable lack of transparency about 
the allocation of risks across financial intermediaries, in particular in new and 
often highly leveraged, players. The nature of the business of certain financial 
intermediaries relied almost exclusively on the roll-over of short-term debt to 
finance longer-term assets. The ability of these players to stand the consequences 
of a significant market correction turned out to be greatly overstated. To make 
things worse, these consequences were intensified by the high leverage and the 
parcelling of risk. When the crisis occurred, the general loss of confidence and 
the large number of linkages among financial institutions resulted in a quick and 
powerful transmission of “fears”.13
4  MAIN FACTORS TO BE ADDRESSED
Let me now look ahead to long-term solutions, which in my view need to start by 
addressing three important factors. 
First, there has been considerable short-termism, i.e. an excessive focus on 
near-term returns. Modern financial systems have favoured instruments and 
intermediaries that promise large returns in the short-term. Such short-termism 
can naturally lead to a misjudgement of the underlying risk, as investors are 
less attentive to low probability outcomes. Short-termism can also result in a 
higher accumulation of risks since high risk-taking typically boosts short-term 
returns on relatively thin levels of capital. Finally, it can exacerbate the impact 
12  See Trichet (2008).
13  See Borio (2008).172 TRICHET
of conflicts of interest and perverse incentives that exist both at the top and at 
lower management levels.14 
This environment creates the conditions for the widely observed herding 
behaviour, in which risk controls easily become a secondary issue. Banks that 
are achieving high returns put considerable pressure on their peers to do the 
same: “As long as the music is playing, you have got to get up and dance”, has 
become a famous quote in the crisis.15 But when the music stops, it’s impossible 
for everybody to carry on dancing. 
It is interesting to note that some of these problems had already surfaced in 
the aftermath of the corporate scandals of 2003. In particular, the presence of 
conflicts of interest and perverse incentives related to flawed compensation 
practices and to the provision of services with conflicting aims (especially by 
rating agencies).16 Thus, the existence of these problems was well-known, and 
policy responses were put in place to address them. Hence, one question that 
remains open is: did we underestimate the consequences of not acting more 
forcefully and more quickly? 
The second main factor concerns transparency. It is striking that despite all 
the regulatory advances and progress in information technology, the financial 
system that has emerged over the last decade has been characterised by a lack of 
transparency in certain securities markets and intermediaries. Regulated markets, 
characterised by standardised products, and a broad base of investors, with access 
to information and legal protection, generally offer better-quality information. 
However, the markets for structured products work largely over the counter, 
and a large part of the financial sector is unregulated. This implies that a fair 
evaluation of the instruments and of the counterparty risk is extremely difficult, 
not only for supervisors and institutions concerned with financial stability but 
also for the market participants themselves. 
More standardised securities exchanged on regulated markets would make it 
easier to price these instruments, as investors could rely on public information 
and on the observations of traded prices. At the same time, it would help policy 
makers and regulators to understand where the risks are located and thus monitor 
the accumulation of imbalances. 
Finally, the third factor I want to mention is the excessive pro-cyclicality of the 
financial system. We need to introduce a framework to dampen this phenomenon. 
There seems to be an inherent tendency for financial systems to cause periods 
of booms, by building up imbalances, and then to go through busts – the rapid 
and disorderly unwinding of these same imbalances. The challenge is to preserve 
an efficient financial system as an engine for economic growth and at the same 
time to ensure its stability.17 Despite centuries of experience and observations 
14  See Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008).
15 See  Financial Times, 10 July 2007, quote by C. Prince, former CEO of Citigroup. 
16  See Maddaloni and Pain (2004).
17  See Hartmann, Heider, Papaioannou and Duca (2007) and ECB (2008b).173 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
of financial crises, it seems to be very difficult to strike the right balance and 
address this pro-cyclicality. 
In this context, it seems to me that central banks have a “franchise” in assuming 
this role. They do not have vested interests and can provide for “stability” in the 
long term.
5 CONCLUSION
Let me bring this address to a close with some suggested elements for actions 
to improve significantly the resilience of financial systems to adverse shocks. 
Resilience is a key word and concept to guide us in the future. 
First, we need to counter mechanisms leading to herding behaviour and establish 
the right incentives for achieving a balance between short-term and long-term 
investors and intermediaries. Second, we need to address the lack of transparency. 
Financial regulators need to tighten up requirements in certain segments of 
the markets and strengthen reporting requirements for formerly unregulated 
institutions. Third, in order to address the “excessive” procyclicality of the 
financial systems, we need to address the mechanisms that intensify fluctuations. 
For example, capital regulations and provisioning rules as developed by the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision need to restrain excessive risk-taking 
households is most needed. 
What is the role of various authorities in this context? As we have seen, central 
banks were the very first among the authorities to react when in August 2007 
the threat to liquidity in the financial system emerged. The resolute action of 
central banks constituted a “first line of defence” against the systemic liquidity 
threat. Almost the entire set of advanced economies and their financial systems 
were affected from the very beginning of the turmoil. In this context, there is 
one message that is particularly important for me in my reflections on the past 
15 months. This is my wholehearted appreciation of the very intimate cooperation 
that we have been able to set up among central banks worldwide. We have 
been working virtually as a “global system of central banks”, corresponding 
to the virtually global nature of today’s financial system. Not only have we 
maintained the continuous flow of information and exchange of assessments 
of developments, but we have also established a set of common actions that 
would have been unthinkable even one year ago. As one example amongst 
many, I would like to mention the fact that the ECB has been providing with 
euro-denominated collateral US dollar liquidity to the European counterparties 
through swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve that have no precedent. 
This action reflects, as much as all the other common actions, the intimate level 
of trust and cooperation within the community of central banks and, in particular 
with the Federal Reserve, whose value has been priceless. 
I have mentioned the exceptional liquidity support by central banks as the “first 
line of defence”. A necessary “second line of defence” against the systemic 
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It would have been unthinkable a year ago that in a number of advanced 
countries, governments would earmark double-digit percentages of their annual 
GDP to guarantee exposures and recapitalise their banking sectors. Here, too, we 
have seen indispensable and resolute action. 
After having set up the previous two lines of defence, a third step is now needed 
in order to improve very significantly medium and long-term confidence. In this 
context, the credibility of the reforms to improve resilience of the global financial 
system as well as the stability of the global economy is of the essence. We will 
see the benefits of the reforms not only in a long-term perspective, but already 
today, because confidence today, and therefore the success of the decisions 
already taken by central banks and governments, depends on the quality and 
credibility of the ambitious reform exercise that has started a few months ago and 
that is presently deepening with the recent and future meetings of the G20. 
In my remarks I have concentrated on the financial aspects of the turmoil, 
which are very much in the domain of the Financial Stability Forum. The 
Financial Stability Forum, whose task is to elaborate international supervisory 
and regulatory policies and standards, has drawn the first set of lessons from 
the turmoil along the lines I have described above. Deepening its work and 
implementing it is now of the essence to establish an appropriate and effective 
reform of the global financial system. The IMF participates in this work and 
provides relevant inputs as a member of the FSF. 
There is also a very important role for the IMF itself in its assessment of 
macro-financial risks and systemic vulnerabilities, and in its surveillance 
of macroeconomic policies. Credible stability in the long run requires 
macroeconomic policies that have a medium-term orientation and are stability-
oriented. Procyclicality can stem not only from unsatisfactory regulatory policies 
in the financial sphere, but also from macroeconomic policies, where it is equally 
undesirable. In a global context, there is hence a need to significantly strengthen 
IMF surveillance over economies that are systemically relevant. The IMF’s 
multilateral consultation with key partners is a process that can be built upon in 
this context. In a long-term perspective, greater discipline in the global economy 
is needed to foster stability and help balance short-term and long-term prosperity 
more appropriately. 
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ABSTRACT
Where did the current financial crisis come from? Who or what is to blame? How 
will it be resolved? How do we undertake reforms for the future? These are the 
questions this paper will seek to answer. The analysis will have three parts. The 
first is a rough and ready sketch of the global roots of this crisis. Second, we will 
focus in a more detailed way on why it hit the financial sector, especially banks. 
Finally, we will end with some suggestions for future regulation, especially 
capital regulation.
A ROUGH SKETCH 1 
It is always useful to start with the macroeconomic environment. In a sense, this 
is a crisis borne out of previous crises. An important difference between the recent 
period of sustained growth and previous periods is the low level of long term real 
interest rates over the last 5 years, certainly relative to the last two decades.
Long rates fell following the collapse in investment in both emerging markets 
and developed countries after the crises in 1998 and the ICT bubble in 2001.
Emerging market governments became more circumspect and increased 
budgetary surpluses, even while cutting back on public investment. For instance, 
in Philippines, investment fell from 24% of GDP in 1996 to 17% in 2006, while 
its savings rose from 14% to 20%. From borrowing 10% of its GDP, it now 
pumps out 2.5 percent as a current account surplus.
Moreover, as industrial economies recovered, corporate investment did not pick 
up, at least not to the extent warranted by the growth. As a result, the worldwide 
excess of desired savings over actual investment – the so-called savings glut 
(Bernanke (2005)) – pushed its way into the main markets that were open to 
investment, housing in industrial countries, lifting house prices and raising 
residential construction.
The US was not by any means the highest in terms of price growth. Housing 
prices have reached higher values relative to rent or incomes in Ireland, Spain, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand for example, though 
not in Germany or Japan. Then why did the crisis first manifest itself in the US? 181 THE GLOBAL ROOTS OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
Probably because the US went further on financial innovation, thus drawing 
marginal buyers into the market.
Essentially, the U.S. financial system managed to transform sub-prime mortgages 
that were local risks, historically handled by local bankers, into mortgage backed 
securities with AAA ratings, acceptable to pension funds, insurance companies, 
and banks around the world. The original mortgage was bundled into a pool, 
and then securities of different seniority sold against it, with the equity tranche 
bearing the first loss. However, the financial engineers were not content to stop 
here. They created more complicated pools, bundling the securities sold by the 
mortgage pools into securities pools, and selling tranched claims against them. 
So $ 100 of mortgages were converted into $ 80 of AAA bonds, $ 5 of A rated 
bonds and $ 10 of BBB bonds (see Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009)) . Then those 
BBB bonds were pooled and further securities issued against them to get more 
AAA bonds. Thus were born the CDO, the CDO squared and so on. Rating 
agencies went along certifying senior tranches of these as of the highest credit 
rating. Risk was sliced and diced but no one knew exactly what was in what. And 
because nearly everyone was paying, it did not matter.
Why were these assets created? Go back to the savings glut. Financial institutions 
in countries with excess savings like Germany and Japan were looking to invest 
their foreign exchange. Many of these institutions were constrained to invest in 
high quality debt instruments. The highly rated tranches of mortgage backed 
securities or of CDOs was exactly what they wanted, especially if the AAA 
tranche of the CDO paid 60 basis points above corporate AAAs. They did not 
investigate the details of the underlying collateral, even if they could get the 
information or knew how to, for the rating was guarantee enough.
It was not just the foreigners. Low interest rates made even usually staid domestic 
institutions like pension funds and insurance companies hungry for yield. So long 
as the rating companies were willing to certify these securities, and ensure they 
fit the rating thresholds of the institutions, they were willing to buy them for the 
extra yield. Of course, there is an old adage in finance – there is no return without 
risk – but this was forgotten in the frenzied search for yield.
As liquidity drained from the housing market, everything changed. Securitized 
mortgage pools were easy to understand and undifferentiated when the housing 
market was liquid – they all had low risk. But as liquidity started drying up 
and defaults increased, pools became differentiated based on how careful the 
originator had been, how well documented the loans were, who they were to, etc. 
Information about the quality of underlying pools started mattering more and 
much of it was hard to get at. Ratings became suspect.
This immediately created a problem for those who owned claims on the mortgage 
pools, and wanted to borrow against, or sell them. In the same way as a used car 
salesman has to sell a car at a significant discount because the buyer suspects 
the car may be a lemon, once the mortgage pool has become differentiated and 
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pension funds are reluctant to buy, and lenders are unwilling to lend, without 
knowing much more.
But if mortgage pools became harder to value, the securities issued by CDOs 
and CDO squared became doubly hard to value, because not only were they 
subject to the same underlying information asymmetries besetting the underlying 
mortgages, but also because they were leveraged claims on these assets, which 
were really complicated to value when defaults rose. Thus illiquidity in the 
housing market created information risk, which coupled with complexity risk, 
destroyed liquidity for asset backed securities in the financial market.
Moreover, for a number of complex securities, default risk was actually much 
higher than foreseen because there was far less diversification in assets than 
originally thought. Put another way, if house prices fall 20%, losses on portfolios 
of mortgage backed securities will be substantial– say at the very least 15% on 
the most recent mortgages. But the BBB securities issued by these portfolios will 
be completely wiped out, so the CDOs that think they have diversified by buying 
BBB securities across the country will also be wiped out, as will all the securities 
issued by the CDOs, including those rated AAA in the past.
As liquidity for these complex securities evaporated, banks found they could 
no longer pledge these assets as collateral against borrowing. A little bit of 
arithmetic helps illustrate the consequences. Say an investment bank, levered 
about 24 to 1, had 96 dollars of debt and 4 dollars of equity capital funding 
100 dollars of assets, before the crisis. And suppose 90 dollars of those assets 
were liquid securities and 10 dollars were mortgage backed securities. As 
mortgage backed securities plunged in value, say to 70 cents on the dollar, and 
nobody was willing to lend against them, the bank had two problems.
One was an immediate liquidity problem. It had to find a way to finance the 
10 dollars of mortgage backed securities that were previously financed with debt. 
Four of those could be financed with the book capital it had, but it had to find six 
more dollars somewhere.
The second was a capital problem. Because the market value of its assets was 
now down to 97 dollars as a result of the fall in the market value of mortgage 
backed securities, it was very thinly capitalized on a market value basis. But this 
problem could be handled later.
This is a sense was the Bear Sterns situation– illiquidity rather than insolvency. 
Central banks reacted by expanding the range of entities they would lend to and 
the range of assets they would accept as collateral. The Fed was willing to take 
the 10 dollars of mortgage backed securities as collateral and lend up to 6 dollars 
against it. This immediately alleviated the liquidity problem, as banks borrowed 
pledging illiquid assets at the central bank.
But having solved the liquidity problem, banks did little to bolster their capital. 
Indeed, the capital problem has been getting worse. The mortgage backed 
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now worth 94 dollars, and it has 96 dollars of debt (including the loan from the 
central bank) outstanding. Unsecured lenders to the bank (and the inter-bank 
market is unsecured) are now unwilling to lend, knowing that their claims will 
be hit when the bank defaults. And unless the central bank is willing to substitute 
for the entire unsecured loan market, the bank will have to default. What was a 
liquidity problem is now a solvency problem, which cannot be solved by further 
small increases in liquidity infusion.
Why have the banks not been more pro-active in raising capital? Clearly they 
felt they had time, in large part because the assistance from the central banks 
alleviated the liquidity problem. Rather than selling equity when asset prices 
were moderately depressed, they thought they could wait the crisis out. And 
central banks have been at fault in not pressing the issue harder when it was 
easier to raise capital, especially given that their liquidity assistance was helping 
banks postpone capital raising.
As of the writing of this paper, we are in the midst of a global financial crisis, and 
the Paulson plan has been voted down. Some of the questions this preliminary 
account raises include the role of monetary policy (was it too lax, did it account 
insufficiently for the effects of low interest rates on asset prices, credit growth, 
and credit quality), the role of prudential supervision (could more have been 
done to monitor the “originate to distribute” model, was enough attention paid 
to institutional incentives and compensation structures, was enough attention 
paid to the rise of new markets such as the credit default swap market), and the 
role of global interdependence (were emerging markets too reliant on industrial 
country demand, were there ways to encourage public investment in the U.S. 
rather than private consumption, did foreign investors have too much faith in 
U.S. securities)?
This crisis does put paid to the notion that we had entered a new era of stability, 
where emerging markets could run current account surpluses and the U.S. would 
act both as consumer of last resort, as well as the world’s banker. The truth 
is excess demand is difficult for any country, even one with as sophisticated 
institutions as the United States, to generate without succumbing to excesses. 
The notion that global capital flows can help smooth real sector imbalances for 
a sustained period of time will have to be reexamined. For all those who warned 
about unsustainable global imbalances, the biggest surprise has been that the 
weakest link has proved to be one that many thought the strongest– the U.S. 
financial system. Moreover, an industrial country crisis is likely to be far more 
damaging than emerging market crises to world growth– for the former has so 
much larger and widespread effects.
We have listed important questions, many of which this paper will not seek to 
answer. Instead, we will focus on much narrower questions. Why were banks so 
vulnerable to problems in the mortgage market? What does this vulnerability say 
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WHY WERE BANKS SO EXPOSED? 2 
Our brief answers are as follows. The proximate cause of the credit crisis (as 
distinct from the housing crisis) was the interplay between two choices made by 
banks. First, substantial amounts of mortgage-backed securities with exposure 
to subprime risk were kept on bank balance sheets even though the “originate 
and distribute” model of securitization that many banks ostensibly followed 
was supposed to transfer risk to those institutions better able to bear it, such as 
unleveraged pension funds.1 Second, across the board, banks financed these and 
other risky assets with short-term market borrowing.
This combination proved problematic for the system. As the housing market 
deteriorated, the perceived risk of mortgage-backed securities increased, and 
it became difficult to roll over short-term loans against these securities. Banks 
were thus forced to sell the assets they could no longer finance, and the value 
of these assets plummeted, perhaps even below their fundamental values – i.e., 
funding problems led to fire sales and depressed prices. And as valuation losses 
eroded bank capital, banks found it even harder to obtain the necessary short-
term financing – i.e., fire sales created further funding problems, a feedback loop 
that spawned a downward spiral.2 Bank funding difficulties spilled over to bank 
borrowers, as banks cut back on loans to conserve liquidity, thereby slowing the 
whole economy.
Let us elaborate on this sketch. We begin our analysis by asking why so many 
mortgage-related securities ended up on bank balance sheets, and why banks 
funded these assets with so much short-term borrowing.
2.1  AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE DEMAND FOR LOW-QUALITY 
ASSETS
Our preferred explanation for why bank balance sheets contained problematic 
assets, ranging from exotic mortgage-backed securities to covenant-light loans, 
is that there was a breakdown of incentives and risk control systems within 
banks.3 A key factor contributing to this breakdown is that, over short periods 
of time, it is very hard, especially in the case of new products, to tell whether 
a financial manager is generating true excess returns adjusting for risk, or 
whether the current returns are simply compensation for a risk that has not yet 
shown itself but that will eventually materialize. Consider the following specific 
manifestations of the problem.
INCENTIVES AT THE TOP
The performance of CEOs is evaluated based in part on the earnings they 
generate relative to their peers. To the extent that some leading banks can 
1  Throughout this paper, we use the word “bank” to refer to both commercial and investment 
banks. We say “commercial bank” when we refer to only the former
2  See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for a detailed analysis of these kinds of spirals and 
Adrian and Shin (2008b) for empirical evidence on the spillovers.
3  See Hoenig (2008) and Rajan (2005) for a similar diagnosis.185 THE GLOBAL ROOTS OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
generate legitimately high returns, this puts pressure on other banks to keep up. 
Follower-bank bosses may end up taking excessive risks in order to boost various 
observable measures of performance. Indeed, even if managers recognize that 
this type of strategy is not truly value-creating, a desire to pump up their stock 
prices and their personal reputations may nevertheless make it the most attractive 
option for them (Stein (1989), Rajan (1994)).
There is anecdotal evidence of such pressure on top management. Perhaps most 
famously, Citigroup Chairman Chuck Prince, describing why his bank continued 
financing buyouts despite mounting risks, said:
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But 
as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still 
dancing.”4
FLAWED INTERNAL COMPENSATION AND CONTROL
Even if top management wants to maximize long-term bank value, it may 
find it difficult to create incentives and control systems that steer subordinates 
in this direction. Retaining top traders, given the competition for talent, 
requires that they be paid generously based on performance. But high-powered 
pay-for-performance schemes create an incentive to exploit deficiencies in 
internal measurement systems. For instance, at UBS, AAA-rated mortgage-
backed securities were apparently charged a very low internal cost of capital. 
Traders holding these securities were allowed to count any spread in excess of 
this low hurdle rate as income, which then presumably fed into their bonuses.  5  
No wonder that UBS loaded up on mortgage-backed securities.
More generally, traders have an incentive to take risks that are not recognized by 
the system, so they can generate income that appears to stem from their superior 
abilities, even though it is in fact only a market risk premium.6 The classic case 
of such behavior is to write insurance on infrequent events, taking on what is 
termed “tail” risk. If a trader is allowed to boost her bonus by treating the entire 
insurance premium as income, instead of setting aside a significant fraction as a 
reserve for an eventual payout, she will have an excessive incentive to engage in 
this sort of trade.
This is not to say that risk managers in a bank are unaware of such incentives. 
However, they may be unable to fully control them, because tail risks are by 
their nature rare, and therefore hard to quantify with precision before they 
4  Financial Times, July 9, 2007.
5  Shareholder Report on UBS Writedowns, April 18th 2008, http://www.ubs.com/1/e/
investors/agm.html.
6  Another example of the effects of uncharged risk is described in the Shareholder Report 
on UBS Writedowns on page 13: “The CDO desk received structuring fees on the notional 
value of the deal, and focused on Mezzanine (“Mezz”) CDOs, which generated fees of 
approximately 125 to 150 bp (compared with high-grade CDOs, which generated fees 
of approximately 30 to 50 bp).” The greater fee income from originating riskier, lower 
quality mortgages fed directly to the originating unit’s bottom line, even though this fee 
income was, in part, compensation for the greater risk that UBS would be stuck with unsold 
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occur. Absent an agreed-on model of the underlying probability distribution, 
risk managers will be forced to impose crude and subjective-looking limits on 
the activities of those traders who are seemingly the bank’s most profitable 
employees. This is something that is unlikely to sit well with a top management 
that is being pressured for profits. 7 As a run of good luck continues, risk managers 
are likely to become increasingly powerless, and indeed may wind up being most 
ineffective at the point of maximum danger to the bank.
2.2  AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE (PRIVATE) APPEAL OF 
SHORT-TERM BORROWING
We have described specific manifestations of what are broadly known in the 
finance literature as managerial agency problems. The poor investment decisions 
that result from these agency problems would not be so systemically threatening 
if banks were not also highly levered, and if such a large fraction of their 
borrowing was not short-term in nature.
Why is short-term debt such an important source of finance for banks? One 
answer is that shortterm debt is an equilibrium response to the agency problems 
described above. 8 If instead banks were largely equity financed, this would leave 
management with a great deal of unchecked discretion, and shareholders with 
little ability to either restrain value-destroying behavior, or to ensure a return on 
their investment. Thus banks find it expensive to raise equity financing, while 
debt is generally seen as cheaper. 9 This is particularly true if the debt can be 
collateralized against a specific asset, since collateral gives the investor powerful 
protection against managerial misbehavior.
The idea that collateralized borrowing is a response to agency problems is a 
common theme in corporate finance (see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1998)), and of 
course this is how many assets – from real estate to plant and equipment – are 
7  As the Wall Street Journal (April 16, 2008) reports, “Risk controls at [Merrill Lynch], then 
run by CEO Stan O’Neal, were beginning to loosen. A senior risk manager, John Breit, was 
ignored when he objected to certain risks...Merrill lowered the status of Mr. Breit’s job...
Some managers seen as impediments to the mortgage-securities strategy were pushed out. 
An example, some former Merrill executives say, is Jeffrey Kronthal, who had imposed 
informal limits on the amount of CDO exposure the firm could keep on its books ($3 billion 
to $4 billion) and on its risk of possible CDO losses (about $75 million a day). Merrill 
dismissed him and two other bond managers in mid- 2006, a time when housing was still 
strong but was peaking. To oversee the job of taking CDOs onto Merrill’s own books, 
the firm tapped a senior trader but one without much experience in mortgage securities. 
CDO holdings on Merrill’s books were soon piling up at a rate of $5 billion to $6 billion 
per quarter.” Bloomberg (July 22, 2008, “Lehman Fault-Finding Points to Last Man Fuld 
as Shares Languish”) reports a similar pattern at Lehman Brothers whereby “at least two 
executives who urged caution were pushed aside.” The story quotes Walter Gerasimowicz, 
who worked at Lehman from 1995 to 2003, as saying “Lehman at one time had very good 
risk management in place. They strayed in search of incremental profit and market share.”
8  The insight that agency problems lead banks to be highly levered goes back to Diamond’s 
(1984) classic paper.
9  By analogy, it appears that the equity market penalizes too much financial slack in operating 
firms with poor governance. For example, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) estimate that 
$1.00 of cash holdings in a poorlygoverned firm is only valued by the market at between 
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financed in operating firms. What distinguishes collateralized borrowing in the 
banking context is that it tends to be very short-term in nature. This is likely 
due to the highly liquid and transformable nature of banking firms’ assets, a 
characteristic emphasized by Myers and Rajan (1998). For example, unlike with 
a plot of land, it would not give a lender much comfort to have a long-term 
secured interest in a bank’s overall trading book, given that the assets making up 
this book can be completely reshuffled overnight. Rather, any secured interest 
will have to be in the individual components of the trading book, and given the 
easy resale of these securities, will tend to short-term in nature.
This line of argument helps to explain why short-term, often secured, borrowing 
is seen as significantly cheaper by banks than either equity or longer-term 
(generally unsecured) debt. Of course, short-term borrowing has the potential 
to create more fragility as well, so there is a tradeoff. However, the costs of 
this fragility may in large part be borne systemically, during crisis episodes, 
and hence not fully internalized by individual banks when they pick an optimal 
capital structure. 10 It is to these externalities that we turn next.
2.3  EXTERNALITIES DURING A CRISIS EPISODE
When banks suffer large losses, they are faced with a basic choice: either they 
can shrink their (risk-weighted) asset holdings, so that they continue to satisfy 
their capital requirements with their nowdepleted equity bases, or they can raise 
fresh equity. For a couple of reasons, equity-raising is likely to be sluggish, 
leaving a considerable fraction of the near-term adjustment to be taken up by 
asset liquidations. One friction comes from what is known as the debt overhang 
problem (Myers (1977)): by bolstering the value of existing risky debt, a new 
equity issue results in a transfer of value from existing shareholders. A second 
difficulty is that equity issuance may send a negative signal, suggesting to the 
market that there are more losses to come (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Thus banks 
may be reluctant to raise new equity when under stress. It may also be difficult 
for them to cut dividends to stem the outflow of capital, for such cuts may signal 
management’s lack of confidence in the firm’s future. And a loss of confidence 
is the last thing a bank needs in the midst of a crisis.
Chart 1 plots both cumulative disclosed losses and new capital raised by global 
financial institutions (these include banks and brokerage firms) over the last four 
quarters. As can be seen, while there has been substantial capital raising, it has 
trailed far behind aggregate losses. The gap was most pronounced in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, when cumulative capital raised was 
only a fraction of cumulative losses. For example, through 2008Q1, cumulative 
losses stood at $394.7 billion, while cumulative capital raised was only 
$149.1 billion, leaving a gap of $245.6 billion. The situation improved in the 
10  A more subtle argument is that the fragile nature of short-term debt financing is actually 
part of its appeal to banks: precisely because it amplifies the negative consequences of 
mismanagement, short-term debt acts as a valuable ex ante commitment mechanism for 
banks. See Calomiris and Kahn (1991). However, when thinking about capital regulation, the 
critical issue is whether short-term debt has some social costs that are not fully internalized 
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second quarter of 2008, when reported losses declined, while the pace of capital 
raising accelerated.
While banks may have good reasons to move slowly on the capital-raising front, 
this gradual recapitalization process imposes externalities on the rest of the 
economy.
THE FIRE SALE EXTERNALITY
If a bank does not want to raise capital, the obvious alternative will be to sell 
assets, particularly those that have become hard to finance on a short-term 
basis.  11 This creates what might be termed a firesale externality. Elements of this 
mechanism have been described in theoretical work by Allen and Gale (2005), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002), Morris and Shin (2004), and Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1997) among 
others, and it has occupied a central place in accounts of the demise of Long-
Term Capital Management in 1998.
When bank A adjusts by liquidating assets – e.g., it may sell off some of its 
mortgage-backed securities – it imposes a cost on another bank B who holds the 
same assets: the mark-to-market price of B’s assets will be pushed down, putting 
pressure on B’s capital position and in turn forcing it to liquidate some of its 
11  In a Basel II regime, the pressure to liquidate assets is intensified in crisis periods because 
measured risk levels – and hence risk-weighted capital requirements – go up. One can get a 
sense of magnitudes from investment banks, who disclose firm-wide “value at risk” (VaR) 
numbers. Greenlaw et al (2008) calculate a simple average of the reported VaR for Morgan 
Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, and find that it rose 34% 
between August 2007 and February 2008.
Chart 1   Progress towards recapitalization by global financial firms
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positions. Thus selling by one bank begets selling by others, and so on, creating 
a vicious circle.
This fire-sale problem is further exacerbated when, on top of capital constraints, 
banks also face short-term funding constraints. In the example above, even if bank 
B is relatively well-capitalized, it may be funding its mortgage-backed securities 
portfolio with short-term secured borrowing. When the mark-to-market value of 
the portfolio falls, bank B will effectively face a margin call, and may be unable 
to roll over its loans. This too can force B to unwind some of its holdings. Either 
way, the end result is that bank A’s initial liquidation – through its effect on market 
prices and hence its impact on bank B’s price-dependent financing constraints – 
forces bank B to engage in a second round of forced selling, and so on.
THE CREDIT CRUNCH EXTERNALITY
What else can banks do to adjust to a capital shortage? Clearly, other more liquid 
assets (e.g. Treasuries) can be sold, but this will not do much to ease the crunch 
since these assets do not require much capital in the first place. The weight of the 
residual adjustment will fall on other assets that use more capital, even those far 
from the source of the crisis. For instance, banks may cut back on new lending 
to small businesses. The externality here stems from the fact that a constrained 
bank does not internalize the lost profits from projects the small businesses 
terminate or forego, and the bank-dependent enterprises cannot obtain finance 
elsewhere (see, e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2005)). Adrian and Shin (2008b) 
provide direct evidence that these balance sheet fluctuations affect various 
measures of aggregate activity, even controlling for short-term interest rates and 
other financial market variables.
RECAPITALIZATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD
From a social planner’s perspective, what is going wrong in both the fire-sale 
and credit-crunch cases is that bank A should be doing more of the adjustment 
to its initial shock by trying to replenish its capital base, and less by liquidating 
assets or curtailing lending. When bank A makes its privately-optimal decision 
to shrink, it fails to take into account the fact that were it to recapitalize instead, 
this would spare others in the chain the associated costs. It is presumably for this 
reason that Federal Reserve officials, among others, have been urging banks to 
take steps to boost their capital bases, either by issuing new equity or by cutting 
dividends. 12
A similar market failure occurs when bank A chooses its initial capital structure 
up front and must decide how much, if any, “dry powder” to keep. In particular, 
one might hope that bank A would choose to hold excess capital well above the 
regulatory minimum, and not to have too much of its borrowing be short-term, so 
that when losses hit, it would not be forced to impose costs on others. Unfortunately, 
12 For instance, Bernanke (2008) says: “I strongly urge financial institutions to remain 
proactive in their capitalraising efforts. Doing so not only helps the broader economy but 
positions firms to take advantage of new profit opportunities as conditions in the financial 
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to the extent that a substantial portion of the costs are social, not private costs, any 
individual bank’s incentives to keep dry powder may be too weak.
ALTERNATIVES FOR REGULATORY REFORM 3 
Since the banking crisis (as distinct from the housing crisis) has roots in both 
bank governance and capital structure, reforms could be considered in both 
areas. Start first with governance. Regulators could play a coordinating role in 
cases where action by individual banks is difficult for competitive reasons – for 
example, in encouraging the restructuring of employee compensation so that 
some performance pay is held back until the full consequences of an investment 
strategy play out, thus reducing incentives to take on tail risk. More difficult, 
though equally worthwhile, would be to find ways to present a risk-adjusted 
picture of bank profits, so that CEOs do not have an undue incentive to take risk 
to boost reported profits.
But many of these problems are primarily for corporate governance, not regulation, 
to deal with, and given the nature of the modern financial system, impossible to 
fully resolve. For example, reducing highpowered incentives may curb excessive 
risk taking, but will also diminish the constant search for performance that 
allows the financial sector to allocate resources and risk. Difficult decisions on 
tradeoffs are involved, and these are best left to individual bank boards rather 
than centralized through regulation. At best, supervisors should have a role in 
monitoring the effectiveness of the decision-making process. This means that the 
bulk of regulatory efforts to reduce the probability and cost of a recurrence might 
have to be focused on modifying capital regulation.
To address this issue, we begin by describing the “traditional view” of capital 
regulation – the mindset that appears to inform the current regulatory approach, 
as in the Basel I and II frameworks. We then discuss what we see to be the 
main flaws in the traditional view. For reasons of space, our treatment has 
elements of caricature: it is admittedly simplistic, and probably somewhat unfair. 
Nevertheless, it serves to highlight what we believe to be the key limitations of 
the standard paradigm.
3.1  THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
In our reading, the traditional view of capital regulation rests largely on the 
following four premises.
PROTECT THE DEPOSIT INSURER (AND SOCIETY) FROM LOSSES DUE 
TO BANK FAILURES
Given the existence of deposit insurance, when a bank defaults on its obligations, 
losses are incurred that are not borne by either the bank’s shareholders or any 
of its other financial claimholders. Thus bank management has no reason to 
internalize these losses. This observation yields a simple and powerful rationale 
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such that, given realistic lags in supervisory intervention, etc., expected losses to 
the government insurer are minimized.
One can generalize this argument by noting that, beyond just losses imposed on 
the deposit insurer, there are other social costs that arise when a bank defaults –
particularly when the bank in question is large in a systemic sense. For 
example, a default by a large bank can raise questions about the solvency of its 
counterparties, which in turn can lead to various forms of gridlock.
In either case, however, the reduced-form principle is this: bank failures are bad 
for society, and the overarching goal of capital regulation – and the associated 
principle of prompt corrective action – is to ensure that such failures are 
avoided.
ALIGN INCENTIVES
A second and related principle is that of incentive alignment. Simply put, by 
increasing the economic exposure of bank shareholders, capital regulation boosts 
their incentives to monitor management, and to ensure that the bank is not taking 
excessively risky or otherwise value-destroying actions. A corollary is that any 
policy action that reduces the losses of shareholders in a bad state is undesirable 
from an ex ante incentive perspective – this is the usual moral hazard problem.
HIGHER CAPITAL CHARGES FOR RISKIER ASSETS
To the extent that banks view equity capital as more expensive than other forms 
of financing, a regime with “flat” (non-risk-based) capital regulation inevitably 
brings with it the potential for distortion, because it imposes the same cost-of-
capital markup on all types of assets. For example, relatively safe borrowers may 
be driven out of the banking sector and forced into the bond market, even in cases 
where a bank would be the economically more efficient provider of finance.
The response to this problem is to tie the capital requirement to some observable 
proxy for an asset’s risk. Under the so-called IRB (internal-ratings-based) 
approach of the Basel II accord, the amount of capital that a bank must hold 
against a given exposure is based in part on an estimated probability of default, 
with the estimate coming from the bank’s own internal models. These internal 
models are sometimes tied to those of the rating agencies. In such a case, risk-
based capital regulation amounts to giving a bank with a given dollar amount of 
capital a “risk budget” that can be spent on either AAA-rated assets (at a low 
price), on A-rated assets (at a higher price), or on B-rated assets (at an even 
higher price).
Clearly, a system of risk-based capital works well only insofar as the model used 
by the bank (or its surrogate, the rating agency) yields an accurate and not-easily-
manipulated estimate of the underlying economic risks. Conversely, problems 
are more likely to arise when dealing with innovative new instruments for which 
there exists little reliable historical data. Here the potential for mis-characterizing 
risks – either by accident, or on purpose, in a deliberate effort to subvert the 
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LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS
A final premise behind the traditional view of capital regulation is that it forces 
troubled banks to seek re-authorization from the capital market in order to 
continue operating. In other words, if a bank suffers an adverse shock to its 
capital, and it cannot convince the equity market to contribute new financing, 
a binding capital requirement will necessarily compel it to shrink. Thus capital 
requirements can be said to impose a type of market discipline on banks.
3.2  PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL MINDSET
THE LIMITS OF INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT
Bear Stearns’ CEO Jim Cayne sold his 5,612,992 shares in the company on March 
25, 2008 at price of $10.84, meaning that the value of his personal equity stake 
fell by over $425 million during the prior month. Whatever the reasons for Bear’s 
demise, it is hard to imagine that the story would have had a happier ending if 
only Cayne had had an even bigger stake in the firm, and hence higher-powered 
incentives to get things right. In other words, ex ante incentive alignment, while 
surely of some value, is far from a panacea – no matter how well incentives are 
aligned, disasters can still happen.
Our previous discussion highlights a couple of specific reasons why even very 
high-powered incentives at the top of a hierarchy may not solve all problems. 
First, in a complex environment with rapid innovation and short histories on some 
of the fastest-growing products, even the best-intentioned people are sometimes 
going to make major mistakes. And second, the entire hierarchy is riddled 
with agency conflicts that may be difficult for a CEO with limited information 
to control. A huge bet on a particular product that looks, in retrospect, like a 
mistake from the perspective of Jim Cayne may have represented a perfectly 
rational strategy from the perspective of the individual who actually put the bet 
on – perhaps he had a bonus plan that encouraged risk taking, or his prospects 
for advancement within the firm were dependent on a high volume of activity in 
that product.
FIRE SALES AND LARGE SOCIAL COSTS OUTSIDE OF DEFAULT
Perhaps the biggest problem with the traditional capital-regulation mindset is 
that it places too much emphasis on the narrow objective of averting defaults 
by individual banks, while paying too little attention to the fire-sale and credit-
crunch externalities discussed earlier.13 Consider a financial institution, which, 
when faced with large losses, immediately takes action to brings its capital ratio 
back into line, by liquidating a substantial fraction of its asset holdings.  14 On the 
one hand, this liquidationbased adjustment process can be seen as precisely the 
kind of “prompt corrective action” envisioned by fans of capital regulation with 
a traditional mindset. And there is no doubt that from the perspective of avoiding 
individual-bank defaults, it does the trick.
13  Kashyap and Stein (2004) point out that the Basel II approach can be thought of as reflecting 
the preferences of a social planner who cares only about avoiding bank defaults, and who 
attaches no weight to other considerations, such as the volume of credit creation.
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Unfortunately, as we have described above, it also generates negative spillovers 
for the economy: not only is there a reduction in credit to customers of the 
troubled bank, there is also a fire-sale effect that depresses the value of 
other institutions’ assets, thereby forcing them into a similarly contractionary 
adjustment. Thus liquidation-based adjustment may spare individual institutions 
from violating their capital requirements or going into default, but it creates a 
suboptimal outcome for the system as a whole.
REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND THE VIRAL NATURE OF INNOVATION
Any command-and-control regime of regulation creates incentives for getting 
around the rules, i.e., for regulatory arbitrage. Compared to the first Basel 
accord, Basel II attempts to be more sophisticated in terms of making capital 
requirements contingent on fine measures of risk; this is an attempt to cut down 
on such regulatory arbitrage. Nevertheless, as recent experience suggests, this is 
a difficult task, no matter how elaborate a risk-measurement system one builds 
into the regulatory structure.
One complicating factor is the viral nature of financial innovation. For example, 
one might argue that AAA-rated CDOs were a successful product precisely 
because they filled a demand on the part of institutions for assets that yielded 
unusually high returns given their low regulatory capital requirements.15 In other 
words, financial innovation created a set of securities that were highly effective 
at exploiting skewed incentives and regulatory loopholes. (See, e.g., Coval, Jurek 
and Stafford (2008a b), and Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009)).
INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION PAID TO COST OF EQUITY
A final limitation of the traditional capital-regulation mindset is that it simply 
takes as given that equity capital is more expensive than debt, but does not seek 
to understand the root causes of this wedge. However, if we had a better sense 
of why banks viewed equity capital as particularly costly, we might have more 
success in designing policies that moderated these costs. This is turn would 
reduce the drag on economic growth associated with capital regulation, as well 
as lower the incentives for regulatory arbitrage.
Our discussion above has emphasized the greater potential for governance 
problems in banks relative to non-financial firms. This logic suggests that equity 
or long-term debt financing may be much more expensive than short-term debt, 
not only because long-term debt or equity has little control over governance 
problems, it is also more exposed to the adverse consequences. If this diagnosis 
is correct, it suggests that rather than asking banks to carry expensive additional 
capital all the time, perhaps we should consider a conditional capital arrangement 
15  Sub-prime mortgage originations seemed to take off to supply this market. For instance, 
Greenlaw et al show that subprime plus Alt-A loans combine represented fewer than 10% 
of all mortgage originations in 2001, 2002 and 2003, but then jumped to 24% in 2004 and 
further to 33% in 2005 and 2006; by the end of 2007 they were back to 9%. As Mian and 
Sufi (2008) and Keys et al. (2008) suggest, the quality of underlying mortgages deteriorated 
considerably with increased demand for mortgaged-backed securities. See European 
Central Bank (2008) for a detailed description of the role of structured finance products in 
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that only channels funds to the bank in those bad states of the world where capital 
is particularly scarce, where the market monitors bank management carefully, 
and hence where excess capital is least likely to be a concern. We will elaborate 
on one such idea shortly.
PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM 4 
Having discussed what we see to be the limitations of the current regulatory 
framework for capital, we now move on to consider potential reforms. We do 
so in two parts. First, in this section, we articulate several broad principles for 
reform. Then, in Section V, we offer one specific, fleshed-out recommendation.
4.1  DON’T JUST FIGHT THE LAST WAR
In recent months, a variety of policy measures have been proposed that are 
motivated by specific aspects of the current crisis. For example, there have 
been calls to impose new regulations on the rating agencies, given the large role 
generally attributed to their perceived failures. Much scrutiny has also been given 
to the questionable incentives underlying the “originate to distribute” model of 
mortgage securitization (Keys et al. (2008)). And there have been suggestions for 
modifying aspects of the Basel II risk-weighting formulas, e.g., to increase the 
capital charges for highly-rated structured securities.
While there may well be important benefits to addressing these sorts of issues, 
such an approach is inherently limited in terms of its ability to prevent future 
crises. Even without any new regulation, the one thing we can be almost certain of 
is that when the next crisis comes, it won’t involve AAA-rated subprime mortgage 
CDOs. Rather, it will most likely involve the interplay of some new investment 
vehicles and institutional arrangements that cannot be fully envisioned at this 
time. This is the most fundamental message that emerges from taking a viral view 
of the process of financial innovation – the problem one is trying to fight is always 
mutating. Indeed, a somewhat more ominous implication of this view is that the 
seeds of the next crisis may be unwittingly planted by the regulatory responses to 
the current one: whatever new rules are written in the coming months will spawn 
a new set of mutations whose properties are hard to anticipate.
4.2  RECOGNIZE THE COSTS OF EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON EX ANTE 
CAPITAL
Another widely-discussed approach to reform is to simply raise the level of capital 
requirements. We see several possible limitations to this strategy. In addition to 
the fact that it would chill intermediation activity generally by increasing banks’ 
cost of funding, it would also increase the incentives for regulatory arbitrage.
While any system of capital regulation inevitably creates some tendency towards 
regulatory arbitrage, basic economics suggests that the volume of this activity is 
likely to be responsive to incentives – the higher the payoff to getting around the 
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regulation, the payoff to getting around the rules is a function of two things: 
i) the level of the capital requirement; and ii) the wedge between the cost of equity 
capital (or whatever else is used to satisfy the requirement) and banks’ otherwise 
preferred form of financing. Simply put, given the wedge, capital regulation will 
be seen as more cumbersome and will elicit a more intense evasive response 
when the required level of capital is raised.
A higher capital requirement also does not eliminate the fire-sale and credit-crunch 
externalities identified above. If a bank faces a binding capital requirement – with 
its assets being a fixed multiple of its capital base – then when a crisis depletes a 
large chunk of its capital, it must either liquidate a corresponding fraction of its 
assets, or raise new capital. This is true whether the initial capital requirement is 
8% or 10%.  16
A more sophisticated variant involves raising the ex-ante capital requirement, 
but at the same time pre-committing to relax it in a bad state of the world.  17 
For example, the capital requirement might be raised to 10%, with a provision 
that it would be reduced to 8% conditional on some publicly observable crisis 
indicator.  18 Leaving aside details of implementation, this design has the appeal 
that it helps to mitigate the fire-sale and credit-crunch effects: because banks face 
a lower capital requirement in bad times, there is less pressure on them to shrink 
their balance sheets at such times (provided, of course, that the market does not 
hold them to a higher standard than regulators). In light of our analysis above, 
this is clearly a helpful feature.
At the same time, since crises are by definition rare, this approach has roughly 
the same impact on the expected cost of funding to banks as one of simply 
raising capital requirements in an un-contingent fashion. In particular, if a 
crisis only occurs once every ten years, then in the other nine years this looks 
indistinguishable from a regime with higher un-contingent capital requirements. 
Consequently, any adverse effects on the general level of intermediation activity, 
or on incentives for regulatory arbitrage, are likely to be similar.
Thus if one is interested in striking a balance between: i) improving outcomes in 
crisis states, and ii) fostering a vibrant and non-distortionary financial sector in 
normal times, then even time-varying capital requirements are an imperfect tool. 
16  It should be noted, however, that higher ex ante capital requirements do have one potentially 
important benefit. If a bank starts out with a high level of capital, it will find it easier to 
recapitalize once a shock hits, because the lower is its post-shock leverage ratio, the less of a 
debt overhang problem it faces, and hence the easier it is issue more equity. Hence the bank 
will do more recapitalization, and less liquidation, which is a good thing.
17  See Tucker (2008) for further thoughts on this. For instance, capital standards could also be 
progressively increased during a boom to discourage risk-taking.
18 Starting in 2000 Spain has run a system based on “dynamic provisioning” whereby 
provisions are built up during times of low reported losses that are to be applied when 
losses rise. According to Fernández-Ordóñez (2008), Spanish banks “had sound loan loss 
provisions (1.3% of total assets at the end of 2007, and this despite bad loans being at 
historically low levels.)” In 2008 the Spanish economy has slowed, and loan losses are 
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If one raises the requirement in good times high enough, this will lead to progress 
on the first objective, but only at the cost of doing worse on the second.
4.3  ANTICIPATE EX POST CLEANUPS; ENCOURAGE 
PRIVATE-SECTOR RECAPITALIZATION
Many of the considerations that we have been discussing throughout this paper 
lead to one fundamental conclusion: it is very difficult – probably impossible – 
to design a regulatory approach that reduces the probability of financial crises to 
zero without imposing intolerably large costs on the process of intermediation 
in normal times. First of all, the viral nature of financial innovation will tend to 
frustrate attempts to simply ban whatever “bad” activity was the proximate cause 
of the previous crisis. Second, given the complexity of both the instruments and 
the organizations involved, it is probably naïve to hope that governance reforms 
will be fully effective. And finally, while one could in principle force banks to 
hold very large buffer stocks of capital in good times, this has the potential to 
sharply curtail intermediation activity, as well as to lead to increased distortions 
in the form of regulatory arbitrage.
It follows that an optimal regulatory system will necessarily allow for some 
non-zero probability of major adverse events, and focus on reducing the costs of 
these events. At some level this is an obvious point. The more difficult question is 
what the policy response should then be, once an event hits. On the one hand, the 
presence of systemic externalities suggests a role for government intervention in 
crisis states. We have noted that, in a crisis, private actors do too much liquidation, 
and too little recapitalization, relative to what is socially desirable. Based on this 
observation, one might be tempted to argue that the government ought to help 
engineer a recapitalization of the banking system, or of individual large players. 
This could be done directly, through fiscal means, or more indirectly, e.g., via 
extremely accommodative monetary policy that effectively subsidizes the profits 
of the banking industry.
Of course, ad hoc government intervention of this sort is likely to leave many 
profoundly uncomfortable, and for good reason, even in the presence of a 
well-defined externality. Beyond the usual moral hazard objections, there are a 
variety of political-economy concerns. If, for example, there are to be meaningful 
fiscal transfers in an effort to recapitalize a banking system in crisis, there will 
inevitably be some level of discretion in the hands of government officials 
regarding how to allocate these transfers. And such discretion is, at a minimum, 
potentially problematic.
In our view, a better approach is to recognize up front that there will be a need for 
recapitalization during certain crisis states, and to “pre-wire” things so that the 
private sector – rather than the government – is forced to do the recapitalization. 
In other words, if the fundamental market failure is insufficiently aggressive 
recapitalization during crises, then regulation should seek to speed up the process 
of private-sector recapitalization. This is distinct from both: i) the government 
being directly involved in recapitalization via transfers; ii) requiring private firms 
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A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL: CAPITAL INSURANCE 5 
5.1  THE BASIC IDEA
As an illustration of some of our general principles, and building on the logic 
we have developed throughout the paper, we now offer a specific proposal. The 
basic idea is to have banks buy capital insurance policies that would pay off in 
states of the world when the overall banking sector is in sufficiently bad shape.19 
In other words, these policies would be set up so as to transfer more capital onto 
the balance sheets of banking firms in those states when aggregate bank capital 
is, from a social point of view, particularly scarce.
Before saying anything further about this proposal, we want to make it clear 
that it is only meant to be one element in what we anticipate will be a broader 
reform of capital regulation in the coming years. For example, the scope of 
capital regulation is likely to be expanded to include investment banks. And it 
may well make sense to control liquidity ratios more carefully going forward – 
i.e., to require, for example, banks’ ratio of short-term borrowings to total 
liabilities not to exceed some target level (though clearly, any new rules of this 
sort will be subject to the kind of concerns we have raised about higher capital 
requirements). Our insurance proposal is in no way intended to be a substitute 
for these other reforms. Instead, we see it as a complement – as a way to give 
an extra degree of flexibility to the system, so that the overall costs of capital 
regulation are less burdensome.
More specifically, we envision that capital insurance would be implemented 
on an opt-in basis, in conjunction with other reforms, as follows. A bank with 
$500 billion in risk-weighted assets could be given the following choice by 
regulators: it could either accept an upfront capital requirement that is, say, 2% 
higher, meaning that the bank would have to raise $10 billion in new equity. Or it 
could acquire an insurance policy that pays off $10 billion upon the occurrence of 
a systemic “event” – defined perhaps as a situation in which the aggregate write-
offs of major financial institutions in a given period exceed some trigger level.
To make the policy default-proof, the insurer (we have in mind a pension fund, or 
a sovereign wealth fund) would at inception put $10 billion in Treasuries into a 
custodial account, i.e., a “lock box”. If there is no event over the life of the policy, 
the $10 billion would be returned to the insurer, who would also receive the 
insurance premium from the bank as well as the interest paid by the Treasuries. If 
there is an event, the $10 billion would transfer to the balance sheet of the insured 
bank. Thus from the perspective of the insurer, the policy would resemble an 
investment in a defaultable “catastrophe” bond.
19  Our proposal is similar in the spirit to Caballero’s (2001) contingent insurance plan for 
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5.2  THE ECONOMIC LOGIC
This proposal obviously raises a number of issues of design and implementation, 
and we will attempt to address some of these momentarily. Before doing so, 
however, let us describe the underlying economic logic.
One way to motivate our insurance idea is as a form of “recapitalization 
requirement”. As discussed above, the central market failure is that, in a crisis, 
individual financial institutions are prone to do too much liquidation, and 
too little new capital raising, relative to the social optimum. In principle, this 
externality could be addressed by having the government inject capital into the 
banking sector, but this is clearly problematic along a number of dimensions. 
The insurance approach that we advocate can be thought of as a mechanism for 
committing the private sector to come up with the fresh capital injection on its 
own, without resorting to government transfers.
An important question is how this differs from simply imposing a higher capital 
requirement ex ante – albeit one that might be relaxed at the time of a crisis. In 
the context of the example above, one might ask: what is the difference between 
asking a pension fund to invest $10 billion in what amounts to a catastrophe 
bond, versus asking it to invest $10 billion in the bank’s equity, so that the bank 
can satisfy an increased regulatory capital requirement? Either way, the pension 
fund has put $10 billion of its money at risk, and either way, the bank will have 
access to $10 billion more in the event of an adverse shock that triggers the 
insurance policy.
The key distinction has to do with the state-contingent nature of the insurance 
policy. In the case of the straight equity issue, the $10 billion goes directly onto 
the bank’s balance sheet right away, giving the bank full access to these funds 
immediately, independent of how the financial sector subsequently performs. 
In a world where banks are prone to governance problems, the bank will have 
to pay a cost-of-capital premium for the unconditional discretion that additional 
capital brings.20
By contrast, with the insurance policy, the $10 billion goes into a custodial 
account. It is only taken out of the account, and made available to the bank, in 
a crisis state. And crucially, in such states, the bank’s marginal investments are 
much more likely to be value-creating, especially when evaluated from a social 
20  There may be a related cosmetic benefit of the insurance policy. Since the bank takes 
less equity onto its balance sheet, it has fewer shares outstanding, and various measures 
of performance, such as earnings per share, and return on equity, may be less adversely 
impacted than by an increase in the ex ante capital requirement. Of course, this will also 
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perspective. In particular, a bank that has an extra $10 billion available in a crisis 
will be able to get by with less in the way of socially-costly asset liquidations.21
This line of argument is an application of a general principle of corporate risk 
management, developed in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). A firm can in 
principle always manage risk via a simple non-contingent “war chest” strategy 
of having a less leveraged capital structure and more cash on hand. But this is 
typically not as efficient as a state-contingent strategy that also uses insurance and/
or derivatives to more precisely align resources with investment opportunities on 
a state-by-state basis, so that, to the extent possible, the firm never has “excess” 
capital at any point in time.
In emphasizing the importance of a state-contingent mechanism, we share a 
key common element with Flannery’s (2005) proposal for banks to use reverse-
convertible securities in their capital structure.  22 However, we differ substantially 
from Flannery on a number of specific design issues. We sketch some of the 
salient features of our proposal below, acknowledging that many details will have 
to be filled in after more analysis.
5.3 DESIGN
We first review some basic logistical issues and then offer an example to illustrate 
how capital insurance might work.
WHO PARTICIPATES?
Capital insurance is primarily intended for entities that are big enough to inflict 
systemic externalities during a crisis. It may, however, be unwise for regulatory 
authorities to identify ahead of time those whom they deem to be of systemic 
importance. Moreover, even smaller banks could contribute to the credit crunch 
and the fire-sale externalities. Thus we recommend that any entity facing capital 
requirements be given the option to satisfy some fraction of the requirement 
using insurance.
SUPPLIERS
Although the natural providers of capital insurance may include institutions such 
as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, the securitized design we propose 
means that policies can be supplied by any investor who is willing to receive a 
21  To illustrate, suppose a bank has 100 in book value of loans today; these will yield a payoff 
of either 90 or 110 next period, with a probability 1/2 of either outcome. One way for the 
bank to insure against default would be to finance itself with 90 of debt, and 10 of equity. 
But this approach leaves the bank with 20 of free cash in the good state. If investors worry 
that this cash in good times will lead to mismanagement and waste, they will discount the 
bank’s stock. Now suppose instead that the bank seeks contingent capital. It could raise 105, 
with 100 of this in debt, and 5 in equity, and use the extra 5 to finance, in addition to the 100 
of loans, the purchase of an insurance policy that pays off 10 only in the bad state. From 
a regulator’s perspective, the bank should be viewed as just as well-capitalized as before, 
since it is still guaranteed not to default in either state. At the same time, the agency problem 
is attenuated, because after paying off its debt, the bank now has less cash to be squandered 
in the good state (10, rather than 20).
22  See also Stein (2004) for a discussion of state-contingent securities in a banking context.200 KASHYAP, RAJAN, STEIN
higher than risk-free return in exchange for a small probability of a large loss.  23 
The experience of the last several years suggests that such a risk profile can be 
attractive to a range of investors.
While the market should be allowed to develop freely, one category of investor 
should be excluded, namely those that are themselves subject to capital 
requirements. It makes no sense for banks to simultaneously purchase protection 
with capital insurance, only to suffer losses from writing similar policies. Of 
course, banks should be allowed to design and broker such insurance so long as 
they do not take positions.
TRIGGER
The trigger for capital insurance to start paying out should be based on losses 
that affect aggregate bank capital (where the term “bank” should be understood 
to mean any institution facing capital requirements). In this regard, a key 
question is the level of geographic aggregation. There are two concerns here. 
First, banks could suffer losses in one country and withdraw from another.  24 
Second, international banks may have some leeway in transferring operations to 
unregulated territories.  25
These considerations suggest two design features: First, each major country 
or region should have its own contingent capital regime, meeting uniform 
international standards, so that if, say, losses in the U.S. are severe, multinational 
banks with significant operations in the U.S. do not spread the pain to other 
countries. Second, multinational banks should satisfy their primary regulator that 
a significant proportion of their global operations (say 90 percent) are covered 
by capital insurance.
With these provisos, the trigger for capital insurance could be that the sum 
of losses of covered entities in the domestic economy (which would include 
domestic banks and local operations of foreign banks) exceeds some significant 
amount. To avoid concerns of manipulation, especially in the case of large banks, 
the insurance trigger for a specific bank should be based on losses of all other 
banks except the covered bank.
23  There may be some benefit to having the insurance provided by passive investors. Not only 
do they have pools of assets that are idle, and can profitably serve as collateral (in contrast 
to an insurance company that might be reluctant to see its assets tied up in a lock box), 
they also have the capacity to bear losses without attempting to hedge them (again, unlike 
a more active financial institution). Individual investors, pension funds, and sovereign 
wealth funds would be important providers. See Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (2008) for a list of major investments, totaling over $40 billion, made by 
sovereign wealth funds in the financial sector from 2007 through early 2008.
24  Indeed, Peek and Rosengren (2000) document the withdrawal of Japanese banks from 
lending in California in response to severe losses in Japan.
25  The trigger might also be stated in terms of the size of the domestic market so that firms 
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The trigger should be based on aggregate bank losses over a certain number of 
quarters.  26 This horizon needs to be long enough for substantial losses to emerge, 
but short enough to reflect a relatively sudden deterioration in performance, 
rather than a long, slow downturn. In our example below we consider a 
four-quarter benchmark, which means that if there were two periods of large losses 
that were separated by more than a year the insurance might not be triggered.
An alternative to basing the trigger on aggregate bank losses would be to base 
it on an index of bank stock prices, in which case the insurance policy would 
be no more than a put option on a basket of banking stocks. However, this 
alternative raises a number of further complications. For example, with so 
many global institutions, creating the appropriate country-level options would 
be difficult, since there are no share prices for many of their local subsidiaries. 
Perhaps more importantly, the endogenous nature of stock prices – the fact that 
stock prices would depend on insurance payouts and vice-versa – could create 
various problems with indeterminacy or multiple equilibria. For these reasons, 
it is better to link insurance payouts to a more exogenous measure of aggregate 
bank health.
PAYOUT PROFILE
A structure that offers large discrete payouts when a threshold level of losses is 
hit might create incentives for insured banks to artificially inflate their reported 
losses when they find themselves near the threshold. To deter such behavior, the 
payout on a policy should increase continuously in aggregate losses once the 
threshold is reached. Below, we give a concrete example of a policy with this 
kind of payout profile.
STAGGERED MATURITIES
An important question is how long a term the insurance policies would run for. 
Clearly, the longer the term, the harder it would be to price a policy, and the more 
unanticipated risk the insurer would be subject to, while the shorter the term the 
higher the transactions costs of repeated renewal. Perhaps a five-year term might 
be a reasonable compromise.
However, with any finite term length, there is the issue of renewal under stress: 
what if a policy is expiring at a time when large losses are anticipated, but have 
not yet been realized? In this case, the bank will find it difficult to renew the 
policy on attractive terms. To partially mitigate this problem, it may be helpful 
for each bank to have in place a set of policies with staggered maturities, so that 
each year only a fraction of the insurance needs to be replaced. Another point to 
note is that if renewal ever becomes prohibitively expensive, there is always the 
option to switch back to raising capital in a conventional manner, i.e., via equity 
issues.
26  Because this insurance pays off only in systemically bad states of nature, it will be expensive, 
but not relative to pure equity financing. For example, suppose that there are 100 different 
future states of the world for each bank, and that the trigger is breached only in 1 of the 100 
scenarios. Because equity returns are low both in the trigger state and in many others (with 
either poor bank specific outcomes or bad but not disastrous aggregate outcomes), the cost 
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AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate these ideas, Chart 2 provides a detailed example of how the proposal 
might work for a bank seeking $10 billion in capital insurance. We assume that 
protection is purchased via five policies of $2 billion each that expire at year end 
for each of the next five years. There are three factors that shape the payouts on 
the policies: the trigger points for both the initiation of payouts and the capping 
of payouts, the pattern of bank losses, and the function that governs how losses 
are translated into payouts.
In the example, the trigger for initiating payouts is hit once cumulative bank 
losses over the last four quarters reach $100 billion. And payouts are capped once 
cumulative losses reach $200 billion. In between, payouts are linear in cumulative 
losses. This helps to ensure that, aside from the time value of earlier payments, 
banks have no collective benefit to pulling forward large loss announcements.
The payout function also embeds a “high-water” test, so that – given the four-
quarter rolling window for computing losses – only incremental losses in a given 
quarter lead to further payouts. In the example, this feature comes into play in 
the 3rd quarter of 2009, when current losses are zero. Because of the high-water 
feature, payouts in this quarter are zero also, even though cumulative losses over 
the prior four quarters continue to be high. Put simply, the high-water feature 
allows us to base payouts on a fourquarter window, while at the same time 
avoiding double-counting of losses.
These and other details of contract design are important, and we offer the 
example simply as a starting point for further discussion. However, given that 
the purpose of the insurance is to guarantee relatively rapid recapitalization of the 
banking sector, one property of the example that we believe should carry over to 
any real-world structure is that it be made to pay off promptly.
5.4  COMPARISONS WITH ALTERNATIVES
An important precursor to our proposal, and indeed the starting point for our 
thinking on this, is Flannery (2005). Flannery proposes that banks issue reverse 
convertible debentures, which convert to equity when a bank’s share price falls 
below a threshold. Such an instrument can be thought of as a type of firm-specific 
capital insurance.
One benefit of a firm-specific trigger is that it provides the bank with additional 
capital in any state of the world when it is in trouble – unlike our proposal 
where a bank gets an insurance payout only when the system as a whole is 
severely stressed. In the spirit of the traditional approach to capital regulation, 
the firm-specific approach does a more complete job of reducing the probability 
of distress for each individual institution. The firm-specific trigger also should 
create monitoring incentives for the bond holders which could be useful. Finally, 
to the extent that one firm’s failure could be systemically relevant, this proposal 
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However, a firm-specific trigger also has disadvantages. First, given that a 
reverse convertible effectively provides a bank with debt forgiveness if it 
performs poorly enough, it could exacerbate problems of governance and moral 
hazard. Moreover, the fact that the trigger is based on the bank’s stock price may 
be particularly problematic here. One can imagine that once a bank begins to get 
into trouble, there may be the ingredients in place for a self-fulfilling downwards 
spiral: as existing shareholders anticipate having their stakes diluted via the 
conversion of the debentures, stock prices decline further, making the prospect 
of conversion even more likely, and so on.  27
Our capital insurance structure arguably does better than reverse convertibles on 
bank-specific moral hazard, given that payouts are triggered by aggregate losses 
rather by poor individual performance. With capital insurance, not only is a bank 
not rewarded for doing badly, it gets a payout in precisely those states of the 
world when access to capital is most valuable – i.e., when assets are cheap and 
27 Relatedly, such structures can create incentives for speculators to manipulate bank 
stock prices. For example, it may pay for a large trader to take a long position in reverse 
convertibles, then try to push down the price of the stock via short-selling, in order to force 
conversion and thereby acquire an equity stake on favorable terms.
Chart 2 Hypothetical Capital Insurance Payout Structure
In this example, Bank X purchases $10 billion in total coverage. It does so by buying five 
policies of $2 billion each, with expiration dates of 12/31/2009, 12/31/2010, 12/31/2011, 
12/31/2012, and 12/31/2013. The payout on each policy is given by:
4 quarter loss - max(high watert-1,trigger)
Full payout - trigger
Payout = (Policy  face)   * 
if 4 quarter loss > high water losst-1 
 =  0 otherwise
The trigger on each policy is $100 billion in aggregate losses for all banks other than X, 













Current quarter loss 50 40 20 0 140
Cumulative 4 quarter loss 80 120 140 110 200
High water mark on losses 80 120 140 140 200
Payout per policy 0 0.4 0.4 0 1.2
Payout total 0 2 2 0 6
Cumulative payout 0 2 4 4 10204 KASHYAP, RAJAN, STEIN
profitable lending opportunities abound. Therefore, banks’ incentives to preserve 
their own profits are unlikely to diminished by capital insurance.
Finally, ownership of the banking system brings with it important political-
economy considerations. Regulators may be unwilling to allow certain investors 
to accumulate large control stakes in a banking firm. To the extent that holders of 
reverse convertibles get a significant equity stake upon conversion, regulators may 
want to restrict investment in these securities to those who are “fit and proper”, 
or alternatively, remove their voting rights. Either choice would further limit the 
attractiveness of the reverse convertible. By contrast, our proposal does not raise 
any knotty ownership issues: when the trigger is hit, the insured bank simply gets 
a cash payout with no change in the existing structure of shareholdings.
The important common element of the Flannery (2005) proposal and ours is the 
contingent nature of the financing. There are other contingent schemes that could 
also be considered; Culp (2002) offers an introductory overview of these types of 
securities and a description of some that have been issued.
Security design could take care of a variety of concerns. For example, if investors 
do not like the possibility of losing everything on rare occasions, the insurance 
policies could be over-collateralized: the insurer would put $10 billion into the 
lock box, but only a maximum of $5 billion could be transferred to the insured 
policy in the event the trigger is breached. This is a transparent change that might 
get around problems arising because some buyers (such as pension funds or 
insurance companies) face restrictions on buying securities with low ratings.
A security that has some features of Flannery’s proposal (it is tied to firm- 
specific events) and some of ours (it is tied to losses, not stock prices) is the 
hybrid security issued in 2000 by the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). RBC sold 
a privately placed bond to Swiss RE that, upon a trigger event, converted into 
preferred shares with a given dividend yield. The conversion price was negotiated 
at date of the bond issue and the trigger for conversion was tied to a large drop in 
RBC’s general reserves. The size of the issue (C$200 million) was set to deliver 
an equity infusion of roughly one percent of RBC’s Tier capital requirement.
Of particular interest is the rationale RBC had for this transaction. Culp 
(2002, p. 51) quotes RBC executive David McKay as follows: “It costs the same 
to fund your reserves whether they’re geared for the first amount of credit loss or 
the last amount of loss...What is different is the probability of using the first loss 
amounts versus the last loss amounts. Keeping capital on the balance sheet for a 
last loss amount is not very efficient.”
The fact that this firm-specific security could be priced and sold suggests the 
industry-linked one that we are proposing need not present insurmountable 
practical difficulties.
Before concluding, let us turn to a final concern about our insurance proposal – 
that it might create the potential for a different kind of moral hazard. Even though 
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infusion in a crisis might reduce their incentives to hedge against the crisis, to 
the extent that they are concerned about not only expected returns, but also the 
overall variance of their portfolios. In other words, banks might negate some of 
the benefits of the insurance by taking on more systematic risk. To see the logic 
most transparently, consider a simple case where a bank sets a fixed target on 
the net amount of money it is willing to lose in the bad state (i.e., it implements 
a value-at-risk criterion). If it knows that it will receive a $10B payoff from an 
insurance policy in the crisis, it may be willing to tolerate $10B more of pre-
insurance losses in the crisis. If all banks behave in this way, they may wind up 
with more highly correlated portfolios than they would absent capital insurance.
This concern is clearly an important one. However, there are a couple of 
potentially mitigating factors. First, what is relevant is not whether our insurance 
proposal creates any moral hazard, but whether it creates more or less than the 
alternative of raising capital requirements. One could equally well argue that, in 
an effort to attain a desired level of return on equity, banks target the amount of 
systematic risk borne by their stockholders, i.e. their equity betas. If so, when 
the capital requirement is raised, banks would offset this by simply raising the 
systematic risk of their asset portfolios, so as to keep constant the amount of 
systematic risk borne per unit of equity capital. In this sense, any form of capital 
regulation faces a similar problem.
Second, the magnitude of the moral hazard problem associated with capital 
insurance is likely to depend on how the trigger is set, i.e. on the likelihood that 
the policy will pay off. Suppose that the policy only pays off in an extremely bad 
state which occurs with very low probability – a true financial crisis. Then a bank 
that sets out to take advantage of the system by holding more highly correlated 
assets faces a tradeoff: this strategy makes sense to the extent that the crisis state 
occurs and the insurance is triggered, but will be regretted in the much more 
likely scenario that things go badly, but not sufficiently badly to trigger a payout. 
This logic suggests that with an intelligently designed trigger, the magnitude of 
the moral hazard problem need not be prohibitively large.
This latter point is reinforced by the observation that, because of the agency 
and performancemeasurement problems described above, bank managers likely 
underweight very low probability tail events when making portfolio decisions. 
On the one hand, this means that they do not take sufficient care to avoid assets 
that have disastrous returns with very low probability – hence the current crisis. 
At the same time, it also means that they do not go out of their way to target 
any specific pattern of cashflows in such crisis states. Rather, they effectively 
just ignore the potential for such states ex ante, and focus on optimizing their 
portfolios over the more “normal” parts of the distribution. If this is the case, 
insurance with a sufficiently low-probability trigger will not have as much of an 
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CONCLUSIONS 6 
Our analysis of the current crisis suggests that governance problems in banks and 
excessive shortterm leverage were at its core. These two causes are related. Any 
attempt at preventing a recurrence should recognize that it is difficult to resolve 
governance problems, and, consequently, to wean banks from leverage. Direct 
regulatory interventions, such as mandating more capital, could simply exacerbate 
private sector attempts to get around them, as well as chill intermediation and 
economic growth. At the same time, it is extremely costly for society to either 
continue rescuing the banking system, or to leave the economy to be dragged into 
the messes that banking crises create.
If despite their best efforts, regulators cannot prevent systemic problems, they 
should focus on minimizing their costs to society, without dampening financial 
intermediation in the process. We have offered one specific proposal, capital 
insurance, which aims to reduce the adverse consequences of a crisis, while 
making sure the private sector picks up the bill. While we have sketched the broad 
outlines of how a capital insurance scheme might work, there is undoubtedly 
much more work to be done before it can be implemented. We hope that other 
academics, policymakers and practitioners will take up this challenge.
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COMMENT
BY STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, BIS, NBER AND CEPR
INTRODUCTION
Anil Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy Stein are among the deepest and 
most original financial economists working in the area of financial structure, and 
especially bank capital regulation, today. Both individually and in collaboration 
they have provided us with timely and insightful analysis on key issues in 
banking and policy. This paper is no exception. It starts with a lucid discussion 
of the main factors underlying the current financial crisis. The authors divide 
the drivers into two general categories: those associated with macroeconomic 
imbalances and those related to banks’ inherent incentive structures. Combined, 
these can help explain the fragility of individual financial institutions, and why 
the problems we have encountered appeared to have been isolated before putting 
the entire financial system at risk.
The authors build on their analysis of banks’ incentive structures to motivate 
a proposal for a new type of contingent capital scheme. This scheme provides 
banks with ready access to capital during episodes of systemic distress. The main 
benefit of this microeconomic tool is that it would reduce the macroeconomic 
externalities of an abrupt reduction in financial system leverage. I agree with 
many of the points the authors make, but I am left with a number of questions.
In this comment, I will begin with a discussion of the economics behind the 
crisis, then proceed to a description of the proposal, and finally explore some 
questions.
THE ECONOMICS BEHIND THE CRISIS
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein point to global macroeconomic imbalances as a 
fundamental causal factor behind the current financial crisis. They identify the 
build-up of private sector debt – demanded by the US and other industrialised 
economies and supplied by economies with current account surpluses, such as 
those in Asia – as creating the conditions for an unsustainable expansion in 
output that exceeded the economies’ long-run capacity over an extended period. 
Against this backdrop, they see the emergence of financial innovation as a factor 
that helped channel, through complex structures, an abundant supply of credit 
to housing. Importantly, instrument complexity and opacity brought about a 
weakening of market discipline, which exacerbated agency problems. Coupled 
with banks’ incentive structures, this led to high levels of leverage in the banking 
sector and, from a social point of view, to an excessive fragility of the financial 
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As Kashyap, Rajan and Stein point out, the natural capital structure for banks – 
little capital plus short-term (apparently) collateralised borrowing – leads 
individual institutions to react to losses in a manner that creates two externalities. 
The first concerns asset fire sales. An individual institution that is forced to sell 
will drive down the value of everyone else’s assets. The second is the fact that 
as banks reduce leverage, lending to the real economy contracts. This, too, is 
self-reinforcing, as without access to credit non-financial firms are forced to cut 
expenditures, leading to a slowdown and further losses for banks. All of this 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a bank to raise capital in the midst of a 
systemic event. 
THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL
The authors have put forward a specific, and very natural, proposal for capital 
insurance. Since the problem is that capital skyrockets in cost exactly when banks 
need it most, they design a contract that injects capital at just the right time, 
shifting the risk to someone else. The authors have worked out a number of the 
details of their capital insurance proposal. Importantly, a bank would be given 
the option of buying insurance in lieu of higher mandatory capital requirements. 
Furthermore, the capital insurance would be offered only by long-only 
(ie unleveraged) institutions that do not face capital requirements themselves. 
The insurer is required to place the gross amount of the insurance in a custodial 
account (a “lock-box”) to be held in the form of government securities or the 
equivalent. The payout is triggered by a fall in banking system-wide capital. 
This proposal makes a very positive contribution to the current debate about how 
capital regulation can be improved. The authors rightly emphasise the need to 
broaden the scope of prudential regulatory policies to better capture risks.
You will not be surprised to hear me say that this is an area in which there has 
been substantial activity in recent months. For example, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision has recently introduced improvements to the Basel 
II framework that strengthen the assessment of both the risks embedded in 
securitised instruments and the treatment of off-balance sheet exposures.
While continuous improvements of the regulatory guidelines within the framework 
of Basel II is essential, I am sympathetic to the following point made by Kashyap, 
Rajan and Stein:
    “[I]t is very difficult – probably impossible – to design a regulatory 
approach that reduces the probability of financial crisis to zero without 
imposing intolerably large costs on the process of intermediation in 
normal times. First, the viral nature of financial innovation will tend to 
frustrate attempts to simply ban whatever bad activity was the proximate 
cause of the previous crisis. Second, given the complexity of both the 
instruments and the organizations involved, it is probably naïve to hope 
that governance reforms will be fully effective.”212 CECCHETTI
Even so, improvements in the ability of regulatory tools to capture risk should 
extend to both systemic events and the risks to the real economy from the 
negative externalities of banks’ individually rational actions.
In other words, we need practical proposals for strengthening the systemic 
dimension of prudential rules. Specifically, prudential tools need to be better 
calibrated to address risks to the system as a whole, and to become more 
responsive to the interdependencies between institutions and markets. The BIS 
has been emphasising this point for some time, arguing in favour of a better, 
rule-based, alignment of the microprudential perspective, with its emphasis on 
individual institutions, with the macroprudential perspective, which focuses 
on the behaviour of the system and its interaction with the business cycle. The 
current crisis only makes the point more pressing.1
A number of aspects of the macroprudential approach advocated by the BIS 
are beyond the scope of the Kashyap, Rajan and Stein paper. For example, this 
approach needs to be embedded in a holistic framework, which encompasses a 
wide range of policies and in which capital regulation is just one – albeit quite 
important – tool. In addition, the paper limits the discussion to a representative 
bank, whereas the cross-sectional dimension of the macroprudential framework 
calls for a differentiation across institutions according to their systemic 
importance and exposure to systematic risk.
The macroprudential approach has both a cross-sectional dimension and a time-
series dimension. The former is simply to ensure that the failure of a single 
institution, or group of institutions, does not put the entire system at risk. The 
capital insurance proposal relates to the latter. There is a growing consensus 
that prudential regulation should seek to dampen the tendency of financial 
decisions to exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. Doing this requires introducing 
countercyclical elements that encourage banks to create true buffers that function 
as loss absorbers. Conceptually, we want banks to build up capital cushions 
during the calm and to drawn them down in the storm. As Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein correctly point out, strict minimum capital requirements do the opposite, 
amplifying stresses because of the externalities of banks’ behaviour. 
I should note that proposals that emphasise ex ante provision of resources that 
can be used in bad times have been advanced by a number of people.2 These 
typically imply some degree of countercyclicality in the level of capital banks 
are required to hold. Compared to the Kashyap, Rajan and Stein proposal, these 
alternatives have the advantage of leaning against the build-up of imbalance 
during the upswing of the cycle by restraining the expansion of financial system 
balance sheets overall.
1  See, for example, Crockett (2000), Knight (2006) and BIS (2002, 2005).
2  See, for instance, Gordy and Howells (2007), Flannery (2005), Goodhart and Persaud 
(2008), and Kashyap and Stein (2004), among others.213 COMMENT SESSION 3
QUESTIONS
Returning to the specifics, this intriguing proposal raises a number of questions. I 
will focus on five, some of which are clearly acknowledged in the paper:
Who offers the insurance? 1. 
How much insurance would each bank purchase? 2. 
How is the trigger for payment measured and administered? 3. 
How is the insurance priced?  4. 
Does insurance economise on the capital committed to the banking  5. 
system?
Who offers the insurance?
As I noted at the outset, the authors say that only unleveraged institutions should 
be allowed to supply this insurance. The problem with this is that there are many 
ways to borrow. Would a life insurance company or a pension fund, institutions 
with contingent liabilities that in many cases resemble nominal or index bonds, 
be qualified to write the insurance?
Another point is that, while the fact of the lock-box eliminates counterparty risk 
for the buyers of the insurance, the seller still faces the risk, meaning that if there 
is a systemic event triggering payment, the insurer faces a loss. This loss comes at 
what will surely be the worst possible time, when all financial institution balance 
sheets are already impaired. Does the capital insurance scheme simply shift the 
problem to another part of the financial system? 
How much insurance would each bank purchase?
Would this depend on the characteristics of the individual institution, such as its 
size and degree of risk-taking, or on the potential economic costs from a systemic 
event? A calibration at the bank level that does not reflect the extent to which the 
individual bank may suffer from or exacerbate systemic distress runs the risk of 
encouraging socially suboptimal “herding” behaviour that would maximise the 
expected benefit from subscribing to the proposed capital insurance scheme.
How is the trigger for payment measured and administered?
For the scheme to work, we need a credible, real-time indicator of the aggregate 
state that is not revised. Any national income accounts-based quantity is clearly 
ruled out, as there are constant revisions. But why do the authors think that 
something like bank capital is less of a problem? Recall that the trigger for payment 
is the level of write-offs the banking system has experienced. The difficulty is 
that accounting standards and their enforcement may not be adequately immune 
to manipulations to make this quantity sufficiently credible. Admittedly, this 
criticism probably applies to capital regulation in general, so I may be holding 
the capital insurance proposal to an unrealistically high standard.
Related to this is the question of how the insurance scheme should evolve if clear 
signs of financial distress were to emerge prior to the realisation of a systemic 
event that triggers payouts to subscribers. During such an interim period, it might 
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their subscriptions to the insurance scheme. However, such behaviour is likely 
to amplify the concurrent rise in insurance premia, which could exacerbate 
individual banks’ health and, eventually, even precipitate a crisis.
How is the insurance priced?
This is a critical point, on which I have three comments:
Pricing system-risk insurance means estimating the probability of tail  • 
events, which are by definition infrequent. Not only is this extremely 
difficult, but the limited experience we have suggests that the market 
tends to underprice this risk in good times, which is to say when insurance 
providers are expected to be long on it.
The primary rationale for the insurance system is to mitigate an externality.  • 
Doesn’t that mean that the market price of the insurance will be too high 
from a social point of view, and thus need to be subsidised?
If the market prices insurance properly, how different will the cost be from  • 
the cost of capital? Here I would make two points:
Since banks can chose whether to raise more capital or buy insurance,  i. 
shouldn’t they equate the (risk-adjusted) cost at the margin? Won’t 
the insurance have the same price as capital?
It is true that since the suppliers of insurance only pay if a systemic  ii. 
event occurs, and not if the bank fails for idiosyncratic reasons, it 
would appear that they require a lower return. But, unlike equity 
holders, the insurance providers do not share in the profits during 
the good times. I hesitate to argue with these authors on a point of 
financial theory, but it seems to me that the difference in cost is likely 
to be small and could depend on the fact that in reality idiosyncratic 
risk is priced.
Does insurance economise on the capital committed to the 
banking system?
One of the appeals of the Kashyap, Rajan and Stein capital insurance scheme 
is that it is intended to economise on capital that is committed to the banking 
system, increasing the non-financial capital stock. There are two reasons to 
wonder if this is going to the case. First, there is the lock-box that forms such a 
critical element of the proposal. The idea is that you need to be certain the insurer 
can pay off if the catastrophic state occurs. What about the resources that are used 
to purchase the securities in the lock-box? I realise these have to be government 
securities – they need to be able to retain both their value and liquidity in a crisis – 
but what does that mean for the capital stock as a whole?
The second reason to question whether the proposal economises on capital 
allocated to the financial system comes from thinking about the pricing problem 
I just discussed. If, as I worry may be the case, the price of the insurance is close 
to that the risk-adjusted marginal cost of capital in the economy as a whole, then 
the savings may disappear. I fear that all of this leads me to wonder whether 215 COMMENT SESSION 3
we shouldn’t simply revert to the point where we are now: Insurance against 
systemic events is most efficiently supplied by the public authorities. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
My overall conclusion is that the proposal made by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 
is welcome and should be considered along with others. While the various ideas 
may differ in details, they seem to agree on some basic principles that should 
guide the prudential framework. In broad terms, these principles are:
1)  Strengthen macroprudential regulation and supervision by focusing on the 
stability and performance of the system as well as individual institutions. 
Proposals that link capital resources to the overall state of the economy and/
or the health of the financial system are in line with this. 
2)  Safeguard stability by supplementing risk-sensitive prudential tools, which we 
all know can be bypassed through ingenious financial innovation, with simpler 
and more transparent rules. We urge bankers to pursue diversification in their 
investment portfolios. Shouldn’t we expect regulators to do the same?
3)  Continue to build on tools that make supervisory review more effective and 
enhance the capacity of markets to provide discipline. 
Academics have a big role to play in this effort, and I think that the Kashyap, 
Rajan and Stein paper is one of the more thoughtful contributions in the right 
direction. And while it may seem that I have been very critical, let me close by 
saying that the proposal may be the best we can realistically hope for.
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COMMENT
BY SEPPO HONKAPOHJA, BOARD MEMBER OF BANK OF FINLAND
This is a very useful paper covering three main themes: (i) analysis of the reasons 
for the over-exposure of banks, (ii) discussion of alternative principles for capital 
regulation and (iii) a specific proposal for reforming capital regulation. In my 
comments I have the perspective of a macroeconomist in discussing each of these 
topics, emphasizing the key messages by the authors and making some critical 
remarks as we move along.   
1  OVER-EXPOSURE OF BANKS
A key initial insight of the paper is that the current financial crisis is due to a 
combination of two factors. First, substantial amounts of MBSs remained in 
the commercial and investment banks. In the upswing MBSs became popular, 
because low interest rates and a savings glut shifted the focus of investors on 
housing markets when they were looking for somewhat higher average returns. 
The second part of the explanation is that the risky MBSs were financed by short-
term borrowing, so that in the wake of the decline in the housing market banks 
found it difficult to roll over the funding of their holdings of MBSs.
The deep explanations of the over-exposure and funding difficulties of banks 
come from agency problems that are inherent for banks. In internal incentive 
schemes of financial institutions it is difficult to separate genuine excess return 
from increased risk-taking. This problem arises because outcomes of investments 
are realized after long lags. In such cases it is difficult to tie reward to performance 
and the use of short-term reward schemes can lead to high levels of risk-taking as 
performance cannot be properly monitored.
Another central feature of financing of banks is that banks have relatively little 
equity in their balance sheets and their funding is relatively short-term in nature. 
The prevalence of debt finance is a natural response to agency problems in 
banking. It is difficult for equity holders to monitor banks because of the long 
time lag between investment and return and because many assets held by banks 
have high liquidity, which again makes monitoring by owners difficult.
A third aspect in the current crisis has been the fact that many of the new 
securities were complex, so that their risks were hard to assess during the 
upswing. When the downturn in housing prices took place, the implicit risks 
became exposed and this led to a strong decline in asset prices. A consequence of 
this decline were ”fire sales” of assets by banks, which created further asset price 
declines and a negative externality on other banks. The whole banking system 
got into difficulties.
The fire-sale externality tends to be associated with banks’ asset-side adjustments 
involving a lot of capital, which in turn has forced cuts in lending to businesses. 218 HONKAPOHJA
The authors call this a credit crunch externality. Customers of bank loans are hurt 
by banks’ needs to reduce their balance sheets because of losses from declining 
asset prices.
In my opinion, there is a further externality and market failure. The losses led 
to liquidity problems for and solvency concerns about individual banks. These 
concerns have created a lack-of-trust externality between banks, which dried up 
interbank-funding markets. As is well-known, the failure of inter-bank markets 
has led to a further squeeze in bank lending to businesses and consumers.
2  PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATORY REFORM
The paper has a very thoughtful discussion of regulatory reforms in view of the 
current crisis. According to the authors, the current financial crisis originates 
from two problem areas, internal governance of banks and capital structures. 
Improvements to bank governance are seen in two main areas: (i) employee 
compensation should be tied to longer-term performance and (ii) profit measures 
should be risk-adjusted. 
The authors suggest that these incentive problems and performance measure 
issues are not regulatory concerns but should instead be dealt with using improved 
internal governance. Clearly, internal governance of banks should focus on these 
two sets of issues. Nevertheless, it must be noted that employee, especially top 
management compensation is currently a huge public concern. For this reason, 
it cannot perhaps be left entirely to banks’ internal reforms. If possible, some 
regulatory guidelines might be given to management compensation schemes. 
Moreover, risk-adjusted performance measures could be subjected to regulatory 
inspection.
Reform of banking capital structures is obviously a major topic in future 
reforms of financial regulation. The authors make useful criticisms of the 
straightforward idea of higher capital requirements. Such schemes are costly 
because of high costs of equity in banking, and higher capital requirements 
do not avoid the fire-sale externality. It should also be noted that traditional 
forms of capital regulation are not able to deal with the viral nature of financial 
innovation. Financial innovation is likely to revive once the current crisis is 
over and times are back to normal. It is going to be a challenge to financial 
regulators to deal with new instruments that will be eventually created. It will 
also be interesting to see how demands for different securities by investors are 
going change as a result of the current crisis. It is likely that investors want to 
have more transparent instruments.
The authors emphasize that one part of the regulatory response should be directed 
at ex post clean-up of a crisis. Government and private recapitalization of banks 
is an appropriate response to the fire-sale and credit crunch externalities that 
are a central part of a financial crisis. Recapitalizations of banks and the public 
guarantees of bank debt are indeed a major policy response in the current crisis. 
They are to be seen as a response not only to the credit-crunch externality 219 COMMENT SESSION 3
discussed in the paper but also as a response to interbank market failure that has 
emerged in association with the solvency concerns. 
The paper does not take up the issue of what to do weak banks, which can be a 
major part of the policy problems in a financial crisis. Importance of the issue 
of weak banks clearly depends on the severity of the crisis. In a mild crisis the 
problem is probably limited to a few isolated cases, whereas in a deep crisis a 
significant part of or possibly all of the banking system of a country gets into 
difficulties with solvency. In the latter case the government has to take a heavy-
handed approach and restructure the country’s banking system. This was the 
case, for example, in the Nordic crises of the 1990s. The Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish governments were forced to make heavy-handed restructurings of their 
banking systems.1
3 CAPITAL  INSURANCE
The third theme of the paper is a proposed new scheme for capital regulation. 
It is suggested that a system of capital insurance be created to increase banks’ 
capital in bad times. Banks would be required to buy insurance that pays off and 
thus props up banks’ capital in states of the world in which the overall banking 
system is facing a crisis.
In this schemes insurers buy treasury bills and put them in a ”lock box”. Insurance 
money would be returned to insurer, with premia paid by banks and together with 
interest on the treasuries in the box if no systemic event occurs. However, if the 
crisis event occurs, then agreed sums of funds are transferred to bank’s balance 
sheet. The scheme would invoke a trigger mechanism to decide on the insurance 
payments. As discussed in the paper, the scheme would also involve thresholds 
and caps to payments and also staggering of individual insurance contracts to 
ensure smooth functioning overall.
I have a number of comments on this proposal. One feature I like is that the 
proposed scheme would largely be a private solution to the banks’ recapitalization 
problem. Insurance would presumably be provided by private institutions and not 
by the government. Having a private solution is in principle preferable, because 
public ownership of banks can create problems in market competition once 
a crisis is over. It should, however, be recognized that in some earlier crises 
private solutions were initially emphasized, but in deep crises (e.g. in the Nordic 
countries) the private solutions tended to be insufficient and governments had to 
take partial or full ownership of problem banks.
In my opinion the main problem with the proposal is that the supply side of 
capital insurance is not considered in detail. Only a brief discussion of potential 
1  For an overview see, for example, Honkapohja, S. (2008), The Nordic Banking Crises 
of the 1990s, mimeo, September, Bank of Finland. Available at http://www.bof.fi/en/
suomen_pankki/organisaatio/johtokunta/honkapohja/ and as Bank of Finland Discussion 
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suppliers is given. Pension funds and sovereign wealth funds are thought to be 
potential suppliers. It is also argued that quite naturally, investors subject to 
capital requirements could not be suppliers of capital insurance. This means, 
however, that pension funds in many countries could not be among the suppliers, 
as pension funds often have requirements or restrictions on forms of asset 
holdings. I also worry about the possible role of hedge funds here. In the current 
crisis hedge funds are strongly scaling down their operations. This suggests that 
they might not be interested in providing capital insurance. 
One part of the proposal is the imposition of a trigger based on the aggregate 
of banks. This means that insurance paid out only in a sufficiently big crisis. 
Having the insurance payout based on a trigger computed from the aggregate of 
banks in a country is clearly a natural requirement as an individualized trigger 
is easily subject to manipulation. There can, however, be other difficulties in 
implementing a trigger based on the aggregate of banks. If the aggregate of banks 
is in trouble, then the crisis is likely to be systemic. In this event many or most 
banks are in trouble, which implies that the trigger-level aggregate losses are 
arising from correlated portfolios and realized systemic risks. Would suppliers 
of capital insurance be available for the renewal of individual insurance contracts 
that mature during a systemic financial crisis? 
If it turns out that there are problems in finding private suppliers to the insurance 
scheme, one could consider public provision of capital insurance. Banks would pay 
premia to an insurance fund run by a government agency and payouts would be 
made up in a crisis situation and the payouts would have a cap based on the amount 
of insurance purchased. This would be somewhat analogous to a mandatory deposit 
insurance scheme in which deposits are insured up to an upper limit. If the government 
were the provider, then the outcome would be somewhat analogous to the current 
policies in which governments inject funds to increase banks’ capital if a systemic 
crisis occurs.2 The big difference would be the advance payments of insurance premia 
by banks and the automatic availability of funds for recapitalization.  
The paper acknowledges that the capital insurance scheme would have its own 
moral hazard concerns. Even if the insurance payout is based on an aggregate 
criterion, it results in reduced incentives to hedge against a financial crisis. With 
the scheme in place, banks might be interested in taking on more systemic risks. 
The paper provides some discussion of the extent of this problem but it does not 
compare the extent of these moral hazard concerns in the proposed scheme and 
other ways of banks’ recapitalization.  
2  Current recapitalization policies by governments are conditional on the occurrence of a 
crisis, which is one feature common with an insurance scheme. Of course, the current 
schemes are discretionary and not an on-going arrangement with insurance premia paid in 
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4 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This is a thoughtful and inspiring paper with useful analysis of different aspects of 
the current crisis. The authors are to be commended for proposing a new solution 
to the banks’ recapitalization problem in a financial crisis. It must, however, 
be said that the proposed capital insurance scheme requires a lot of further 
analysis. In particular, the private supply side should be analyzed in more depth. 
It would also be important to properly assess the benefits and costs of the scheme 
in relation to other ways of solving the recapitalization problem. A general 
equilibrium framework would seem to be required for such an undertaking. 222 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 3
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi asked Raghuram Rajan how to get financial markets 
to function again. Rajan responded that his inclination was as follows. Once the 
government decides to intervene, the government should go all the way: banks 
must be cleaned up, by a combination of recapitalization and purchases of bad 
assets. More public funds will be needed to accomplish this. Alex Cukierman 
argued that in a crisis as grave as the current crisis, there is no alternative to 
government intervention using taxpayers’ money. He advanced the proposal that 
banks be taxed in a boom in order to fund government intervention in case of a 
grave crisis. Rajan replied that he worries that an insurance scheme run by the 
government, of the kind proposed by Cukierman, would under-price insurance, 
thereby creating a wealth transfer from taxpayers to banks. Gabriel Stein 
observed that capital insurance proposed by the authors seemed similar to deposit 
insurance. The key challenge for each policy is to minimize the costs to the 
taxpayer.
Francesco Giavazzi wondered if there is an externality when a bank terminates 
a loan. If there is, then what is the difference between a bank terminating a loan 
and General Motors terminating a contract with a supplier? Rajan responded that 
the difference was only a matter of degree. Nevertheless, the difference could be 
large due to systemic risk. Stanley Fischer remarked that the paper emphasizes 
internal agency problems in banks. He argued that marking-to-market was 
important in attenuating these agency problems. Andrew Levin wondered 
whether the state should regulate banks as it regulates public utilities. Rajan 
found the analogy between banks and public utilities unhelpful. We should let 
banks maximize profits, he said.
In response to the discussants, Rajan discussed in greater detail the supply of 
capital insurance. He emphasized that unlevered financial institutions should 
supply capital insurance. One can think of unlevered financial institutions as 
being owned by comparatively wealthy taxpayers. This observation shows 
that, under his proposal, risk would be shifted to wealthier taxpayers, rather 
than to all taxpayers. Furthermore, risk would be shifted ex ante. He added that 
state contingent capital is cheaper than direct capital, due to agency problems. 
One cannot access contingent capital ex ante. Finally, he acknowledged that 
accounting could be manipulated by banks that have bought capital insurance, 
but he believed that this problem could be minimized in a satisfactory way.224
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INTRODUCTION
BY FRANCESCO GIAVAZZI, IGIER, BOCCONI UNIVERSITY, 
CEPR AND NBER
“We are 27 countries in the European Union. In the euro area, we are 15. Of the 
27, 25 have no opt-out clause. The challenge is to progressively absorb all the 
newcomers: none of them has an opt-out clause. At the same time it is imperative 
to preserve the credibility of the euro area as a whole by strictly respecting the 
conditions of entry, the Maastricht criterion.” Jean-Claude Trichet:  1
Enlargement will affect the euro area and the ECB in many ways. By virtually 
any metric, it will add to the region’s diversity (whether the focus is on language, 
culture, or legal systems). From an economic perspective, a 25-country currency 
area will form the world’s largest in terms of GDP, with a population of about 
500 million, compared to around 300 million in the United States. The ratio 
of per capita incomes between the richest and poorest members would widen 
to nearly 13 from less than 4, based on recent data. The speed of integration 
of product, labor and financial markets may quicken, accelerating structural 
change. And each new euro-area member will bring with it a new fiscal agent 
and a parliament. Among other things, this expansion will increase incentives for 
free-riding, thereby complicating any constitutional changes that would require 
unanimity.
Naturally, the need to assess the preparedness of prospective members will 
repeatedly revive the issues that confronted the European Council ahead of EMU: 
What degree of convergence has been achieved, what is needed to satisfy the 
Treaty’s provisions? Should those provisions be amended? So far the answer has 
been negative because “amendment” meant “relaxation”: the experience with the 
current suggests however that there may be reason to make entry criteria more, not 
less stringent. Does this affect our view about the desirability of new criteria?
Will trends toward economic divergence for some existing euro-area members 
intensify or diminish as membership rises? How will the difficulty of coordination 
among 25 fiscal agents affect monetary policy? Will a larger number of more 
diverse members exposed to idiosyncratic shocks raise the chances of a national 
fiscal crisis, widen market yield spreads and, in the extreme, lead to a test of the 
Maastricht Treaty’s “no-bailout” provisions?
Enlargement will be a particular challenge in the area of communication. Even 
today, no other central bank faces the task of communicating with the public 
at large in 16 different countries. Will the presence of NCB governors on the 
Governing Council of the ECB be enough? Diverse national histories may prompt 
different constituencies to view identical policy statements as accommodative or 
1  Interview with S. G. Cecchetti and K. L. Schoenholtz (2009). Europe and the Euro, ed. 
A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi. Chicago: Chicago University Press.227 INTRODUCTION
restrictive. If the longest-run challenge of the ECB is to secure a popular base, 
then enlargement only intensifies that challenge.
The panel was asked to address in particular:
Entry criteria. The health of the banking system is not among the current  1. 
entry criteria. In this light it is worth asking what would have happened 
had some of the “outs” been “in” during the current crisis. Consider for 
instance the effect of the exposure of Swedish banks to the Baltics, or of 
Hungary’s exposure to a sudden stop in capital flows.
    Looking ahead, had these countries been in the euro area during the crisis, 
would they pose an additional difficulty for ECB monetary policy? Should 
the entry criteria be extended? Is there a tradeoff between the relaxation 
of criteria that are economically unsound (e.g. inflation in the light of the 
Balassa-Samuleson effect) and the introduction of new criteria, e.g. on the 
financing of the current account, or on banks’ capital?
Large capital inflows. Massive capital inflows into some accession  2. 
countries (e.g. Estonia) seem to have been distortionary, having created 
boom-bust cycles that domestic policies have been unable to offset. The 
same happened with Portugal and Greece just after they joined the euro. 
What is the lesson from these experiences?
Banking supervision. Are we sufficiently confident that cooperation  3. 
between national supervisors would still work after enlargement? 
Does enlargement strengthen the argument for centralized euro area 
supervision? 
A technical but important issue: different ways inflation is measured.  4. 
In some accession countries (e.g. Estonia) inflation is still measured 
differently compared to the Euro area HICP. How does this affect the 
entry criteria?
Monetary policy in the meantime: exchange rate pegs (ERM2) or inflation  5. 
targeting with flexible exchange rate?228 GASPAR
PANEL STATEMENT
BY VÍTOR GASPAR, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN POLICY ADVISERS, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
I want to start by thanking Frank Smets for his invitation to participate in 
the ECB’s Fifth Central Banking Conference “The Euro at Ten: Lessons and 
Challenges”. Having been involved in the preparation of the first three ECB 
Central Banking Conferences it is, for me, personally very gratifying to be 
here. I also want to express my gratitude to colleagues from DG-ECFIN who 
provided me with the material I will use in my intervention.1 Marco Buti and 
Servaas Deroose intended to be present here but, in the end, could not come due 
to pressing obligations linked to the on-going financial crisis. 
This will be my only reference to the financial crisis. In contrast to Erik Berglöf, 
I will not focus on its implications for the challenges associated with euro 
enlargement. Nevertheless, I am prepared to argue that the financial crisis actually 
strengthens the argument that I will be putting forward in my intervention. I will 
not be following the sequence suggested by Francesco Giavazzi’s five questions. 
I am convinced that, when I am finished, my answer to most of those questions 
will be clear. That said, it makes it more pressing and urgent. 
Yesterday, I participated in a workshop in Brussels with the theme: “Five Years 
of an Enlarged EU: a Positive Sum Game”. It was devoted to the impact of the 
EU’s fifth enlargement. I am personally convinced that enlargement is one of the 
most successful policies of the EU. It has spread peace, prosperity, human rights 
and democracy across the European continent. At the same time, enlargement 
offers testimony to the EU’s power of attraction. Enlargement has contributed 
to making the European Union the largest economic entity in the world. 
The European Union is characterized by its diversity.2 Member States that joined 
during the two most recent enlargements are also very diverse among themselves. 
This diversity implies that there will be considerable differences in their policy 
approaches. 
The same can be said about the euro area. The process of enlargement of the euro 
area is on-going. Of the ten Member States that joined with the fifth enlargement, 
four will have already joined the euro area by January 2009 (when the Slovak 
Republic becomes the 16th member of the euro area). The European Union Treaty 
provides a clear institutional path for euro adoption. Each Member State of the 
1  Especially Marco Buti, Servaas Deroose, Massimo Suardi and Joachim Wadefjord. None 
should be held responsible for the intervention’s shortcomings but myself.
2  Diversity has been a distinctive characteristic of European civilization for a long time. For 
example, Guizot (1840) writes: «Lorsque j’ai tenté de déterminer la physionomie propre 
de la civilisation européenne, comparée aux civilisations antiques et asiatiques, j’ai fait 
voir que la première était variée, riche, complexe, qu’elle n’était jamais tombée sous la 
domination d’aucun principe exclusif, que les divers éléments de l’état social s’y étaient 
combinés, combattus, modifiés, et qu’ils avaient été continuellement obligés de transiger et 
de vivre en commun.» (p. 380)229 PANEL STATEMENT
fifth and sixth enlargement, without exception, is expected, and is welcome, to 
adopt the euro. It can do so as soon as it meets the convergence criteria. 
This allows me to make a comment in passing about the first question, raised 
by Francesco Giavazzi, concerning possible amendments to the convergence 
criteria. Convergence criteria aim at ensuring the formation of a stability 
oriented Economic and Monetary Union, based on the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition. As I said before, the institutional path 
for euro adoption – which includes the convergence criteria – is clear. Clarity 
is of particular importance for candidate countries. It sets out what each has to 
do in order to ensure admission to the euro area. One strong argument against 
considering revisions to the convergence criteria is precisely the uncertainty and 
disturbance that might cause in the candidate countries themselves. I do not want 
to discuss revisions to the convergence criteria further. In my view such a debate 
serves no useful institutional purpose. 
Before continuing I want to mention, in passing, that participation in the euro area 
is associated with important benefits. These benefits can be organized into two 
groups: first, integration benefits. These relate to increased trade and financial 
integration. They derive from “One Money, One Market” mutually reinforcing 
integration dynamics.3 The contributions to the panel “Optimum Currency Areas: 
The Academic View” will, no doubt, cover the relevant arguments and empirical 
evidence.4 Second, benefits from a coherent framework for stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policies. In the euro area these are centred around monetary 
policy, assigned to an independent central bank – the European Central Bank – 
with the primary objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term. 
Stability-oriented macroeconomic policies provide the best environment for 
sustainable growth and development. 
I have emphasized diversity across the new Member States. However, diversity 
does not prevent me from focusing on common challenges and guiding principles 
for policy-making. I will assume the viewpoint of a new Member State that shows 
the political will necessary to join the euro area. Notwithstanding diversity, most 
of the Member States, that have more recently joined the European Union, have 
average income levels well below the average of the EU. In the years since 
accession, they have converged fast. The gap with the average of the EU15 
narrowed by about 10 percentage points and, in 2007, it reached 62%. During 
this period real GDP growth in the new Member States averaged 6.4% against 
1.8% for the euro area. Catching up is progressing fast but there is still quite a 
long road ahead.
The challenge is to ensure steady, sustainable, non-inflationary growth. From 
the viewpoint of the countries concerned the prospect of participation in the euro 
area should be considered in this broader context. 
3  See Mongelli (Forthcoming). 
4  Given the composition of the panel, trade effects figured much more prominently than financial 
integration. Nevertheless the implications of the latter for the conduct of macroeconomic policy 
are very substantial.230 GASPAR
I have studied the experience of adjustment to participation in the euro area, 
based on the experience of the founding participants.5 I am still very much 
engaged in this line of research. I believe there is much to learn. 
My tentative conclusion, from a policy perspective, is that it is useful to consider 
the challenges associated with adjustment to euro area participation, from the 
viewpoint of the new Member States, in three groups: first, achieving real and 
nominal convergence simultaneously. Second, managing the expansionary effect of 
trade and financial integration especially those associated with rapid credit growth 
in a context of financial deepening. Third, preserving external competitiveness, 
in order to contribute to stability and sustainability. The magnitude of the last 
challenge is illustrated by countries with substantial and enduring current account 
deficits, leading to rapid accumulation of net foreign liabilities. 
While the above challenges are common, successful policies will have to 
take national specificities carefully into account. There is no “silver bullet” or 
universal panacea that could be applied blindly across the board. Thus, I would 
avoid dichotomies like ERM2 vs. inflation targeting with a floating exchange 
rate.6 A successful participant in ERM2 will be able to maintain price stability. 
Similarly, an inflation targeting central bank in a small very open economy will 
have to respond to the exchange rate in order to maintain price stability.7 
In spite of the diversity of situations, imposing a case-by-case approach, there are 
a number of general guiding principles that may be useful. Specifically, I want 
to list four:
First, it seems crucial to reinforce the conditions promoting free and open 
market competition favouring change and innovation and allowing profitable 
investment opportunities – including FDI. Such a principle, which is sound 
enough in general, is particularly important in the context of European 
integration and prospective participation in the euro area. The reason is that 
easier access to financing and the catching-up process itself lead to an easing 
of budget constraints in the short run. Such a temporary abode should not be 
used to protect inefficient providers of goods and services or to skew resource 
allocation to sectors sheltered from competition. 
Second, prudent fiscal policy. This implies a fiscal policy based on automatic 
stabilizers ensuring a strong counter-cyclical stance. It also requires a focus on 
long-term sustainability and the quality of Public Finances. 
Third, effective supervision of financial institutions and markets. It is essential to 
be aware and vigilant concerning systemic risks (including macro-financial risks). 
5  Fagan and Gaspar (2008a) looked at the adjustment process of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Fagan and Gaspar (2008b) also looked at the broader implications for two groups: “core” and 
“convergence” countries. Gaspar and St. Aubyn (2009) have also worked on the contrasting 
experiences of Portugal and Spain.
6  In reference to Francesco Giavazzi’s question 5.
7  See Detken and Gaspar (2003) for a theoretical discussion.231 PANEL STATEMENT
Fourth, flexible labour and product markets facilitating structural adjustment 
while maintaining high levels of resource utilization. 
Proverbs provide ample examples of best laid plans going awry. Difficulties 
in policy action follow from complex and conflicting theoretical and empirical 
evidence. Such difficulties are compounded in the face of significant structural 
adjustment. Different and contradictory arguments will be relevant, and the way 
to weigh them far from obvious. All of these challenges are clear and present for 
policy-makers from the new Member States in their path to the euro area. In the 
circumstances, it seems to be fundamental to resist the temptations of the present 
in order to lay out the foundations of future prosperity. 232 GASPAR
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PANEL STATEMENT
BY ATHANASIOS ORPHANIDES, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
OF CYPRUS
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this panel on the euro and enlargement. 
Coming from one of the smallest new member states of our great union, and one 
that has just joined the euro area, I feel that we are well acquainted with the potential 
benefits of completing the journey towards our economic and monetary union as 
well as the challenges presented along the way. In my remarks, I will share with you 
some thoughts on these issues, drawing on our perspective and experience. Before I 
proceed, I should note that these thoughts are my own and do not necessarily reflect 
views of my colleagues on the Governing Council of the ECB.
As previous experience has shown, the new EU member states may find 
themselves confronted with a number of important challenges that test their 
economies in the run-up to ERM II and the adoption of the single currency. Apart 
from designing and pursuing the appropriate monetary and exchange rate policy 
that will eventually lead to the adoption of the euro, these challenges include 
strong consumption expenditure and significant credit growth following accession 
to the EU, higher inflation rates due to the convergence process, and destabilising 
capital flows triggered by interest rate differentials. The new member states 
may also be faced with inflated asset prices. As has already been exemplified, 
in order to mitigate the aforementioned challenges it is important for any new 
member state aspiring to adopt the euro to achieve a high degree of nominal and 
real convergence with the euro area before joining ERM II. Moreover, it is well 
established that the monetary and exchange rate regime in place and the response 
of a new member state to these challenges should not be seen in isolation from its 
initial starting conditions and historical/institutional evolution.
Regardless of the choice of monetary and exchange rate regime there are common 
challenges that the new member states will face on the road to euro adoption. A 
crucial role will be played by the initial conditions of the new member states. Per 
capita GDP and the general price level in the new member states are significantly 
below euro area levels. The very prospect of the catching up process presents 
a unique opportunity for raising the welfare of the citizens of the new member 
states but this is an opportunity that comes with challenges.
The initial level of development of a country, measured by its per capita GDP, 
and the speed of real convergence are the main determinants of relative inflation 
in the long-run – the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Therefore, the overall inflation 
rate in the new member states is expected to be higher during the catching 
up process. On the other hand, as the per capita income gap between the new 
member states and the euro area declines, we can expect the price level gap to 
decline as well. This price convergence can take place via a nominal appreciation 
of the exchange rate or via a relatively higher inflation rate, depending on the 
exchange rate regime. 234 ORPHANIDES
Another major challenge for the new member states seeking to join the euro area 
is the considerable net capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio investment. Most new member states have experienced 
strong non-FDI capital inflows encouraged by market expectations that these 
countries will join the euro area. In particular, they have been driven by initially 
higher domestic nominal interest rates and the expectation of yield convergence 
ahead of euro adoption, as well as by the favourable prospects for growth. In 
some new member states, these capital inflows continue to be the main source of 
financing, leading to a further build up of gross external debt as a proportion of 
GDP. Net inflows of FDI are also an important source of financing. In one case 
this constitutes about 20% of GDP. Compared with FDI, non-FDI flows may 
embody more serious risks since they are sensitive to interest rate differentials 
and risk premia, among other things. In any event, the risk of a sudden stop in 
capital flows should be kept in mind by the governments of new member states. 
The aim should be to pursue prudent policies that minimise these risks and 
insure against the worst of possible outcomes. In the present environment of 
malfunctioning international capital markets and funding difficulties in banking, 
such risks have increased.
A related challenge is that of managing the potential for a rapid expansion of 
credit. Indeed, a number a factors have led to such an expansion in the new 
member states in the last few years. On the demand side, the initial low level of 
credit availability and indebtedness, the rapid output growth, the rise in income 
expectations and the increased market confidence associated with EU entry have 
led to a greater willingness of economic agents to take on debt. On the supply 
side, the development of the banking sector after privatisation and the welcoming 
of foreign banks have increased the lending capacity of the banking sector. At 
the same time, rising competition among banks resulted in strong incentives for 
banks to expand their lending to households. With low initial credit to GDP ratios 
which afforded greater potential for growth, this implied considerably faster 
credit growth during the transition to equilibrium. Indeed, credit to households 
has risen the fastest in the five least developed new member states where the 
starting levels of credit were the lowest.
The fastest growing parts of the credit market have been household loans, 
particularly mortgage loans. The latter have been encouraged by deregulation in 
the property market, the rapid rise in property prices and expectations of further 
price increases which appear to have generated speculative buying, including by 
non-residents. Once again, the issue is how to properly pace the vast potential 
for welfare gains and the challenge for policy is how to prevent credit growth 
from becoming excessive, with the well known dangers of the resolution of the 
associated excesses.
Two other issues to take into account are whether the catching up process of 
the price level can be better managed inside or outside the monetary union, and 
whether the transition to the euro can be better managed with a floating or with 
a fixed exchange rate regime. Thus, the new member states are faced with the 
challenge of designing an appropriate exchange rate strategy that will eventually 
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pre–accession phase no single strategy is prescribed. Accession countries are free 
to choose any regime they consider appropriate, ranging from a pegged exchange 
rate to inflation targeting.
We should acknowledge that alternative exchange rate strategies have different 
risks associated with them. However, recent experience has reaffirmed that 
successful adoption of the euro can be achieved with a number of these alternative 
strategies. For example, in the case of Cyprus and Malta, which joined the euro 
area in January of this year, the strategy was based on an exchange rate target. 
Although both countries used the same fluctuation band of + –15%, Cyprus allowed 
the exchange rate to fluctuate within the narrow band of + –2,25%, whereas Malta 
maintained the parity without fluctuations. In contrast, Slovakia, which is due to 
join the euro area on 1 January 2009, has relied on an inflation targeting strategy 
with wider variability in the exchange rate, tolerating fluctuations within a 
+ –15% fluctuation band around the central exchange rate with the euro. Apart 
from the primary focus of the strategy, both price stability and exchange rate stability 
vis-à-vis the euro need to be achieved for successful integration into EMU.
Regardless of the choice of the monetary policy and exchange rate strategies 
during the transition to EMU, proper assessment of the timing of euro adoption 
presents some challenges. The new member states should examine very carefully 
the consequences of either pushing for early euro adoption or postponing 
membership. On one hand, early entry can provide the benefits of full membership 
of EMU. Delaying membership into the euro area risks exchange rate instability 
and should be avoided when a country is otherwise well-prepared to join. On 
the other hand, attempts to join before a country is ready can be problematic 
and it is useful to assess the risks from the perspective of where a country is 
in the catching up process. If the per capita GDP and price level gaps are still 
fairly large and the speed of catching up is fast, a country will have difficulty 
in controlling inflation once in the Monetary Union. Consequently, it might be 
advisable to postpone euro adoption until the gaps have narrowed.
Cyprus’s aspiration to become a member of the EU started in the early 1990s and 
the debate as to which exchange rate policy would be the most appropriate was 
an important one. At the time, it was decided that the pursuit of an exchange rate 
strategy aimed at maintaining price stability through exchange rate stability was 
the appropriate regime that would lead to a smooth integration of Cyprus into 
EMU. This strategy involved linking the Cyprus pound to the ecu and later to 
the euro. Indeed, managing the exchange rate by pegging the Cyprus pound to a 
strong anchor delivered the desired price stability objective, in addition to high 
growth rates and low unemployment.
There are several critical elements for the success of this strategy. First, it was 
pursued by the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) with no devaluations even in 
the most adverse conditions. Thus, there was a clear and unambiguous policy 
stance which boosted credibility and facilitated future policies. The credibility of 
the CBC reinforced people’s belief in this strategy and thus anchored inflation 
expectations. Second, the authorities followed prudent economic policies 
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respect, the credit and current accounts served as warning indicators signalling 
possible threats to the sustainability of the fixed rate regime. Third, in cases of 
imbalances the CBC resorted to the temporary use of non-traditional tools such 
as credit ceilings. The strategy was also reinforced and augmented by the prudent 
monitoring of money aggregates and the judicious screening of external balances. 
In particular, the current account deficit was closely monitored and served as an 
indicator of nascent inflationary threats, with tightening measures being adopted 
when imbalances in the current account appeared to accumulate even under 
conditions where the short-term outlook for inflation appeared benign. Thus, 
even though a stable exchange rate was the operational focus of policy during 
the transition to EMU, risks to price stability were always closely monitored and 
measures taken to avert their materialisation.
In summary, during the run-up to ERM II and the adoption of the single currency, 
the new member states could experience challenges that might expose their 
economies to some risks. To mitigate these challenges it is important for the 
new member states to achieve a high degree of nominal and real convergence 
with the EU economy before joining the ERM II. Even in the case of Cyprus and 
Malta, which had achieved a high degree of convergence, they still faced various 
challenges such as credit and housing booms and high capital inflows. During 
the transition period to the euro a crucial role will be played by the monetary 
and exchange rate regime that the countries follow. Nevertheless, it has been 
shown from the experience of the recent entrants to the euro area that regardless 
of the choice of regime, a country can successfully adopt the euro by displaying 
a strong commitment to following the appropriate strategies and having a clear 
reform agenda.
I would like to conclude by framing the issue at hand in a broader perspective. 
Ultimately, for the new member states, the challenges of successful completion 
of the journey towards the economic and monetary union are those of managing 
prosperity. Entry of a new state into the EU generates tremendous potential for 
wealth generation that should benefit all citizens of the union, both from old and 
new member states. The potential long-term benefits are arguably much greater 
for the citizens of new member states. It is an unavoidable element of human 
nature that new member state citizens may be impatient and wish to reap the 
full benefit that can be attained at the conclusion of the journey right away. The 
ultimate challenge for policy is to keep the long-run perspective and not allow 
impatience to result in accumulating imbalances that would delay attainment of 
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PANEL STATEMENT
BY ANDRÁS SIMOR, GOVERNOR OF MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
I am glad to have been invited to this panel. It seems to me that ‘euro 
enlargement’ in the past couple of years featured prominently on the agenda 
of various European conferences and policy fora and, as such, ended up a bit 
over-discussed. However, the recent bout of the financial crisis has definitely 
put this topic in a new perspective. My impression is that a number of New 
Member States, as well as some of the old opt-outs, that were seriously affected 
by the crisis now wish that they were already in the euro area when this latest, 
most severe episode erupted. I would not be surprised if, as a consequence of 
the crisis, ambitions for speeding up the euro area entry process intensified in 
these countries. This panel discussion is a good opportunity for me to present 
the motivation, arguments and concerns that an ‘out’ country may have in this 
respect. Naturally, I can only speak on behalf of Hungary, or more precisely 
the Hungarian Central Bank. It may not be a typical view as this country was 
perhaps the most spectacularly affected by the crisis among the New Member 
States. Nevertheless, I think at least some elements of this view are shared by our 
Central Eastern European peers. 
I would like to touch upon three major topics. First, how did the Hungarian 
Central Bank see the ‘pros and cons’ of a quick euro strategy before the crisis? 
Second, how did the crisis change this assessment? Finally, I would like to say a 
few words about the Maastricht criteria and the way we envisage to meet them.
The Hungarian Central Bank has long been a proponent of an ‘as soon as possible’ 
euro area entry strategy. We made our first comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 
back in 2001. The analysis suggested that Hungary constituted an optimal 
currency area with the euro area, at least to the extent that some peripheral euro 
area member countries did. The benefits appeared to be large, stemming from 
trade creation and the disappearance of a sizeable currency risk premium. At 
that time fiscal policy seemed broadly on track. We had just introduced inflation 
targeting which showed some early success in breaking inflation inertia. In the 
euro area itself, there were no signs of divergence, either. All this suggested that 
a quick euro area entry was doable and worth pursuing. The future looked rosy.
However, things turned out to be quite different. An unprecedented fiscal 
expansion in 2002-2006 shed a cruel light on the structural and institutional 
weaknesses of the Hungarian public finances and slowed down the disinflation 
process. The country was drifting away from meeting the Maastricht criteria and 
the expected date of entering the euro area was moving further and further out in 
the future. At the same time, news from the euro area caused some discomfort 
too, as growth in some less developed member countries slowed down so much 
that their real convergence stopped or even reversed.
Having had this experience, it is not surprising that when we did our review of 
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years ago. Although our basic conclusion remained the same, that is, we still 
think that Hungary should join the euro area as soon as possible, we had become 
more aware of some risks involved in the quick euro adoption strategy.
Let me elaborate on two of these risks. The first is entering the euro area without 
sufficient progress in structural reforms; the second is the problems caused by 
potentially large capital inflows after the common currency is introduced.
It is a commonly shared view that efficient labour and product markets, which 
help a country’s dynamic adjustment to asymmetric shocks, are essential for 
success within a monetary union. In terms of labour and product market reforms 
Hungary still has a lot to do. Although nominal and real wages are more flexible 
than in the core euro area, the employment rate is one of the lowest in the EU. 
Our analysis suggests that this may be related to wrong incentives hindering 
labour supply, such as generous early retirement and maternity leave schemes 
and a very high tax wedge. These are in turn manifestations of a bigger problem, 
‘the premature welfare state’, which is weighing heavily on potential growth 
on the one hand, and is a source of a chronic fiscal imbalance on the other. Our 
fiscal and labour market weaknesses are deeply interconnected and we have 
to address them together in a wide-ranging structural reform. Scaling back the 
overly generous welfare state is painful and the political willingness to do so is 
not so strong, so when this structural reform will take place is rather uncertain. 
The question is, can we afford to enter the euro area if this reform is not yet 
completed? This brings us to the territory of political economy, more precisely 
to the issue of whether the euro fosters or hinders structural reform. Although 
this issue has received a lot of attention recently in both theoretical and empirical 
work, my impression is that so far no consensus has emerged. What this means 
for the euro strategy of Hungary is that probably we should not risk entering the 
euro area until this crucial structural reform – that is, the scaling back of overly 
generous the welfare state in order to increase the labour supply, foster potential 
growth and stabilize public finances – is completed or is at least safely on track.
The second risk, which frequently took the centre stage in debates on euro 
accession, is that of large and potentially disruptive capital inflows. The starting 
point of the argument here is that the catching-up process of New Member States 
is about to continue for a long period even after they introduce the common 
currency. The catching-up entails a real appreciation, which, once the exchange 
rate is irrevocably fixed, translates into higher inflation and lower real interest 
rates. Low real interest rates may in turn trigger excessive demand fuelled 
by an unsustainable credit boom financed from foreign borrowing. When the 
inevitable correction comes, there is no independent monetary policy to smooth 
the adjustment and a serious bust follows the boom. Such boom-bust patterns 
were clearly observable in some first-wave euro area members like Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain. Better wait with euro adoption, the argument goes, until 
catching-up is more advanced and the equilibrium real appreciation is smaller. 
I have one observation to this argument. We cannot ignore the fact that the 
financial integration of the New Member States to a large extent has already 
taken place. The banking sectors in these countries are owned predominantly by 
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border lending by parent banks in foreign currency was available in virtually 
unlimited quantities. This practically meant that foreign (euro or Swiss franc) 
interest rates had become the point of reference for domestic consumption and 
investment decisions well before the euro was introduced, pushing down the 
effective real interest rate. It is obvious by now that the credit boom that was 
envisaged to take place after euro area entry actually arrived much earlier. The 
only difference was that, not having the common currency yet, it left us with a 
sizeable currency mismatch. Staying out of the euro area did not prevent us from 
running into the boom. Now that we have to face the bust, it is not clear either 
whether having an independent monetary policy places us in a better position 
to smooth the adjustment. That is because the effectiveness of monetary easing 
and the subsequent depreciation is seriously limited by the negative wealth 
effect on the sizeable unhedged foreign currency liabilities the private sector had 
accumulated. In short, with integrated financial systems, large capital flows have 
been taking place in New Member States regardless of the fact that they have 
not yet introduced the euro. Euro adoption does not carry an extra risk in this 
respect. On the contrary, it may help eliminate potentially dangerous currency 
mismatches. It is important to see that in this respect, it would eliminate a source 
of instability from the point of view of the euro area parent banks as well.
Let me now turn to the implications the current crisis may have on euro adoption 
strategies. First, the crisis clearly illustrates that having your own currency may 
be more of a source of shocks than a shock-absorbing device. You may say that 
Hungary deserved what it gets now, but there are other countries with more sound 
fundamentals that are undergoing serious stress. Second, the crisis is an obvious 
indication that the years of abundant global liquidity are over. We are probably 
in the middle of a credit contraction globally and the chances of another credit-
boom evolving in the foreseeable future are minimal. The risk of a credit-fuelled 
boom-bust, should a country enter the euro area in the next couple of years, is 
greatly reduced. Third, the crisis may have increased the disciplining power of 
financial markets. The deleveraging process that we are going through implies 
a thorough repricing of risk. Just like in other asset classes, there is increased 
differentiation among government bonds based on the issuers’ risk profile. This is 
well illustrated by the unprecedented differences we currently see between CDS 
spreads on bonds of euro area sovereign issuers. Countries with weaker public 
finances, and Hungary is obviously one of them, will receive stronger incentives 
from the financial markets in the coming years to put their fiscal house in order. 
This means that the crisis may actually speed up the most important structural 
reform in Hungary, the much-needed scaling back of the overly generous welfare 
state. From the euro strategy perspective this would be good news, since, as I said 
before, we think that adopting the euro without going through this painful reform 
carries the risk of a prospective underperformance in the euro area.
All in all, this crisis has evidently demonstrated that the banking sectors of the 
euro area and the New Member States are deeply integrated, has greatly reduced 
the chances of credit booms in the forthcoming years and may exert an extra 
disciplining power in countries prone to fiscal misbehaviour in the future. For 
these reasons, I think it may act as a catalyst for the euro accession process. 240 SIMOR
Importantly, it should be let to act as a catalyst, that is, it should not be used as an 
excuse to make the entry criteria, or their interpretation, more stringent.
Finally, let me turn to the prospects of meeting the criteria in Hungary and, more 
specifically, what I think this implies for our euro strategy.
Currently, there is no official target date for euro adoption in Hungary. Popular 
support for the euro is relatively strong, and it probably intensified further 
after the recent currency turmoil. All the major political parties agree on the 
desirability of introducing the common currency. However, at the current 
juncture, Hungary does not meet any of the Maastricht criteria. Government and 
Central Bank officials, including myself, repeatedly expressed the view that the 
earliest date to start talking about a roadmap to euro area may be somewhere 
in 2009. Given Hungary’s not too convincing track record regarding the fiscal 
balance and inflation, an ERM II entry is only reasonable when the prospective 
meeting of the Maastricht criteria is safely on track.
Hungary’s Convergence Programme envisages meeting the fiscal deficit criterion 
by 2009. As a reaction to the recent bout of the global financial crisis and 
the deteriorating prospects for external financing, the government decided 
to withdraw the draft 2009 budget and rewrite it so that the deficit reduction 
next year is more pronounced. In addition, the IMF rescue package came with 
conditions which implied further expenditure-cutting measures. The Central 
Bank’s latest inflation forecasts imply that the Maastricht inflation criterion may 
be met by 2010. 
On the other hand, the financial turmoil has undoubtedly reached Eastern 
Europe. As a result, currently there is extreme uncertainty in the New Member 
States regarding the future course of such fundamental things as financial 
intermediation, credit growth, the exchange rate and real convergence in general. 
These are all very important factors that have to be taken into account when 
making a decision on the euro strategy or indeed on ERM II entry itself. It is 
therefore worth waiting with setting out very specific euro adoption plans for 
Hungary until the dust settles at least a little bit.
In the meantime, the Slovakian experience with the euro, starting next year but 
showing its implications already in the recent unfolding of the crisis, will provide 
a good natural experiment for the other New Member States, and will no doubt 
be closely watched. 241 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Much of the general discussion focused on the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The 
panellists were asked what a policy-maker in a country wishing to join EMU 
is to do when facing a five-percent-inflation-rate and a fixed exchange rate. 
Vítor Gaspar and Athanasios Orphanides both responded that a five-percent-
inflation-rate does not represent price stability. Furthermore, Gaspar argued 
that evidence suggests the Balassa-Samuelson effect to be small. Orphanides 
reiterated that optimal policy in the transition to the EMU is country-specific. 
Nevertheless, some general principles are available. A candidate country must 
avoid a devaluation of its currency, and policy-makers in that country must watch 
the current account.
Jean Pisani-Ferry asked whether the current financial crisis implied that the 
enlargement of the euro area should slow down or accelerate. Erik Berglöf 
responded that, in his judgment, there was no conflict between any institutional 
reforms that may be sparked by the crisis and the enlargement of the euro.242
Jaume Ventura, André Sapir, Wolfgang Schill, Andrew Rose, Martin Feldstein 
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INTRODUCTION 
BY WOLFGANG SCHILL, ECB
Let me welcome Martin Feldstein, Andrew Rose, André Sapir and Jaume 
Ventura. Thank you very much for joining this session whose aim is to seek an 
academic view on what lessons we can draw from the optimal currency area 
theory during these ten years. 
When looking through a couple of recent surveys of the literature on optimal 
currency areas I was reminded again how much of the work stands on the 
shoulders of Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen and in how much detail they were 
trying to carve out the characteristics they thought were crucial for judging 
whether two economies should form a currency union or not.
Taking the risk of oversimplifying, along the lines of their arguments, a monetary 
union among a group of partner countries can function well if: (i) labour mobility 
and/or wage and price flexibility is high, (ii) the countries are relatively small 
and open to trade, (iii) the production and consumption structures are similar, 
(iv) the degree of diversification is high so that overall, and (v) the probability of 
asymmetric shocks should be low. 
However, as compelling one might think these arguments are, during the 1970s 
and 1980s we have seen the popularity of this strand of work falling. Despite 
the simplicity of the OCA theory, its normative implications were complex to 
follow through. As we might hear in a few minutes there are still quite different 
judgements within the academic community which prominent or less prominent 
place this work deserves within the universe of economic theory. 
Nevertheless, while almost forgotten, a renaissance for the OCA theory took 
place in the second half of the 1980s. The main driver was that plans towards a 
European Monetary Union became more and more concrete.
A little bit later, Frankel and Rose started to turn the earlier argumentation of 
the OCA theory upside down. Again risking oversimplification, they replaced 
a static approach with a dynamic one, and proposed that participation in a 
monetary union will by itself foster trade and integration to a degree that it 
changes the economic structures of the countries concerned. Thereby business 
cycles would become more highly correlated, asymmetric shocks less likely, 
and a country specific monetary policy less needed. As a consequence, the 
much emphasised costs of giving up tailor made monetary policy would be 
significantly reduced. 
Finally, one should not hide or forget, that at around the same time a competing 
hypothesis was advanced – by Krugman in particular. The argument here was that 
participation in a monetary union would foster specialisation and concentration, 
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business cycles, more differentials in growth, employment and inflation and – 
sooner or later more and more political tensions. 
Now, some time has passed since these heated debates. European Economic and 
Monetary Union and the Euro have been in place for almost a decade. Therefore, 
one could argue that the discussion is far less theoretical than it might have been 
at times and a new empirical dimension is emerging as new data is collected. So 
it is probably exactly the right time to again review the arguments, taking into 
account the experience so far.
Since almost ten years have successfully passed with the euro, natural questions 
to pose to the panellists relate to the future. For example: 
(i)  What are the longer term challenges national policy makers face when 
participating in a large and diversified economic and monetary union? 
(ii)  What are the longer term challenges for monetary policy operating in such 
an environment? And 
(iii)  Which structural policies and reforms could be most effective to foster the 
smooth functioning of EMU? 246 FELDSTEIN
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I am very pleased to be a participant in this ECB Central Bank Conference on 
the tenth anniversary of the creation of the euro and of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). While it is difficult to specify the conditions for 
an optimal currency area, it is clear that the eurozone has been a very successful 
currency area. The euro was launched without serious problems and the ECB has 
succeeded in achieving the low inflation rate that is its single policy mandate. 
The desire of other countries to join the eurozone is further evidence that it is 
doing something right.
Rather than trying to define an optimal currency area or to state the conditions 
for an optimal currency area, I think it is better to ask the question: When is it in 
the interest of an outsider to join an existing currency union? And when is it in 
the interest of the existing members to add that outsider? Of course, this can be 
applied to the initial decision of any two or more countries to form a currency 
union.
I will begin by reviewing the advantages of a currency union from the point of 
view of the potential entrant and of the receiving group. I will then discuss two 
negative aspects of a currency union and examine the economic conditions that 
affect the seriousness of these negative aspects. 
TRADITIONAL ADVANTAGES OF A CURRENCY UNION
Since this session is subtitled “Academic Views,” I will begin with the three 
standard textbook advantages of a monetary union.
Currency convenience. A traveler in the eurozone does not have to carry a 
different currency for each country that he will visit. This is an advantage 
to potential joiners, to the receiving group, and to outsiders like myself. The 
importance of this is not large in today’s world of credit cards and ATMs. 
Price comparability. With a single currency, a shopper in one country can easily 
compare the price of a particular good in different places, thereby minimizing 
the cost of purchase and strengthening the efficiency of the market. This too is 
a potential gain both to the joiner and to the existing group. But I have never 
understood why this is considered significant. The housewife in Madrid cannot 
shop for her daily bread in Frankfurt while the wholesale buyer has always 
been able to compare the prices of steel that were stated in Spanish pesetas and 
German marks with the help of a pocket calculator.
Cross border investment. A single currency eliminates the direct exchange rate 
risk of cross-border investment within the currency union. This also is a potential 
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worrying about the potential loss if the exchange rate changes adversely. To the 
extent that this causes cross-border investment to occur that would not otherwise 
have happened, it presumably increases the efficiency of the international 
allocation of capital. But the amount of this gain is reduced to the extent that 
firms would otherwise hedge that currency risk by borrowing in the host country 
to finance their cross-border fixed investment and would use currency futures to 
hedge the currency risk of cross-border portfolio investment. 
TRANSITION GAINS
The academic literature on monetary unions focuses on the continuing advantages 
and disadvantages of membership. In practice the creation of the European 
Monetary Union demonstrated that there can be significant transition gains for 
some of the joining countries. 
Before they joined the EMU, several countries had high inflation rates and 
correspondingly high rates of interest. The requirement to reduce inflation and 
interest rates as conditions of membership gave these countries the political 
ability to make these healthy changes. Once in the EMU, the lack of independent 
national monetary policies preserved the low inflation. 
The EMU membership criteria imposed on those who would join the EMU also 
included a reduction in the fiscal deficit and in the national debt. Although not all 
applicants satisfied these standards at the time of entry, their attempts to do so did 
initially help to reduce government spending and to limit fiscal deficits.
FIVE ADDITIONAL PERSISTENT GAINS FOR JOINERS
As I look at the EMU experience I see five additional ongoing gains that accrue 
to those who join.
Inflation Discipline. Although not every monetary union has a commitment 
to low inflation, the EMU has had one from the beginning with the ECB’s 
single goal of price stability. Countries with a tradition of high inflation, often 
driven by union wage demands, benefited from the discipline imposed by EMU 
membership. Unions recognized that wage increases in excess of productivity 
gains could not be absorbed by an exchange rate adjustment but would lead to a 
loss of competitiveness and reductions in employment. 
This gain to the joiners who had previously had high inflation rates did bring 
with it a risk to the low inflation members. Since monetary policy in the EMU is 
set by a consensus of all member countries, there was the danger that an increase 
in the number of countries with a history of high inflation could lead to a more 
inflationary monetary policy for the union as a whole. Fortunately that has not 
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Exchange Rate Discipline. Any monetary union automatically prevents member 
countries from seeking to gain competitive advantage by currency devaluations 
or to offset excess wage increases in this way. This is closely related to the 
inflation discipline but goes beyond it since it is implicit in any monetary union. 
It is a gain to those countries that had a history of devaluations but a risk to those 
existing member countries to the extent that there comes to be increased pressure 
to devalue the common currency.
Lender of Last Resort. Commercial banks always have the potential need for 
a lender of last resort when they experience a liquidity problem. Under those 
circumstances, central banks do provide liquidity against illiquid collateral. In 
this age of global banking, the needs of a domestic bank or of a group of domestic 
banks may exceed the appropriate lending ability of the national central bank and 
the fiscal capacity of the national government. This is an even greater problem 
if the commercial bank needs foreign exchange. Shifting from the resources 
of a single national bank to the resources of the central bank of the monetary 
union provides a more powerful lender of last resort. This is an advantage to any 
country that joins but is a potential risk to the existing members if the resulting 
lending is against overvalued collateral. 
Expertise. Although some small countries have a rich supply of wise economists 
and skilled bankers, not all of them do. The complex decisions of monetary 
policy and banking supervision can benefit from the larger pool of talent that 
can serve on the monetary policy board of a multi-country union and on the 
supervisory and research staffs of the central bank.
Political Union. A monetary union need not be a precursor of a political union. 
But the EMU and the euro were seen by many in Europe as ways of strengthening 
the European union and developing support for a stronger political union. If 
individuals carry euros in their pockets instead of French francs or Italian lira, 
they would be more likely to think of themselves as Europeans. If they saw the 
power of the central banks shift from their own national capitals to Frankfurt, 
they would see the European Union as a more significant political force. For 
those who favored this transition to a stronger political union, the creation of the 
monetary union and the single currency were advantages.
DISADVANTAGES OF A CURRENCY UNION
The currency union implies a single monetary policy and a single exchange rate 
for all member countries. A country that joins a currency union therefore gives 
up the opportunity to select a monetary policy that it regards as optimal for its 
own circumstances. Similarly, the country’s exchange rate cannot respond to the 
market forces by which changes in technology, taste, and the behavior of other 
countries affect its international competitiveness. 
A country that considers joining a currency union must weigh these disadvantages 
against the advantages that I have described in the earlier part of these remarks.  
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the extent to which it can expect to gain from those advantages and the extent 
to which it would be disadvantaged by the single monetary policy and single 
exchange rate. 
The adverse effect of the single monetary policy and single exchange rate will 
depend primarily on four conditions.
Industrial similarity. If all of the countries in the currency union had the same 
industrial composition and were subject to the same shocks to technology and 
demand, the lack of individualized monetary policy and differential exchange 
rate movements would be irrelevant. A country that considers joining should 
evaluate the extent to which a monetary policy designed for the currency union 
as a whole would be the best one for itself. We see in the EMU substantial 
differences among countries in the distribution of industries that are reflected in 
differences in unemployment rates and in trade balances. 
Labor Mobility. A fall in demand in a particular country or region will lead to 
less unemployment if the labor force is geographically mobile and can shift to 
other areas where demand is stronger. This is one way in which the United States 
has been able to cope with cyclical and structural changes in demand. The ability 
to achieve such labor mobility in a currency union depends on several features. 
The variety of languages clearly inhibits labor mobility within the euro area. 
Labor regulations, union restrictions, and licensing rules may also impede such 
geographic mobility. 
Fiscal Structure. Fiscal policy is important in two ways: the role of the central 
fiscal authority and the freedom of the individual national fiscal authorities. In 
the United States, the central government collects about two thirds of all taxes 
and an even larger part of cyclically sensitive income and profits taxes. When 
demand falls in a particular part of the country, the amount of taxes paid from 
that region to the central government falls. This automatic fiscal policy dampens 
the local decline in net income and therefore stimulates demand relative to what 
it would otherwise be. That helps to compensate for the lack of an independent 
monetary authority for the region. In a currency union with a very small central 
fiscal authority, like the EMU, there is no such fiscal counterbalance to local 
swings in domestic demand. 
Members of the currency union can of course vary national taxes and spending 
to provide a local stimulus to offset declines in demand. But this ability to run 
deficits creates a problem for the currency union as a whole. Because there is a 
single currency, large fiscal deficits in any single country do not create the market 
feedback in the form of higher interest rates or a weaker currency as it would if 
the deficit country had its own currency. Although there are some relatively small 
differences in national interest rates, the primary effect of any country’s fiscal 
deficit is diluted and spread over the entire currency union, causing the common 
interest rate to rise and the overall currency to decline. 
While this is an advantage for the country that alters its domestic policy, it is 
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Growth Pact that, in principle, limits the extent of any country’s fiscal deficit. 
Some rule of that type is a necessary feature of any currency union in which fiscal 
actions remain decentralized among the member governments. That limit on 
each country’s fiscal policy is a further disadvantage for countries that consider 
joining a currency union. 
Willingness to Sacrifice. The potential success of a currency union depends on 
the willingness of the member countries to accept what the monetary authority 
regards to be best for the group of countries as a whole. At times, that will mean 
a policy that is directly counter to the interest of specific countries within the 
currency union. The willingness of those countries and of their voting publics to 
support a common policy that is clearly against their interest is a critical feature 
that will govern the long-term success and survival of any currency union.
THE CURRENT CHALLENGE
The first decade of the EMU has been a clear success. But it is about to be 
challenged by more difficult conditions: a financial crisis and sharply declining 
economic activity on a scale that exceeds anything that Europe experienced in 
the past decade.
Not all EMU countries will be affected equally by the evolution of the European 
economy or by the policies of the ECB. Some governments or political parties 
within countries will wish that they had more control over their monetary policy 
or more ability to pursue a very aggressive fiscal policy.
Because of a limited willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of other EMU 
nations or for the EMU as a system, some of those governments or politicians 
may seek to exit the EMU or may threaten that they will do so unless policies 
are changed. 
In short, the next few years will be a very challenging time for the ECB and for 
the European political process. 251 PANEL STATEMENT
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BY ANDREW K. ROSE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 
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ABSTRACT
This short paper reviews the recent literature linking monetary union, international 
trade, and business cycle synchronization. I survey the literature using the quantitative 
technique of meta-analysis, which allows me to estimate the effects of EMU taking 
into account the entire extant literature. Twenty-six recent studies have investigated 
the effect of currency union on trade, using actual European data of relevance. 
Taking all these studies into account, EMU has raised trade inside the Eurozone by 
at least 8% and perhaps 23%. Twenty different studies have estimated the effect of 
trade on the synchronization of business cycles. Aggregating across these estimates, 
an increase of bilateral trade between two countries raises the synchronization of 
their business cycles by an economically and statistically significant effect. I estimate 
that a one percent increase in bilateral trade increases the correlation coefficient of 
detrended output by .02. Taken together, the estimates suggest that EMU has created 
a virtuous circle; by increasing trade and the synchronization of business cycles, 
EMU reduces the need for national monetary policy. That is, EMU seems along the 
path to becoming an optimum currency area.
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen European countries are currently involved in the world’s largest and most 
interesting currency union, EMU. Yet most economists (especially those from 
the other side of the Atlantic) do not think that when EMU was created it was 
an optimum currency area (hereafter “OCA”). At the birth of EMU in 1999, 
national business cycles appeared to be imperfectly synchronized across the 
members of EMU, and few thought that trade would rise substantially with 
monetary union. Together, these lead most to believe that EMU did not satisfy 
the requirements of an OCA, using either the classic model of Mundell (1961) 
or the more modern version of Alesina and Barro (2002). In this short paper, 
I wish to argue that even though EMU was not created as an OCA, it is moving 
in that direction.
My argument relies on two recent empirical literatures, which I survey briefly. 
The first estimates the effect of European Monetary Union (EMU) on trade; 
the second estimates the effect of trade on the cross-country synchronization of 
business cycles. I use meta-analysis to provide a quantitative summary of both 
literatures.
1  The data set, sample output, and a current version of the paper are available at my website
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These literatures deal with questions that are intrinsically important to the 
EMU/OCA nexus, and inter-related. Any reduction of the transactions costs 
associated with trade inside the Eurozone by EMU is of general interest. 
Indeed, one of the few undisputed benefits of EMU is its trade-promoting 
effect, so quantifying its size is an important exercise. The second linkage is 
also of interest. If increased trade raises the coherence of business cycles across 
countries, it thereby reduces the need for national monetary policy. If both links 
work in practice, then a currency union like EMU which does not look like an 
optimal currency area ex ante may become one ex post. This can occur if the 
trade increase stemming from currency union actually makes the currency union 
optimal, by reducing or eliminating the need for a national monetary policy to 
reduce idiosyncratic business cycles. Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) lay out the 
argument in detail.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LITERATURE
In the summer of 1999, I began to circulate a paper that estimated the effect of 
currency union on trade; Economic Policy subsequently published this paper 
in 2000. This paper exploited a panel of cross-country data covering bilateral 
trade between a large number of countries. Since most of the variation was across 
pairs of countries rather than time, I used a conventional “gravity” model of trade 
to account for factors that drive trade (other than monetary arrangements). This 
equation has now become the standard vehicle for the literature, and takes the 
form:
Tijt = β1Dij + β2(Yi Yj)t + ΣkβkZijt + Σt δt Tt + γCUijt + uijt,
where: Tijt denotes the natural logarithm of trade between countries i and j at time 
t, {β}is a set of nuisance coefficients, Dij denotes the log of distance between 
i and j, Y denotes the log of real GDP, Z denotes other controls for bilateral trade, 
CUijt is a dummy variable that is one if countries i and j are in a currency union 
at t and zero otherwise, and u is a well-behaved disturbance term. The coefficient 
of interest is γ, which represents the partial effect of currency union on trade, 
ceteris paribus.
The surprising and interesting finding was that currency union seemed to have a 
strong and robust effect on trade. Even using the standard linear gravity model 
that accounts for most variation in trade patterns, my point estimate was that 
the coefficient for a currency union dummy variable (which is unity when a 
pair of countries share a common currency and zero otherwise) has a point 
estimate of around =1.21. This implies that members of currency unions traded 
over three times as much as otherwise similar pairs of countries ceteris paribus, 
since exp(1.21) >  3. While there was no benchmark from the literature, this 
estimate seemed implausibly large to me (and others). Almost all the subsequent 
research in this area has been motivated by the belief that currency union cannot 
reasonably be expected to triple trade. I provided a meta-analysis of the work as 
it existed in March 2004 in my 2005 paper with Stanley. 253 PANEL STATEMENT
One of the problems with almost all the work that Stanley and I surveyed was 
that it estimated the effect of currency unions on trade using monetary unions that 
preceded EMU. This choice was made of necessity; since the euro only started to 
circulate in 2002, there was essentially no European data of relevance available. 
However, the currency unions that existed before the Eurozone involved 
countries that were either small or poor (or both). Clearly the relevance of such 
currency unions for EMU was unknown.
Some four years have now passed since I finished my 2005 survey (with Stanley), 
and much work has been done. I am now aware of 26 studies that estimate the 
currency union effect on trade – γ in equation (1) above – using data directly 
relevant for EMU. It seems appropriate to see what these studies say, taken as a 
whole.
META-ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF CURRENCY UNION ON TRADE
Meta-analysis is a set of quantitative techniques for evaluating and combining 
empirical results from different studies. Essentially one treats different point 
estimates of a given coefficient as individual observations. One can then use 
this vector of estimates to: estimate the underlying coefficient of interest, test 
the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, and link the estimates to features of 
the underlying studies. Since there are currently a number of studies that have 
provided estimates of γ, the effect of currency union on trade, meta-analysis 
seems an appropriate way to summarize the current state of the literature. Stanley 
(2001) provides an excellent recent review and further references.
One begins meta-analysis by collecting as many estimates of a common effect as 
possible. To my knowledge, there are twenty-six papers that provide estimates of 
the effect of currency union on bilateral trade (γ) using data of relevance. These 
articles are tabulated in Table 1 (I note parenthetically that I am a co-author of 
none.) I also present the studies’ preferred estimate of γ, along with its standard 
error. In each case, I present the estimate of γ that seems to be most preferred 
or representative (if a preferred estimate is not available) by the author(s) of the 
study. While I have strong views about the value of some of these estimates 
(or lack thereof), I weigh each estimate equally, simply because there is no easily 
defensible alternative weighting scheme.
The most basic piece of meta-analysis is a test of the null hypothesis γ=0 when the 
twenty-six point estimates (and their standard errors) are pooled across studies. 
This classic test is due originally to Fisher (1932) and uses the p-values from 
each of the (26) underlying γ estimates. Under the null hypothesis that each of the 
p-values is independently and randomly drawn from a normal [0, 1] distribution, 
minus twice the sum of the logs of the p-values is drawn from a chi-square. 
The hypothesis can be rejected at any standard significance level, since under the 
null hypothesis the test-statistic of 785 is drawn from chi-squared (52). 2
2  Edgington’s small sample correction leads to the same conclusion.254 ROSE
I tabulate meta-estimates of the currency effect on trade in Table 2. I provide both 
“fixed effect” and “random effect” meta-estimates that are common in the area. 
The former are based on the assumption that a single fixed effect underlies every 
study, so that, in principle, if every study were infinitely large, every study would 
yield an identical result. This is the same as assuming there is no heterogeneity 
across studies. By way of contrast, the random effects estimator assumes that 
the studies are estimating different treatment effects, drawn from a distribution 
whose mean is of interest. 3
3  http://www.cochrane-net.org/openlearning/HTML/mod13.htm. To elaborate: the fixed 
effect assumption is that differences across studies are only due to within-study variation. 
By way of contrast, random effects models consider both between-study and within-study 
variability and assume that the studies are a random sample from the universe of all possible 
studies.
Table 1 Recent Studies of Currency Union and Trade
Gamma SE
1 Bun and Klaassen 2002 0.33 0.1
2 de Souza 2002 0.17 0.24
3 de Nardis and Vicarelli 2003 0.061 0.027
4 Cabasson 2003 0.63 0.24
5 Micco, Stein, Ordonez 2004 0.089 0.025
6 Barr, Breedon and Miles 2004 0.25 0.033
7 Baldwin and Taglioni 2004 0.034 0.015315
8 Faruqee 2004 0.082 0.018
9 de Nardis and Vicarelli 2004 0.093 0.039
10 Clark, Tamirisa, and Wei 2004 0.22 0.38
11 Baldwin, Skudelny, and Taglioni 2005 0.72 0.06
12 Yamarik and Ghosh 2005 1.8285 0.30475
13 Adam and Cobham 2005 1.029 0.039486
14 Baxter and Koupritsas 2006 0.47 0.22
15 Flam and Nordstrom 2006b 0.139 0.02
16 Berger and Nitsch 2006 -0.001 0.036
17 Gomes, Graham, Helliwell, Kano, Murray and 
Schembri
2006 0.069 0.011
18 Baldwin and Taglioni 2006 -0.02 0.03
19 Baldwin and Di Nino 2006 0.035 0.01
20 Flam and Nordstrom 2006a 0.232 0.024
21 Tenreyro and Barro 2007 1.899 0.351
22 Bun and Klaassen 2007 0.032 0.016
23 de Nardis, De Santis and Vicarelli 2007 0.04 0.01278
24 Brouwer, Paap, and Viaene 2007 0.067 0.025769
25 Flam and Nordstrom 2007 0.248 0.046
26 de Nardis, De Santis and Vicarelli 2008 0.09 0.033962255 PANEL STATEMENT
Manifestly, there is considerable heterogeneity; the fixed and random effect 
estimators are not similar in magnitude. However, both estimates are both 
economically substantial; the smaller fixed effect estimate of γ indicate that 
currency union raises trade by about 8% (as ln(.08)-1=.08), while the random 
effect estimate indicates that the effect is more like 23%.
There is little indication that any single study is especially influential in driving 
these results. If the studies are omitted from the meta-analysis one by one, one 
finds the (fixed-effect) point estimates for γ tabulated in Table 3, along with a 
95% confidence interval.
It seems that EMU has had a measurable effect already on trade. In the spirit 
of trying to stay modest, the few years since EMU began have already seen 
trade rise within the Eurozone by at least 8%. Since EMU is a relatively young 
institution, it seems likely (though uncertain) that this effect will grow with time. 
I also note that this conclusion is consistent with writers who have surveyed 
the literature in a more qualitative fashion. The best known of these is Baldwin 
(2006), who writes “The bottom line of this literature is that the euro probably 
did boost intra-Eurozone trade by something like five to ten percent on average, 
although the estimates size of this effect is likely to change as new years of data 
emerge.” 4
4  Probably the most relevant is Frankel (2008), who writes “If one estimates the effects of the 
euro versus other monetary unions in a large sample that includes all countries and all years, 
thereby bringing to bear as much information as possible on questions such as the proper 
coefficients on common border and common language in a gravity model, then the effect 
of the euro in the first eight years is seen to be large, and comparable with the effect of the 
other non-euro monetary unions.”
BCSijt = α + β*ln(tradeijt) + controls + εijt 





Lower Bound of 
95%
Upper Bound of 
95%
Fixed 0.08 0.07 0.09
Random 0.21 0.15 0.27256 ROSE
INCREASED TRADE ENHANCES BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION
I now turn to the link between international trade and business cycle 
synchronization. It is now standard to use the following equation:
where BCS a measure of business cycle synchronization between countries i and 
j during time period t. Countries might choose their monetary regime, such as a 
fixed exchange rate, to both simultaneously enhance trade and affects BCS, so 
β is almost always estimated with instrumental variables.
Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) show that theoretically β is ambiguously signed; 
it depends on what kind of trade is spurred by integration, and what sorts of 
shocks hit the economy. However, if β is positive, then currency unions may 
endogenously become optimal. In particular, if currency raises trade significantly, 
Table 3 Checking for influential studies in the meta-estimate of γ




1 Bun and Klaassen  0.08  0.07  0.09
2 de Souza  0.08  0.07  0.09
3 de Nardis and Vicarelli  0.08  0.07  0.09
4 Cabasson 0.08  0.07  0.09
5 Micco, Stein, Ordonez  0.08  0.07  0.09
6 Barr, Breedon and Miles  0.08  0.07  0.09
7 Baldwin and Taglioni  0.09  0.08  0.10
8 Faruqee  0.08 0.07 0.09
9 de Nardis and Vicarelli  0.08  0.07  0.09
10 Clark, Tamirisa, and Wei  0.08  0.07  0.09
11 Baldwin, Skudelny, and 
Taglioni 
0.08 0.07 0.09
12 Yamarik and Ghosh  0.08  0.07  0.09
13 Adam and Cobham  0.07  0.06  0.08
14 Baxter and Koupritsas  0.08  0.07  0.09
15 Flam and Nordstrom  0.08  0.07  0.09
16 Berger and Nitsch  0.08  0.08  0.09
17 Gomes, et al  0.09  0.08  0.10
18 Baldwin and Taglioni  0.09  0.08  0.09
19 Baldwin and Di Nino  0.10  0.09  0.10
20 Flam and Nordstrom  0.08  0.07  0.09
21 Tenreyro and Barro  0.08  0.07  0.09
22 Bun and Klaassen  0.09  0.08  0.10
23 de Nardis, De Santis and 
Vicarelli 
0.09 0.08 0.10
24 Brouwer, Paap, and Viaene  0.08  0.07  0.09
25 Flam and Nordstrom  0.08  0.07  0.09
26 de Nardis, De Santis and 
Vicarelli 
0.08 0.07 0.09257 PANEL STATEMENT
then by indirectly raising BCS it reduces the need for a national monetary 
policy to offset idiosyncratic domestic shocks, thus making the currency union 
sustainable.
The chief measurement issue is determining an empirical analogue for business 
cycle synchronization (BCS). This is typically (though not always) measured as 
a correlation coefficient that is estimated between detrended levels of activity 
for countries i and j, over some reasonable period of time. 5 Since EMU has only 
existed for a short period of time, no study, to the best of my knowledge, creates 
BCS measures using only post-EMU data.
The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of trade on BCS. This 
has been estimated by twenty different studies. These studies, along with their 
estimates of β (and its standard error) are tabulated in Table 4. While twenty 
studies are not enough to give one a truly large sample, it still seems worthwhile 
to use meta-analysis to aggregate their estimates quantitatively.
5  Different measures of real activity are available (real GDP; the unemployment rate; 
industrial production …), as are detrending techniques (HP-filtering; Baxter-King filtering; 
first-differencing; linear detrending …). These do not seem to have an appreciable difference 
on the results in practice.
Table 4 Recent Studies of Trade and Business Cycle Synchronization
Beta SE 
1  Baxter and Kouparitsas  2005  0.134  0.032 
2  Bower and Guillenmineau  2006  0.02055  0.00528 
3  Calder  2007 0.013 0.004 
4  Calderon Chong and Stein  2007  0.015  0.003055 
5 Choe  2001  0.027 0.008333 
6  Clark and van Wincoop  2001  0.09  0.03 
7  Crosby  2003 0.048 0.063 
8 Fidrmuc  2004  0.021 0.044872 
9  Fiess  2007 0.123 0.062 
10  Frankel and Rose  1998  0.086  0.015 
11  Gruben, Koo and Mills  2002  0.059  0.017206 
12 Imbs  2003  0.03089  0.020058 
13 Imbs  2004  0.074  0.022289 
14  Inklaar, Jong-a-Pin and de Haan  2005  0.115  0.041071 
15  Kose and Yi  2005  0.091  0.022 
16  Kose, Prasad and Terrones  2003  0.0107  0.0045 
17  Kumakura  2006 0.0575 0.0354 
18  Kumakura  2007 0.05555 0.01232 
19  Otto, Voss and Willard  2001  0.0461  0.090999 
20  Shin and Wang  2004  0.07665  0.07665 258 ROSE
The hypothesis that β is statistically insignificantly different from zero is grossly 
rejected; under the null hypothesis of no effect, the test-statistic of 277 is drawn 
from chi-squared (40). 6 The meta-estimates of the effect of trade on BCS are 
presented in Table 5. As with the effect of currency union on trade, there is 
considerable heterogeneity and the fixed and random effect estimators are 
not close. I continue to be conservative, and focus on the lower, fixed-effect, 
estimate of β≈.02. While this is considerably lower than I estimated in my 1998 
paper with Frankel, it is still economically significant. If EMU has thus been 
associated with a trade increase of say 8% and each 1% increase in bilateral 
trade leads to an increase in BCS of .02, then EMU leads to an increase in the 
correlation coefficient of detrended outputs of (.02*8=) .16. Since the sample 
average of BCS is around .22, this represents an economically relevant increase 
in the synchronization of business cycles across the members of EMU. While 
this reduction in idiosyncratic national business cycles is substantial, whether 
it is enough to obviate the need for a national monetary policy is, of course, a 
different question.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper was to provide a brief quantitative survey of two 
related literatures. The effect of EMU on trade has now been examined by 
some 26 studies; I use meta-analysis to aggregate these together. If one weighs 
each of the studies equally, the literature has not yet come to a consensual view 
concerning the effect of EMU; a conservative estimate is that EMU has already 
lead to an increase in trade of some 8%, but a more substantive effect of 23% is 
also plausible. The hypothesis that it has had had no effect at all can be easily 
rejected by the literature taken as a whole. 
I also ask what can be learned from the twenty papers that estimate the effect 
of international trade on business cycle synchronization (BCS). The meta-
estimates here are also heterogeneous, though again the idea that trade has no 
effect on BCS seems grossly inconsistent with the data. A conservative estimate 
is that each 1% increase in trade between a pair of countries seems to raise the 
correlation coefficient for their detrended outputs by around .02. 
EMU seems to have had a combination of two effects: the direct consequence of 
increased trade, and an indirect benefit through the effect of this trade expansion 
on business cycle synchronization. This means that EMU may have created 
6  Again, Edgington’s technique changes nothing.









Fixed 0.020 0.016 0.023
Random 0.043 0.031 0.054259 PANEL STATEMENT
a virtuous circle that might make currency union closer to being sustainable. 
Whether the effect is big enough to make Europe an optimal currency area 
remains to be seen. A modern currency union between large rich countries 
like EMU has no historical precedent, and too little time has passed since the 
introduction of the euro for the trade and BCS effects to be clearly estimated. 
That said, EMU seems clearly to be moving along the path to becoming an 
optimum currency area.
I close with a caveat. EMU has had and is having an enormous number of 
economic consequences, and I have ignored almost all of them in this brief paper. 
Countries choosing whether or not to enter (or stay in) EMU have to consider 
its effect on the efficiency of capital and labor markets, the quality of monetary 
policy inside EMU, risk-sharing, and so forth. The non-economic issues 
associated with sovereignty and political influence within the EMU may be of 
equal or greater importance. Still, the two literatures I have surveyed provide 
some grounds for an optimistic, though early, view of EMU.
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BY ANDRÉ SAPIR, UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES
THE OCA THEORY
Mundell (1961) is a short and beautiful paper. In less than ten pages, and without 
a single mathematical formula or graph, it presents the optimum currency area 
(OCA) theory, which is rightly regarded as the theoretical underpinning for 
Europe’s single currency. It is fit, therefore, that the celebration of the euro’s 
tenth anniversary should reflect upon the contribution of the OCA theory to the 
euro’s success.
The general question raised by Mundell (1961) is whether national currencies 
should be flexible - or what is the optimum number of currencies - for the 
purpose of stabilization. Writing in the early Sixties, just after the creation of the 
European Common Market, Mundell also poses the corollary question of whether 
its members should “allow each national currency to fluctuate, or would a single 
currency area be preferable?” (p. 657).
The answer to the general question, he finds, depends on the extent of 
factor mobility. “The argument for flexible exchange rates based on national 
currencies is only as valid as the Ricardian assumption about factor mobility. 
If factor mobility is high internally and low internationally a system of flexible 
exchange rates based on national currencies might work effectively enough.” 
(p. 661, emphasis added). Hence, the question about whether or not the Common 
Market should adopt a single currency “is essentially an empirical problem” 
concerning the degree of factor mobility among its members (p. 662).
Contrary to what is often alleged, Mundell (1961) does not claim that the degree 
of factor mobility is the sole criterion for determining the optimum number of 
currencies. Three other criteria are implicit in the paper, which relate to the fact 
that the loss in terms of stabilization due to the creation of a single currency is 
higher when (1) macroeconomic shocks are more asymmetric between countries; 
(2) the size of countries is large, and therefore the exchange rate instrument 
is more powerful for offsetting such shocks, a point later emphasized by 
McKinnon (1963); and (3) other adjustment mechanisms, including possibly a 
common fiscal system later emphasized by Kenen (1969), are less able to deal 
with asymmetric.
After the initial conceptual work of the 1960s, the OCA theory was nearly all but 
forgotten during the next two decades.1 It was revived in the early 1990s, around 
1  A major exception is Mundell (1973).264 SAPIR
the time of the Maastricht Treaty, which laid out the timetable for Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the criteria countries would have to fulfil before 
adopting the single currency. The revival came in the form of empirical evidence 
concerning mostly Europe, which had lacked so far, rather than as challenges to 
the existing theory.
Most of the empirical literature on the OCA theory deals with the issue of 
asymmetric shocks. The general result is that the countries which belonged 
to the European Union in the 1990s (EU-15) fall into two groups: a ‘core’, 
comprising of Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Austria and Denmark, 
where shocks are highly correlated and the speed of adjustment is relatively fast; 
a ‘periphery’, comprising of Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden, where shocks are larger and more idiosyncratic, 
and the speed of adjustment is slower.2, 3 
MAASTRICHT
The Maastricht criteria bear little resemblance to the OCA criteria. Whereas the 
latter emphasize the importance of economic integration and of real convergence 
among the candidate countries to monetary integration, the former insists instead 
on nominal convergence. What matters for Maastricht is inflation, exchange 
rates, interest rates and public finance, not asymmetric shocks due to structural 
differences.
Why this apparent discrepancy, or even contradiction, between the OCA and the 
Maastricht criteria? One possible explanation is that EMU is driven by political 
rather than by economic considerations, and that its founding fathers feared the 
political consequences of a division of the European Union into a ‘core’ and 
a ‘periphery’ that might have resulted from the use of OCA criteria. Though 
there may be some truth in this line of reasoning, it is clearly unreasonable to 
believe that economic considerations were totally absent in the preparation of the 
Maastricht criteria.
What then might be possible economic explanations for ignoring the OCA 
criteria? One reason is that macroeconomic shocks were considered to be less 
likely inside the monetary union because of the elimination of shocks induced by 
national central banks. A second is that it was hoped that shocks would become 
less asymmetric because the introduction of a single currency would induce real 
convergence by boosting intra-industry trade, as suggested by Frankel and Rose 
(1997). A third reason is that the exchange rate instrument had anyway lost its 
usefulness as a tool for offsetting shocks due the liberalization of capital controls. 
A final reason is that, although EMU lacks a common fiscal instrument, national 
automatic stabilizers were possibly viewed as sufficiently capable of absorbing 
2  See, in particular, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1996 and 1997).
3  Forni and Reichlin (2001), however, strike an important note of dissent with their finding 
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asymmetric shocks, especially after the introduction of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, which was meant to increase the room for manoeuvre in bad times.4 
Although these economic considerations probably go some way in explaining 
why the framers of the Maastricht Treaty decided to ignore the OCA criteria, 
they cannot explain why other criteria were used instead. The reason is simple 
enough. European monetary union has never been about simply creating a single 
currency. Rather it has always been about creating a stable common currency, 
a currency like the D-Mark. The Maastricht criteria are therefore essentially 
designed to ensure that countries joining the euro are able to live within an 
environment of low inflation, similar to what Germany, and the countries in 
DM-area, enjoyed before monetary unification. 
OCA THEORY VS. MAASTRICHT
Based on the Maastricht criteria, 11 of the EU-15 countries were judged ready 
to adopt the euro on 1 January 1999, and Greece was admitted two years later. 
Since the other three EU members were actually not interested in joining the euro 
at the time, it can be safely concluded that the Maastricht criteria did not split the 
European Union into two groups.5 
On the other hand, had the OCA theory criteria been in force, only the DM-area 
countries (Germany, France, the Benelux and Austria) would have qualified 
initially, and the EU would have been split into a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’, with 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Finland out in the cold.
The possibility of such a split was real, even with the Maastricht criteria, which 
might have been interpreted with an ‘OCA theory twist’ for fear that a wide 
EMU may be too risky initially in terms of asymmetric shocks. The eventuality 
of a narrow EMU was a topic of much concern in the run up to the introduction 
of the euro, especially among economists from the ‘periphery’. For instance, 
Viñals (1996) addresses the potential consequences of a narrow EMU on the 
excluded countries and finds that “there is a real risk of an unfavourable effect on 
the economies of [these] countries, provoked by financial markets turning their 
backs on their currencies. If this were to happen, there would be a danger that the 
countries excluded from EMU would undergo unwanted currency depreciations 
and higher interest risk premia that would adversely affect inflation and the 
budget deficit” (pp. 1108-9). The paper concludes that a European monetary 
union going beyond the ‘core’ countries is absolutely necessary. “At stake is 
not only the chance to create a monetary union that is adequately representative 
of Europe, but also the preservation of the integrity of the Single Market.” 
(p. 1109).
Since the wide EMU approach prevailed, one may be tempted to ask whether 
it was a mistake to ignore the OCA criteria after all. One way to answer this 
4  These explanations are developed in Buti and Sapir (1998).
5  This was true at least until the 2004 enlargement.266 SAPIR
question is to look at the perception of euro area members by financial markets 
reflected in 5-year credit default swap (CDS) rates on government bonds. During 
‘good times’, broadly speaking the first nine years of the euro, financial markets 
made very little difference between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries. As late 
as 29 December 2007, the 5-year CDS rates ranged between 10 and 20 for all euro 
area countries. Since the acceleration of the financial crisis in September 2008, 
huge spreads between the two groups of countries have appeared. At the time this 
conference took place in mid-November 2008, the rates for government bonds 
from Greece, Ireland and Italy were already above 100 and around 75 for Spain 
and Portugal, compared to 25-35 for France, Germany and the Netherlands.6 Not 
surprisingly, differences reassert themselves during ‘bad times’.
CONCLUSION
The OCA theory criteria are clearly relevant and important for entry into a 
monetary union. In practice, however, they are difficult to use for two reasons. 
First, there is the issue of whether it is countries or regions overlapping several 
countries that are the relevant units when judging the importance of asymmetric 
shocks. Second, the risk of asymmetric shocks measured prior to the formation 
of a monetary union may be very different from the risk actually encountered 
after the creation of the single currency. In the case of the European monetary 
union, the OCA theory criteria may have had the added disadvantage that their 
application might have created an economic and political problem by splitting 
the European Union into a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’. Ignoring these criteria has 
not prevented, however, certain fundamental differences between countries 
belonging to the euro area from reappearing during the ‘bad times’ that emerged 
with the financial crisis of 2008. This suggests that entry criteria are necessarily 
imperfect and that more attention needs to be devoted to systemic surveillance of 
countries after entry in order to limit problems in ‘bad times’. 
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PANEL STATEMENT
BY JAUME VENTURA, CREI AND POMPEU FABRA UNIVERSITY
About half a century ago, Robert Mundell raised a novel question: when is it 
optimal for a set of countries to adopt a common currency? This seemed an 
esoteric problem at the time, the kind of theoretical stuff only academics care 
about. But events since have made it clear that this problem is also very relevant 
for policymakers who mostly care about practical matters. Not surprisingly then, 
some of the best minds in the profession have devoted substantial time trying to 
answer Mundell’s question. As a result of their efforts, there is today a massive 
body of theoretical and applied research on optimal currency areas. This research 
has greatly improved our understanding of many aspects of this problem, and it 
constitutes a prime example of how theory and policy interact in a fruitful way.
But my objective here is neither to review nor to praise past research. To the 
contrary, I want to point at where this research has missed the mark and then 
discuss some of the potential directions that I think this research should take in 
the future. It is obvious to everybody that a currency union has microeconomic 
effects, as it reduces the costs of transactions between countries. The most 
interesting question has always been what the costs of a currency union are. 
Existing research has been lopsided, focusing almost exclusively on the central 
bank’s role in managing the business cycle in the presence of price and wage 
rigidities. In fact, the problem of choosing the optimal currency area has been 
framed in terms of how a currency union limits the ability of the central bank 
to fulfill this role. This is certainly an important aspect of the optimal currency 
area problem. But it is not the only one. The central bank also has the role of 
ensuring financial stability by acting as a lender-of-last-resort when systemic risk 
and contagion in the financial system threaten to bring the economy to a halt. 
And yet, we know very little about how a common currency affects the ability of 
the central bank to effectively play this important role. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
literature on optimal currency areas has by and large neglected this aspect of the 
problem. It seems safe to assume though that recent events have convinced most 
of you that this is a gap in our knowledge that we desperately need to fill.
1  LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT IN NORMAL TIMES: DEALING WITH 
NOMINAL RIGIDITIES
The bulk of existing research in the optimum currency areas problem has adopted 
what I would label as a “monetary-policy” view of liquidity management. 
According to this view, central banks should aim at keeping the interest rate 
low and steady and provide the economy with the liquidity it needs as economic 
activity grows and the financial system evolves.
This simple recipe need some qualification, though. As a result of shocks to 
preferences and technology, the growth rate of economic activity fluctuates. It 
has become commonplace to refer to these fluctuations in the growth rate as 269 PANEL STATEMENT
business cycles. In the absence of frictions, these cycles would constitute optimal 
responses of the economy to shocks, and should not concern central banks. 
But there are frictions to watch for, namely, wage and price rigidities. These 
rigidities sub-optimally magnify the business cycle and open up the door for the 
central bank to play a useful stabilizing role. By lowering the interest rate when 
economic activity is growing sluggishly, and raising it when economic activity is 
growing too fast; the central bank can neutralize the effects of nominal rigidities 
and smooth the business cycle. Despite occasional claims to deny this, this view 
of liquidity management as a tool to moderate business cycles quite accurately 
depicts the behavior of central banks in normal times.
This view of liquidity management leads to a very natural answer to Mundell’s 
question. Namely, the borders of an optimal currency area are determined by 
a trade-off between the microeconomic benefits of a single currency and the 
macroeconomic losses from a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. The stronger are 
the trade linkages among the members of the currency union, the larger are the 
microeconomic benefits that a currency union delivers. The less synchronized 
are the business cycles of the members of the currency union, the larger are the 
macroeconomic losses that the union generates. It is not surprising therefore that 
most research on optimal currency areas has focused on studying the theoretical 
determinants of these gains and losses. A more applied branch of this research 
has focused on measuring these gains and losses in specific cases, in order to 
assess whether the conditions for a welfare-improving currency union exist. As 
mentioned already, I will not try to review this extensive research here.
A very interesting line of this literature has asked whether the conditions that 
guarantee a successful currency area are endogenous to the creation of the 
currency area itself. In a nutshell, the idea here is that the adoption of a single 
currency might foster trade among its members and synchronize their business 
cycles. Even if a currency area does not look optimal ex-ante, it might turn out to 
be optimal ex-post as its creation creates the conditions that are required for its 
success. This way of looking at the optimal currency area issue is both original 
and insightful. In his presentation to this panel, Andy Rose has just provided a 
nice summary of some of the findings of this line of research.
Before going beyond the “monetary-policy” view, I cannot resist to briefly 
mention an important issue that I think deserves much more attention than it has 
received. I am referring here to the role of externalities in the choice of monetary 
policy. Globalization has expanded market borders well beyond political borders. 
And yet the current political structure gives governments the incentives to adopt 
a local approach to economic policy that disregards the costs and benefits that 
fall on the other side of the political border. As the mismatch between market 
borders and political borders grows, externalities becomes more severe and the 
quality of policy making declines. Cooperation among existing central banks is 
only a partial and inefficient way of coping with this problem. The creation of a 
currency union and a single central bank seems to me a much more effective way 
to handle externalities in policy making. This consideration, however, has not 
been emphasized enough by existing research on optimal currency areas.270 VENTURA
But as I said at the beginning, I want to talk about future research and not past 
research. And it seems to me that future research should work at complementing 
the “monetary-policy” view of liquidity management with another view that, 
somewhat paradoxically, is much older. This is the “financial-stability” view of 
liquidity management, and I turn to it next.
2  LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS PERIODS: DEALING WITH 
SYSTEMIC RISK
Much before Keynes convinced the profession of the need for active 
macroeconomic management to deal with the business cycle, central banks 
were entrusted with the mission of safeguarding financial stability by providing 
enough liquidity to banks during crisis periods. This traditional role of central 
banks as the lender-of-last-resort has been essentially ignored by the literature on 
optimal currency areas. And yet, it has important implications for the design of an 
optimum currency area and it has obviously taken a prominent place recently. 
The “financial-stability” view of liquidity management recognizes the dangers 
of one of the most useful activities of banks, namely, maturity conversion. 
This consists of borrowing short-term from savers and lending long-term to 
investors. Maturity conversion is useful because it allows the economy to 
efficiently use existing liquidity. Firms typically need liquid assets to finance real 
investments that will generate profits or cash-flows a few years ahead. Borrowing 
long-term allows firms to carry on these investments with the confidence that 
they will not run out of cash before the investments deliver their fruits. Families 
and other creditors typically save to insure against unexpected shocks such as 
unemployment or illness. Lending short-term allows families to operate with the 
confidence that they will be able to use their savings when they are most needed. 
Therefore, the banks fulfill a useful service to their clients by borrowing short 
from families and lending long to firms.
The problem, of course, is that the maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities subjects banks to the risk of a liquidity shortage. This happens if a large 
fraction of the creditors of a bank want their savings back on short notice and the 
bank does not have enough liquid assets because it has made loans with a long 
maturity. In general, such a situation should not concern central banks since the 
interbank market will take care of this problem. Banks with a liquidity shortage 
will borrow from those that have excess liquidity using their loans as a collateral. 
There is no reason to think that, in normal times, the banking system as a whole 
has a shortage of liquidity.
But two types of problem can arise in this market that create the possibility of 
an aggregate liquidity shortage or financial crisis and require the central banks 
to play its role of lender-of-last-resort. The first type of problem is a situation of 
panic or generalized lack of confidence. This happens when the liquidity shortage 
affects most banks in the system simultaneously and the interbank market dries 
up. Without an injection of liquidity by the central bank, banks would be unable 
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only the central bank can create it. Quick and decisive intervention by the central 
bank might avoid a banking crisis that could have very negative consequences 
for the real economy. As soon as the panic is over, the central bank can safely 
withdraw the additional liquidity from the market and avoid potential inflationary 
consequences. If properly executed, this intervention should not have fiscal costs. 
To the contrary, the central bank might charge an interest rate to banks for the 
liquidity provided and even make a gain.
But even better, panics might not even happen if creditors anticipate this type 
of intervention by the central bank. After all, panics are nothing but the bad 
outcome of a coordination game. Creditors panic and run to the banks because 
they think other creditors will do the same and leave them with nothing. If 
nobody ran today, there would be enough for everybody tomorrow and no need 
to panic at all. To convince investors not to run, the central bank only needs to 
give assurances to creditors that there will be enough liquidity for everybody 
tomorrow even if others run today. This type of reasoning provides the logic 
behind deposit insurance and other type of ex-ante policies that protect the 
banking system from the possibility of aggregate liquidity shortages. Whether 
central banks can ever achieve enough credibility to ensure that no panics will 
arise is still an open question. For our purposes, it suffices to notice that having a 
central bank that is willing and able to provide liquidity during crises periods not 
only reduces the negative effects of these crises, but it also lowers the probability 
of them happening in the first place. And all of this without fiscal costs!
The second type of problem is a situation in which there is too little information 
in the market and, as a result, the quality of the loans owned by a given bank 
is unknown to other banks. This is likely to happen in periods of fast financial 
innovation in which many of the products that banks own are new, opaque 
and therefore difficult to adequately price. In this case, the standard “lemons” 
problem arises and banks are naturally reluctant to lend to each other, correctly 
fearing that the bank asking for loans is insolvent. Once again, we find that 
the interbank market dries up and some banks are no longer capable to satisfy 
their creditors. The problem becomes one of systemic risk if, as it is the case in 
modern financial systems, the balance sheets of banks are interconnected. As 
one bank goes down, doubts arise about connected banks that might lead them 
to fail as well. This leads to a new round of doubts and failures that spreads 
the liquidity shortage throughout the system. Very soon most of the banking 
system is under suspicion and a systemic collapse is looming. Without quick and 
decisive intervention by the central bank, this collapse might occur and bring 
along severe costs in terms of economic activity.
The details of how to handle this type of crisis are less known. Moreover, there 
are no miracle cures. This is not a coordination problem anymore, but one of 
asymmetric information. If the market does not know the quality of bank assets, 
neither does the central bank. Accepting those assets as collateral by the central 
bank might therefore involve heavy fiscal losses. Direct infusion of liquidity at 
the cost of the taxpayer is also a possibility. It is still possible that, in this second 
type of crises, quick and decisive intervention by the central bank might also 
avoid a banking crisis that could have very negative consequences for the real 272 VENTURA
economy. But we do not know very well the costs of such intervention. To start 
with, the fiscal costs might be large. Is it fair that taxpayers suffer because of 
the misbehavior of managers and the inability of shareholders to control them? 
Moreover, if anything has been learned recently, is that agency problems are 
much more severe than we ever anticipated. What are the effects on incentives 
of a policy of bailing out banks at the cost of the taxpayer? The creation of new 
and opaque assets with the intent of going around existing regulation might make 
bank managers rich. But somewhat paradoxically, it also cloggs the financial 
system and might lead to a sudden shortage of liquidity. Bailing out banks 
might limit the effects on real activity of this type of crises, but it might worsen 
incentives and make them more likely in the medium and long-run. We do not 
know yet what is the optimal way to handle this second type of crises, but it is 
safe to work with the hypothesis that it will involve some sort of rescue package 
together with a toughening of regulation.
It goes without saying that the “monetary-policy” and “financial-stability” 
views of liquidity management are not only not incompatible, but they are 
complementary. Each of them describes one important aspect of central banking 
and only together they provide a complete picture of the behavior of central 
banks. And yet, we find that up to now the “financial-stability” view of liquidity 
management has not played any significant role in the research on optimal 
currency areas. I venture to say here that, once the research in this area takes into 
account the role of the central bank as a lender-of-last-resort, there will be one 
new and important factor entering the basic trade-off for a currency union, in 
addition to trade linkages and synchronization of business cycles. This additional 
factor is the interconnectedness of financial systems.
In the absence of a currency union, what are the problems that can arise when 
various central banks try to simultaneously manage a common crisis? Regardless 
of whether the crisis is due to a panic (coordination-problem type of crisis) or 
misbehavior of managers (asymmetric information type of crisis), it is crucial 
that the central bank be able to inject liquidity wherever the financial system 
needs it. The problem, of course, is that this might be outside the political 
borders. It will be of very little help to inject liquidity only in domestic banks if 
the later balance sheets are heavily interconnected with those of foreign banks 
who are not receiving the liquidity they need. A quick and decisive intervention 
is difficult if many central banks have to agree first on how and when liquidity 
is provided. One can go back in history to find many instances in which a crisis 
keeps growing as policymakers spend their time bickering on who should do 
what and when, and worrying more about the impact of their actions on public 
perceptions than about actually solving the problem.
The situation is even worse when the solution of the crisis involves fiscal costs. 
This adds an important negative externality in policy making that can lead to two 
perverse effects. The first one is that it can lead to a war of attrition, that is, a 
situation in which corrective action is delayed because of disagreement on how to 
share the costs. In this sort of situation (which is not unlike the case of a strike), 
all parties involved want other parties to pay most of the cost of intervention. 
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larger. By the time the different parties agree to a solution, the problem is much 
larger than it was at the beginning. This is obviously inefficient and costly. Why 
is it not possible then to reach an agreement quickly? The answer is asymmetric 
information. Everyone is suffering because of the delay, but everyone is holding 
its position in the hope that the situation will be so unsustainable to others that 
they will concede and accept to pay most of the costs. The agreement is only 
possible when the costs have grown so large that they are unbearable to some of 
the parties.
The second problem is that, once the agreement is reached, it is likely to be 
inefficient and difficult to enforce. The liquidity banks receive might depend 
on the nationality of their shareholders rather than their real needs. Needed 
but costly interventions might not take place if most of the benefits go abroad. 
Not needed and also costly interventions might take place, if most of the costs 
are financed by foreign taxpayers. When redistribution across national lines 
becomes an issue, efficiency takes the back seat and this leads to short and long 
term negative effects. Despite official talk to the contrary, central banks are not 
immune to domestic politics and the electoral effects of their policy choices. 
For all these reasons, a currency union looks much more attractive when we are 
reminded of the central bank’s role as a lender of las resort.
3 FINAL  REMARKS
As I mentioned at the beginning of my intervention, my goal was not to review or 
praise past research. Instead, I have made the observation that existing research 
on optimal currency areas has missed the mark in one important respect: the need 
to evaluate how a currency union affects the central bank’s ability to fulfill its 
role of lender-of-last-resort. I hope I have made a convincing case for research to 
proceed in this direction and that some of the tips provided here will be useful to 
researchers in the area. Thank you for your kind attention.274 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Vítor Gaspar asked André Sapir why in his panel presentation Sapir used 
current account balances, and not fiscal balances, to explain risk premia on 
long-term government debt within the euro area. Sapir responded that the 
current account balances explain the risk premia, while the fiscal balances do 
not. Furthermore, Gaspar asked Martin Feldstein to comment on the fact that 
risk premia on long-term government debt in the euro area have only appeared 
recently. We had ten good years, replied Feldstein, and pressures within the euro 
area are beginning to show up only now.
Tommasso Aquilante asked Andrew Rose whether data on trade in services 
were included in the empirical studies that Rose considered in his panel 
presentation. Aquilante conjectured that trade in services faces higher barriers 
than trade in goods. Andrew Levin remarked that services are less cyclical 
than goods. Rose responded that little data on trade in services was available. 
Stanley Fischer wondered whether Jaume Ventura’s model of externalities in 
lending-of-last-resort activities implied that banking supervision had to be done 
by an EMU-wide institution. Andrew Levin wondered whether there is evidence 
to support the view that small countries and small companies have gained 
relatively more from the European common currency.
Assaf Razin asked everyone to compare Hungary and the United Kingdom. 
Hungary seems capable of achieving low and stable inflation only by joining 
EMU. By contrast, the United Kingdom can depreciate itself out of the current 
recession. Razin believed that reflecting upon this comparison would be crucial 
for understanding the monetary integration in Europe.276
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INTRODUCTION
BY LUCREZIA REICHLIN, LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL
I am honoured to chair the Policy Panel of this conference, celebrating the 
10th anniversary of the euro. The panellists do not need introduction. I welcome 
here Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Stanley Fisher, Governor 
of the Bank of Israel, Su Ning, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, 
Guillermo Ortiz, Governor of the Banco de México, and Jean-Claude Trichet, 
President of the European Central Bank.
It is an odd time for celebration. In the midst of a financial crisis and with a 
recession glooming ahead, we may be facing the hardest test not only for the 
single European currency, but also for the world’s financial architecture. 
Let me suggest some questions for discussion. This conference has analyzed 
the experience of the euro area as a currency union in the last ten years. 
Looking ahead, what are, in your view, the key issues when it comes to the link 
between financial integration, financial development, and currency and monetary 
arrangements?
The process of real integration, financial integration and the financial development 
we have witnessed, both at the regional level and at the global level, pose some 
new challenges for monetary policy. How have these developments affected the 
prospects of existing and possible future currency unions and fixed exchange 
rate regimes?
Furthermore, there are some topics that are particularly important today. One key 
policy issue is whether there is a need for new local or global financial regulation 
to prevent potential financial instability linked to financial integration. Financial 
integration also raises new problems for banking and corporate finance. 
Finally, let me put on the table the issue of the role of a central bank as provider 
of liquidity and lender of last resort in a monetary union, and the connected 
problem of the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy.279 PANEL STATEMENT
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BY BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
US FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
I am pleased to be here in Frankfurt today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
euro. The euro’s introduction was a remarkable achievement. As an academic, I 
did a bit of consulting for the European Monetary Institute, the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) predecessor, on monetary transmission mechanisms; I thus played 
a part, albeit an extremely small one, in this grand project. I mention this only 
as a reminder that the creators of the euro drew on monetary expertise from 
around the world, an early example of the international cooperation that has since 
proven to be one of the hallmarks of the ECB. Indeed, the run-up to the euro’s 
establishment and the experience of the past decade have been associated with an 
unprecedented degree of policy coordination among the sovereign states within 
the euro area, including cooperation in the areas of fiscal and regulatory policies 
as well as monetary policy. 
The current financial crisis and global economic slowdown likewise have been 
an occasion for unprecedented international policy coordination, within Europe 
but also globally. For example, in its regulatory capacity, the Federal Reserve 
has worked closely with regulators and supervisors from a number of European 
nations, and we are active participants in the international Financial Stability 
Forum and the standard-setting bodies operating under the aegis of the Bank 
for International Settlements. My focus today, however, will be cooperation 
in monetary policy and, especially, in the meeting of the liquidity needs of our 
increasingly globalized financial markets.
As you know, financial markets remain under severe strain. The proximate 
cause of the financial turmoil was the end of the U.S. housing boom and the 
attendant losses on mortgages and mortgage-related assets by many institutions. 
However, more fundamentally, the turmoil was the product of a global credit 
boom, characterized by a broad underpricing of risk, excessive leverage by 
financial institutions, and an increasing reliance on complex and opaque financial 
instruments that have proven to be fragile under stress. The unwinding of this 
boom (and the associated financial losses) has led to the withdrawal of many 
investors from credit markets and deleveraging by financial institutions, both of 
which have acted to constrict available credit to households and businesses. This 
credit squeeze is, in turn, a principal cause of the economic slowdown now taking 
place in many countries.
Central bankers have been working closely together throughout this period 
of financial turmoil. Personally, I have found the opportunity to share views 
regularly with President Trichet and other leading central bankers at various 
international meetings extremely valuable. We are all in frequent contact by 
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other countries, to compare our analyses of developing trends, and to draw on 
each other’s experience and knowledge.
The merits of coordinated monetary policies have been discussed by policymakers 
and academics for decades, but in practice, such coordination has been quite rare. 
However, on October 8, the Federal Reserve announced a reduction in its policy 
interest rate jointly with five other major central banks – the Bank of Canada, 
the Bank of England, the ECB, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) – with the Bank of Japan expressing support. Last month’s joint action was 
motivated by the abatement of inflationary pressures and increased indications 
of economic slowing in our respective economies. In addition, the coordinated 
rate cut was intended to send a strong signal to the public and to markets of our 
resolve to act together to address global economic challenges. 
As you know, however, monetary policy actions have not resolved the ongoing 
strains in financial markets, including interbank funding markets. The Federal 
Reserve has responded to the strong demand for funding by banks and primary 
dealers by dramatically increasing the amount of term funding that it auctions 
to banks, providing new lending facilities for nonbanks, supplying high-
quality securities for use in repurchase agreement (repo) markets and for other 
collateralized lending, and funding purchases of commercial paper. Elsewhere, 
including Canada, the euro area, and the United Kingdom, central banks have 
introduced or expanded similar measures to boost the provision of liquidity 
in their local currencies. In addition to these measures, governments in many 
countries broadened deposit insurance coverage and announced plans to inject 
capital into their banking systems and to guarantee bank debts. All of these 
steps are consistent with the principles agreed to by the Group of Seven finance 
ministers and central bank governors in their October 10 communiqué. 
Although the range of mechanisms we have used has been broad, our provision 
of liquidity conforms to a central bank’s traditional role as the lender of last 
resort. However, a novel aspect of the current situation is that the balance 
sheets of financial institutions have increasingly come to include instruments 
denominated in foreign currencies. The need for currencies outside an 
issuing country’s markets arises primarily from the global role played by key 
international currencies, such as the dollar and the euro. For example, over the 
past decade, international loans and deposits have grown tremendously, as has 
the issuance of international debt securities – that is, bonds, notes, and money 
market instruments sold outside the borders of the borrower’s country and 
sometimes denominated in foreign currencies. These developments have posed 
new challenges for conventional central bank liquidity and lender-of-last-resort 
policies. For example, injecting euros or sterling into national money markets 
may not be sufficient to restore market function in these economies when 
funding shortages are in dollars. 
Indeed, a significant feature of the recent financial market stress is the strong 
demand for dollar funding not only in the United States, but also abroad. 
Many financial institutions outside the United States, especially in Europe, had 
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to nonbanks and purchases of asset-backed securities issued by U.S. residents.1 
Also, the continued prominent role of the dollar in international trade, foreign 
direct investment, and financial transactions contributes to dollar funding needs 
abroad. While some financial institutions outside the United States have relied on 
dollars acquired through their U.S. affiliates, many others relied on interbank and 
other wholesale markets to obtain dollars. As such, the recent sharp deterioration 
in conditions in funding markets left some participants outside the United States 
without adequate access to short-term dollar financing.
The emergence of dollar funding shortages around the globe has required a more 
internationally coordinated approach among central banks to the lender-of-last-
resort function. The principal tool we have used is the currency swap line, which 
allows each collaborating central bank to draw down balances denominated 
in its foreign partner’s currency. The Federal Reserve has now established 
temporary swap lines with more than a dozen other central banks.2 Many of 
these central banks have drawn on these lines and, using a variety of methods 
and facilities, have allocated these funds to meet the needs of institutions within 
their borders.3 Although funding needs during the current turmoil have been 
the most pronounced for dollars, they have arisen for other currencies as well. 
For example, the ECB has set up swap lines and repo facilities with the central 
banks of Denmark and Hungary to provide euro liquidity in those countries. The 
terms of many swap agreements have been adjusted with the changing needs for 
liquidity: The sizes of the swaps have increased, the types of collateral accepted 
by these central banks from financial institutions in their economies have been 
expanded, and the maturities at which these funds have been made available 
have been tailored to meeting the prevailing needs. Notably, in mid-October, the 
Federal Reserve eliminated limits on the sizes of its swap lines with the ECB, 
the Bank of England, the SNB, and the Bank of Japan so as to accommodate 
demands for U.S. dollar funding of any scale. Taken together, these actions have 
helped improve the distribution of liquidity around the globe.
This collaborative approach to the injection of liquidity reflects more than 
the global, multi-currency nature of funding difficulties. It also reflects 
the importance of relationships between central banks and the institutions 
they serve. Under swap agreements, the responsibility for allocating 
foreign-currency liquidity within a jurisdiction lies with the domestic central 
bank. This arrangement makes use of the fact that the domestic central bank 
1  See Patrick McGuire and Goetz von Peter (2008), “International Banking Activity amidst 
the Turmoil,” BIS Quarterly Review, June; also see ECB (2008), “The International Role 
of the Euro (923.7 KB PDF),” July. The ECB report noted that investment banks based 
in the United States and financial institutions based in the United Kingdom have been 
among the top non-euro-area issuers of euro-denominated bonds; it also said that banks in 
Europe and some firms located mainly in the United Kingdom with business concentrated 
in the securitization of residential mortgages have been among the top non-U.S. issuers of 
dollar-denominated bonds.
2  The central banks include those in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the euro area, 
Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom.
3  Some other countries with extensive accumulated stocks of dollar reserves have made these 
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is best positioned to understand the mechanics and special features of its 
own country’s financial and payments systems and, because of its existing 
relationships with domestic financial institutions, can best assess the strength of 
each institution and its needs for foreign-currency liquidity. The domestic central 
bank is also typically best informed about the quality of the collateral offered by 
potential borrowers.
The efforts by central banks around the world to increase the availability of 
liquidity, along with other steps taken by central banks and governments, have 
contributed to tentative improvements in credit market functioning. However, the 
continuing volatility of markets and recent indicators of economic performance 
confirm that challenges remain. For this reason, policymakers will remain in 
close contact, monitor developments closely, and stand ready to take additional 
steps should conditions warrant. In times like these, we are especially aware 
of the importance of having close working relationships with our central 
bank colleagues around the world. These relationships are fostered by the ties 
established in forums like this one and in the many venues where policymakers 
regularly gather. 
The 10th anniversary of the euro is an opportunity not only to celebrate an 
impressive and historic achievement, but also to reaffirm our commitment to 
cooperation as we address the challenges of an increasingly integrated global 
economy. Central bankers and other policymakers around the world must 
continue to work together to address disruptions in credit markets and to promote 
a vibrant global economy. 283 PANEL STATEMENT
PANEL STATEMENT
BY STANLEY FISCHER, GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF ISRAEL
As a policymaker from a small open economy, I shall focus on the question of 
whether the increase in global financial integration – that is, capital account 
integration – of the last half-century has moved or should move the monetary 
policy regime in a small open economy such as ours in a particular direction. The 
answer is based on the work of Mundell and McKinnon in the 1960s, including 
their fundamental research on optimal currency areas. 
Essentially the question comes down to the joint choice of exchange rate and 
monetary policy regimes. For a country completely open to international capital 
flows, I believe in the corner solution approach to the exchange rate regime, based 
on the impossible trinity. But that strong statement has to be combined with the 
recognition (i) that the real exchange rate cannot be a matter of indifference to the 
policymakers of a small open economy, and (ii) that to say that the exchange rate 
should be flexible is not necessarily to say that it should be totally free floating.
In practice, for an economy open to international capital flows, the choice needs 
to be made between a pegged exchange rate regime – which leaves very little 
room for a monetary policy focused on domestic goals, and a flexible exchange 
rate regime, which requires the specification of a monetary policy regime. The 
experience of the last twenty years supports the view that an inflation targeting 
regime has many advantages, provided that it is understood that we are talking 
about flexible inflation targeting.
Modern monetary policy is typically given three goals – and here I quote from the 
draft revised Bank of Israel law, which draws on the laws of other central banks 
including the ECB and the Bank of England, and which we hope will be accepted 
by the government and the Knesset:
The primary goal of monetary policy is to maintain price stability, typically  • 
as defined by the government. In our case, the inflation target range is 
1-3 percent per annum, with the center of the range – 2 percent per annum – 
being taken as the point target. There may be a slight preference for stating the 
target as a number – generally 2 percent – with a tolerance range of plus/minus 
1 percent, as a way of avoiding giving the impression that any rate between 1 
and 3 percent is equally satisfactory.
To support the other goals of government economic policy, particularly  • 
growth and employment, so long as that does not conflict with the primary 
goal of maintaining price stability. 
To contribute towards ensuring the stability of the financial system. • 
The flexibility in flexible inflation targeting consists of allowing the central bank 
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or range when the inflation rate deviates from target. This flexibility is needed 
because a monetary policy that seeks to return inflation to the target range as 
rapidly as possible may well destabilize the path of real output, and thus conflict 
with the second and possibly the third goals of monetary policy. 
The debate about the inflation targeting approach to monetary policy can become 
heated. On one side are proponents of the dual mandate approach, which says 
that both inflation and output should receive equal weight as goals of monetary 
policy. In making the argument, proponents usually argue against a monetary 
policy approach that would imply that inflation is the only goal of monetary 
policy. If there were ever proponents of this approach, they are now very rare, 
for the flexible inflation targeting approach – which gives weight to both output 
and inflation over the short and medium term – is the more generally accepted 
view. The equal weight view has the difficulty that in the medium and longer 
term, monetary policy has very little influence on growth. Thus a monetary 
policy that strives to achieve a growth target that cannot be reached, is likely 
to produce increasing inflation – at which point the flexible inflation targeting 
approach allows the policymaker to give medium- and longer-term preference 
to achieving the inflation goal, which is what monetary policy can achieve over 
that time horizon. On the other side, flexible inflation targeting is attacked by 
proponents of a twin-pillar monetary policy, one that focuses not only on the 
behavior of inflation but also on that of the money supply. This latter approach 
seems fully consistent with flexible inflation targeting, and it may well be a 
matter of tradition and preference as to whether that fact is recognized or not. 
What should a central bank that is following a flexible inflation targeting 
approach do if the exchange rate is at a level that is problematic from the 
macroeconomic viewpoint, that is, from the viewpoint of growth? There are 
several possibilities:
Ignore the problem – which is easier for a large relatively closed country than  1. 
for a small open economy;
Say this is a problem for fiscal policy. This may be the right answer from  2. 
an analytic viewpoint, but it is not a good answer in the real world of 
policymaking. The truth is that all of us would be very happy if fiscal 
policy would stick to medium-term guidelines that produce a desired 
path of government spending, the deficit, and the debt, with appropriate 
counter-cyclical elements, without expecting it also to take care of the real 
exchange rate;
Try to use capital controls. These may work for a short time, though even that  3. 
is doubtful, and in any case they will not work for any length of time. Further, 
reverting to the use of capital controls sends a disturbing signal to foreign 
investors and domestic residents alike.
An inflation targeting country that has significant pass-through from the  4. 
exchange rate to inflation will in practice react to changes in the exchange 
rate in a way that is likely to be stabilizing for the real exchange rate;285 PANEL STATEMENT
The central bank may by coincidence find itself in a position similar to  5. 
that of the Bank of Israel earlier this year, when the need to add to reserves 
coincided with a significant strengthening of the real exchange rate. Our own 
examination of the adequacy of our foreign exchange reserves had for some 
time been signaling that we needed to increase our reserves, which by each 
of three tests we applied  1 were too small by about $10 billion, to a range of 
$35-40 billion. We decided to begin acquiring reserves at a time when the 
exchange rate of the shekel had appreciated significantly, which made the 
decision to buy foreign exchange easier. We decided not to set a target range 
for the exchange rate, but rather to buy at a steady rate each day, and not to 
vary the daily rate of purchases based on day-to-day exchange rate changes. 
This judgment was based on lessons we have drawn from experience in 
countries with open capital accounts during the 1990s and in other periods, 
when governments that intervened in the markets in order to achieve a given 
exchange rate frequently found themselves losing against more sophisticated 
private sector market participants. 
Clearly, no country can rely on its decisions on desired reserves coinciding with 
its views on possible deviations of the exchange rate from its medium term 
equilibrium. Ours was a fortunate coincidence, which led to a policy response 
that has by and large been successful, in that the exchange rate against the dollar 
has gradually returned to a range that is more consistent with our macroeconomic 
situation than it was in March. I should also note that we originally started 
buying a very small amount daily -- $25 million in March 2008 – but when the 
exchange rate strengthened rapidly in July, we increased our daily purchases to 
$100 million a day. We have maintained that daily rate of purchases – and given 
global economic instabilities in the last several months, we are very pleased to 
have added significantly to our reserves.2
The central bank may also have to intervene from time to time to deal with  6. 
disorderly markets. Some time ago we developed a set of criteria by which we 
would define a situation of foreign exchange market failure. We had not seen 
such a situation for many years, but early this year, in mid-March, we found 
our foreign exchange market showing signs of market failure as previously 
defined. Accordingly we intervened in the market (this was before we 
instituted the program of reserve acquisitions described above) and succeeded 
in restoring its efficient operation.
The argument so far has been simple: a small open economy in the modern world 
should operate with a floating exchange rate and a flexible inflation targeting 
approach to monetary policy. But we have to recognize that the current crisis 
1  The three were: the test that says reserves should be at least equal to foreign exchange 
liabilities falling due within the next twelve months; a reserve adequacy test in terms of 
months of imports; and an internal calculation based on potential uses of reserves, and the 
probabilities with which we were likely to find ourselves needing to use the reserves in each 
of the possible situations.
2  When the initial $10 billion of purchases were completed at the beginning of December, 
we recalculated the desired level of reserves, and as a result of increased market volatility, 
decided to continue the program until we reach a reserve range of $40-44 billion.286  FISCHER
has revealed the difficulty for many countries of operating successfully in a 
world with massive and volatile capital flows, of the type we have seen in the 
last year. 
It had seemed, based on the experience of the 1990s, that countries that had 
accumulated sufficient reserves could manage to ride out periods of global 
economic instability by using their reserves to defend against capital outflows. 
But it is clear from the situations of Russia and Korea in the last few months that 
even very large reserves are not sufficient to ensure stability in the face of rapid 
reversals of capital flows. 
Countries can augment their reserves by obtaining access to contingent credit 
lines. In the 1990s both Mexico and Argentina at different times had such 
lines provided by the private sector, but when the going got tough, these lines 
evaporated or became very hard to activate. The IMF has several times tried to 
develop a contingent credit line facility, including during the last two months. 
However there have been difficulties in the design of such facilities, none of 
which has ever been used. It must be possible to design such a facility in a 
way that countries will be willing to use it to augment reserves – but to do that, 
member countries of the Fund that are opposed to the use of low-conditionality 
facilities will have to change their views, for until now this group has generally 
succeeded in placing conditions on activation of contingency facilities that have 
rendered them unusable. 
Perhaps the most interesting development with regard to augmenting foreign 
exchange reserves in the face of a lack of liquidity in this crisis has been the 
swap lines that the Fed has extended not only to the central banks of the leading 
industrialized countries, but also to four emerging market country central banks – 
those of Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore. The Fed is the only 
financial institution that can extend dollar liquidity in unlimited amounts, and 
its willingness to provide large-scale liquidity assistance to central banks of 
countries that are judged to be following responsible policies, may well represent 
an important step in the evolution of the international financial system and its 
ability to deal with crises.
The other approach to the impossible trinity is to opt for a pegged exchange rate, 
thereby losing the capacity to conduct a monetary policy aimed at affecting the 
domestic economy. Hong Kong SAR has clearly succeeded in this enterprise, 
withstanding a coordinated attack on the currency in 1997, and not having been 
seriously challenged since then. Nonetheless very few countries have been able 
to live with a pegged rate, even within a currency board arrangement, in the 
last twenty years. At this moment we are seeing major difficulties confronting 
Latvia. 
One can argue that countries that have not succeeded in maintaining a pegged 
exchange rate have simply not been willing to implement the necessary monetary 
policy. However the issue is not one of monetary policy alone – it is also an issue 
for all of macroeconomic policy, for given the massive capital inflows to Latvia 
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as monetary policy would have had to be aimed at maintenance of the currency 
board arrangement. That means that a country that wants to peg its exchange 
rate may well find itself without any effective policy tools that can be used for 
domestic purposes. It is accordingly no surprise that given the scale of capital 
flows in the last two decades, so few countries have succeeded in maintaining a 
pegged rate for a long period.
That takes us to the last possibility – the hardest of hard pegs, joining a currency 
bloc. Joining a currency bloc is a far more serious step than merely changing 
monetary policy. For some countries, giving up the national money is a traumatic 
step. More fundamentally, the country that joins a currency bloc is likely 
beginning a series of far-reaching structural changes in its economy, including in 
its production and trading patterns.
To be sure, even such a step is not irreversible. Countries can in principle leave 
a currency bloc, possibly not of their own volition. And not all currency blocs 
are equally strong. The European Monetary Union is the strongest of such blocs, 
quite likely the strongest international currency bloc ever. Its strength, and its 
attraction in a time of fully integrated capital markets, is evident from the fact 
that as a result of the current crisis, some countries that had decided to stay out 
of EMU appear to be rethinking that issue. 
That fact, and this tenth anniversary, are testimony to the founders, builders, 
and guardians of the Euro area, who have within a short time created a currency 
that has earned the trust of its users within the Euro area and outside it. It is an 
impressive and historical achievement.288 SU
PANEL STATEMENT
BY SU NING, DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA
I am very pleased to be invited to address the audience on the topic of challenges 
confronting China’s monetary policy and China’s policy measures in the context 
of globalization.
1  CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION FOR CHINA’S MONETARY 
POLICY
China has been actively engaged in the economic globalization process after its 
accession into the WTO, and has integrated into the international community 
becoming an important part of the world economy. Globalization has brought 
forth both opportunities and challenges to China. With respect to monetary 
policy, the challenges are as follows. 
First, China’s BOP imbalances against the background of global economic 
imbalances have become a major factor constraining the independence and 
effectiveness of China’s monetary policy. With dual surplus on the trade account 
and the capital account, in order to keep the RMB exchange rate at an adaptive 
equilibrium level, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has to purchase foreign 
exchange and inject base money. These operations have piled up massive 
liquidity, stimulated excessive investment, pushed up asset prices and have 
eventually affected price stability.
Second, increasing sensitivity of domestic prices to international price movements 
has made it more difficult for the PBC to maintain price stability. In recent years, 
prices of commodities, food and assets have gone up across the board, shoring up 
inflationary pressure all over the world and exerting a noticeable impact on domestic 
prices in China. Globalization has complicated the factors that affect prices; 
therefore, how to predict price trend, how to differentiate the effects of various 
factors, how to appropriately apply monetary policy are new issues encountered by 
the PBC when performing its mandate of maintaining price stability.
Third, the global financial crisis will have repercussions on China’s economic and 
financial stability. Despite relatively strong independence of China’s economy, 
it inevitably cannot be obviated from the international financial crisis when the 
world is increasingly globalized. After the breaking out of the Asian financial 
crisis, China went through economic slowdown and heightened financial risks. 
The adverse impact of the recent global financial crisis triggered by the U.S. 
sub-prime crisis on China’s economic growth and financial stability cannot be 
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2  MONETARY POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES FROM 
GLOBALIZATION
To address the challenges brought by globalization, the PBC has taken a series 
of measures in recent years. 
First, the PBC has adopted comprehensive measures to promote the equilibrium 
of balance of payments and enhance the independence of its monetary policy. 
China’s BOP imbalances have deep-rooted reasons related to globalization, and 
is a part of global imbalance. To address the root causes of its BOP imbalances, 
China needs to restructure the economy. But to solve the issue, it also requires 
a global economic restructuring through joint efforts from the international 
community. China has strengthened the coordination and cooperation of its 
monetary and exchange rate policy with fiscal, trade, industrial, investment 
and other macro-economic policies in recent years and, as part of its wider 
efforts to restructure the economy, has implemented a basket of restructuring 
policies to expand consumption, increase imports and open up the domestic 
market. Meanwhile, the PBC has improved its liquidity management in the 
banking system, conducted sterilization operations to siphon excessive liquidity 
resulting from purchase of foreign exchange through multiple monetary policy 
instruments, thus buying time for economic restructuring. The PBC has also 
actively participated in the IMF-initiated multilateral consultations involving 
China, the U.S., Japan, the euro zone and Saudi Arabia to discuss policy 
responses to promote an orderly solution of global imbalance.
Second,  the PBC has made its monetary policy more preemptive and better 
targeted and has maintained prices at a basically stable level. The PBC has 
reinforced monitoring and analysis of price movements, analyzing the influence 
of internal factors on prices as well as closely studying how domestic prices 
are affected by price movements of commodities in the international market, 
international economic and financial developments and monetary policy changes 
in other countries. The PBC has made great efforts to improve the price 
monitoring system and to analyze the impact of short-term supply shocks and 
imported factors on domestic prices, in order to accurately predict medium- and 
long-term price movements and enhance the preemptiveness and effectiveness 
of monetary policy. When addressing the latest round of inflation, the PBC 
made in-depth analysis of the causes and, after identified different influences of 
imported factors on prices, supply constraints and resources prices adjustments, 
the PBC was able to make correct judgments on the general movements of price 
and adopt well-targeted policies accordingly. Currently, the PBC is closely 
following the price developments in order to secure medium- and long-term price 
stability through flexible monetary policy.
Third, the PBC has put the role of financial adjustment into full play to 
promote stable and rapid economic growth. When facing risks of slowdown, 
the PBC works to avoid a sharp decline in economic growth by stimulating 
domestic growth potential through macroeconomic policies. Recently, facing 
with unfavorable fallout of the global financial crisis, the PBC has timely 
adjusted its monetary policy stance and has taken flexible measures in response.290 SU
In September and October, the PBC reduced the reserve requirement ratio twice, 
and cut interest rate three times. The PBC has also designed a series of policies 
to extend greater credit support to some key sectors in the economy to bolster 
growth. At present, China’s credit growth is moderate in general, and China’s 
economy continues to grow at a relatively rapid pace.
Fourth, the PBC has continued to push forward financial reform, strengthen 
risk prevention and establish a risk management mechanism so as to maintain 
financial stability. Efforts have been made to enhance the overall strength, 
competitiveness and risk management of China’s financial sector. Measures 
have been taken to improve the monitoring over major financial markets such as 
money, capital and insurance markets and their interaction with monetary policy 
so as to establish and improve regulation, assessment and early warning systems 
to prevent systemic risks. The PBC will establish a deposit insurance system, 
improve the investor protection system and insurance policyholder protection 
system, and standardize the market exit mechanism of financial institutions. The 
PBC will strengthen liquidity monitoring and management in conducting its due 
role of lender of the last resort. 
Fifth, the PBC has promoted international coordination of monetary policy and 
international financial cooperation. China is actively involved in international 
financial cooperation and conduct in-depth discussion on global economic and 
financial issues and policy coordination issues with other governments and 
central banks through various frameworks. 
Currently, the international financial market is still in violent turbulence, posing 
unprecedented challenges to all monetary authorities. In order to ward off the 
impact of the international economic malaise, the Chinese government has 
decided to adopt proactive fiscal policy and moderately loose monetary policy. 
Recently, the central government unveiled a 4-trillion yuan economic stimulus 
package comprising of ten measures aimed to expand domestic demand and 
promote economic growth. Going forward, the PBC will strive to improve 
the preemptiveness, scientific approach and effectiveness of monetary policy, 
flexibly use monetary instruments in order to promote stable and rapid economic 
development and financial stability. Meanwhile, the PBC will further reinforce 
international policy coordination and cooperation, and join force with the 
international community in dealing with the financial crisis.291 PANEL STATEMENT
PANEL STATEMENT
BY GUILLERMO ORTIZ MARTÍNEZ, GOVERNOR OF BANCO DE MÉXICO
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the convenience of adopting coordinated policy actions 
among financial authorities around the globe, in the context of the current 
world financial turmoil, originated in the U.S. economy and spread to the global 
financial sector.
The literature on international coordination of macroeconomic policies in general, 
and of monetary policy in particular has analyzed the benefits and costs of policy 
coordination among countries. As it is well known, shocks and the policy 
response to these shocks in one country could have effects in other economies. In 
this context, it is interesting to assess if some degree of policy coordination may 
improve efficiency by the internalization of the so-called externalities. 
Most of the literature on international policy coordination focuses on the gains 
and incentives to cooperate in “normal times”, when markets are functioning 
relatively well. Under these circumstances the individual net benefits from 
adopting cooperative policy measures are perceived to be relatively small for 
each country. In contrast, the experience of the recent episode of “financial 
strain” showed that the relative gains from policy coordination in this type 
of environment are substantially higher. Thus, countries are more willing to 
cooperate and adopt collective policy actions during episodes of severe “financial 
stress”. 
In this sense, one of the lessons from the recent crisis is that there is not an 
appropriate international infrastructure to encourage international cooperation in 
“normal times” that can also facilitate a prompt implementation of coordinated 
actions during episodes of “financial stress”. Thus, it is important to improve the 
international arrangements for cooperation among authorities around the world.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical framework 
that has been used in the analysis of policy coordination among countries, which 
is useful for analyzing the incentives to cooperate in “normal times”; section 3 
analyzes the convenience of adopting collective policy actions in periods of 
“financial stress” and describes the implementation of policy coordinated actions 
during the current global financial crisis; and, section 4 discusses the need to 
improve the institutional framework for international cooperation. Conclusions 
are presented in section 5.292 ORTIZ
2   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
COORDINATION
Countries are subject to different types of shocks in the global economy and 
the policy response to these shocks plays a key role in transmitting its effects 
across countries. According to Meyer, Doyle, Gagnon and Henderson (2002), 
in general, there are two main types of shocks: international shocks, with either 
symmetric or asymmetric effects on different countries, and country-specific 
shocks, that broadly speaking can be transmitted from one country to another 
depending on the existing trade and financial links across economies.
In recent years, the globalization process has tightened trade and financial links 
across countries. For instance, Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006), and Rogoff 
(2006) document that cross border financial claims and direct foreign investment 
have significantly increased over the last two decades. Bordo and Murshid 
(2002) show that a globalization process involves a larger variety of international 
shocks, and a faster and stronger transmission of country-specific shocks and 
policies across economies.
Under these circumstances, the question that arises is whether an inward-looking 
approach to policy design is optimal or some degree of international policy 
coordination may improve the outcome? A theoretical framework to analyze this 
question can be found in the traditional game theory approach. The first author 
to apply techniques of game theory to address the issues of policy coordination 
among countries was Hamada (1976), who developed a two-country model 
where policymakers’ objectives were price stability and balance of payments 
equilibrium, and the level of credit expansion was the policy instrument. Hamada 
showed that in equilibrium countries do not cooperate and they can not achieve 
their objectives simultaneously. Thus, the non-cooperative solution would be 
suboptimal. Some refinements of this policy game are contained in Hamada 
(1979 and 1985), and in Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), among others.
In general, as in the case of a non-cooperative game, without coordination each 
country takes for granted other countries’ policy parameters and implied responses 
in order to design its own strategy (Nash equilibrium). As Taylor (2008) has 
pointed out, in the case of monetary policy actions one can easily imagine central 
bank policymakers taking for granted the policy rules of other central banks and 
deciding the best monetary policy response to achieve price and output stability, 
which leads to a global non-cooperative rule.
In the case of zero-sum games, where what one player gains the other loses, there 
would be no case for cooperation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). However, in the 
case of policy coordination among countries, things are different because of the 
existence of externalities. In this sense, the theoretical literature on international 
policy coordination emphasizes the fact that macroeconomic policies in one 
country affect welfare in other countries, that is, the design and implementation 
of policy actions has externalities for other countries (Meyer, Doyle, Gagnon and 
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has in the design of policies on expectations, particularly, the possibility that 
cooperation could lead expectations towards a more desirable outcome.
A framework for international policy cooperation would therefore internalize 
these external effects and lead to higher global welfare than the non-cooperative 
case. In this regard, a significant body of literature on international cooperation 
shows that when policymakers do not cooperate, the results are not optimal, 
but when they cooperate, the solution is Pareto superior (see Cooper 1985; 
Corden 1985; Canzoneri and Gray 1985, Currie and Levine, 1985).
However, as it is well known, in the presence of externalities, optimization by an 
individual agent does not take into account potential positive or negative effects 
on other economies, that is, they do not collect all the benefits and costs of their 
actions. When countries decide whether to cooperate or not with other countries, 
they do not fully internalize all the effects of their actions. As a result, for each 
country the individual net benefit from cooperating with the rest of the world is 
usually smaller than the social benefit.
Furthermore, even though policy cooperation among countries may imply 
welfare gains, the absence of a commitment device has made cooperation an 
unlikely event. Only when the payoff for cooperation is large and is shared 
by the different countries, and a non-zero probability is assigned to a very 
bad outcome associated with a non-cooperative solution, the mechanisms to 
cooperate are successful. Otherwise, there are always incentives to deviate from 
these commitments. In addition, since policy makers are, in general, appointed 
for fixed terms, it is possible for authorities to underestimate the probability of 
this rare event taking place during their tenure and therefore assume that the 
corresponding probability is zero. Therefore, this structure of incentives implies 
that in many cases, international policy cooperation is only feasible when there 
is a supranational authority that can make credible threats to induce commitment 
among countries (Meyer, Doyle, Gagnon and Henderson, 2002).
Finally, some quantitative literature on policy coordination has also stressed that 
the gains of policy coordination among countries may be fairly small. Oudiz and 
Sachs (1984) were the first to estimate the gains from international cooperation. 
They used the reduced forms of econometric models and quadratic country welfare 
functions, and found small gains from policy coordination. Frankel (1989) also 
estimated the welfare gains between cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, 
and found similar results. Recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) used an open 
economy macroeconomic model to analyze cooperation and found that the gains 
from policy coordination are small. Several other authors have used similar 
models to analyze the welfare gains from policy coordination and found similar 
results (see Corsetti and Pesenti 2001, Zheng and Pappa 2005, Tchakarov 2004, 
among others).
Usually these models have focused on the coordination of monetary policy 
actions among countries, highlighting the role of these policies in stabilizing 
macroeconomic fluctuations. However, as it was emphasized by Lucas (1985), 
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Thus, the benefits from policy coordination seem to be quite small, that is, the 
cooperative outcome does not seem to substantially improve the non-cooperative 
one. In this sense, as Taylor (2008) has recently pointed out, the perception that 
gains from cooperation are small and the complexity associated with the adoption 
of coordinated policy actions among different countries, have discouraged 
policymakers around the world to embrace cooperative policies. Thus, countries 
have relied on inward-looking policies.
3  THE CASE FOR COOPERATION
The theoretical framework described in the previous section is useful to explain 
the absence or very little cooperation that we have seen in “normal times”, 
that is, when domestic and international markets are functioning relatively 
well. However, this inward-looking approach, to some extent, has allowed the 
accumulation of some distortions and imbalances in the global economy. In this 
sense, it can be argued that the current financial crisis was preceded by little 
cooperation in some areas.
For instance, the rise in commodity prices was viewed by several central banks 
as an exogenous shock to their economies and responded accordingly. However, 
the fact is that, from a global perspective, this shock resulted, to some extent, 
from a lax global stance of monetary policy. As Frankel (2008) has pointed 
out, low global real interest rates reduced the cost of carrying inventories and 
tended to raise commodity prices. It can be considered as a clear example of how 
international coordination may have helped to moderate the effect of the recent 
expansionary phase of the global business cycle on the prices of commodities.
Another example is the absence of a prudential regulatory framework for the 
financial system at an international level, which allowed a substantial relaxation 
of credit standards. In addition, it appears today that not enough attention was 
given to supervising the involvement of non-financial firms in financial markets, 
particularly with respect to the use of sophisticated derivative instruments that 
implied some risks.
These considerations suggest that when policymakers assess the convenience of 
embracing a cooperative global policy, they seem to ignore the possibility (assign 
a zero probability) that extremely adverse events, like the current crisis, could 
take place during their tenure. Thus, when deciding whether to cooperate or not, 
the adoption of a risk management approach (assigning a non zero probability 
to extreme adverse events) may change the incentives in favor of a global 
cooperative policy.
Despite the discussion on the issues that led to the current financial crisis, this 
experience is useful to illustrate that coordination under episodes of “financial 
stress” is clearly convenient. For instance, once the financial crisis started and 
spread to the global economy, central banks and other financial authorities 
immediately started to respond with domestic measures to provide liquidity to their 
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they were not enough to prevent a further deterioration of conditions in financial 
markets. Eventually this situation led to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
mid-September. This event significantly changed the perception of risk in financial 
markets, and the probability of a major disruption in international financial markets 
increased. Then, in the weeks following this event, it became clear that non-
coordinated policies were not enough to restore confidence in financial markets 
and reduce the risk of a further deterioration of economic conditions. 
In this sense, the possibility of a disruption in financial markets increased the 
relative gains from collective policy actions among authorities from different 
countries. Here it is important to note that conditions in financial markets started 
to improve when markets perceived a coordinated effort among central banks 
and financial authorities across the world, which confirms the convenience of 
embracing coordinated actions at an international level in periods of severe 
financial stress.
Among the coordinated policy actions adopted by central banks and other 
financial authorities are: a) the coordinated global interest rate cut at the 
beginning of October, when the Fed, along with other central banks around the 
world, cut its reference interest rate; b) the swap lines among central banks, as a 
collective action to supply dollar liquidity to financial markets; c) the new credit 
lines offered recently by the IMF; and, d) the coordinated efforts across countries 
to capitalize financial institutions around the globe. These coordinated actions 
helped to restore investors’ confidence in financial markets and the probability 
of a severe disruption in financial markets apparently has decreased. 
In the case of emerging markets, the effects of the crisis have been transmitted 
to these economies through several channels. First, the financial crises and the 
subsequent slowdown in economic activity in advanced economies has impacted 
emerging countries though real channels, such as the reduction in export growth, 
the drop in labor remittances, and the deterioration in households and firms 
confidence. On the other hand, the financial distress has both direct and indirect 
effects on emerging markets financial sectors. Direct channels of contagion could 
arise when domestic financial institutions have significant exposure to foreign 
assets, and/or when they rely on foreign funding. Indirect channels of contagion, 
in turn, are exposed through several factors such as a tightening of financial 
conditions in domestic debt markets, excess volatility in asset prices (exchange 
rate, stock market, domestic bond market), and a slowdown of bank credit and 
an increase in its costs.
However, it is interesting to note that emerging markets had not been significantly 
affected until mid-September (collapse of Lehman Brothers). However, the 
aggravation of the financial crisis tested the resilience of these economies. By 
October 24, asset prices and their volatility in these economies had been affected 
considerably. For example, from Sep. 12 to Oct. 24, EMBI spreads increased 
395bp in Mexico and 400bp in Brazil; domestic currencies depreciated 26% in 
Mexico and 30% in Brazil; stock markets decreased 34% in Mexico and 40% in 
Brazil; and, 10-year domestic bond yields increased 284bp in Mexico and 448pb 
in Brazil.296 ORTIZ
The experience from emerging markets is useful again to illustrate the 
importance of coordinated actions. Despite some individual measures adopted 
in each country, the announcement of the facilities to access liquidity in dollars 
for emerging markets on October 29 (swap lines between the Fed and the 
central banks of Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Singapore, and new credit 
lines offered by the IMF) coincides with an improvement in the performance 
of financial variables in emerging markets. In particular, after the adoption of 
these coordinated policy actions, an important reduction in sovereign interest rate 
spreads and in volatility in asset prices was observed. 
In view of the performance of financial markets after the implementation of 
these collective policy efforts, coordination among authorities around the 
globe has been certainly welcome. Therefore it is interesting to consider, as 
the markets return to “normal times”, the convenience of maintaining some of 
these mechanisms in the future as part of a framework to help countries (and, 
in general, the world economy) cooperate and to some extent insure against 
episodes of financial disruption.
4  NEED TO IMPROVE THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
COOPERATION
The recent global financial crisis has made it clear that the cooperative efforts 
adopted in forums such as the BIS, IMF, and the Financial Stability Forum, among 
others, in terms of exchanging views and providing information about the global 
economy, have been insufficient in providing a framework for cooperation. Thus, 
it is important not only to strengthen the role of these institutions but also to build 
a wider international infrastructure that facilitates higher levels of cooperation 
among countries in “normal times”.
However, it is important to note that the adoption of coordinated efforts 
in “normal times”, does not necessary imply that all central banks should 
embrace exactly the same monetary policy actions. As it was mentioned before, 
international shocks can have asymmetric effects on countries, that is, the same 
shock can affect several countries in different ways. Under these circumstances, 
the appropriate policy response would not be the same for all countries. For 
instance, in the particular cases of Mexico and Canada, both countries are highly 
integrated to the U.S. economy, which might make a case for a currency union in 
North America. However, several international shocks have asymmetric effects 
on these economies (i.e. shocks to prices of certain commodities), thus, central 
banks should have enough flexibility to respond independently to these types of 
shocks.
Coordination in “normal times” means the implementation of an appropriate 
institutional mechanism that can make possible the adoption of coordinated 
actions by central banks and other financial authorities around the world. This 
institutional mechanism could be used to: a) provide the infrastructure to facilitate 
the prompt implementation of collective policies in periods of severe “financial 
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actions is a necessary measure to restore the normal functioning of markets; 
and, b) provide a framework to discuss and analyze, during “normal times”, 
coordinated efforts to insure against the occurrence of enormously traumatic 
events, like the current financial crisis. This framework must facilitate the 
exchange of information in a transparent way, the improvement of the regulatory 
framework of financial institutions, and the monitoring of the world economy 
in order to avoid the accumulation of huge distortions and imbalances as in the 
previous years. Finally, the presence of emerging market authorities in the design 
and implementation of this global cooperative framework should increase, as 
their role in the world economy has increased in recent years.
5 FINAL  REMARKS
The current episode of financial strain in the global economy provides some 
important lessons for central banks and financial authorities around the world. 
First, it makes clear that the current institutional framework for cooperation is not 
enough to avoid the accumulation of imbalances and distortions that paved the way 
for the liquidity and credit problems that have affected financial markets since the 
second half of 2007. Second, it illustrates that the net payoff that countries can 
have under coordination depends on the state of their economies and of the world 
economy. For instance, the incentives to cooperate are higher in periods of severe 
“financial stress” than in “normal times”. Third, it shows the need to rethink the 
role of international policy coordination, not only as a vehicle to address financial 
stress episodes, as the current one, but to conveniently define a framework for 
international policy cooperation that could also work in “normal times”.
It is clear that working towards an environment of international coordination on 
macroeconomic policies is a complex task. However, it is also evident that this 
challenge will help to build a more stable international financial environment.
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I would like to express my gratitude for having the opportunity to host this 
panel of distinguished experts and colleagues. Dear Ben, dear Stanley, dear 
Ning, and dear Guillermo: I greatly appreciate your willingness to participate 
in this conference despite the tremendous challenges we are all currently faced 
with. I would also like to use this opportunity to thank the conference organisers 
for a superb job and indeed all conference participants for their important 
contributions. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the current crisis distracts our minds from the 
subject of the Conference: the euro coming of age. In different conditions, 
I would have argued – as I did in the past – that, far from suppressing growth and 
entrenching divergences, the euro has spurred a spectacular drive of job creation 
virtually everywhere in the Union. By helping and fostering a long-due redressing 
of economic priorities and processes, the euro has enabled many countries 
participating in Monetary Union to do their best to compete successfully. We see 
signs that this restructuring is spreading to other parts of the Union that have been 
less successful so far in taking up the challenge. 
Under normal circumstances, European Monetary Union – international 
integration in its most intimate form – would have been the subject of these 
remarks. 
With the current crisis in the background, however, I want to address a different 
form of convergence and cooperation in the international arena, which involves 
central banks and crisis management.
Of course, this brings me quite far. With ever stronger global integration of goods 
and services trade and, in particular, financial markets there are increasingly 
stronger linkages among the world regions. As a result, economic and financial 
crises in one world region increasingly spill over to other regions. At the same 
time, corrective policy action in one region creates conditions and economic 
incentives that are felt and are acted upon elsewhere. How should policymakers 
around the world deal with this fact? In particular, is there a case for international 
coordination of macroeconomic policies? 
I will try to give a tentative answer to these important questions. I will argue 
that we need to be careful with what we understand by international policy 
coordination. Policy coordination does not mean, of course, a unique policy 
stance for the entire world. Coordinated policy action is not a surrogate for 
domestic macroeconomic prudence. We are all convinced that monetary 
policies geared towards domestic price stability, sound public finances and 
flexible economic structures create the conditions for an international financial 
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Are there areas in which policy cooperation can help strengthen domestic 
macroeconomic policies? My short answer is “Yes, there are”. Before giving 
you concrete examples of beneficial cooperation, let me take a brief theoretical 
detour, which will make clear why aiming for a globally unified policy stance 
is undesirable, whereas other types of cooperation are more promising. In 
an influential paper a few years ago Obstfeld and Rogoff questioned the 
conventional wisdom that increased integration of goods and financial markets 
strengthens the case for policy stance coordination.1, 2 Their theoretical results 
even suggest that the need for policy stance coordination decreases with the 
level of international integration. The basic intuition is that integrated goods 
and financial markets provide a powerful risk-pooling mechanism, leaving 
policymakers free to focus on minimising the distortions that might hamstring 
their respective domestic economies. As I noted on previous occasions, the path 
of policy over the business cycle in the euro area relative to the United States 
has differed for a number of reasons – and this despite the common conviction 
that maintaining price stability is the prerequisite for sustainable job creation 
and economic success. The most important reasons for different policy paths 
are differences in underlying economic structures and differences in the timing, 
nature and duration of economic shocks.3
This being said, there is an interesting sideline in Obstfeld and Rogoff’s paper, 
which seems to me to be very relevant for the current situation and which would 
be a fruitful area for future research. The result I mentioned earlier – that tight 
international linkages do not necessarily strengthen the case for international 
policy coordination – holds for what I would define as “normal times”. In 
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s words it holds “unless risk aversion is very high”.4 In the 
current generation of theoretical models, risk aversion is generally considered 
a constant parameter. I think that recent years and months have taught us an 
important lesson: attitudes toward risk not only vary over time – for example, 
following long-term trends – but they do so by waves and oscillations around 
trends. Phases of excessive risk taking can be followed by sudden reversals 
driven by abrupt global confidence shocks such as the one experienced in mid-
September 2008. 
The entirely exceptional joined interest rate cuts on 8 October 2008 and – in similar 
tense conditions – on 13 September 2001 have to be seen in this context. In both 
cases there was extraordinary uncertainty about the economic outlook and there 
was strong evidence that upside risks to price stability had diminished in many 
world regions at the same time. Joint action was first and foremost predicated on 
the need to respond to the same shock, a shock that was being transmitted around 
the globe with lags measurable in hours. This created the room for interest rate 
cuts, in all cases consistent with the mandate of the respective central banks. We 
1  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002).
2  A classic contribution to the literature on policy coordination, reflecting the conventional 
wisdom, can be found in Oudiz and Sachs (1984).
3  See Trichet (2006) and Trichet (2007).
4  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), p. 503. 302 TRICHET
chose to coordinate the timing of announcement because we wanted to mutually 
reinforce our message of confidence to the markets. 
That being said, reflecting upon our very close relationship, I see all the hours 
spent on exchanging ideas with my fellow governors, reflecting on facts and 
prospects, has progressively consolidated an element of intimate confidence that 
is a major asset for the present and future. We have built a remarkable common 
ground of shared experience, mutual understanding and trust – in which today’s 
consultation does not need a long preamble because it follows naturally from 
yesterday’s discussion – that has facilitated action in many directions. 
We have intimately cooperated in ways that cannot be easily integrated into 
theoretical models. For example, there is a continuous exchange of information 
that helps all of us to better understand the nature of the crisis and its intricate 
international propagation patterns. We have cooperated intimately as regards 
the provision of liquidity in order to restore the normal functioning of interbank 
money markets around the world. 
Since December 2007, the ECB, in cooperation with the US Federal Reserve 
System and other central banks, has been conducting term auction facilities – 
so-called TAF operations – in which it provides USD liquidity on behalf of the 
US Fed to euro area banks against ECB eligible collateral. These operations do 
not have a direct impact on euro liquidity conditions and are aimed at improving 
global funding conditions. In this respect I would like to stress that to my 
knowledge this was the first joint action of that kind ever taken by central banks 
to relieve pressures in the short term funding markets. 
The world can count on a continuation of this fruitful cooperation among central 
banks and it can also count on the fact that this cooperation occurs fully in line 
with our respective mandates and, in exceptional times like these, can even 
strengthen their achievement.
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Francesco Giavazzi asked the panellists whether the current financial crisis 
would foster more cooperation within Europe in the area of financial regulation 
and supervision. Alex Cukierman posed a similar question about fiscal policy. 
Jean-Claude Trichet responded that Europeans should take advantage of the 
pressure due to the crisis in order to consider pan-European banking supervision. 
As far as fiscal policy is concerned, the Stability and Growth Pact remains 
fundamental for the functioning of EMU. Ben Bernanke believed formal 
cooperation in fiscal policy within EMU to be unlikely. On the other hand, he 
thought that informal convergence of fiscal policies across EMU is likely. Such 
convergence is desirable because of international spillovers entailed by fiscal 
policy. According to Stanley Fischer, the invisible hand of intellectual climate 
makes a significant fiscal expansion likely all over the world. Guillermo Ortiz 
remarked that emerging markets must be cautious and they cannot engage in a 
persistent fiscal expansion.304
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BY JÜRGEN STARK, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF THE ECB
I wish to thank all of you for joining this 5th ECB Central Banking Conference 
here in Frankfurt. It has been a privilege for us – and here I am speaking also 
on behalf of my colleagues on the Executive Board of the ECB – to host this 
event, with such distinguished panellists and participants during this busy and 
extremely difficult time.
In my view, the past one and a half days have been a great success. Your 
expertise, experience and thought-provoking ideas, as well as your contributions 
to the discussions have enriched the intellectual and political debate on monetary 
union in Europe – its achievements, its challenges and its future.
It has not been the aim of this conference to celebrate the ECB and its 
achievements. However, it is worth recalling that, contrary to what was expected 
by a number of critical observers in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the euro has been a remarkable achievement. Let me also remind you in 
this context that the ECB is obliged to maintain price stability.
With inflation averaging only slightly above 2% in the euro area in the face 
of several significant adverse supply shocks, we have witnessed a decade of 
relatively stable prices. Likewise, longer-term inflation expectations have 
remained broadly anchored at levels in line with price stability during this time. 
Such anchoring reflects favourably on the high degree of credibility enjoyed 
by the ECB’s monetary policy. This success is also a tangible proof of the 
institutional robustness, coherence and unity of the Eurosystem – of its capacity 
to act in a truly European spirit on the basis of shared values, high standards and 
common principles. This has in turn led to striking progress in economic and 
financial integration in the euro area. 
Ten years on, even those early critics admit that the euro has performed better 
than expected. And meanwhile, today’s critics are saying that the ECB’s monetary 
policy over this period has not really been tested, that it’s just been lucky. Not 
true. The past ten years have not been plain sailing. Far from it. From the outset, 
the ECB has been confronted with a high degree of uncertainty and a series of 
severe shocks: the aftermath of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s; the bursting of 
the dot.com bubble; 9/11; and sharp rises in oil and food prices worldwide. 
Over this same period, the euro area has also had internal imbalances to contend 
with. An issue that was intesively discussed yesterday. These imbalances 
remain a challenge. While EMU highlights the need for flexible economies, 
the euro cannot be blamed for the emergence of those imbalances. Rather, this 
largely reflects a lack of adjustment in a number of Member States. This is 
particularly true for those euro area countries whose adjustment mechanisms 
and responsiveness to exogenous shocks is still rather slow. To allow euro 
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benefits of EMU, it remains indispensable that the countries concerned bring 
their structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures more into line with the 
conditions and rules of monetary union.
Overall, the ECB has done well to overcome these difficulties. However, 
the current global financial distress poses challenges of a significant and 
unprecedented nature to the ECB and other central banks around the globe. With 
this crisis, EMU is now ultimately experiencing a real test.
In these demanding times, some widely-recognised core principles have helped 
the ECB to weather the storm. The Maastricht Treaty assigns a clear and 
unambiguous mandate to the ECB to maintain price stability. It also grants the 
ECB full independence from political influence to fulfil this mandate. Besides 
these instiitutional safety belts, monetary policy needs to be forward-looking, 
medium-term oriented and underpinned by a comprehensive analytical framework. 
Given the monetary nature of inflation over the longer term, such a framework 
must include a thorough analysis of monetary and credit developments to allow 
for well-informed and consistent decision-making. Finally, one principle – that 
has gained much attention during the current crisis – is to keep the determination 
of the monetary policy stance distinguished from the management of liquidity in 
money markets.
All these principles are captured in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. 
And globalisation does not fundamentally alter these principles – which give 
guidance, in particular, in critical times. To weaken or even abandon these 
principles would undermine our commitment and credibility. And, in the end, 
we would risk losing orientation.
Our strategy has provided a consistent and coherent framework not only for 
internal analysis and policy decision-making but also for external communication. 
Using the same framework for internal and external purposes has helped the ECB 
to ensure that its monetary policy remains consistent, credible and effective. One 
key element here is that the ECB, from the outset, has been transparent about its 
mandate, strategy, and decisions, as well as about what monetary policy can do 
and, even more importantly, what it cannot do. In this sense, expectations about 
transparency requirements should be in line with the actual strategy followed by 
the central bank.
Without compromising on its mandate, the ECB has demonstrated a willingness 
and capacity to react rapidly to exceptional circumstances. It has taken a large 
number of extraordinary measures to support the functioning of the money 
market and interbank intermediation. These measures could be perceived 
as innovative:
it has provided full allotment at a fixed interest rate in all its refinancing  • 
operations;
it has expanded the range of eligible collateral in this context; and, • 308 STARK
in close cooperation with other central banks, it has taken measures to improve  • 
global funding conditions in various currencies.
Allow me to add here, on a personal basis, a word of caution: we, as central 
bankers, have the obligation to remain prudent. First, not to set the wrong 
incentives for market participants. Second, central banks need to be aware of any 
operational and reputational risks associated with the adoption of new measures 
and less traditional instruments, notably for the balance sheet of the Eurosystem 
and, ultimately, for the credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy. Not to mention 
the potential impact on central bank independence. The reputation of the ECB 
is firmly based on the credibility of its commitment to price stability. This 
credibility must by no means be put at stake. 
Likewise, in its monetary policy decisions, the ECB has not shied away from 
taking some highly unusual but appropriate steps. Within the space of less than 
one month, on 8 October and 6 November, the ECB lowered its key rates by 
100 basis points in total. These moves were remarkable and unique in the ECB’s 
ten-year history – in terms of magnitude, timing and rapidity. Importantly, the 
latest policy decisions remained fully in line with the ECB’s mandate and the 
principles I mentioned just now.
Those who say that we were or still are “behind the curve” should consider all 
the decisions the ECB has taken since the financial crisis has intensified and 
broadened. In this respect, let us not forget that a central bank has only one 
instrument at hand, namely monetary policy. It cannot be held accountable for 
meeting more than one objective. Any such attempt would overburden monetary 
policy. For this reason, the Treaty provides for a clear and efficient allocation 
of policy responsibilities, with price stability being exclusively and primarily 
assigned to an independent ECB as its primary objective. 
Not surprisingly, our debates yesterday and today have triggered the question of 
how to safeguard EMU and build on its achievements at a time when the world’s 
financial landscape is changing dramatically. In fact, the current financial 
turmoil – the origins and implications of which we discussed in detail – is likely 
to dampen demand in the euro area and the rest of the world for quite some 
time. It may well turn out to be a litmus test for the functioning of EMU, both in 
economic and institutional terms.
Having carefully listened to the presentations, I remain confident that monetary 
union will withstand the test of time. As illustrated during the conference, the 
euro has already brought real benefits to the 320 million people in the euro area. 
It has been the main driver behind the remarkable increase in economic and 
financial integration as well as the transformation of the financial system over 
the past decade. It has made the euro area economically more stable for both 
investors and consumers.
In particular, financial integration has promoted cross-border portfolio flows in 
the euro area and thus enabled consumers and investors to share and diversify 
risks. As illustrated yesterday, EMU has increased banking integration.309 CLOSING ADDRESS
Another interesting finding is that key policy initiatives at the European level, 
notably within the context of the Financial Services Action Plan, have made a 
significant contribution to fostering banking and regulatory integration.
However, in my view, there is room for improvement, especially as regards 
cooperation and coordination between national supervisors and regulators in 
Europe. As the Vice-President emphasised in his opening address yesterday, 
there is a growing understanding of the need to strengthen the pan-European 
character of financial stability arrangements for crisis prevention and resolution.
However, during the ongoing financial turmoil, the euro area and the EU as a 
whole have proved their capacity to act decisively and promptly under difficult 
circumstances. National measures have been coordinated in a pragmatic manner 
with a view to enhancing their effectiveness through mutual reinforcement. 
As regards the role of central banks in banking supervision, recent tensions in 
financial markets have confirmed that close cooperation and active exchanges of 
information between central banks and supervisory authorities are indispensable. 
In particular, the financial turmoil has revealed areas in which cooperation could 
be strengthened. In fact, central banks contribute to financial stability.
But improved coordination and institutional innovations, while necessary, are not 
sufficient to make the euro area economy more resilient to adverse shocks. To 
enhance the adjustment capacity of the euro area economy, the current situation 
should serve as a catalyst for the resolute implementation of the necessary 
reforms. This would enable the Member States of the EU to fully exploit the 
benefits of economic and financial integration, with positive effects on growth 
potential and job creation in the euro area.
Having said all this, we should not forget how Europe would look today without 
the euro. An issue that was only marginally addressed during the conference. It 
goes without saying that the euro area countries would be significantly worse 
off. Multiple crises would arise simultaneously. Currency crises would go hand 
in hand with banking crises and real economy disruptions at country level. These 
currency crises might also spill over to other countries in the region. Not to forget 
political tensions between countries. By eliminating contagion via the exchange 
rate channel, the euro has mitigated the risk of contagion stemming from national 
economic or financial crises. In this sense, the euro has been a very important 
stabilising element in difficult times.
It is therefore not surprising that many central and eastern European countries 
would like to join the euro area on a fast-track procedure to be better shielded 
from global financial tensions and crises. This is understandable, given that many 
of them have already made progress towards adopting the euro. But we have also 
heard clear words of caution. Let me take the opportunity to emphasise that the 
euro area is not a closed shop. Following three enlargement rounds since the start 
of monetary union in January 1999, and with Slovakia joining the euro area as 
its 16th member on 1 January 2009, there is no reason to believe that the door 
might one day be closed. 310 STARK
But there is no shortcut. In fact, the difficulties that some countries face today 
are related to their failures to adjust, failures that go back a long way. As a 
result, domestic and external imbalances have emerged, with adverse effects 
on the sustainability of the catching-up processes in those countries. The fast 
introduction of the euro would not resolve the underlying problems – but could 
weaken EMU.
Structural adjustments as well as nominal and real convergence are therefore 
needed prior to the adoption of the euro. This means that the countries concerned 
must achieve a sustainable level of nominal convergence at high standards in 
terms of meeting the convergence criteria.
The adoption of the euro without adjustment is not possible. To regard entry into 
EMU as an easy way to solve or circumvent the current challenges surrounding 
the catching-up processes would be wrong. And a premature entry might 
aggravate current problems and put the credibility of EMU at risk. Policymakers 
have to be aware that the adoption of the euro represents a regime shift and thus, 
as Governor Constancio pointed out yesterday, need to learn the rules of the 
game in advance.
The ECB has demonstrated its ability to act even under extraordinary 
circumstances – without compromising its price stability mandate. This has 
strengthened the ECB’s credibility.
If the ECB is to continue to deliver price stability over the medium term, then the 
financial system has to be stable and function smoothly. It is first and foremost 
through that financial system that monetary policy impulses are transmitted to 
future price developments. It is indispensable to restore confidence and bring 
the global financial system back on a solid footing. It is crucial to understand 
the implications of globalised financial markets for the design of institutional 
arrangements for the prevention and resolution of financial crises.
Let me conclude: We are going through a period when solid institutions are 
needed around the globe. And solid institutions are expected to be disciplined. 
As such, central banks provide an anchor of confidence and stability in difficult 
times. This must not be put at risk by weakening or even “lifting” this anchor.312 PROGRAMME
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